There are those who propose the idealness of earth for life as a reason to believe the universe was created. Altho I do believe the universe was created, it seems to me that if I proposed this argument to a dedicated atheist, they would just say that of course life arose in the place which happened to be able to support life.
So I was wondering whether there was a part of this argument I was missing the point of?
You seem to be referring to the fine tuning argument.
It is based, roughly, on the idea that certain constants that seem to have impacted the emergence of life are very particular, do not
seem to depend by necessity on the laws of physics, and, if they were slightly altered, would (allegedly) have prevented life from arising.
Earth is ideal, but the argument alleges that the existence of a planet like earth depends on a variety of more basic factors. As such, it does not exactly defeat the argument to say that life obviously arose in the place that supports it, since the claim is that not that
earth happens to support life, but that the universe supports life as a result of a variety of what look like contingent constants.
I think the argument might vindicate some theistic intuitions, but I don’t really find it decisive. I don’t think we know enough about the nature of the laws of physics and other cosmic constants to conclude what we need to. I also feel as though the probabilities involved are largely based on estimates, which is why people on separate sides of the debate come up with the disparate conclusions that life should be exceedingly unlikely and that life should be inevitable.
It may also be the case that life
as we know it would not have emerged if not for these particular constants. But it doesn’t follow that nothing resembling “life” would emerge under different constants. In short, we can’t realistically predict what would be the case if constants of the universe were different; our “modal intuitions” do not extend that far.
Lastly, the fine tuning argument is more vulnerable than are traditional arguments to the charge that it does not rise above deism. Traditional arguments claim that change, efficient causality, perfection, and teleology
right now depend on
ipsum esse subsistens. I think that gets one closer to the traditional notion of God.