The "Greatest" proof (pun intended) for the existence of God - Anselm

[R_Daneel]

Sorry, for the misunderstanding. I ment to have quotation marks or a question mark on the first sentence, as it was a quote from your post. I believe my misunderstanding of your statement might be because I assumed that anything that had attributes must exist, so if we are talking about attributes of something, then it exists.

Is it correct, or just redundant, to say that all existant things have the attribute of existense? If God exists (which I believe) does He have the attribute of existence by His nature, inseparable from it? Do we have the attribute of existense by gift?

Oh, well, misunderstandings happen all the time.

I must answer your post at some length, so please be patient. First, “existence”. By existence I mean physical existence. It is unfortunate that the word “existence” is also applied to concepts. To clarify, I proposed (a long time ago) to use two words, P-existence for physical existence and C-existence for conceptual existence. Physical existence is exactly what it says. For example a chair exists physically, it can be detected by the senses, it has certain attributes, like the number of the legs, or an armrest, etc. The concept of a chair does not exist physically. The C-existence of a chair is just an abstraction of all the physical chairs. Therefore P-existence comes first, and if there are beings, who are able to conceptualize, then they create the “abstract concept”.

Now, you ask, if the attributes of a chair are tied to a physically existing chair, or can we say that the physical chair is simply a physical manifestation of the “abstract chair”, in other words, is the existence of a physical chair an attribute of “physical existence” of an abstract chair. Strangely, there are some philosphers who assert the latter. They speak of “abstract objects”, which do not exist physically, but their physical equivalents are just the manifestations of the “ideal” or “abstract” objects. At first glance it almost sounds reasonable.

However, when looked at it in depth, it turns out that this approach is completely nonsensical. It is the case of putting the cart in front of the horse. According to this view, the maker of the first chair did not invent this new implement, rather he discovered the “abstract chair”, and simply “copied” it into a material form. They apply this “process” to everything. By their idea Beethoven did not create the Ninth Symphony, he discovered the “abstract object of the Ninth Symphony”, and put it down on paper. According to them, Shakespeare did not create “Hamlet”, he just discovered the abstract object of Hamlet, and copied it down to paper. I cannot fathom, how such nonsense can be held by some people, but there you go. Some people actually believe this. Mind-boggling.

Now, to your actual question. No, it makes no sense at all to speak of existence as an attribute. An attribute of “what”? Of the concept? It presumes that the “abstractions” come first, and physical reality comes later. Yes, some ancient philosphers believed that, and there still are a few contemporary ones, who hold that opinion. What can I say? The zoo of the Lord is huge, and there are all sorts of beings in it, sensible ones, and idiots, as well. This makes the world so interesting.

 

[JohnDamian]

Now, to your actual question. No, it makes no sense at all to speak of existence as an attribute. An attribute of “what”? Of the concept? It presumes that the “abstractions” come first, and physical reality comes later. Yes, some ancient philosphers believed that, and there still are a few contemporary ones, who hold that opinion. What can I say? The zoo of the Lord is huge, and there are all sorts of beings in it, sensible ones, and idiots, as well. This makes the world so interesting.

I am afraid you simply do not understand theories of individuation.

To say things are individuated by matter is ludicrous as it pressupposes a general individuation of quanta. What you are saying is begging the question.

What you are saying is equivalent to what Petrus Aureolus stated when claiming (unfoundedly) that “objects are singular by themselves; and this singularity is a basic fact that needs no further explanation”. It is merely absurd and laughable begging the Question.

Common quiddities, and specific haecceitys nessecarily are prior to instantiations; otherwise you pressuppose the individuation of singular quanta; which is absurd.

 

[R_Daneel]

I am afraid you simply do not understand theories of individuation.

To say things are individuated by matter is ludicrous as it pressupposes a general individuation of quanta. What you are saying is begging the question.

What you are saying is equivalent to what Petrus Aureolus stated when claiming (unfoundedly) that “objects are singular by themselves; and this singularity is a basic fact that needs no further explanation”. It is merely absurd and laughable begging the Question.

Common quiddities, and specific haecceitys nessecarily are prior to instantiations; otherwise you pressuppose the individuation of singular quanta; which is absurd.

I am not afraid to admit that your whole post is a meaningless gobbledegook to me. Maybe if you translated it to plain English that would change, but I don’t think so.

To put this simply. Physical objects exist independently of our perceptions to them. Humans can observe these objects and observe their attributes. They can select some attributes based upon their preferences, and declare them and significant, and declare other attributes as non-significant. This process is not random, nor is it haphazard. It is diven by the people’s aim of how to use those objects.

Most humans are able to conceptualize an “abstraction” of these physical objects. Not all, for example some autistic people are unable to think of a “generic, abstract dog”. Nevertheless, these people can be highly educated and very smart people.

To say that abstractions come first, and materialization of these abstractions come later, is sheer nonsense - in everyday terms it is called putting the cart in front of the horse. To speak of the color or taste (attributes) of an imaginary (read: non-existent) apple is lunacy. Yes, it is possible to concoct a sentence like: “There is a nonexistent red apple on top of an imaginary science-fiction book, which resides in the abstract left-hand drawer of my future table” - but such a sentence is a meaningless proposition. There is nothing else to say.

 

[Betterave]

Oh, well, misunderstandings happen all the time.

I must answer your post at some length, so please be patient. First, “existence”. By existence I mean physical existence. It is unfortunate that the word “existence” is also applied to concepts. To clarify, I proposed (a long time ago) to use two words, P-existence for physical existence and C-existence for conceptual existence. Physical existence is exactly what it says. For example a chair exists physically, it can be detected by the senses, it has certain attributes, like the number of the legs, or an armrest, etc. The concept of a chair does not exist physically. The C-existence of a chair is just an abstraction of all the physical chairs. Therefore P-existence comes first, and if there are beings, who are able to conceptualize, then they create the “abstract concept”.

Your proposal sounds familiar somehow… How would you say it relates, for example, to the distinction Aquinas uses between entia naturae and entia rationis? (No need to reinvent the wheel, right? )

Now, you ask, if the attributes of a chair are tied to a physically existing chair, or can we say that the physical chair is simply a physical manifestation of the “abstract chair”, in other words, is the existence of a physical chair an attribute of “physical existence” of an abstract chair. Strangely, there are some philosphers who assert the latter. They speak of “abstract objects”, which do not exist physically, but their physical equivalents are just the manifestations of the “ideal” or “abstract” objects. At first glance it almost sounds reasonable.

However, when looked at it in depth, it turns out that this approach is completely nonsensical. It is the case of putting the cart in front of the horse. According to this view, the maker of the first chair did not invent this new implement, rather he discovered the “abstract chair”, and simply “copied” it into a material form. They apply this “process” to everything. By their idea Beethoven did not create the Ninth Symphony, he discovered the “abstract object of the Ninth Symphony”, and put it down on paper. According to them, Shakespeare did not create “Hamlet”, he just discovered the abstract object of Hamlet, and copied it down to paper. I cannot fathom, how such nonsense can be held by some people, but there you go. Some people actually believe this. Mind-boggling.

Some people? Who, pray tell?

Now, to your actual question. No, it makes no sense at all to speak of existence as an attribute. An attribute of “what”? Of the concept? It presumes that the “abstractions” come first, and physical reality comes later. Yes, some ancient philosphers believed that, and there still are a few contemporary ones, who hold that opinion. What can I say? The zoo of the Lord is huge, and there are all sorts of beings in it, sensible ones, and idiots, as well. This makes the world so interesting.

Which philosophers are you referring to here? Abstract representations of the concept ‘philosophers’ are nice, but sometimes names of concrete particulars are helpful, a little easier to pin to reality, if you know what I mean.

 

[Betterave]

I am not afraid to admit that your whole post is a meaningless gobbledegook to me. Maybe if you translated it to plain English that would change, but I don’t think so.

To put this simply. Physical objects exist independently of our perceptions to them. Humans can observe these objects and observe their attributes. They can select some attributes based upon their preferences, and declare them and significant, and declare other attributes as non-significant. This process is not random, nor is it haphazard. It is diven by the people’s aim of how to use those objects.

Most humans are able to conceptualize an “abstraction” of these physical objects. Not all, for example some autistic people are unable to think of a “generic, abstract dog”. Nevertheless, these people can be highly educated and very smart people.

To say that abstractions come first, and materialization of these abstractions come later, is sheer nonsense - in everyday terms it is called putting the cart in front of the horse. To speak of the color or taste (attributes) of an imaginary (read: non-existent) apple is lunacy. Yes, it is possible to concoct a sentence like: “There is a nonexistent red apple on top of an imaginary science-fiction book, which resides in the abstract left-hand drawer of my future table” - but such a sentence is a meaningless proposition. There is nothing else to say.

And, if I understand correctly, you believe all this because to believe anything else would be absurd?

 

[R_Daneel]

Your proposal sounds familiar somehow… How would you say it relates, for example, to the distinction Aquinas uses between entia naturae and entia rationis? (No need to reinvent the wheel, right? )

Sometimes the “wheel” gets lost. Right now John Damian argues that there is no real distinction between C-existence ans P-existence.

Some people? Who, pray tell?

Actually I met some on these boards a long time ago. Since they are absent now and cannot speak for themselves it would be inappropriate for me to use their names, I think. They were all Molinists, as far as their philosophy went.

Which philosophers are you referring to here? Abstract representations of the concept ‘philosophers’ are nice, but sometimes names of concrete particulars are helpful, a little easier to pin to reality, if you know what I mean.

They were referring to some, but I cannot recall their names. It all happened years ago. I have been around on these boards for over 6 or 7 years, maybe even longer. Under different names, since I tend to forget my passwords when I take a long absence, and it is easier to create a new one.

 

[R_Daneel]

And, if I understand correctly, you believe all this because to believe anything else would be absurd?

Sure. Is the propostion “There is a nonexistent red apple on top of an imaginary science-fiction book, which resides in the abstract left-hand drawer of my future table” meaningful? One cannot speak of properties of non-existent (or imaginary) objects. How could a nonexistent apple be red? What is the difference between a nonexistent apple and a nonexistent book? How can one speak about the contents of a nonexistent book? Before something can have attributes, it must exist. I think this is beyond dispute.

 

[Betterave]

Sometimes the “wheel” gets lost. Right now John Damian argues that there is no real distinction between C-existence ans P-existence.

Actually I met some on these boards a long time ago. Since they are absent now and cannot speak for themselves it would be inappropriate for me to use their names, I think. They were all Molinists, as far as their philosophy went.

They were referring to some, but I cannot recall their names. It all happened years ago. I have been around on these boards for over 6 or 7 years, maybe even longer. Under different names, since I tend to forget my passwords when I take a long absence, and it is easier to create a new one.

Something like Russell’s teapot then: they’re out there somewhere, you can’t verify it, much less that you understood and are accurately reporting whatever they said, but you’re sure they exist?

 

[Betterave]

Sure. Is the propostion “There is a nonexistent red apple on top of an imaginary science-fiction book, which resides in the abstract left-hand drawer of my future table” meaningful?

I hope so - don’t you mean something by it?

One cannot speak of properties of non-existent (or imaginary) objects. How could a nonexistent apple be red? What is the difference between a nonexistent apple and a nonexistent book? How can one speak about the contents of a nonexistent book? Before something can have attributes, it must exist. I think this is beyond dispute.

The answers to your questions must depend on what you mean by “a nonexistent apple.” What do you mean by it?

1. “Before something can have attributes, it must exist”?
2. “Before something can exist, it must have attributes”?

(I’m not too clear on what your argument is, so I’m just throwing some propositions back to you.)

 

[R_Daneel]

Something like Russell’s teapot then: they’re out there somewhere, you can’t verify it, much less that you understood and are accurately reporting whatever they said, but you’re sure they exist?

Actually you could verify it, if you use the “search” feature of the board and look for “abstract object”. It would be rather tedious, I know. And not really necessary. However, here is a link on Wiki: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abstract_object

I hope so - don’t you mean something by it?

I certainly do not. I just gave it as an example of how to string together words to make a syntactically correct but semantically meaningless proposition. And it is meaningless since all the referents are non-existent. If we removed the “non-existent” parts, it would be perfectly meaningful. To wit: “There is a red apple on top of a science-fiction book, which resides in the left-hand drawer of my table”.

The answers to your questions must depend on what you mean by “a nonexistent apple.” What do you mean by it?

Imaginary apple, or the concept of an apple. An apple which does not have P-exitence.

1. “Before something can have attributes, it must exist”?
2. “Before something can exist, it must have attributes”?

(I’m not too clear on what your argument is, so I’m just throwing some propositions back to you.)

It is number 1). Attributes without physical existence (P-existence) is nonsense.

 

[Douglas_Kraeger]

I am afraid you simply do not understand theories of individuation.

To say things are individuated by matter is ludicrous as it pressupposes a general individuation of quanta. What you are saying is begging the question.

What you are saying is equivalent to what Petrus Aureolus stated when claiming (unfoundedly) that “objects are singular by themselves; and this singularity is a basic fact that needs no further explanation”. It is merely absurd and laughable begging the Question.

Common quiddities, and specific haecceitys nessecarily are prior to instantiations; otherwise you pressuppose the individuation of singular quanta; which is absurd.

I also ask youto try and put your above comments in plain English. You use words that are not common and itappears that even though they may beused correctly, thereis no evidence that it is realavent to the originalpoint beingmade. Could you try andbring it down to my level of understanding? Thank you.

 

[Betterave]

I certainly do not. I just gave it as an example of how to string together words to make a syntactically correct but semantically meaningless proposition. And it is meaningless since all the referents are non-existent. If we removed the “non-existent” parts, it would be perfectly meaningful. To wit: “There is a red apple on top of a science-fiction book, which resides in the left-hand drawer of my table”.

So “IF referents of a proposition are non-existent, THEN that proposition is meaningless” is a true proposition in your view? (Are you sure you want to say that?)

Imaginary apple, or the concept of an apple. An apple which does not have P-exitence.

In that case your questions don’t appear to present any particular difficulty. For example, How could a nonexistent apple be red? Imagine a red apple!

It is number 1). Attributes without physical existence (P-existence) is nonsense.

I understand that you made that assertion. I’m asking for your argument, and why you prefer it to 2.

 

[R_Daneel]

So “IF referents of a proposition are non-existent, THEN that proposition is meaningless” is a true proposition in your view? (Are you sure you want to say that?)

It depends of what the proposition says. Your question is too vague and it sounds like the “set of all sets” with all its well-known problems. Counterfactuals can have meaning, depending on what they refer to.

In that case your questions don’t appear to present any particular difficulty. For example, How could a nonexistent apple be red? Imagine a red apple!

An apple which is “imagined” has C-existence. You may say that the imaginary apple has the imaginary attribute of being red - which is pretty meaningless. You may say that the imaginary red apple resides on your table, and then you mix up P-existence and C-existence, resulting in a meaningless proposition. When you say that there are two imaginary apples, one imagined red, and one imagined green, how can you tell, which is red, and which is green?

I understand that you made that assertion. I’m asking for your argument, and why you prefer it to 2.

Because non-P-existent (or imaginary) objects can have only “imaginary” (or non-P-existent) attributes - which does not tell us anything. When we talk about attributes, we talk about “something” which has attributes. C-existence is dependent on P-existence.

 

[JDaniel]

[SNIP]

However, when looked at it in depth, it turns out that this approach is completely nonsensical. It is the case of putting the cart in front of the horse. According to this view, the maker of the first chair did not invent

 

[nguirado]

Interestingly, I heard a theistic physicist say that atheistic physicists answer the “something from nothing” arguments by saying that the rules of the universe existed before the universe and then a quantum fluctuation (I think) occurred and matter came into being conforming to the laws of the universe.

Oh, well, misunderstandings happen all the time.

I must answer your post at some length, so please be patient. First, “existence”. By existence I mean physical existence. It is unfortunate that the word “existence” is also applied to concepts. To clarify, I proposed (a long time ago) to use two words, P-existence for physical existence and C-existence for conceptual existence. Physical existence is exactly what it says. For example a chair exists physically, it can be detected by the senses, it has certain attributes, like the number of the legs, or an armrest, etc. The concept of a chair does not exist physically. The C-existence of a chair is just an abstraction of all the physical chairs. Therefore P-existence comes first, and if there are beings, who are able to conceptualize, then they create the “abstract concept”.

Now, you ask, if the attributes of a chair are tied to a physically existing chair, or can we say that the physical chair is simply a physical manifestation of the “abstract chair”, in other words, is the existence of a physical chair an attribute of “physical existence” of an abstract chair. Strangely, there are some philosphers who assert the latter. They speak of “abstract objects”, which do not exist physically, but their physical equivalents are just the manifestations of the “ideal” or “abstract” objects. At first glance it almost sounds reasonable.

However, when looked at it in depth, it turns out that this approach is completely nonsensical. It is the case of putting the cart in front of the horse. According to this view, the maker of the first chair did not invent this new implement, rather he discovered the “abstract chair”, and simply “copied” it into a material form. They apply this “process” to everything. By their idea Beethoven did not create the Ninth Symphony, he discovered the “abstract object of the Ninth Symphony”, and put it down on paper. According to them, Shakespeare did not create “Hamlet”, he just discovered the abstract object of Hamlet, and copied it down to paper. I cannot fathom, how such nonsense can be held by some people, but there you go. Some people actually believe this. Mind-boggling.

Now, to your actual question. No, it makes no sense at all to speak of existence as an attribute. An attribute of “what”? Of the concept? It presumes that the “abstractions” come first, and physical reality comes later. Yes, some ancient philosphers believed that, and there still are a few contemporary ones, who hold that opinion. What can I say? The zoo of the Lord is huge, and there are all sorts of beings in it, sensible ones, and idiots, as well. This makes the world so interesting.

 

[R_Daneel]

What does it mean to say “invent?” Is it possible that the maker of the first chair initially saw people sitting, perhaps on stones, or the grassy lawn, etc. then abstracted (dematerialized) that sight to a concept of what would later come to be called “chair?” - then made the chair? Or, do you think he devised the entire concept by some accident of his intellect while sitting down for dinner, thinking about how one could be more comfortable during that ritual?

Possible. Maybe the chair was not a good example. But the same cannot be said about “Hamlet” or the “Ninth Symphony”. Or think about chess. The pieces, the board and the rules of chess are completely arbitrary. To say that there is an “abstract object” with those pieces and ruleset and the inventor of chess simply “discovered” them instead of “making them up” - ex nihilo - would make no sense.

An attribute of an extant exigency, of some sort perhaps?

I have no idea what you mean. Please elaborate.

Well, in some cases, wouldn’t you agree that they do?

But the “abstractions” do not exist apart from out imagination, and that is what the concept of “abstract objects” implies.

 

[Betterave]

It depends of what the proposition says. Your question is too vague and it sounds like the “set of all sets” with all its well-known problems. Counterfactuals can have meaning, depending on what they refer to.

Well what is the principle or argument upon which you base your claim then? Why is the statement about the imaginary entities meaningless? (It can’t just be because you say so.)

An apple which is “imagined” has C-existence. You may say that the imaginary apple has the imaginary attribute of being red - which is pretty meaningless. You may say that the imaginary red apple resides on your table, and then you mix up P-existence and C-existence, resulting in a meaningless proposition. When you say that there are two imaginary apples, one imagined red, and one imagined green, how can you tell, which is red, and which is green?

1. “being red” is not an “imaginary attribute” - applied to an imaginary apple it is an imagined attribute - which is not at all meaningless.
2. mixing up two kinds of existence *may *be something like ‘bad grammar,’ but it’s not meaningless, surely?
3. obviously when you imagine two apples, the one you imagine as red is red, the one you imagine as green is green - what do you mean “how can you tell…”??

Because non-P-existent (or imaginary) objects can have only “imaginary” (or non-P-existent) attributes - which does not tell us anything.

I think this is not true - it seems you’re conflating “imaginary attribute” and “imagined attribute.”

When we talk about attributes, we talk about “something” which has attributes.

Yes, and when we talk about something, we talk about something which has “attributes.” Your asserting the former in preference to the latter does not ipso facto make it more important.

C-existence is dependent on P-existence.

Sure it is - but P-existence is also dependent on C-existence. Same comment as above: Your choosing to assert the former in preference to the latter does not ipso facto make it more important.

 

[JDaniel]

Possible. Maybe the chair was not a good example. But the same cannot be said about “Hamlet” or the “Ninth Symphony”. Or think about chess. The pieces, the board and the rules of chess are completely arbitrary. To say that there is an “abstract object” with those pieces and ruleset and the inventor of chess simply “discovered” them instead of “making them up” - ex nihilo - would make no sense.

I wonder if in fact the pieces, board and rules of chess are “completely” arbitrary. . . I must agree that, in part, they probably are, but, I have to think that some of the game is not. Even though the board and pieces did not hitherto exist, the pieces represented things extant during the middle ages. And, games were played on open, grassy fields which could easily be shrunk down for playing indoors. All of this would have required some abstraction, would it not?

But the “abstractions” do not exist apart from out imagination, and that is what the concept of “abstract objects” implies.

Actually, I think it is more commonly understood that abstractions occur in our intellects, not our imaginations. Although some certain could.

jd

 

[R_Daneel]

I wonder if in fact the pieces, board and rules of chess are “completely” arbitrary. . . I must agree that, in part, they probably are, but, I have to think that some of the game is not. Even though the board and pieces did not hitherto exist, the pieces represented things extant during the middle ages. And, games were played on open, grassy fields which could easily be shrunk down for playing indoors. All of this would have required some abstraction, would it not?

Well, chess is a stylized war-game. One can say that it simulates a real war, having pieces which are stronget and weaker, which emulate certain hand-to-combat scenarios. So the concept is based upon reality. The pieces could be different, the board could be different (hexagons vs. squares), the rules could be different. There are variants of it, usually not played widespread.

But that does not mean that there is an “abstract object” out there, which was “discovered” by the inventor of the game. There are infinitely many possible war-games. But it would make no sense to say that all those possible war-games “exist” as “abstract objects”, waiting to be “discovered” by someone.

Think about card games. There are quite a few different decks of cards, and rule-sets to play a game. To assert that they are “discovered” and not “invented” is absurd. That is all I am saying.

Actually, I think it is more commonly understood that abstractions occur in our intellects, not our imaginations. Although some certain could.

I certainly agree with that. Many abstractions reflect the real physical world (sciences), others reflect other abstractions (philosophy), yet others pertain to fully imaginary “things” (fairies, ghosts).

 

[BOBDOBBS2K]

I LOVE the ontological argument! Could somebody please semantically whip me up a perfect burger and some perfact beers? It is lunchtime, and I am hungry.