The Filioque in light of Revelation 22:1

[Catholic_Dude]

Firstly, begging the question is when one uses a proposition to prove itself. This would not be a case of begging the question.
Secondly, proceeds is a generic Greek word which means to be sent out of something else. The term is used many times in the New Testament for things unrelated to the procession of the Holy Spirit.

If you’re suggesting that there are two processions then that would be the case.

Not any more than it supports the Eastern explanation that the Spirit manifests through the Son, but has its origin from the Father alone, preserving the unique causality of the Father.

The Holy Spirit having His origin from the Father alone is not disputed. What you originally said was that the economic sending of the Spirit by the Son suggests there is a sending in an ontological sense as well. If so, then you’re well on your way to affirming the Filioque, properly understood.

Then that is even worse, because your diagram makes the Son a second principle. The Spirit can only receive its personal existence from the Father, or else you have two Gods, not one.

I don’t see how the linear is “even worse” than the triangle diagram. A second principle would require a triangle-type understanding. The linear model is a Father-through-Son, rather than Father-plus-Son.

It is the Roman Catholic idea that the Father and Son can be an exclusive non-personal unity without subordinating the Spirit or compromising the unity of the three which is inconsistent. This is why we say that the Son cannot cause the Spirit, because we are concerned with not subordinating the Spirit. I think you’re misunderstanding what the disagreement is about.

This needs clarification. How does saying the Spirit proceeds from a single cause and single procession (Catholic dogma) result in subordination? Better yet, clarify what you mean by subordinate. There is a real ontological sense in which the Son is subordinate to the Father, without compromising Divinity.

Again, I see no reason why it can be said the Father exclusively generates both the Son and Spirit while saying the Father generates both, the Son one, and the Spirit none.

 

[Cavaradossi]

If you’re suggesting that there are two processions then that would be the case.

The Holy Spirit having His origin from the Father alone is not disputed. What you originally said was that the economic sending of the Spirit by the Son suggests there is a sending in an ontological sense as well. If so, then you’re well on your way to affirming the Filioque, properly understood.

I am not convinced that properly understood, the Filioque, does not confuse the manner of origin of the persons with the trinitarian taxis or confuse the hypostatic identity of the Father with the identity of the Son by sharing the Father’s hypostatic property of casualty. Perhaps you could clarify how it does not.

I don’t see how the linear is “even worse” than the triangle diagram. A second principle would require a triangle-type understanding. The linear model is a Father-through-Son, rather than Father-plus-Son.

The linear model is worse because it does not reflect the fact that the Spirit is from the Father through the Son. Instead it makes it look as if the Son is the cause of the Spirit’s being, violating the principles held to by John of Damascus who wrote that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and rests in the Son and also by Gregory of Nyssa who wrote of a non-casual intermediary role of the Son. It also violates the principle Gregory the Theologian elucidated when he wrote that the Son has everything the Father has except for causality.

This needs clarification. How does saying the Spirit proceeds from a single cause and single procession (Catholic dogma) result in subordination? Better yet, clarify what you mean by subordinate. There is a real ontological sense in which the Son is subordinate to the Father, without compromising Divinity.

Again, I see no reason why it can be said the Father exclusively generates both the Son and Spirit while saying the Father generates both, the Son one, and the Spirit none.

It subordinates the Spirit because the Son and the Father share causality while the Spirit does not. Either the Father alone must be cause and principle or cause and principle are proper to the divine nature, so that all three persons possess these properties. This is not to deny that the Son has some intermediate role in the Spirit’s existence (both Gregory of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas taught as much, as did Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus), but the Son properly is neither the cause nor principle of the Spirit, nor can the Spirit properly be said to be from the Son but only through the Son, for as Gregory of Cyprus rightly observes, the prepositions ‘through’ and ‘from’ are not equivalent, and furthermore, because John of Damascus denies that the Spirit can be said to be from the Son.

 

[Catholic_Dude]

I am not convinced that properly understood, the Filioque, does not confuse the manner of origin of the persons with the trinitarian taxis or confuse the hypostatic identity of the Father with the identity of the Son by sharing the Father’s hypostatic property of casualty. Perhaps you could clarify how it does not.

The debate seems to center on whether the Father only begets the Son and spirates the Spirit or whether spirating is given also to the Son. Why the EO say only the Father can spirate does not seem logically consistent.

The linear model is worse because it does not reflect the fact that the Spirit is from the Father through the Son. Instead it makes it look as if the Son is the cause of the Spirit’s being, violating the principles held to by John of Damascus who wrote that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and rests in the Son and also by Gregory of Nyssa who wrote of a non-casual intermediary role of the Son. It also violates the principle Gregory the Theologian elucidated when he wrote that the Son has everything the Father has except for causality.

We must be talking past eachother here: the linear model, as I’m trying to demonstrate, is saying exactly what you think it is not saying.

It subordinates the Spirit because the Son and the Father share causality while the Spirit does not.

But by this same logic the Son and Spirit are both (equally) subordinated because under the EO model only the Father possesses causality. So what you’re saying then is that having the Son and Spirit subordinated is ok but only having the Spirit subordinated is not ok. That seems like a logically arbitrary dilemma.

And as I said, subordination within the Trinity is not automatically anathema; it all depends on what the subordination is.

Either the Father alone must be cause and principle or cause and principle are proper to the divine nature, so that all three persons possess these properties.

What is wrong with Father alone being cause and principle while also in generating the Son making the Son a continuation of that one cause of the Spirit?

This is not to deny that the Son has some intermediate role in the Spirit’s existence (both Gregory of Cyprus and Gregory Palamas taught as much, as did Gregory of Nyssa and John of Damascus), but the Son properly is neither the cause nor principle of the Spirit, nor can the Spirit properly be said to be from the Son but only through the Son, for as Gregory of Cyprus rightly observes, the prepositions ‘through’ and ‘from’ are not equivalent, and furthermore, because John of Damascus denies that the Spirit can be said to be from the Son.

Properly understood, I agree with this, as does Catholic dogma. When Catholics say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, this is dogmatically understood as proceeds from the Father through the Son. It is a difference of semantics rather than substance.

 

[marlo]

Dear Catholic Dude,

I think the best argument that has been raised by Revelations 22:1 is that the word “*ekporeumenon” in which also used in the creed, could not mean a sole procession from one source as some Eastern Orthodox would claim, as Revelations 22:1 shows procession from the Throne of God and Lamb uses the word "*ekporeumenon" as well.
*
Having said that, it should also be noted that the Latin translator of the creed used a very accurate word procedit to translate “**ekporeumenon”. Hence the previous discussion on these forums that said that due to lack of equivalent word does not hold water after all. We should trust the scholastic ability of these ancient Greek to Latin Translators.

and since the “**ekporeumenon” word was used in the creed, it would clearly show that the procession from the Father alone *is just an invention of those who deny the insertion of the Filioque to the creed, claiming that “*ekporeumenon” would prevent that. Boy, Revelations 22:1 sure proved them wrong.

it might not be the best justification of the Filioque**. but rather that the procession “**ekporeumenon” of the Holy Spirit from the Father used in the creed could not mean alone or single procession.

Good work sir

thanks
Marlo
*

The debate seems to center on whether the Father only begets the Son and spirates the Spirit or whether spirating is given also to the Son. Why the EO say only the Father can spirate does not seem logically consistent.

We must be talking past eachother here: the linear model, as I’m trying to demonstrate, is saying exactly what you think it is not saying.

But by this same logic the Son and Spirit are both (equally) subordinated because under the EO model only the Father possesses causality. So what you’re saying then is that having the Son and Spirit subordinated is ok but only having the Spirit subordinated is not ok. That seems like a logically arbitrary dilemma.

And as I said, subordination within the Trinity is not automatically anathema; it all depends on what the subordination is.

What is wrong with Father alone being cause and principle while also in generating the Son making the Son a continuation of that one cause of the Spirit?

Properly understood, I agree with this, as does Catholic dogma. When Catholics say the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son, this is dogmatically understood as proceeds from the Father through the Son. It is a difference of semantics rather than substance.

 

[Shiranui117]

Dear Catholic Dude,

I think the best argument that has been raised by Revelations 22:1 is that the word “*ekporeumenon” in which also used in the creed, could not mean a sole procession from one source as some Eastern Orthodox would claim, as Revelations 22:1 shows procession from the Throne of God and Lamb uses the word "*ekporeumenon" as well.
*
Having said that, it should also be noted that the Latin translator of the creed used a very accurate word procedit to translate “**ekporeumenon”. Hence the previous discussion on these forums that said that due to lack of equivalent word does not hold water after all. We should trust the scholastic ability of these ancient Greek to Latin Translators.

and since the “**ekporeumenon” word was used in the creed, it would clearly show that the procession from the Father alone *is just an invention of those who deny the insertion of the Filioque to the creed, claiming that “*ekporeumenon” would prevent that. Boy, Revelations 22:1 sure proved them wrong.

it might not be the best justification of the Filioque**. but rather that the procession “**ekporeumenon” of the Holy Spirit from the Father used in the creed could not mean alone or single procession.

Good work sir

thanks
Marlo
*

Aside from the fact that the Filioque was not originally part of the Creed. Charging the Orthodox of denying the Filioque, an obvious innovation, is actually charging them of holding the ancient faith. Also, I’ve heard time and time again on this very forum that the Latin word “procedit” does not hold the same nuance as the Greek verb used. It’s also been said that the writers of the Gospels had no clue of how the Greek verb they use to describe the sending of the Holy Spirit would be used to describe the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father.

The fact of the matter is, the Filioque’s an illegitimate addition to the Creed, and accusing the Orthodox of being wrong for rejecting it is ludicrous.

 

[Vico]

The* filioque* was never added (in Greek) to the original Creed of 381. The Latin creed is also orthodox.

Πιστεύομεν εις ένα Θεον Πατερα παντοκράτορα, ποιητην ουρανου και γης, ορατων τε πάντων και αορατων.

Και εις ένα κύριον Ιησουν Χριστον, τον υιον του θεοθ τον μονογενη, τον ει του πατρος γεννηθέν τα προ πάντων των αιώνων, φως εκ φωτος, θεον αληθινον εκ θεου αληθινου, γεννηθέντα, ου ποιηθέντα, ομοουσιον τωι πατρί· δι’ ου τα παντα εγένετο· τον δι’ ημας τους αιθρώποους και δια την ημετέραν σωτηρίαν κατελθοντα εκ των ουρανων και σαρκωθέντα εκ πνεύματος αγίου και Μαρίας της παρθένου και ενανθρωπήσαντα, σταυρωθέντα τε υπερ ημων επι Ποντίου Πιλάτου, και παθοντα και ταφέντα, και ανασταντα τηι τρίτηι ημέπαι κατα τας γραφάς, και ανελθόντα εις τους ουρανούς, και καθεζόμενον εκ δεξιων του πατρός, και πάλιν ερχόμενον μετα δόξης κριναι ζωντας και νεκρούς· ου της βασιλείας ουκ έσται τέλος.

Και εις το Πνευμα το Άγιον, το κύριον, (και) το ζωοποιόν, το εκ του πατρος εκπορευόμενον, το συν πατρι και υιωι συν προσκυνούμενον και συνδοξαζόμενον, το λαλησαν δια των προφητων.

Eις μίαν, αγίαν, καθολικην και αποστολικην εκκλησίαω;·ομολογουμεν εν βάπτισμα εις άφεσιν αμαρτιων· προσδοκωμεν ανάστασιν νεκρων, και ζωην του μελλοντος αιώωος.

Αμήν.

Latin:

Credo in unum Deum,Patrem omnipoténtem,factórem cæli et terræ,visibílium ómnium et invisibílium.Et in unum Dóminum Iesum Christum,Fílium Dei Unigénitum,et ex Patre natum ante ómnia sæcula.Deum de Deo, lumen de lúmine, Deum verum de Deo vero,génitum, non factum, consubstantiálem Patri: quem ómnia facta sunt.Qui propter nos hómines et propter nostram salútemdescéndit de cælis.Et incarnátus est de Spíritu Sanctoex María Vírgine, et homo factus est.Crucifíxus étiam pro nobis sub Póntio Piláto;passus, et sepúltus est,et resurréxit tértia die, secúndum Scriptúras,et ascéndit in cælum, sedet ad déxteram Patris.Et íterum ventúrus est cum glória,iudicáre vivos et mórtuos,cuius regni non erit finis.Et in Spíritum Sanctum, Dóminum et vivificántem:qui ex Patre Filióque procédit.Qui cum Patre et Fílio simul adorátur et conglorificátur:qui locútus est per prophétas.Et unam, sanctam, cathólicam et apostólicam Ecclésiam.Confíteor unum baptísma in remissiónem peccatorum.Et expecto resurrectionem mortuorum,et vitam ventúri sæculi.Amen.

 

[marlo]

The “ekporeumenon” argument used by the Eastern Orthodox is used to claim the the insertion cannot take place as this is a unique feature of the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father [alone] just as Begotten is a unique feature of the Son in their manifestation of existence cannot hold water anymore. So the only argument left is that the Filioque is an illegitimate insertion, however if you look closely with the aid of Revelation 22:1 the doctrinal value of the procession “ekporeumenon” of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son can be interpreted as Orthodox, this also removes another argument that Procession from the Father and the Son mean “Father through the Son”. Therefore the procession “ekporeumenon” Father and the Son could be used as a valid expression by itself.

This could be another step on clarifying doctrinal issues between East and the West, The insertion (filioque) is illegitimate and should be removed however it has an Orthodox explanation that can be accepted as Orthodox which will not make it a heresy. I think both side can agree with this.

Aside from the fact that the Filioque was not originally part of the Creed. Charging the Orthodox of denying the Filioque, an obvious innovation, is actually charging them of holding the ancient faith. Also, I’ve heard time and time again on this very forum that the Latin word “procedit” does not hold the same nuance as the Greek verb used. It’s also been said that the writers of the Gospels had no clue of how the Greek verb they use to describe the sending of the Holy Spirit would be used to describe the eternal procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father.

The fact of the matter is, the Filioque’s an illegitimate addition to the Creed, and accusing the Orthodox of being wrong for rejecting it is ludicrous.

 

[Shiranui117]

The “ekporeumenon” argument used by the Eastern Orthodox is used to claim the the insertion cannot take place as this is a unique feature of the Holy Spirit’s procession from the Father [alone] just as Begotten is a unique feature of the Son in their manifestation of existence cannot hold water anymore. So the only argument left is that the Filioque is an illegitimate insertion, however if you look closely with the aid of Revelation 22:1 the doctrinal value of the procession “ekporeumenon” of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son can be interpreted as Orthodox, this also removes another argument that Procession from the Father and the Son mean “Father through the Son”. Therefore the procession “ekporeumenon” Father and the Son could be used as a valid expression by itself.

This could be another step on clarifying doctrinal issues between East and the West, The insertion (filioque) is illegitimate and should be removed however it has an Orthodox explanation that can be accepted as Orthodox which will not make it a heresy. I think both side can agree with this.

The explanation that I can accept, is that the Filioque does not relate to the eternal or hypostatic procession of the Holy Spirit, but only the sending of the Holy Spirit upon the world. I do not see any other reason to believe otherwise; all the explanations of the Filioque proceeding hypostatically/eternally from Father and Son together somehow make no logical sense.

 

[Vico]

forums.catholic-questions.org/image.php?u=196602&dateline=1277058134 Shiranui117,

There are two internal processions from the Father, one in the Son, and the other in the Holy Spirit. That the Son participates is a logical deduction based upon positive theology applied to the idea of consubstantiality and relationship, rather than scriptural reference (per Augustine). This can also be from writings of St. Maximus.

St. Maximus, from Quaestiones et dubia 1.34:Ὥσπερ ἐστὶν αἴτιος τοῦ λόγου ὁ νοῦς, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, διὰ μέσου δὲ τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ δυνάμεθα εἰπεῖν τὸν λόγον εἶναι τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν υἱὸν λέγειν τοῦ πνεύματος."
Just as Mind is cause of the Word, so it is also of the Spirit, but by means of the Word. And just as we cannot say that a word is “of the voice”, so also we cannot say that the Son is “of the Spirit”.
St. Maximus, from Ad Thalassium 63: just as the Holy Spirit exists of the Father by nature, according to substance, so also is he, according to substance, of the Son, in that, in an ineffable way, he proceeds from the Father substantially through the Son who is begotten.
Lossky, In the Image and Likeness of God, Chapter 4:This unique cause is not prior to his effects, for in the Trinity there is no priority and posteriority. He is not superior to his effects, for the perfect cause cannot produce inferior effects. He is thus the cause of their equality with himself. {20}

{20}. “For He would be the origin (arche) of petty and unworthy things, or rather the term ‘origin’ would be used in a petty and unworthy sense, if He were not the origin of the Godhead (tes Theotetos arche) and of the goodness contemplated in the Son and in the Spirit: in the former as Son and Word, in the latter as Spirit which proceeds without separation.” –
St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Or. 2, 38; P.G. 35, col. 445.

 

[Shiranui117]

forums.catholic-questions.org/image.php?u=196602&dateline=1277058134 Shiranui117,

There are two internal processions from the Father, one in the Son, and the other in the Holy Spirit. That the Son participates is a logical deduction based upon positive theology applied to the idea of consubstantiality and relationship, rather than scriptural reference (per Augustine). This can also be from writings of St. Maximus.

St. Maximus, from Quaestiones et dubia 1.34:Ὥσπερ ἐστὶν αἴτιος τοῦ λόγου ὁ νοῦς, οὕτως καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος, διὰ μέσου δὲ τοῦ λόγου. καὶ ὥσπερ οὐ δυνάμεθα εἰπεῖν τὸν λόγον εἶναι τῆς φωνῆς, οὕτως οὐδὲ τὸν υἱὸν λέγειν τοῦ πνεύματος."
Just as Mind is cause of the Word, so it is also of the Spirit, but by means of the Word. And just as we cannot say that a word is “of the voice”, so also we cannot say that the Son is “of the Spirit”.

 

[Vico]

forums.catholic-questions.org/image.php?u=196602&dateline=1277058134

                                                                     [Shiranui117](http://forums.catholic-questions.org/member.php?u=196602),

There are two internal processions from the Father, one in the Son, and the other in the Holy Spirit. That the Son participates is a logical deduction based upon positive theology applied to the idea of consubstantiality and relationship, rather than scriptural reference (per Augustine). This can also be from writings of St. Maximus.

I don’t have Quaestiones et dubia in front of me to read or get the full context, so I’ll work with what St. Maximus said here.

Simply taking what he said, it does not imply that he means that the Son causes the Spirit, but merely that the Spirit does not cause the Son. A voice is not of the word, either; rather, both come from the Mind. A word does not have to be of the voice at all, furthermore. I do not see any contradiction with what has already been said.

The trickier questions here are, what is meant by proceeding substantially from the Father through the Son? And what does it mean, that the Holy Spirit is, according to substance, of the Son?

I do not see how this supports the Filioque. If anything, it would seem to support the Orthodox position.

Yes “proceeding substantially” is the key. The Holy Spirit receives his divine substance, from the Father, through the begotten Son. This is the communication of equality that Lossky speaks of, and is proper to the apophatic expression.

They are orthodox statements and that is why I presented them. There is no conflict between the western expression and what St. Maximus has said, or with Lossky quote, if not rigidly defined. The Latin Church too, sees the communication from the Father. St. Maximus uses the phrase “so it is also of the Spirit, but by means of the Word”. The Word (Son) is the means.The Holy Spirit is “sent” by the Father and Son, as he also “proceeds” from them. For this reason he is called “the Spirit of the Father” (e.g., Mt. 10:20; 1 Cor 2:11; also Jn 15:26), but also “the Spirit of the Son” (Gal 4:6), or “the Spirit of Jesus” (Acts 16:7), since it is Jesus himself that sends him (cf. Jn 15:26). Therefore the Latin Church professes that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (qui a Patre Filioque procedit) while the Orthodox Churches profess from the Father through the Son. He proceeds “by way of will,” “in the manner of love” (per modum amoris). This is a sententia certa, that is, a theological doctrine commonly accepted in the Church’s teaching and therefore sure and binding.
This conviction is confirmed by the etymology of the name “Holy Spirit,” to which I alluded in the previous catechesis—Spirit, spiritus, pneuma, ruah. Starting from this etymology “the procession” of the Spirit from the Father and the Son is described as “spiration” (spiramen) a breath of Love.

This spiration is not generation. Only the Word, the Son, “proceeds” from the Father by eternal generation. God, who eternally knows himself and everything in himself, begets the Word. In this eternal begetting, which takes place by way of intellect (per modum intelligibilis actionis), God, in the absolute unity of his nature, that is, of his divinity, is Father and Son. “He is,” and not “he becomes,” “he is” so eternally. “He is” from the beginning and without beginning. Under this aspect the word “procession” must be understood correctly. There is no connotation proper to a temporal “becoming.” The same is true of the “procession” of the Holy Spirit.

Blessed Pope John Paul II, 1985, General Audience

vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/audiences/alpha/data/aud19851120en.html

The idea expressed above regarding temporality is the same as that expressed by Lossky in the same book I quoted from.

 

[TS_Aquinas]

What is the rebuttal to John 5:19-20 as a premise to demonstrate the filioque?

And If people are interested, St. Ambrose spoke about Rev 22:1 in “On the Holy Spirit, Book III” Chapter 20.

 

[Vico]

What is the rebuttal to John 5:19-20 as a premise to demonstrate the filioque?

And If people are interested, St. Ambrose spoke about Rev 22:1 in “On the Holy Spirit, Book III” Chapter 20.

The filioque is inference based upon Nicea’s use of consubstantial (homoousion) not by way of Biblical quotes referring to internal procession. The Bible quotes all refer to the economic procession.

Christ states that he does only what he sees the Father doing - John 5:19.
That whatever the Father does, the Son does and the Father shows the Son all he does - John 5:19-20.
He speaks only what he has heard - John 8:26, 40.
Has spoken nothing of himself, but the Father - John 14:10, 24.
And all that belongs to the Father, belongs to the Son - John 16:15.

 

[Cavaradossi]

The debate seems to center on whether the Father only begets the Son and spirates the Spirit or whether spirating is given also to the Son. Why the EO say only the Father can spirate does not seem logically consistent.

It is because the Eastern Fathers were quite clear on the matter. The Father is the sole cause. To make the Son another principle would be to have two Gods. This is why a double procession is heresy in both East and West. The only other solutions are to ascribe causality to the Father alone, as the East has done or to have the Son share in the Father’s causality, which the East sees as a confusion of hypostatic properties.

But by this same logic the Son and Spirit are both (equally) subordinated because under the EO model only the Father possesses causality. So what you’re saying then is that having the Son and Spirit subordinated is ok but only having the Spirit subordinated is not ok. That seems like a logically arbitrary dilemma.

And as I said, subordination within the Trinity is not automatically anathema; it all depends on what the subordination is.

The former type of subordination is acceptable, because it is only a subordination according to cause. The Father is greater than the Son and the Holy Spirit with respect to causality. What makes the latter type of subordination unacceptable is that it implies a subordination by essence. We recognize only two types of properties, those which are predicated of a specific hypostasis and those which are resultants of the divine nature. A property can never be predicated of two persons and not three because it would either result in a sabellian confusion of two hypostases or result in an admission that the one which does not have this property is not consubstantial with the two.

This distinction may seem arbitrary, but it was crucial in the refutation of Eunomius’ argument against the Trinity. Eunomius argued that the property of being ingenerate should be predicated of the divine essence. The Cappadocians argued that ingeneracy and causality are properties of the Father, while being begotten is a property of the Son and proceeding is a property of the Spirit, but that in all other things, they are the same. To paraphrase Gregory the Theologian: everything the Father has, the Son has but causality.

What is wrong with Father alone being cause and principle while also in generating the Son making the Son a continuation of that one cause of the Spirit?

Well, let us ask, if the Son has causality, what type of property would it be? Hypostatic or Essential? If it results from their common nature, then why does the Spirit not also possess this property? If causality is an hypostatic property, then how do the Son and Father differ? For them to differ, we would have to admit that causality is not truly an hypostatic property (for it would not differentiate the two) but that it is either an accident, something which no tradition admits is a possibility, or that it is predicated of the essence, meaning that Holy Spirit, not possessing causality, would not be divine.

This is in fact, the exact same problem which faced the Cappadocian Fathers concerning the Son and the Spirit. In detailing how the Spirit and the Son could be of one essence with the Father, they were faced with the problem of attempting to differentiate the Son and the Spirit, both being caused, without either confusing the hypostases by predicating the same property (caused) to be of both persons, or predicating this property to be of their common nature (as then they could not be of one nature with the Father, Who is uncaused). Their solution then was to differentiate the manner in which we predicate the term ‘caused’ of the Son and of the Spirit. The Son is said to be caused because of his special manner of taking existence from the Father, that is by generation. The Spirit is said to be caused because of its special manner of taking existence from the Father, that is by procession, which is completely unlike begetting. In other words, it is an equivocal use of the name ‘caused’, not a univocal use.

While it may be tempting to say that a similar thing could be done for the name ‘cause’, it must be admitted that such language is foreign to the Eastern Fathers, who only admitted that the Father alone has causality. Furthermore, it is inaccurate to draw the conclusion from the term ‘through’ that that which is through another is therefore caused by it. The Son was incarnate through the Virgin Mary, that is true, but it is impossible to infer from this that she was the cause of His person. Would it not be better then, for the Latin Church to cease using the term ‘cause’ as a descriptor for the relation between the Son and the Spirit, as it can easily mislead people into believing that the Son causes the subsistence of the Spirit? Furthermore, is not such an equivocal use of ‘cause’ misleading, as the Son is the cause of our receiving the Spirit, but not of the Spirit itself? If the Latin Church believes as we do, why then does it continue to use such unclear terminology?

 

[Shiranui117]

Shiranui117;9439888:

Yes “proceeding substantially” is the key. The Holy Spirit receives his divine substance, from the Father, through the begotten Son. This is the communication of equality that Lossky speaks of, and is proper to the apophatic expression.

They are orthodox statements and that is why I presented them. There is no conflict between the western expression and what St. Maximus has said, or with Lossky quote, if not rigidly defined. The Latin Church too, sees the communication from the Father. St. Maximus uses the phrase "so it is also of the Spirit, but by means

of the Word". The Word (Son) is the means.The Holy Spirit is “sent” by the Father and Son, as he also “proceeds” from them. For this reason he is called “the Spirit of the Father” (e.g., Mt. 10:20; 1 Cor 2:11; also Jn 15:26), but also “the Spirit of the Son” (Gal 4:6), or “the Spirit of Jesus” (Acts 16:7), since it is Jesus himself that sends him (cf. Jn 15:26). Therefore the Latin Church professes that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son (qui a Patre Filioque procedit) while the Orthodox Churches profess from the Father through the Son. He proceeds “by way of will,” “in the manner of love” (per modum amoris). This is a sententia certa, that is, a theological doctrine commonly accepted in the Church’s teaching and therefore sure and binding.
This conviction is confirmed by the etymology of the name “Holy Spirit,” to which I alluded in the previous catechesis—Spirit, spiritus, pneuma, ruah. Starting from this etymology “the procession” of the Spirit from the Father and the Son is described as “spiration” (spiramen) a breath of Love.

This spiration is not generation. Only the Word, the Son, “proceeds” from the Father by eternal generation. God, who eternally knows himself and everything in himself, begets the Word. In this eternal begetting, which takes place by way of intellect (per modum intelligibilis actionis), God, in the absolute unity of his nature, that is, of his divinity, is Father and Son. “He is,” and not “he becomes,” “he is” so eternally. “He is” from the beginning and without beginning. Under this aspect the word “procession” must be understood correctly. There is no connotation proper to a temporal “becoming.” The same is true of the “procession” of the Holy Spirit.

Blessed Pope John Paul II, 1985, General Audience

vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/audiences/alpha/data/aud19851120en.html

The idea expressed above regarding temporality is the same as that expressed by Lossky in the same book I quoted from.

Now, here’s my biggest problem with this idea: It seems to say that the Holy Spirit receives His hypostasis from the Father, yet receives His divine Essence (or substance, if you like) from the Father and then through the Son. Does that mean the Holy Spirit is put together on an assembly line? Because that’s what it sounds like to me. I can’t see any way to interpret otherwise; how can the Holy Spirit receive His Essence in a different manner than (or apart from ) His hypostasis?

 

[Vico]

Vico;9441051:

Now, here’s my biggest problem with this idea: It seems to say that the Holy Spirit receives His hypostasis from the Father, yet receives His divine Essence (or substance, if you like) from the Father and then through the Son. Does that mean the Holy Spirit is put together on an assembly line? Because that’s what it sounds like to me. I can’t see any way to interpret otherwise; how can the Holy Spirit receive His Essence in a different manner than (or apart from ) His hypostasis?

Hypostasis and substance are not the same.

Saint Basil said:That which is spoken of in a special and peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis. Suppose we say “a man.” The indefinite meaning of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain. Suppose we say “Paul.” We set forth, by what is indicated by the name, the nature subsisting.2024 This then is the hypostasis, or “understanding;” not the indefinite conception of the essence or substance, which, because what is signified is general, finds no “standing,” but the conception which by means of the expressed peculiarities gives standing and circumscription to the general and uncircumscribed. It is customary in Scripture to make a distinction of this kind, as well in many other passages as in the History of Job. When purposing to narrate the events of his life, Job first mentions the common, and says “a man;” then he straightway particularizes by adding “a certain.”
m.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf208.ix.xxxix.html

newadvent.org/fathers/3202038.htm

Father is first cause: the cause of equality. It is eternal rather than a sequence: without “and then”.

 

[Cavaradossi]

Hypostasis and substance are not the same.

Saint Basil said:That which is spoken of in a special and peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis. Suppose we say “a man.” The indefinite meaning of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain. Suppose we say “Paul.” We set forth, by what is indicated by the name, the nature subsisting.2024 This then is the hypostasis, or “understanding;” not the indefinite conception of the essence or substance, which, because what is signified is general, finds no “standing,” but the conception which by means of the expressed peculiarities gives standing and circumscription to the general and uncircumscribed. It is customary in Scripture to make a distinction of this kind, as well in many other passages as in the History of Job. When purposing to narrate the events of his life, Job first mentions the common, and says “a man;” then he straightway particularizes by adding “a certain.”
m.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf208.ix.xxxix.html

newadvent.org/fathers/3202038.htm

Father is first cause: the cause of equality. It is eternal rather than a sequence: without “and then”.

But essences can only be considered by virtue of hypostases and hypostases without essence have no content. Every hypostasis has an underlying nature and essence, and only in virtue of hypostases are essences known to exist. Furthermore, the hypostasis is also known as the individual, as he points out in the thirtieth chapter if the philosophical chapters. He writes in this chapter:However the particular they [the fathers] called individual, and person and hypostasis or individual substance, as, for example, would be Peter and Paul. Now the hypostasis must have substance together with accidents, and it must subsist in itself and be found to be sensibly, that is, actually existent. It is furthermore impossible for two hypostases not to differ from each other in their accidents and still to differ from each other numerically. And one should know that the characteristic properties are accidents which distinguish the hypostases.

 

[Cavaradossi]

I see thad I accidentally attributed that quote above to an unspecified he. That he would be John of Damascus.

It is also worth noting that the term individual refers to that which cannot be further divided without destroying is species (see the eleventh philosophical chapter). Thus, neither is the soul a man, nor is Peter’s soul Peter himself. Both the species ‘man’ and the particular substance ‘Peter’ cannot be further divided without destroying the whole, so they are known as individuals. The Holy Spirit as an individual and hypostasis cannot be considered separately from the divine essence, the ‘what it is’, or else several absurdities would follow.

 

[Shiranui117]

Hypostasis and substance are not the same.

Saint Basil said:That which is spoken of in a special and peculiar manner is indicated by the name of the hypostasis. Suppose we say “a man.” The indefinite meaning of the word strikes a certain vague sense upon the ears. The nature is indicated, but what subsists and is specially and peculiarly indicated by the name is not made plain. Suppose we say “Paul.” We set forth, by what is indicated by the name, the nature subsisting.2024 This then is the hypostasis, or “understanding;” not the indefinite conception of the essence or substance, which, because what is signified is general, finds no “standing,” but the conception which by means of the expressed peculiarities gives standing and circumscription to the general and uncircumscribed. It is customary in Scripture to make a distinction of this kind, as well in many other passages as in the History of Job. When purposing to narrate the events of his life, Job first mentions the common, and says “a man;” then he straightway particularizes by adding “a certain.”
m.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/npnf208.ix.xxxix.html

newadvent.org/fathers/3202038.htm

Father is first cause: the cause of equality. It is eternal rather than a sequence: without “and then”.

Cavaradossi beat me to the point. If you have a hypostasis, then you HAVE to have an essence and a nature along with it. I know they’re not the same thing, but you cannot have them be separate from one another, either.

 

[Vico]

…

Cavaradossi beat me to the point. If you have a hypostasis, then you HAVE to have an essence and a nature along with it. I know they’re not the same thing, but you cannot have them be separate from one another, either.

Do you see a conflict in or with what St. Basil said?

In the case of our Trinity, we have one eternal substance with three eternal hypostases.