The fallacy of the interaction problem

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

This is rather simple to explain. There are two facts that one should consider to see what is the problem related to duality of soul and body: 1) Soul cannot be detected, 2) what intervene between soul and body can be neither be from nature of soul nor body.

The red highlight is a false premise. One’s soul can be detected through introspection.
The blue highlight essentially says “If z is to be a conduit for interaction between x and y, it must be of different nature from x and y.” To me, this sounds quite like the antithesis of your conclusion.

Bahman:

The interaction is crucial part of beings in the same nature. Consider matter for example, we know we at lease have four forces without them our universe has different shape like a gel. It is through these forces that a part of matter can interact with another part, things could move and have firm shape etc. The question of interaction between soul and matter then looks very valid since since it is a valid question for being in the same nature and because without that one cannot affect another one and vice versa.

This is begging the question. The whole paragraph can be reduced to “since matter can only interact with other matter via the rules of physics, therefore things must be of the same nature to interact.”

polytropos:

I’ve read two philosophy books written by hylomorphists, and my big brother is one, so I think I should have at least a vague idea of what hylomorphism teaches. This is not claiming that I know more about your view than you do, it’s saying that I know what view is meant by that label.
Your terminology is completely different from that of my brother. Still, I think we can agree that if any one sentence summarizes hylomorphism, it would be “the soul is the form of the body”. Can we agree on that?
And can we agree that forms are like redness and fiveness and stuff?
As for your assertion that the redness of an apple is different from the universal constant of redness itself, what is this difference? Is not the apple an instantation of redness itself?

 

[Bahman]

The red highlight is a false premise. One’s soul can be detected through introspection.

I am afraid I don’t know how to detect my soul through introspection.

it would be “the soul is the form of the body”. Can we agree on that?

How about saying that body or in general matter is a form of Soul? This resolves the problem of interaction in dualism since it asserts that matter is a form of Soul.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

I am afraid I don’t know how to detect my soul through introspection.

There’s no “how”. Introspection is detecting/perceiving your soul.

Bahman:

How about saying that body or in general matter is a form of Soul? This resolves the problem of interaction in dualism since it asserts that matter is a form of Soul.

First, I would like to clarify in case this was misunderstood that I was not advocating hylomorphism, I was characterizing it.
Also, form is, IMO, defined as the properties/characteristics of a thing. To say that the body, or anything physical, is the form of the soul, is pretty absurd.
Lastly, don’t say “problem of interaction”, because the interaction problem is not valid

 

[polytropos]

I’ve read two philosophy books written by hylomorphists, and my big brother is one, so I think I should have at least a vague idea of what hylomorphism teaches. This is not claiming that I know more about your view than you do, it’s saying that I know what view is meant by that label.

I don’t doubt that you have some background in it. But I do not think that noting that souls change while forms don’t is a sufficient rebuttal of hylemorphism. I am curious - what is your brother’s response to such a criticism?

Your terminology is completely different from that of my brother.

That forms are not properties, that accidents and substances are categories of being, accidents being ontologically dependent on substances for their existence, and that properties are accidents that flow essentially from a substance are all, I think, all central tenets of hylemorphism. Words like property can often be used loosely, but in Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics, they have a very specific meaning.

Still, I think we can agree that if any one sentence summarizes hylomorphism, it would be “the soul is the form of the body”. Can we agree on that?

I can agree with that, with qualification. Hylemorphism further holds that 1). forms do not exist independently of substances’ instantiating them, 2). universal, changeless forms (which only “exist” as abstracted by an intellect) are not the same thing as the forms of individual substances. There is a difference between rationality and your rationality, one being changeless rationality in the abstract, the other being a substance’s rationality. Your rationality can change (if you become more or less rational) when you instantiate rationality more or less well, while rationality itself does not change.

As I’ve said before, I think there is some looseness in calling the soul the form of the body. If the soul is a man’s rationality, and a man’s rationality is essentially immaterial, what we mean when we say that the soul is the form of the body is that man’s substance is essentially immaterial. The soul never exists apart from man’s substance (though it may exist apart from the body, after death, and it must be associated with a body at some point).

And can we agree that forms are like redness and fiveness and stuff?

Yes, taking into account the qualifications given above.

As for your assertion that the redness of an apple is different from the universal constant of redness itself, what is this difference?

The redness of an apple is ontologically dependent on the apple and is concrete. Universal redness only “exists” if a conscious intellect abstracts it from a particular instance of redness, and so is abstract. One being concrete, the other being abstract, they cannot both be the same.

Is not the apple an instantation of redness itself?

I take you to mean here, “Is not the apple’s redness an instantiation of redness itself?” Yes. But that would not make them the same thing. I am an instantiation of humanity, but I’m not humanity, I am a human being, a particular human. I am concrete; humanity is abstract. I can countenance the form of humanity because I have observed humans, even though humanity does not exist apart from any human substance.

An apple’s redness is a “token,” while redness itself is a “type,” to use more contemporary terms.

 

[polytropos]

This is rather simple to explain. There are two facts that one should consider to see what is the problem related to duality of soul and body: 1) Soul cannot be detected, 2) what intervene between soul and body can be neither be from nature of soul nor body.

Could you explain 2)? It does not seem self-evident. You seem to be saying that something would have to intervene between soul and body and be of a different nature. That does not meet what SentinelOfTruth is asking, which is why there is a problem with interaction between immaterial and material objects in the first place, since we don’t have knowledge of immaterial objects to claim that they don’t interact with matter. If we have not experienced immaterial objects other than the soul, on what basis do we claim that things must be the same nature to interact?

I am not a Cartesian (or similar) dualist, so it doesn’t really matter to me, but you don’t seem to be responding to what he is asking.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

I am curious - what is your brother’s response to such a criticism?

Come to think of it, I haven’t given him this argument yet. Philosophical issues are sort of tabooed in our world, and especially so in my family. I guess I really should be more active about my radical views. However I did try another argument on him, which ended in him mysteriously ceasing to answer me (we were talking via a remote chat program rather than in person, so he might have had to go). After that, we never discussed it again. Anyway, the argument I used on him, was, ironically, the interaction problem: a form is, (in his version, not yours) the set of a thing’s properties, so how can it exert causal influence on a (supposedly) substantive, material being?

polytropos:

I can agree with that, with qualification. Hylemorphism further holds that 1). forms do not exist independently of substances’ instantiating them, 2). universal, changeless forms (which only “exist” as abstracted by an intellect) are not the same thing as the forms of individual substances. There is a difference between rationality and your rationality, one being changeless rationality in the abstract, the other being a substance’s rationality. **Your rationality can change **(if you become more or less rational) when you instantiate rationality more or less well, while rationality itself does not change.

Surely my form is my rationality, no? If so, then it would be non-static form.

polytropos:

I take you to mean here, “Is not the apple’s redness an instantiation of redness itself?”

No, I meant the apple itself.

 

[polytropos]

Anyway, the argument I used on him, was, ironically, the interaction problem: a form is, (in his version, not yours) the set of a thing’s properties, so how can it exert causal influence on a (supposedly) substantive, material being?

Indeed. “Bundle theories” of forms face other problems. Why should a bundle of properties behave like a form is taken to behave if it is just a bundle of coinciding properties? There would have to be some principle of unity connecting the properties, in which case the form would not be just a bundle of coinciding properties.

Surely my form is my rationality, no? If so, then it would be non-static form.

I think there are a couple ways to think of this. Yes, your form is your rationality, but your rationality still does not exist independently of your substance. What is certain is that your substance qua rational changes.

What does not change is rationality itself (the abstracted form). Before and after the change, if we had to describe your form, we would say that it was rational. Would it make sense to say your form changed with your substance? Perhaps, although I think it might be more semantic. Your form will always be rational. I guess one would have to decide if we should speak of changes to objects as changes to concrete, individual forms, or just to substances.

Say there is a triangle drawn on a chalkboard. I smudge one of its sides slightly. It is probably more accurate to say that its form has not changed, but its substance* has (it instantiates its form less well). In the case of the triangle, I could erase it completely, and the substance would be gone, along with the substantial form, but that is impossible for the soul. With respect to the soul then, I think the most plausible interpretation is that the form does not change while your substance qua rational does, although I suppose a hylemorphist could alternatively hold that substantial forms can change while universal forms cannot (I’d have to think about such a position).

*Speaking loosely. It’s doubtful whether a triangle drawn on a chalkboard would be a substance, but I think it gets the point across.

No, I meant the apple itself.

Then to be precise, no, the apple does not instantiate redness. The apple instantiates appleness, and because it is an apple, it has its own accident of redness. The accident is what instantiates redness.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

Then to be precise, no, the apple does not instantiate redness. The apple instantiates appleness, and because it is an apple, it has its own accident of redness. The accident is what instantiates redness.

“Apples are not instances of redness.”
- you

polytropos:

Say there is a triangle drawn on a chalkboard. I smudge one of its sides slightly. It is probably more accurate to say that its form has not changed, but its substance* has (it instantiates its form less well).

Wouldn’t you agree that then the triangle’s form is “triangle-with-smudged-side-ness”, rather than just “triangle instantiated less well”?

polytropos:

Would it make sense to say your form changed with your substance? Perhaps, although I think it might be more semantic. Your form will always be rational. I guess one would have to decide if we should speak of changes to objects as changes to concrete, individual forms, or just to substances.

You have stated that an apple’s redness is an instance of redness itself, and that my rationality is similarly an instance of rationality. Assuming that by “rationality” you mean essentially “soul”, this leaves you vulnerable to my original argument: the apple’s redness, despite not being redness itself, is still static, in fact in any other example like this the instance of the universal is static. But somehow, the soul is still an exception.

 

[polytropos]

“Apples are not instances of redness.”
- you

“Apples are not instances of redness” is consistent with “The accident [of redness] is what instantiates redness.” Apples are not instances of redness, nor are they identical to their accidents (whether properties or inessential accidents).

Wouldn’t you agree that then the triangle’s form is “triangle-with-smudged-side-ness”, rather than just “triangle instantiated less well”?

No, I would not, in the same sense that as one grows old one does not go from “human-with-brown-hair” to “human-with-gray-hair” (at least one’s form does not).

You have stated that an apple’s redness is an instance of redness itself, and that my rationality is similarly an instance of rationality. Assuming that by “rationality” you mean essentially “soul”, this leaves you vulnerable to my original argument: the apple’s redness, despite not being redness itself, is still static, in fact in any other example like this the instance of the universal is static. But somehow, the soul is still an exception.

The apple’s redness (what I’ve held to be the instance of redness itself) is not static though. If we leave the apple out on the counter for long enough, it might become less red. The substance changes, the accidents along with it. The soul is not an exception.

 

[Bahman]

Also, form is, IMO, defined as the properties/characteristics of a thing.

That I understand but what is this “thing”.

To say that the body, or anything physical, is the form of the soul, is pretty absurd.

It is not pretty absurd. What if I say everything is Self/Mind/Soul/God and selves/minds/souls/us? Self has infinite attributes, like knowledge, wisdom, instinct etc as selves have several separate attributes similar to Self some known some unknown. This way everything has the same nature so the interaction problem is resolved. Moreover the stuff that we call it matter is one of God attributes that we could interact with it in different manner, either as external objects or our bodies.

 

[aragonjohn1]

I am not saying that things must be of the same nature to interact. I am accusing all the philosophical material I’ve read of saying that. Also, humans and dogs both have a physical nature.

By dualism I mean the belief that there are two essential kinds of substances: physical and immaterial.

God bless

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

No, I would not, in the same sense that as one grows old one does not go from “human-with-brown-hair” to “human-with-gray-hair” (at least one’s form does not).

Why doesn’t it? You go from being a human with brown hair to being one with gray hair, so why shouldn’t your form change? Could you perhaps more clearly define form?

polytropos:

The apple’s redness (what I’ve held to be the instance of redness itself) is not static though. If we leave the apple out on the counter for long enough, it might become less red. The substance changes, the accidents along with it. The soul is not an exception.

That’s not a change in it’s redness. It’s redness at time x is an instance of the universal redness of shade a. At time y, it’s new redness is of the shade b. It is just losing it’s old form (redness a) and acquiring redness b to replace it. Since, however, we carry the guilt of our past sins, this logic cannot be applied to the soul.

Bahman:

That I understand but what is this “thing”.

The thing which has the form in question.

Bahman:

It is not pretty absurd. What if I say everything is Self/Mind/Soul/God and selves/minds/souls/us? Self has infinite attributes, like knowledge, wisdom, instinct etc as selves have several separate attributes similar to Self some known some unknown. This way everything has the same nature so the interaction problem is resolved. Moreover the stuff that we call it matter is one of God attributes that we could interact with it in different manner, either as external objects or our bodies.

• What is infinite about those attributes?
• How do you know the attributes exist if they are “unknown”?
• How is matter an attribute of God?
• You did not really answer what I said.

 

[polytropos]

Why doesn’t it? You go from being a human with brown hair to being one with gray hair, so why shouldn’t your form change? Could you perhaps more clearly define form?

Forms is not just what a thing is, the sum of its accidents. Form is the unitive principle of a substance that accounts for its essence (real definition), ie. the things that are essential to what it is. Hair color is an accident but not a property; what hair color you have does not change what you are, and it is not essential to your hair color.

That’s not a change in it’s redness. It’s redness at time x is an instance of the universal redness of shade a. At time y, it’s new redness is of the shade b. It is just losing it’s old form (redness a) and acquiring redness b to replace it. Since, however, we carry the guilt of our past sins, this logic cannot be applied to the soul.

You seem to be collapsing the idea of form altogether, ie. any change is just a new form. I think it is pretty clear that this is not what hylemorphism holds. Forms are “destroyed” only when the substance instantiating them goes out of existence, not every time a change occurs. What you are proposing essentially eliminates form altogether; a substance’s “form” is just what the substance is at a given time, and if it changes, then it has a new form, since form can’t change.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

Forms is not just what a thing is, the sum of its accidents. Form is the unitive principle of a substance that accounts for its essence (real definition), ie. the things that are essential to what it is. Hair color is an accident but not a property; what hair color you have does not change what you are, and it is not essential to your hair color (did you mean “not essential to your essence”?).
Have you ever heard of the distinction between accidental and substantial form? You’ve touched on the point, calling accidental form simply “accidents”, but you don’t seem to include these in your definition of form.
Also, google’s second (the first one is about the kind you own) definition of property is “an attribute, quality, or characteristic of something.” By this definition, hair color is a property.

polytropos:

You seem to be collapsing the idea of form altogether, ie. any change is just a new form. I think it is pretty clear that this is not what hylemorphism holds. Forms are “destroyed” only when the substance instantiating them goes out of existence, not every time a change occurs. What you are proposing essentially eliminates form altogether; a substance’s “form” is just what the substance is at a given time, and if it changes, then it has a new form, since form can’t change.

I wasn’t saying that the form is destroyed every time the substance changes, just that that particular shade of red is no longer being instantiated.
If you say that the apple’s redness (as distinct from redness itself) is a form, then what do you call redness itself? It it a property? An attribute?

 

[Bahman]

What is infinite about those attributes?

The number of them and the level.

How do you know the attributes exist if they are “unknown”?

They are unknown to us but they should exist as God should be mature in all possible attribute that could exist and we also should practice those attributes by time passes and as we evolve. In my humble opinion there will be no point of rest for beings in future as we evolve to higher level of excellence in field of our expertise.

How is matter an attribute of God?

First it is a form of mind so it could interact with other forms mind so the problem of interaction is resolved second it is not conscious form of mind so it doesn’t have any specific shape and as a result could be used by us to build and construct things.

You did not really answer what I said.

What was your question?

 

[SentinelofTruth]

Bahman:

They are unknown to us but they should exist as God should be mature in all possible attribute that could exist and we also should practice those attributes by time passes and as we evolve. In my humble opinion there will be no point of rest for beings in future as we evolve to higher level of excellence in field of our expertise.

I thought you were talking about attributes of human rationality.

Bahman:

First it is a form of mind so it could interact with other forms mind so the problem of interaction is resolved second it is not conscious form of mind so it doesn’t have any specific shape and as a result could be used by us to build and construct things.

Um, no, it’s not a form of mind. Mind is immaterial.

Bahman:

What was your question?

It wasn’t actually a question. I said “To say that the body, or anything physical, is the form of the soul, is pretty absurd.” Your response had little to do with this.

 

[polytropos]

Have you ever heard of the distinction between accidental and substantial form? You’ve touched on the point, calling accidental form simply “accidents”, but you don’t seem to include these in your definition of form.

I have not used the term here, but yes, there are accidental forms as well as substantial forms. Previously I said:

Accidents are not abstract. Like substances, they have forms but aren’t forms themselves.

So no, by “accident” I do not mean “accidental form” in the same way that by “substance” I do not mean “substantial form.”

Also, google’s second (the first one is about the kind you own) definition of property is “an attribute, quality, or characteristic of something.” By this definition, hair color is a property.

That is the colloquial definition. I agree that “property” is often used to mean that. But in philosophy, we carefully define our terms so that it is clear what we mean. That definition is basically what we mean by accident (a term which few people use colloquially), while property is an accident that is essential to a particular substance.

So if we decide not to mean by property what I mean by property, then hair color is a “property.” But if we are trying to speak in precise hylemorphic terms, then hair color is not a property.

I wasn’t saying that the form is destroyed every time the substance changes, just that that particular shade of red is no longer being instantiated.

So are you taking the two shades of red to be two different forms? Is there a form of redness at all, or just many forms of each possible shade of red? Do forms exist when they are not instantiated? Are you speaking in hylemorphist terms, or from your own philosophical position?

If you say that the apple’s redness (as distinct from redness itself) is a form, then what do you call redness itself? It it a property? An attribute?

Redness itself is a universal form, which only “exists” as abstracted. It is an accidental form. It is not a property since it is not an accident of anything in particular, though accidents of certain things instantiate it.

 

[SentinelofTruth]

polytropos:

That is the colloquial definition. I agree that “property” is often used to mean that. But in philosophy, we carefully define our terms so that it is clear what we mean. That definition is basically what we mean by accident (a term which few people use colloquially), while property is an accident that is essential to a particular substance.

So if we decide not to mean by property what I mean by property, then hair color is a “property.” But if we are trying to speak in precise hylemorphic terms, then hair color is not a property.

Very well.

polytropos:

I have not used the term here, but yes, there are accidental forms as well as substantial forms.

Your definition of form was:

polytropos:

Form is the unitive principle of a substance that accounts for its essence (real definition), ie. the things that are essential to what it is.

What, then, is your distinction between accidental and substantial form?

polytropos:

So are you taking the two shades of red to be two different forms? Is there a form of redness at all, or just many forms of each possible shade of red? Do forms exist when they are not instantiated? Are you speaking in hylemorphist terms, or from your own philosophical position?

Yes, I am taking them to be different forms. There is an archetypal redness, one that is truly “red”, more so than other reds. Forms do not exist when they are not instantiated. I am not speaking in hylomorphist terms.

polytropos:

Redness itself is a universal form, which only “exists” as abstracted. It is an accidental form. It is not a property since it is not an accident of anything in particular, though accidents of certain things instantiate it.

So the universal ones are accidents, and instances of them are substantial forms?

 

[polytropos]

Your definition of form was:

What, then, is your distinction between accidental and substantial form?

That definition was for substantial form, which was not clear. But one basically just applies that definition to accidents rather than substances. Hylemorphists take substances and accidents both to be categories of being, the difference being that substances are ontologically primary while accidents are dependent on substances for their existence (meaning they only exist because a substance exists with a given accident; accidents do not exist on their own, while substances exist independently and may or may not have a given accident).

Accidents, like substances, have essences, so the definition applies similarly. Accidental form is the unitive principle of an accident that accounts for what it is essentially. In the case of redness, that might be pretty basic - having a particular phenomenal quality.

Yes, I am taking them to be different forms. There is an archetypal redness, one that is truly “red”, more so than other reds.

OK. So if over the course of a change, a particular form of redness ceases to be instantiated and another begins to be instantiated, there has been no destruction of a form? Or would you never speak of the destruction of a form, even though you do not take forms to exist when they are not instantiated?

So the universal ones are accidents, and instances of them are substantial forms?

No. Substances and accidents are two categories of being. They compose our ontology - what exists in our metaphysical system. The difference is that accidents depend on substances for their existence, while substances are primary. Both are concrete, rather than abstract and universal. Substances have substantial forms. Accidents have accidental forms.

We can abstract substantial forms and accidental forms, and what we abstract are universals. From observing humans, I abstract humanity. From observing red objects, I abstract redness. But these universals only “exist” as abstract; they do not exist concretely in the world, whether primary or dependent. As such, any universal substantial or accidental forms that I abstract are not the same as either the substances or accidents from which I abstracted them or even the substantial or accidental forms of the substances or accidents from which I abstracted them.

Particular substances have substantial forms. I can abstract universal substantial forms from them, but the universal is not the same as the particular. Particular accidents have accidental forms. I can abstract universal accidental forms from them, but the universal is not the same as the particular.

 

[Bahman]

Um, no, it’s not a form of mind. Mind is immaterial.

You are talking in a way that you exactly know what is the matter nature. All which was said was that the matter is a form of mind, subconscious (sorry for mistype in previous post) and can easily interact with other type of mind.

It wasn’t actually a question. I said “To say that the body, or anything physical, is the form of the soul, is pretty absurd.” Your response had little to do with this.

Why pretty absurd? You are talking a way that you know what is exactly nature of mind and forms it could take. I am taking the exactly opposite approach to hylomorphism which states that soul is form of matter which to me is very inconsistent for a strong reason namely it is against eternality of soul since once a person is dead the form is lost and the concept of soul disappear.