The Modal Ontological Argument

[belorg]

Do you remember that kid in your high school class who was neither a good athlete or student, but did all kinds of antics in the classroom to call attention to himself?

I don’t think I attended high school together with you, so, no, I do not remember that kid.

 

[tonyrey]

So, the only thing you can do to counter my argument is begging the question. I think this says it all.
Thanks for the discussion.

To accuse some one of begging the question implies that there **is **a question - which you deny!

 

[polytropos]

The point is that my argument does not beg the question. Premise 1 does not soleley rely on the conclusion (God is impossible) being true.
My request to CatholicSoxFan was to tell me which necssary truth premise 1 of my argument violates. The only answer he has been able to give so far is that it violates the necessary truth of God’s existence, which is exactly what we are trying to establish. So, in saying that W1 is impossible because God is necssary, CatholicSoxFan begs the question.

I don’t find CatholicSoxFan’s argument very strong (as I’ve articulated, I don’t think the modal perfection argument offers the premise that God possibly exists much support), but I do think that your W1 begs the question. Supposing that there is a world with a single contingent entity is equivalent to supposing that no necessary beings exist. That seems to be a very strong metaphysical claim, and it is clearly distant from our modal intuitions. That seems to be a good reason to doubt your premise 1.

That said, you did define the particle as “simple” and “eternal,” and you later specified that it need not be physical (as would seem to be required if it is simple and eternal). I think that it might be open to a theist to argue that a simple, eternal, nonphysical “particle” (whatever nonphysical entity that is meant to signify) would necessarily be God.

I don’t think CatholicSoxFan’s argument, though, has the metaphysical apparatus necessary for that end.

 

[belorg]

I don’t find CatholicSoxFan’s argument very strong (as I’ve articulated, I don’t think the modal perfection argument offers the premise that God possibly exists much support), but I do think that your W1 begs the question. Supposing that there is a world with a single contingent entity is equivalent to supposing that no necessary beings exist

I don’t claim the entity in W1 is contingent, polytropos.
Begging the question means that the only reason to accept a premise is if you accept the conclusion. A world with only one particle is possible does not entail all by itself that god is impossible.

That seems to be a very strong metaphysical claim, and it is clearly distant from our modal intuitions. That seems to be a good reason to doubt your premise 1.

Actually, my premise 1 is a very mundane claim.

That said, you did define the particle as “simple” and “eternal,” and you later specified that it need not be physical (as would seem to be required if it is simple and eternal). I think that it might be open to a theist to argue that a simple, eternal, nonphysical “particle” (whatever nonphysical entity that is meant to signify) would necessarily be God.

It may be open to the theist to argue this, but that would require a completely different argument.

 

[belorg]

To accuse some one of begging the question implies that there **is **a question - which you deny!

Do you have any idea what begging the question means, Tony?

 

[polytropos]

I don’t claim the entity in W1 is contingent, polytropos.

I am not talking about a necessary particle.

You have also claimed that it is possible. If it is neither impossible nor necessary, then it is contingent.

Begging the question means that the only reason to accept a premise is if you accept the conclusion. A world with only one particle is possible does not entail all by itself that god is impossible.

Your statements about the particle (that is is possible and not necessary) imply that it is contingent. A world in which only a contingent entity exists is possible if and only if no necessary beings are possible.

It may be open to the theist to argue this, but that would require a completely different argument.

Agreed.

 

[belorg]

You have also claimed that it is possible. If it is neither impossible nor necessary, then it is contingent.

I don’t claim it is necessary, but neither do I claim it’s not necessary. I simply make no claims about necessity

Your statements about the particle (that is is possible and not necessary) imply that it is contingent. A world in which only a contingent entity exists is possible if and only if no necessary beings are possible.

You completely misunderstand this.

 

[polytropos]

You completely misunderstand this.

This seems a bit uncharitable. It is reasonable to conclude from the statement “I’m not talking about a necessary particle” that the particle was not meant to be necessary. There also does not seem to be anything wrong with what I said: If the particle is contingent, then claiming the consistency of W1 is equivalent to claiming that there are no necessary beings.

I don’t claim it is necessary, but neither do I claim it’s not necessary. I simply make no claims about necessity

If you claim that it is possible, then it is either contingent or necessary. If it’s contingent, then as I’ve argued, the consistency of W1 is doubtful. If it is necessary, then your second premise does not follow from it, for you have not ruled out that your not-necessarily-physical, eternal, simple particle is God. In that case, the only attributes we have predicated of it are also traditionally predicated of God.

 

[belorg]

This seems a bit uncharitable. It is reasonable to conclude from the statement “I’m not talking about a necessary particle” that the particle was not meant to be necessary. There also does not seem to be anything wrong with what I said: If the particle is contingent, then claiming the consistency of W1 is equivalent to claiming that there are no necessary beings.

“I am not talking about a necessary particle” is not the same as "I am talking about a non-necssary particle, polytropos. The second is your interpretation of what I say and it’s wrong.
I make no claim as to the necessity or contingency of the particle. If I truly claimed it was contingent, then claiming the consistency of W1 would be equivalent to claiming there are no necessary beings, which, BTW, would not make my arguiment question-begging, but since I remain neutral about the necessity or contingency, so W1 is not equivalent to claiming there are no necssary beings.

If you claim that it is possible, then it is either contingent or necessary.

I can be either necessary or contingent, I make no claim about that.

If it’s contingent, then as I’ve argued, the consistency of W1 is doubtful.

There is nothing doubtful about it.

If it is necessary, then your second premise does not follow from it, for you have not ruled out that your not-necessarily-physical, eternal, simple particle is God. In that case, the only attributes we have predicated of it are also traditionally predicated of God.

God is not traditionally called a particle. God is personal. I could add ‘non-personal’ or whatever. The point is that the particle I propose is far simpler as a hypothesis than God, so there is no reason why this much simpler hypothesis should not be possible whereas an outrageously complex hypothesis like God should be possible.
And keep in mind that I am not claiming the entity God is complex, I am claiming that the hypothesis “God” is far more complex than the hypothesis "an eternal particle.

 

[polytropos]

“I am not talking about a necessary particle” is not the same as "I am talking about a non-necssary particle, polytropos. The second is your interpretation of what I say and it’s wrong.

I didn’t say that my interpretation was right, just that it was reasonable. (The rest of my post took into consideration that you aren’t claiming it is necessary.)

I make no claim as to the necessity or contingency of the particle. If I truly claimed it was contingent, then claiming the consistency of W1 would be equivalent to claiming there are no necessary beings, which, BTW, would not make my arguiment question-begging, but since I remain neutral about the necessity or contingency, so W1 is not equivalent to claiming there are no necssary beings.

You do make a claim about its necessity or contingency: that it is possible. Anything that is not impossible is either necessary or contingent. As such, anyone is free to produce a constructive dilemma based on whether the particle is necessary or contingent.

There is nothing doubtful about it.

I regard a claim that insists that a world with no necessary beings, without supporting argument against the existence of necessary beings, as doubtful. To claim that a necessary being exists is a weaker claim, since it is a claim about the existence of a single entity. A claim about a world with no necessary beings is a claim about all future claims about necessary beings, and is as such a very strong claim. (Note this paragraph is about the conditional beginning with “If it’s contingent…”.)

God is not traditionally called a particle.

Particles are not traditionally called nonphysical.

God is personal. I could add ‘non-personal’ or whatever. The point is that the particle I propose is far simpler as a hypothesis than God, so there is no reason why this much simpler hypothesis should not be possible whereas an outrageously complex hypothesis like God should be possible.
And keep in mind that I am not claiming the entity God is complex, I am claiming that the hypothesis “God” is far more complex than the hypothesis "an eternal particle.

Fair enough. I am not defending the modal ontological argument here, so I don’t care to argue that “God possibly exists” can be found a priori more likely than your particle.

I’d maintain that if the particle is contingent, then the consistency of W1 depends on the nonexistence of any proposed necessary being, in which case W1 is not a simple hypothesis at all. So unless it is argued that the particle is necessary, I do not find your argument convincing.

That said, it seems like I could also argue: Why not an arbitrary number of simple, eternal, nonphysical, necessary particles? (Or similarly simple hypothetical entities?) If any such entities were to exist, W1 would be inconsistent (I am now working on the conditional which begins with “If it’s necessary…”), since it asserts that only 1 exists. (I think a premise like “There is a possible world in which only God exists” is equally dubious, unless one were to argue for it based on other epistemically prior premises having to do with the nature of God, for it claims that God is the only necessary being, which is a strong claim about every other proposed necessary being.)

As such, I find problems with either disjunct of “If the W1 is possible, then it is either contingent or necessary.” (Implicit or explicit) claims about necessary entities can be very strong, if they are to delimit the number of necessary entities in an argument that simply appeals to the consistency of a possible world. Therefore I find good reason to doubt the antecedent, that W1 is possible.

 

[polytropos]

The point is that the particle I propose is far simpler as a hypothesis than God, so there is no reason why this much simpler hypothesis should not be possible whereas an outrageously complex hypothesis like God should be possible.

Now that I have thought about it a bit more, to clarify some of the points of my last post, I think we have to disambiguate the particle you propose and the possible world (W1) you propose. The former may be “much simpler” as a hypothesis, but for the reasons I’ve given, the latter is a very strong claim. A theist proposing a modal argument (not that I am endorsing CatholicSoxFan’s) is claiming that there is a possible world in which God exists (or perhaps, there is a possible world in which no contingent beings exist). Someone proposing W1 is suggesting (depending on whether the particle is contingent or necessary) that either no necessary beings exist or that the only necessary entity is belorg’s particle. The latter is a much stronger claim, even if the particle qua entity is a simpler hypothesis, because the theist is remaining silent about necessary entities in general.

The existence claims being made by the theist and by belorg are not analogous.

 

[tonyrey]

*To accuse some one of begging the question implies that there **is ***

In this context it means you are assuming nothing is necessary - which is not self-evident.

 

[polytropos]

Definition: a belorg particle is an eternal, simple, not-necessarily-physical, either contingent or necessary particle.
Let W1 be a possible world in which a single belorg particle exists.
Let W1’ be a possible world in which a single contingent belorg particle exists.
Let W1* be a possible world in which a single necessary belorg particle exists.

1. If W1 is possible, then W1 is either contingent or necessary. (analytic)
2. If W1 is possible, then either W1’ or W1* is possible.
3. Suppose W1’ is a possible world.
   2a. W1’ is not consistent with W2, a possible world in which a contingent belorg particle exists and a necessary belorg particle exists, and nothing else.
   2b. We do not have a good reason to suppose W1’ is possible while W2 is not.
   2c. Therefore, W1’ is not possible.
4. Suppose W1* is a possible world.
   3a. W1* is not consistent with W3, a possible world in which two necessary belorg particles exist, and nothing else.
   3b. We do not have a good reason to suppose W1* is possible while W3 is not.
   3c. Therefore, W1* is not possible.
5. Neither W1’ nor W1* is possible.
6. Therefore, W1 is not possible.

In short, if we do not reject the case that belorg particles are necessary, then any proposed world which excludes non-belorg particles will be susceptible to these counterexamples. We have no reason to suppose that W1 is possible rather than W2 or W3, but they are all inconsistent with each other, because there are necessary belorg particles in W2 and W3 that are not in W1’ or W1*. This is why there is a difference between claims about whether there are any worlds that contain some necessary entity, and whether there are worlds which contain one and only one entity.

Likewise, it would be problematic for me to say, “There is a possible world in which only God exists.” The reason is that we don’t know that God has not willed a belorg particle to exist in all possible worlds. The stipulation that God is the only being in some world makes an implicit claim about any other proposed necessary entities.

 

[belorg]

Again, you misunderstand the argument. The reason why I don’t define the belorg particle as necssary or contingent is precisely because of what you are trying to show here.

1. Suppose W1’ is a possible world.
   2a. W1’ is not consistent with W2, a possible world in which a contingent belorg particle exists and a necessary belorg particle exists, and nothing else.
   2b. We do not have a good reason to suppose W1’ is possible while W2 is not.
   2c. Therefore, W1’ is not possible.

 

[belorg]

In this context it means you are assuming nothing is necessary - which is not self-evident.

No, I am not assuming this.

 

[tonyrey]

In this context it means you are assuming nothing is necessary - which is not self-evident.

Then you agree that “something” is necessary? Or are you completely in the dark?

 

[belorg]

Then you agree that “something” is necessary? Or are you completely in the dark?

It may very well be that “something” is necessary, but there is no conclusive evidence either way.

 

[polytropos]

Again, you misunderstand the argument. The reason why I don’t define the belorg particle as necssary or contingent is precisely because of what you are trying to show here.

Your argument does not evade the problem. It does not matter if you do not specify. As long as you claim that W1 is possible, the particle will be either contingent or necessary. If we have no reason to believe either case, then we have no reason to believe that W1 is a possible world. And there are problems for it in either case, stemming from the fact that you are dictating that in W1 the belorg particle (whether it is contingent or necessary) is the only thing in that world.

If we are to believe such a world with a single belorg particle is possible, then why not a world with that belorg particle and another necessary belorg particle in addition? But those worlds are inconsistent. So one would have to deny the possibility that belorg particles can be necessary. But then W1 would just be the assertion of a world with necessary beings, and is as such a much stronger and less simple “hypothesis” then a claim that some possible world contains a single necessary being. (And so it is not really on par with the existence claim being made by a theist.)

If belorg’s particle is contingent then we do have a good reason to suppose that W2 is not possible because we have to consider premise 1 on its own. If there is nothing contradicting a necssary truth in premise 1, then premsie 1 is possible and **if **we consider belorg’s particle contingent, then if follows that W2 is impossible.
But nothing in my argument hints at which possibility you should choose.

A possible world, polytropos, is a world without logical contradictions. My world does not contain any logical contradiction, so it is, all other things being equal, a possible world.
Now of course, there can be reasons to prefer one possibility over the other, and if two possibilities are mutually exclusive, then there is a conflict, but that’s exactly what I aim to show with my argument. If Soxfan’s arguemnts is correct, then my W1 is not possible, but likewise, if my argument succeeds, then his argument fails.
And, just by considering both arguments on their own, we cannot conclude who is correct, which makes both my argument and his, on their own, worthless.

You are right that the issue is that there is nothing to indicate which possibility should be chosen. But that is what makes W1 untenable. There is no reason to regard W1 as more likely than W2. This highlights the problem with dictating by fiat that there are worlds in which particular necessary entities do not exist.

Where I think you are wrong is that the analogy with CatholicSoxFan’s argument breaks down. He is not dictating that some necessary entity does not exist in some possible world. He is claiming that God exists in some possible world. The difference can be seen by the fact that your W1 imposes broad and sweeping restrictions on the possibility of necessary beings (if we consider any necessary being after accepting the possibility of W1, we are committed to throwing out either the necessary being or W1), while CatholicSoxFan’s does not.

Now I don’t think CatholicSoxFan’s argument succeeds for other reasons. But his claims are weaker than yours, even if a belorg particle in itself and a priori is a simpler hypothesis than God.

To say that there is no possible world in which only God exists would be a heresy for a Catholic. God willing a belorg particle (I like the name, sounds like it’s on par with a Higgs boson ) in every possible world is inconsistent with God’s freedom and makes God an automaton.

It doesn’t seem to follow from the fact that God wills something in all possible worlds that God is an automaton. In all possible worlds in which I win the lottery, I donate some of it to charity. It does not follow that I don’t donate my winnings freely, or that I was required by winning to donate. To say otherwise is to project the logical term necessary onto metaphysics.

I think a good argument for God would determine that all other beings are dependent on God, and so there are possible worlds in which only God exists, but I think declaring as much from the beginning is not tenable. But that is essentially what W1 does.

 

[empther]

Originally Posted by tonyrey
Then you agree that “something” is necessary? Or are you completely in the dark?

It may very well be that “something” is necessary, but there is no conclusive evidence either way.

It’s always a pleasure to read Aquinas,
after reading belorg.

From the five ways: Summa Q2 Art 3

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not.** Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence — which is absurd. **Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. **Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. say goodby to the infinite past idea ] ** Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

 

[belorg]

Your argument does not evade the problem. It does not matter if you do not specify. As long as you claim that W1 is possible, the particle will be either contingent or necessary. If we have no reason to believe either case, then we have no reason to believe that W1 is a possible world. And there are problems for it in either case, stemming from the fact that you are dictating that in W1 the belorg particle (whether it is contingent or necessary) is the only thing in that world.

I am not dictating anything. I am saying that, considering the arguiment of its own, which you are not doing, W1 is possible. W1 may very well be inconsistent with other world that seem equally possible at first sight, but my argument is specifically set up to show that CatholicSoxFans argument is also inconsistent with other possible worlds.

If we are to believe such a world with a single belorg particle is possible, then why not a world with that belorg particle and another necessary belorg particle in addition? But those worlds are inconsistent. So one would have to deny the possibility that belorg particles can be necessary.

Without reference to other PW’s, the world you describe is also possible. Bothy worlds are not compossible, so at least one of them must be impossible, but that’s another matter.

But then W1 would just be the assertion of a world with necessary beings, and is as such a much stronger and less simple “hypothesis” then a claim that some possible world contains a single necessary being. (And so it is not really on par with the existence claim being made by a theist.)

I can also claim it is possible that there is world with only one necessary being. There is nothing impossible about that. The compossibility of worlds is not relevant here.

You are right that the issue is that there is nothing to indicate which possibility should be chosen. But that is what makes W1 untenable. There is no reason to regard W1 as more likely than W2. This highlights the problem with dictating by fiat that there are worlds in which particular necessary entities do not exist.

There is no dictating anywhere.

Where I think you are wrong is that the analogy with CatholicSoxFan’s argument breaks down. He is not dictating that some necessary entity does not exist in some possible world.He is claiming that God exists in some possible world. The difference can be seen by the fact that your W1 imposes broad and sweeping restrictions on the possibility of necessary beings (if we consider any necessary being after accepting the possibility of W1, we are committed to throwing out either the necessary being or W1), while CatholicSoxFan’s does not.

If we accept CatholicSoxFan’s world with God, we are forced to throw out W1 and as long as no independent reason is given why we should throw it out, we have no reason to do so.

It doesn’t seem to follow from the fact that God wills something in all possible worlds that God is an automaton. In all possible worlds in which I win the lottery, I donate some of it to charity. It does not follow that I don’t donate my winnings freely, or that I was required by winning to donate. To say otherwise is to project the logical term necessary onto metaphysics.

You do not donate your winnings in every possible world.

I think a good argument for God would determine that all other beings are dependent on God, and so there are possible worlds in which only God exists, but I think declaring as much from the beginning is not tenable. But that is essentially what W1 does.

Declaring this from the beginning is what possible world semantics is all about. From the beginning every world that contains no contardiction is a possible world.