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warpspeedpetey
Guest
What does “multiply up” mean?…What if the picture included the fact that ‘free will’ multiplies up the possible arrangements of atoms tremendously? …
What does “multiply up” mean?…What if the picture included the fact that ‘free will’ multiplies up the possible arrangements of atoms tremendously? …
I am not going to listen to this, as I would become seriously depressed.Shelly Kagan of Yale University did a course on death (Phil 176). They recorded all 25 lectures of the course (45-50 minutes each) and made it available on YouTube.
It sounds like a morbid topic for a class, but the course actually isn’t. Among other things questions like this are explored. Yes, 20 hours of lectures is a lot. But I got through them in about 3 days listening to them while I worked.
Surprisingly it’s not depressing. The title of the course could have just as well been “Existence.” But I understand where you are coming from and can totally understand why you would not want to risk exposing yourself to something with a name that makes it suspect to cause depression.I am not going to listen to this, as I would become seriously depressed.
What, in your words, is the Professor’s idea regarding the nature of our mind?
ICXC NIKA.
Specifically, for me, it would be depressing, and so I will give it a pass.Surprisingly it’s not depressing. The title of the course could have just as well been “Existence.” But I understand where you are coming from and can totally understand why you would not want to risk exposing yourself to something with a name that makes it suspect to cause depression.
Understood, ICXC NIKAI dare not summarize his words for fear of misrepresenting them. There’s a certain amount of distortion introduced by summarizing something, and more by putting it into my own words and there was just too much discussed on that question for me to be capable of summarizing it in a manner that I think would be adequate. It was over multiple lectures that the question of “what is the mind” was explored. For those that dare venture I think the lecture that best addresses your question was “Arguments for the existence of a soul” (part 1, part 2).
I mean that free will (as a factor) might increase the indeterminacy of even totally logical/informed extrapolations from the present, without making those predictions undeterministic, because the further ahead you predict, the more complexity is likely to increase or multiply up. In a chaotic situation like some of the denser scenes in the Sony coloured balls advert ( youtube.com/watch?v=-zOrV-5vh1A ), you could work out where all the balls will end up if you know everything at the start. If the balls could make decisions based on the position of other balls and alter their movement (like an animal), there might be conditional predictions which become laden with more and more ‘if this decision, then that result’ over time. While these balls might make very simple decisions based on obvious causal factors, people with consciousness, values, memory and forgetting etc might not be very easily predictable. Hence you could know every atom of their makeup but you only know capacities and possibilities and actual predictions would be vague - their atoms could end up in a wider range of arrangements due to the existence of free will.What does “multiply up” mean?
If those balls could choose where to bounce regardless of the determinant physical factors then they would have free will wouldn’t they?…If the balls could make decisions…
YES! Precisely - this is what I think the Christian idea of free will is, but I do not think those hypothetical balls would be able to step outside causality, merely to complicate it and be involved deliberately in it.If those balls could choose where to bounce regardless of the determinant physical factors then they would have free will wouldn’t they?
That just leads back to the same dilemma. A chance pattern being completely coherent. With every particle in the universe just happening to be in the right place at the right time, every time, for all time, for no reason at all, to form a coherent picture of a world full of people.… I do not think those hypothetical balls would be able to step outside causality, merely to complicate it and be involved deliberately in it.
I don’t think it only happens in humans. There are a number of other animals that I would say have some degree of free will.If Free Will were solely a matter of material and quantum wouldn’t it seem strange any large enough conglomeration of matter didn’t exhibit it? Wouldn’t it seem strange that it only happens in homosapiens? Why not a rock? There are gigatonnes of rock for every neuron of every person on the planet. Why not trees? There are a great many number of trees for every human being, Why not colonies of bacteria? They far outnumber us. Fish?
Which is whats so strange. A 2 pound rock has as many quantum events occurring as a 2 pound brain, and can be just as chemically active over much longer periods of time. So how do we know that rocks aren’t all telepathic and talking about us in the same light? “Those slimy bio units cannot talk so they must not have free will, anything that dies so quickly would not have time to form free will”. Its a little tongue in cheek here, but the point is that our perceptions of what constitutes an appearance of free will doesn’t matter. All claims to biological necessity are assertions based on our psychological desires to see the world in our terms. Since we have not ever seen anything that we can attribute to free will coming from an entire universe of matter suggests that mere quantum indeterminancy is an insufficient explanation for the appearance of free will among Homo Sapiens.…One of the central components of any entity that can achieve at least the appearance of free will is some apparatus or system of processing information…
The success of science is ample evidence that we transcend physical laws with our insight and ability to use them.Since the power of the mind transcends physical laws…
That it is, or a better way to express it is the brain is enabled by “physical laws”.…and the brain is limited by physical laws
Physical laws determine the brain’s activity but it is directed by the mind.
Then how do you explain our power to transcend physical laws and direct the activity of the brain?(… the mind is independent and not limited by the brain.)
That would be a demonstrably false claim, IMO.![]()
Well, the rocks possessing no voice or body mechanism, could express no discernible volitional activity.Which is whats so strange. A 2 pound rock has as many quantum events occurring as a 2 pound brain, and can be just as chemically active over much longer periods of time. So how do we know that rocks aren’t all telepathic and talking about us in the same light? “Those slimy bio units cannot talk so they must not have free will, anything that dies so quickly would not have time to form free will”. Its a little tongue in cheek here, but the point is that our perceptions of what constitutes an appearance of free will doesn’t matter. All claims to biological necessity are assertions based on our psychological desires to see the world in our terms. Since we have not ever seen anything that we can attribute to free will coming from an entire universe of matter suggests that mere quantum indeterminancy is an insufficient explanation for the appearance of free will among Homo Sapiens.
I’m not going to say with absolute certainty that they don’t. There are some that will hold a panentheistic view that the universe as a whole is a giant mind. For now I’m holding the position that rocks don’t think because it isn’t supported by any evidence (if you have evidence that they do think feel free to present it).Which is whats so strange. A 2 pound rock has as many quantum events occurring as a 2 pound brain, and can be just as chemically active over much longer periods of time. So how do we know that rocks aren’t all telepathic and talking about us in the same light?
It kind of does; there’s different philosophies on what constitutes free will, some of which are incompatible with each other. The question of “what is free will” is deserving of a thread and introductions to free will fill many books. If we nail down a specific description of free will and decide to use it (and if that description allows) then we could remove the perception of free will all together and evaluate whether or not a given system has the agreed upon properties. But if any of the properties can’t be objectively evaluated then even in the agreed upon description there will be room for perception to be introduced.but the point is that our perceptions of what constitutes an appearance of free will doesn’t matter.
I will assume that either is not to be applied to anything I said or it is being misapplied to something I’ve said. As I have not asserted biological necessity. I even made mention computer controlled machines (nonbiological). Biological entities do form a majority of the things I’ve discussed because there are so many examples of them. I have not seen nearly as many non-biological entities that have displayed the appearance of free will. The capabilities that I’ve asserted are an ability to sense the environment, the ability to process the information from those senses, and the ability to act within the environment. I also made mention to cognition and desire, but I never asserted that agents with free will need to be biological.All claims to biological necessity are assertions based on our psychological desires to see the world in our terms.
Quantum indeterminacy wasn’t stated or implied in my response, so I will also assume that is meant for another response until I hear otherwise.Since we have not ever seen anything that we can attribute to free will coming from an entire universe of matter suggests that mere quantum indeterminancy is an insufficient explanation for the appearance of free will among Homo Sapiens.
From the rocks view point our nearly instantaneous existences wouldn’t necessarily seem to express volitional activity either. To them all of biological history may be little more than a slight case of athletes foot. The point being is that life as we know it is not necessarily important to the concept of free will if it is really a buildup from quantum indeterminacy. The argument made implies that all matter should have an emergent free will, because all matter experience the quantum indeterminacy that the argument relies upon. Yet this quantum indeterminacy hasn’t resulted in discernible effects anywhere but Homo Sapiens. That seems awful strange given that the total mass of the observable universe is unimaginably greater than the mass of our physical brains. So quantum indeterminacy seems to be an insufficient explanation for the appearance of free will in the species.Well, the rocks possessing no voice or body mechanism, could express no discernible volitional activity.
ICXC NIKA
You quoted a post from a conversation where we were discussing it. As to the rest see the post immediately above this one for my general response.…Quantum indeterminacy wasn’t stated or implied in my response, so I will also assume that is meant for another response until I hear otherwise.
That’s my point, there is no basis to the assertion that biology or any particular configuration of matter is a prerequisite for free will. So making the claim doesn’t solve the problem that the argument implies all matter should have emergent free will because free will emerges from quantum phenomenon.I’m not going to say with absolute certainty that they don’t…
You are asserting that free will requires a certain configuration of matter. Call it biology, call it a computer. The contention that free will requires a specific configuration is insupportable simply on the basis that such an arrangement is most familiar to us.… I never asserted that agents with free will need to be biological.
You replied to a post in which James had raised an argument from quantum indeterminacy from something he had read. Dennett I think he said.Quantum indeterminacy wasn’t stated or implied in my response, so I will also assume that is meant for another response until I hear otherwise.
Your correct, I did. My apologies. Though one of the points of my response was to show that humans are not the only entities that display free will and to describe some of the necessary components for free will.You replied to a post in which James had raised an argument from quantum indeterminacy from something he had read. Dennett I think he said.
The number of stars in the universe is estimated at 70 sextillion(7*10^22) by the Australian National University. Feel free to disagree with this number and use what ever number you think to represent the number of stars in the universe. Of all of those stars we (humans) have only explored a subset of the worlds that rotate around one of those stars. If we take the entire universe into consideration we are talking abot a collection of items for which an overwhelming majority have never been observed up close. So in trying to make that statement more accurate one can say “That seems awful strange given the small percentage of the total mass of the observable universe that we have examined.” The mass of a human brain doesn’t bear much relevance here. If that is in any way a misrepresentation of reality please let me know. I don’t think that it is.That seems awful strange given that the total mass of the observable universe is unimaginably greater than the mass of our physical brains.
No, I have not asserted that free will requires a certain configuration of matter. I have asserted that an agent with free will be capable of acting within its environment, gathing information about that environment, and being able to process that information in some way. I’ve not constrained that to requiring a certain arrangement of matter. If you remove any of these from a being then you will have destroyed its free will. We humans will limit another beings free will (even other humans) if we find that their excercising of free will is destructive of a nuisance to us (usually through physical restraints such as hand cuffs or prisons).You are asserting that free will requires a certain configuration of matter. Call it biology, call it a computer. The contention that free will requires a specific configuration is insupportable simply on the basis that such an arrangement is most familiar to us.