The kalam argument

[Gorgias]

Then God is not an existing thing, but is a no-thing.

Close. God is a not-thing, so to speak.

How can something which does not exist cause a material effect like parting the sea for Moses?

Because He is existence itself!

God Himself stated that He exists: “I AM”, where “AM” is a form of the verb ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’.

Wait… using the limitations of human language in order to place limitations on God?!? Oh, that’s rich!

Then God is not alive, despite what He says in the Psalms: “My soul thirsts for God, for the living God .”

I might suggest that you familiarize yourself with Aquinas’ discussion of univocal, equivocal, and analogical language.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

Aquinas, for example, has no care (in his arguments) about whether there was a start to the universe.

Well… I think it’s more like “Aquinas didn’t want to throw out Aristotelian philosophy, which he’d have had to do if he crossed Aristotle’s notion of an uncreated cosmos.” Therefore, he left the question open.

Some modern Thomists break from Aquinas (and Aristotle) in regards to whether an accidentally ordered series can have an infinite regress, and yes, it may be that Aquinas was not personally comfortable breaking from Aristotle on this point. Still, he does explicitly address series ordered this way and does explicitly admit they can proceed to infinity, whatever his motivations. And if he was presented with the Kalam Cosmological Argument, I’d anticipate he’d reject it for that reason. Admittedly I can only speculate. More cogent to my original point, though, his Five Ways do not rely on that type of series and they do not demonstrate a beginning to the universe, something which Aquinas also did not take as a premise in the Five Ways. A temporal beginning to creation may follow as a corollary to the Five Ways and other arguments that Aquinas develops, but the Ways are concerned with the Here And Now at any moment, not the start of the universe.

 

[rossum]

God isn’t “contained” by anything. At best, we could say that He supercedes all sets.

Then He is contained in the set {Things that supercede all sets}. Any description of God: omnipotent, omnipresent, eternal etc. puts God in the set {Things that are omnipotent} etc.

God doesn’t have properties, per se. He is simple, not composite.

So, when the Bible describes God as the “living God” then the Bible is incorrect. Hmmm… You might find that some other Christians disagree with you on that one.

Because He is existence itself!

No. How can a property, such as existence, cause molecules of water to move? You are reifying an adjective in an attempt to make it a noun. Existence is a property/adjective, it is not a noun. Reifying is an error, and is to be avoided.

Wait… using the limitations of human language in order to place limitations on God?!?

Wait… the Bible is written in a human language. Are you telling us to reject the Bible because it is written in Hebrew and Greek, both human languages. All pronouncements of the Catholic Church are similarly written/spoken in human languages. You are on dangerous ground here because you have denied all available sources that tell about God.

 

[Gorgias]

So, when the Bible describes God as the “living God” then the Bible is incorrect. Hmmm… You might find that some other Christians disagree with you on that one.

Again: please read up on Aquinas and “analogical speech”.

No. How can a property, such as existence, cause molecules of water to move? You are reifying an adjective in an attempt to make it a noun. Existence is a property/adjective, it is not a noun. Reifying is an error, and is to be avoided.

We’re not talking “reified”, we’re talking deified.

The reification argument doesn’t hold up, though, since we’re not attempting to make physical an abstract notion. In fact, we would say that you’ve got it quite backward: God is, and later, things in the material universe approach the nature of His essence, in various ways. To put it simply, we reify God’s essence, as it were!

Wait… the Bible is written in a human language. Are you telling us to reject the Bible because it is written in Hebrew and Greek, both human languages.

No, I’m telling you that the Bible – written in human languages – does not place limitations on God, and therefore, insisting that it does is a mischaracterization and misunderstanding of what’s written therein.

You are on dangerous ground here because you have denied all available sources that tell about God.

Nice try, but no. However, you are picking up on a particular and valid and long-known point: nothing we can say or think can completely describe God! He’s beyond that! So, yeah – you’re kinda getting it right, here: we can approach an understanding of God, but not fully ever grasp Him!

 

[rossum]

We’re not talking “reified”, we’re talking deified .

God was always God, so He was never deified. Someone like Herakles started as a human and was later deified. God did not start as a human being.

Reification still remains an error; an adjective is not a noun.

No, I’m telling you that the Bible – written in human languages – does not place limitations on God

So, my use of human language does not place limitations on God either. Why are you complaining?

 

[Gorgias]

God was always God, so He was never deified.

I was trying to be clever. Get it? Reified-deified?

Reification still remains an error; an adjective is not a noun.

I think linguists would disagree with you that language isn’t an ongoing, living, changing process.

So, my use of human language does not place limitations on God either. Why are you complaining?

Because you were arguing that it does:

God Himself stated that He exists: “I AM”, where “AM” is a form of the verb ‘to be’ or ‘to exist’.

See what I mean? You’re relying on the limitations of language in order to ‘prove’ the nature of God. You’ve kind of got it backward: we try – to the best of our ability – to use language to describe God.

 

[HarryStotle]

No. How can a property, such as existence, cause molecules of water to move? You are reifying an adjective in an attempt to make it a noun. Existence is a property/adjective, it is not a noun. Reifying is an error, and is to be avoided.

You speak as if you fully comprehend existence. You call existence “a property,” implying that you completely understand the act of being. I wouldn’t just presume that. Existence is infinitely more than “a property.” Being or existing is quite a different matter from having a property such as size, colour or shape – not that we really understand why anything or anyone would even possess those, to any significant extent.

Your caution that “reifying is an error” likewise presumes you fully comprehend reality to its fundamental ground, but you don’t. You base this claim regarding the error of reification on the presumption that you are capable of making such a declaration, but you don’t really know whether it truly would be an error or not. It fits your assumptions and world view to make such declarations, but that is about all you can claim.

 

[HarryStotle]

Gorgias:

God isn’t “contained” by anything. At best, we could say that He supercedes all sets.

Then He is contained in the set {Things that supercede all sets}. Any description of God: omnipotent, omnipresent, eternal etc. puts God in the set {Things that are omnipotent} etc.

God is not “a thing,” ergo he cannot be in the set of THINGS that supercede all sets. Things, likewise, are not omnipotent, nor omnipresent, nor omniscient. Only God is, and God is NOT a thing.

 

[HarryStotle]

Some modern Thomists break from Aquinas (and Aristotle) in regards to whether an accidentally ordered series can have an infinite regress, and yes, it may be that Aquinas was not personally comfortable breaking from Aristotle on this point. Still, he does explicitly address series ordered this way and does explicitly admit they can proceed to infinity, whatever his motivations.

Actually, I don’t think Aquinas “explicitly admit” an accidentally ordered series can proceed to eternity. He does suggest such an ordered series hasn’t been disproven, but that isn’t the same thing as admitting the possibility. He leaves the question open, though.

Admittedly I haven’t read everything he wrote, so you could help your cause by citing from his work on the subject.

 

[rossum]

You call existence “a property,” implying that you completely understand the act of being.

So, using the word “God” implies that you completely understand God? You are arguing here for our language to be greatly reduced to a minimal vocabulary. That is not a practical proposition. The relationship between language and reality is not simple:

Not only was it difficult for him to comprehend that the generic symbol dog embraces so many unlike individuals of diverse size and form; it bothered him that the dog at three fourteen (seen from the side) should have the same name as the dog at three fifteen (seen from the front).

Borges, “Funes the Memorious”

 

[Wesrock]

Actually, I don’t think Aquinas “explicitly admit” an accidentally ordered series can proceed to eternity. He does suggest such an ordered series hasn’t been disproven, but that isn’t the same thing as admitting the possibility. He leaves the question open, though.

He addresses it in ST I, Q46, A2. His style is to start with the objections a skeptic would make then gives his own reply. These objections actually seem to be a version of the KCA. The question is whether the world having a beginning must be accepted as an article of faith. The objector believes it can be demonstrated.

Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.

Objection 7. Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. ii, text 5).

Objection 8. Further, if the world and generation always were, there have been an infinite number of men. But man’s soul is immortal: therefore an infinite number of human souls would actually now exist, which is impossible. Therefore it can be knownwith certainty that the world began, and not only is it known by faith.

His reply to Objection 7 addresses the point at issue most directly. The emphasis is mine.

Reply to Objection 7. In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se—thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

The last clause after my last emphasis is referring to an essentially ordered series.

But where before I said I speculated that Aquinas would reject the KCA I was wrong. He actually considers a version of it and rejects it explicitly in this question and article.

 

[HarryStotle]

Reply to Objection 7. In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se—thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

Read Article 1, same part…

I answer that, Nothing except God can be eternal. And this statement is far from impossible to uphold: for it has been shown above (I:19:4) that the will of God is the cause of things. Therefore things are necessary, according as it is necessary for God to will them, since the necessity of the effect depends on the necessity of the cause (Metaph. v, text 6). Now it was shown above (I:19:3), that, absolutely speaking, it is not necessary that God should will anything except Himself. It is not therefore necessary for God to will that the world should always exist; but the world exists forasmuch as God wills it to exist, since the being of the world depends on the will of God, as on its cause. It is not therefore necessary for the world to be always; and hence it cannot be proved by demonstration.

From your quote…

But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity “accidentally” as regards efficient causes… What Aquinas seems to be getting at is a kind of theoretical possibility regarding accidental causation. I.e., that theoretically speaking it is possible to multiply causes to infinity. That does not, however take time into consideration. Where causes in time (actual causation) are the subject, he appears to hedge his opinion on the matter.

Continued…

 

[HarryStotle]

There are a number of points in Article 1 that appear to make his position more inconclusive than you seem to think regarding the Kalam. The last sentence in the quote above, makes the point that the “world” (universe) need not exist always, and its necessity cannot be proved by demonstration.

That would mean an infinite series per accidens “in time” isn’t provable by demonstration. Its possibility is, therefore, not established nor held by Aquinas, but left an open question by him.

Also he speaks of “imaginary time” and of “time really existing” in Article 1 …

Reply to Objection 8. God is prior to the world by priority of duration. But the word “prior” signifies priority not of time, but of eternity. Or we may say that it signifies the eternity of imaginary time, and not of time really existing; thus, when we say that above heaven there is nothing, the word “above” signifies only an imaginary place, according as it is possible to imagine other dimensions beyond those of the heavenly body.

This entire section is quite sophisticated and gets into distinctions which are not easily deciphered. I wouldn’t conclude what you suppose so easily. It is necessary to read the entire Question 46 to get the context and understand the distinctions he is attempting to make.

 

[Wesrock]

There are a number of points in Article 1 that appear to make his position more inconclusive than you seem to think regarding the Kalam. The last sentence in the quote above, makes the point that the “world” (universe) need not exist always, and its necessity cannot be proved by demonstration.

By only “God is eternal” he does not mean infinite duration in time, but of God’s necessity for existing without duration or successive moments. Indeed, that paragraph ends with stating that since the world’s eternity is not necessary that it cannot be demonstrated that it is eternal. I think you go too far in your reading. A1 was whether it could be demonstrated that the world was eternal. The objector said it could, Aquinas said they were wrong. That can’t be demonstrated. But A2 asks the opposite, can it be demonstrated that it had a beginning? Aquinas again says no because he rejects the idea that an infinite regress in time or accidental causes is impossible.

Aquinas addresses the question of infinite time in A2 reply to objection 6, though I will quote 5, too.

Objection 5. Further, it is certain that nothing can be equal to God. But if the world had always been, it would be equal to God in duration. Therefore it is certain that the world did not always exist.

Objection 6. Further, if the world always was, the consequence is that infinite days preceded this present day. But it is impossible to pass through an infinite medium. Therefore we should never have arrived at this present day; which is manifestly false.

Reply to Objection 5. Even supposing that the world always was, it would not be equal to God in eternity, as Boethius says (De Consol. v, 6); because the divine Being is all being simultaneously without succession; but with the world it is otherwise.

Reply to Objection 6. Passage is always understood as being from term to term. Whatever bygone day we choose, from it to the present day there is a finite number of days which can be passed through. The objection is founded on the idea that, given two extremes, there is an infinite number of mean terms.

Aquinas specifically denies it’s impossible to demonstrate that the world is either eternal or had a beginning and that it must be taken as an article of faith. He also explicitly in this section writes of series per accidens proceeding to infinity. The point of his reply to objection 7 is in the context of whether objection 7 can prove the world has existed forever. It belongs in that context.

Perhaps he hedged to a solid answer for the purpose of this being a textbook for seminarians and so left out some uncertainty, but as far as the going with what’s in the text, it’s clear he’d have rejected the KCA. As far as the KCA goes, all that matters is that the ST says there’s no contradiction in duration or accidental efficient causes proceeding to infinity. It doesn’t matter that he also thinks the eternity of the world is equally undemonstrable.

Sorry for the rushed post.

 

[Wesrock]

That would mean an infinite series per accidens “in time” isn’t provable by demonstration. Its possibility is, therefore, not established nor held by Aquinas, but left an open question by him.

No, he’s saying it can’t be proved that it’s a historical fact that the universe has existed for infinite duration. He isn’t leaving the question of whether an accidental series of efficient causes could proceed to infinity or whether an infinite duration of time are possible. He explicitly says in A2 that because they are possible it can’t be demonstrated that the world had a beginning.

To paraphrase, “It can’t be demonstrated that the world is eternal, but it also can’t be demonstrated that it had a beginning because objections that you can’t have infinite time before the present or an infinite number of accidental efficient causes up to the present fail, because such series are possible.”

 

[HarryStotle]

HarryStotle:

That would mean an infinite series per accidens “in time” isn’t provable by demonstration. Its possibility is, therefore, not established nor held by Aquinas, but left an open question by him.

No, he’s saying it can’t be proved that it’s a historical fact that the universe has existed for infinite duration. He isn’t leaving the question of whether an accidental series of efficient causes could proceed to infinity or whether an infinite duration of time are possible. He explicitly says in A2 that because they are possible it can’t be demonstrated that the world had a beginning.

The logic doesn’t follow. Merely because Aquinas admits an infinite accidental series of causes is possible does not imply “it CANNOT be demonstrated that the world (the universe) had a beginning.”

Mere possibility does not entail inevitability. The beginning of the universe might be demonstrated on other grounds – the BGV Theorem, for example. If the universe’s beginning can be demonstrated based upon its internal workings, then it CAN be demonstrated that the universe had a beginning. The mere possibility of an infinite accidental series does not logically imply that, therefore, the beginning of the universe CANNOT be demonstrated. That just doesn’t follow, logically.

 

[Wesrock]

Wesrock:

HarryStotle:

That would mean an infinite series per accidens “in time” isn’t provable by demonstration. Its possibility is, therefore, not established nor held by Aquinas, but left an open question by him.

No, he’s saying it can’t be proved that it’s a historical fact that the universe has existed for infinite duration. He isn’t leaving the question of whether an accidental series of efficient causes could proceed to infinity or whether an infinite duration of time are possible. He explicitly says in A2 that because they are possible it can’t be demonstrated that the world had a beginning.

The logic doesn’t follow. Merely because Aquinas admits an infinite accidental series of causes is possible does not imply “it CANNOT be demonstrated that the world (the universe) had a beginning.”

Mere possibility does not entail inevitability. The beginning of the universe might be demonstrated on other grounds – the BGV Theorem, for example. If the universe’s beginning can be demonstrated based upon its internal workings, then it CAN be demonstrated that the universe had a beginning. The mere possibility of an infinite accidental series does not logically imply that, therefore, the beginning of the universe CANNOT be demonstrated. That just doesn’t follow, logically.

Now you take my meaning too far. Aquinas personally believed a beginning could not be demonstrated from natural reason alone and that it must be accepted as an article of faith. Maybe he was wrong on that. He also personally rejected the notion that a beginning could be demonstrated by either of the following two methods:

1. By arguing that a series of accidental efficient causes could proceed to infinity
2. By arguing that it was illogical to have an infinite duration of time before the present day.

The first he said failed because he argued that such a series could proceed to infinity. The second he said failed because movement between any two points in time could be measured in finite numbers of units. He also rejected a few other arguments that attempted to show a beginning through natural reason.

Maybe he was wrong.

But that is what he wrote, and it amounts to him personally rejecting the primary arguments of the KCA. This is done explicitly in the Summa Theologica. That’s all I said.

The BGV Theorem would not have been knowable to Aquinas, anyway, as such measurements or knowledge of cosmology and the inflationary model were not possible for him to know with his resources. But the BGV Theorem, so far as I understand it, is something else entirely and doesn’t contradict the specific refutations he made to the arguments presented to him.

 

[AlNg]

By only “God is eternal” he does not mean infinite duration in time, but of God’s necessity for existing without duration or successive moments.

If God exists without duration or successive moments, how could He then become man on earth during a particular time period.

But the BGV Theorem, so far as I understand it,

How do you understand the BGV theorem? I am afraid it has been misapplied.

 

[HarryStotle]

Wesrock:

By only “God is eternal” he does not mean infinite duration in time, but of God’s necessity for existing without duration or successive moments.

If God exists without duration or successive moments, how could He then become man on earth during a particular time period.

God, as God exists without duration or successive moments, but Jesus as man existed in time, during a particular period of time. Eleanore Stump and Norman Kretzmann dealt with issues relating eternity and time in this paper:

https://doc-0g-20-docs.googleuserco...707/*/0Bwre_fqicQ1pUTY3Z0ljOG51Sm8?e=download

 

[AlNg]

Jesus as man existed in time

Was Jesus God? Was God a man for all eternity or did He change and become a man 2000 years ago?