P
polytropos
Guest
I’m not saying that it’s not a deductive argument, and I’m not saying it’s invalid. I am saying that the propositions about great-making properties that you have given us make it epistemically circular. I can claim that any property is possible by claiming that it’s a great-making property, because great-making properties are defined as not entailing their negations. But that is where the circularity comes in: if I claimed that p is possible because p is F and Fs don’t entail ~F, then I am transferring the possibility claim to the claim that p is F. I am just saying that p is of a kind which is definitionally possible. As such, the claim that p is F assumes that p is possible, which is what we want to show.The MPA is a demonstrative argument; it basically argues that one proposition (maximal greatness is possible) is equivalent to true proposition (great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties). In other words, it is a deductive argument. Take for example the Kalam Argument. Premise 2 of it says that the universe began to exist. But given the fact that everything that begins to exist has a cause, doesn’t that mean that it’s equivalent to the conclusion, that the universe has a cause? You see, if you use that kind of argumentation to try to prove that an argument is circular, deductive arguments begin to collapse.