The Modal Ontological Argument

[empther]

Originally Posted by polytropos
Your argument does not evade the problem. It does not matter if you do not specify. As long as you claim that W1 is possible, the particle will be either contingent or necessary. If we have no reason to believe either case, then we have no reason to believe that W1 is a possible world.

Since W1 does not exist,
it cannot legitimately be used in an argument for God’s non-existence.
Apples and oranges. Can’t get there from here. Setting a mountain on a cloud. And certainly not the ‘evidence’ the atheists keep demanding. :bigyikes: :extrahappy:

 

[belorg]

It’s always a pleasure to read Aquinas,
after reading belorg.

From the five ways: Summa Q2 Art 3

It’s a pleasure to read Aqiunas if you understand what he is saying, which, obviously, you don’t as is painfully clear from your “say goodby to the infinite past idea” Because that is not what Aquinas is saying at all.

 

[empther]

It’s a pleasure to read Aqiunas if you understand what he is saying, which, obviously, you don’t as is painfully clear from your “say goodby to the infinite past idea” Because that is not what Aquinas is saying at all.

Atheists need to hang on to the infinite past theory or they’re out of business.

An infinite past would make an infinite series of necessary causes possible. That is obviously what Aquinas is saying as anybody can see for themselves if they have any reading comprehension at all.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

I think this is a good time to bring up the Leibniz Argument.

 

[belorg]

Atheists need to hang on to the infinite past theory or they’re out of business.

**An infinite past would make an infinite series of necessary causes possible. ** That is obviously what Aquinas is saying as anybody can see for themselves if they have any reading comprehension at all.

I am afraid that there is something wrong with your reading comprehension, empther, because that is definitely not what Aquinas is saying.
A friendly advice: stick to the Super Bowl.

 

[belorg]

I think this is a good time to bring up the Leibniz Argument.

Which is not an ontological argument, but a cosmological argument. So, I have no idea why you bring it up here.

 

[raikou]

Atheists need to hang on to the infinite past theory or they’re out of business.

An infinite past would make an infinite series of necessary causes possible. That is obviously what Aquinas is saying as anybody can see for themselves if they have any reading comprehension at all.

What do you mean by the “infinite past theory?” Do you mean the theory that the universe could have always existed? Because my friend, St Thomas also said that it is also possible for the universe to have always existed and it is not necessarily incompatible with God being the First Cause.

newadvent.org/summa/1046.htm

What can be said about the possibility of an infinite duration of existence is not necessarily true for the infinite chain of causes. Duration of existence and the chain of causes are two different concepts.

But all is well. I thought the same before. It doesn’t mean that your other arguments aren’t making sense.

 

[raikou]

BTW, on the topic: at first I thought the ontological argument has no use because it initially seems like a circular thing. But I’m starting to understand that it’s really useful.

For atheists who try to escape the “argument from design” by a “multiverse theory” where this seemingly designed universe that we have is held to be merely one of the possible universe given us by the great and mighty “chance,” they will still have to grapple with the possibility of God existing in another possible universe. But if it’s possible for God to exist in another universe, then God must exist in all universes.

You see, these people who are open to other existing possible universes for which we have no evidence whatsover should also be open to the possibility of God existing in another universe, if they should be consistent with their principles.

 

[raikou]

1 There is a possible world (W1)in which there is only one simple, eternal particle, (and maybe some abstract objects, depending on your view of their ontological status).
2 God (a maximally great being who is omniscient etc…) does not exist in W1. (from 1)

3 Therefore God is impossible.

Now, if the theist is going to (and they have to, in order to deny the conclusion that God is impossible) claim that the existence of W1 contradicts a necessary truth, I think they have to back it up, and not just say they don’t have to because they’re a theist.

I am not talking about a necessary particle.

If the particle in the argument is not necessary, then it is merely contingent. If it is contingent, then it is possible for it not to have existed. But if at one point, it can not have existed, it wouldn’t be eternal. Therefore, that non-necessary eternal particle is a contradiction of terms. Therefore, that particle is not possible. The argument’s P1 is refuted.

 

[polytropos]

I am saying that, considering the arguiment of its own, which you are not doing, W1 is possible. W1 may very well be inconsistent with other world that seem equally possible at first sight, but my argument is specifically set up to show that CatholicSoxFans argument is also inconsistent with other possible worlds.

Without reference to other PW’s, the world you describe is also possible. Bothy worlds are not compossible, so at least one of them must be impossible, but that’s another matter.

I can also claim it is possible that there is world with only one necessary being. There is nothing impossible about that. The compossibility of worlds is not relevant here.

Compossibility of worlds is relevant here. The only reason your argument could have any force at all is because W1 is incompossible with P2 of the modal ontological argument. I am arguing that the problem is on your end, ie. my examples show that, contrary to your claims, W1 is not a simpler hypothesis that SoxFan’s P2 (and this is true even if belorg particles in themselves are simpler hypotheses than God).

W1 makes a stronger claim because it commits us to a negative position with respect to an arbitrary number of other possible worlds. As such, it does not win out when compared with P2 of SoxFan’s argument (which I regard as problematic for him, since I don’t buy the modal perfection argument).

If we accept CatholicSoxFan’s world with God, we are forced to throw out W1 and as long as no independent reason is given why we should throw it out, we have no reason to do so.

I agree. But this does not change the fact that positing possible worlds in which there are no necessary beings is to make a very strong claim (a stronger claim than to posit a possible world with a necessary being).
1). There is a world in which a belorg particle exists.
2). There is a world in which only a belorg particle exists.
The former is actually a weaker claim than CatholicSoxFan’s world with God (if it is true that belorg particles are simpler hypotheses). But the latter is not.

 

[polytropos]

For atheists who try to escape the “argument from design” by a “multiverse theory” where this seemingly designed universe that we have is held to be merely one of the possible universe given us by the great and mighty “chance,” they will still have to grapple with the possibility of God existing in another possible universe. But if it’s possible for God to exist in another universe, then God must exist in all universes.

You see, these people who are open to other existing possible universes for which we have no evidence whatsover should also be open to the possibility of God existing in another universe, if they should be consistent with their principles.

Multiverse theory and possible world semantics are not quite the same thing. There being a multiverse would not imply that God exists in some multiverse.

The premise that God exists in some possible worlds seems problematic either way. The argument is capitalizing on S5, which says that “possibly necessary” is just “necessary.” But then the issue is that anyone familiar with S5 will know that “Possibly, God exists” is logically equivalent to “Necessarily, God exists.” So such a premise requires additional support. (Multiverse theory would not give that support.)

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Which is not an ontological argument, but a cosmological argument. So, I have no idea why you bring it up here.

You seemed to be talking about things related to infinite regresses, and other things related to cosmological arguments.

 

[belorg]

Compossibility of worlds is relevant here. The only reason your argument could have any force at all is because W1 is incompossible with P2 of the modal ontological argument. I am arguing that the problem is on your end, ie. my examples show that, contrary to your claims, W1 is not a simpler hypothesis that SoxFan’s P2 (and this is true even if belorg particles in themselves are simpler hypotheses than God).

Compossibility is not relevant to judge the possibility of one world.

W1 makes a stronger claim because it commits us to a negative position with respect to an arbitrary number of other possible worlds. As such, it does not win out when compared with P2 of SoxFan’s argument (which I regard as problematic for him, since I don’t buy the modal perfection argument).

It doesn’t commit us to anything, just as the ontological argument doesn’t commit us to anything.
And I agree, if my argument was set out to disporve God, you would have some sort of a point. But my argument is set out to show that it is not the case that something should be consiered possible if it doesn’t contradict a necessary truth. And that’s where compossibility comes in.
But compossibility cannot be judged by merely looking at the premises of an argument.

I agree. But this does not change the fact that positing possible worlds in which there are no necessary beings is to make a very strong claim (a stronger claim than to posit a possible world with a necessary being).

On its own, a claim that does not commit us to a necessary or contingent being is literally infinitely weaker than a claim to posit a possible world with a necessary being. And that’s because a necssary being exist in all possible worlds, which , as far as we now is an infinite number. And infinity divided by one is infinity.

1). There is a world in which a belorg particle exists.
2). There is a world in which only a belorg particle exists.
The former is actually a weaker claim than CatholicSoxFan’s world with God (if it is true that belorg particles are simpler hypotheses). But the latter is not.

The latter is a minimal claim. Just considering possibility on its own, there is nothing contradicting an established necessary truth in a one belorg particle world, which doesn’t mean that a multiple belorg particle world is not possible. But the belorg particle is just about as simple as you can get (I can make it simpler if you like). So, what I am proposing is the simplest of all possible worlds. So, it is about the weakest claim or hypothesis anybody could make. That its implications are far-reaching has nothing to do with the simplicity of the actual hypothesis.

Anyway, Maydole’s Ontological Argument is one of the only to actually argue for the possibility of this maximally great being. It’s a pity that CatholicSoxFan did not emphasize this aspects of Maydole’s argument. That would make an interesting discussion.

 

[belorg]

You seemed to be talking about things related to infinite regresses, and other things related to cosmological arguments.

I was just replying to empther, who completely misunderstood what Aquinas was saying.
I am not committed to any sort of infinite regress.

 

[belorg]

If the particle in the argument is not necessary, then it is merely contingent. If it is contingent, then it is possible for it not to have existed. But if at one point, it can not have existed, it wouldn’t be eternal. Therefore, that non-necessary eternal particle is a contradiction of terms. Therefore, that particle is not possible. The argument’s P1 is refuted.

You are confusing Aquinas’ use of necessary , which means something like ‘eternal and indestructible’ with logically necssary, which means that its non-exsitence would violate some logical truth.
There is nothing contradictory in an eternal, contingent entity. Richard Swinburne e.g. believes God is such a being.

 

[belorg]

Multiverse theory and possible world semantics are not quite the same thing. There being a multiverse would not imply that God exists in some multiverse.

The premise that God exists in some possible worlds seems problematic either way. The argument is capitalizing on S5, which says that “possibly necessary” is just “necessary.” But then the issue is that anyone familiar with S5 will know that “Possibly, God exists” is logically equivalent to “Necessarily, God exists.” So such a premise requires additional support. (Multiverse theory would not give that support.)

Yes, and Maydole’s argument actually tries to give additional support. I don’t think it succeeds, but it’s a bit harder to refute than e.g. Plantinga’s version.

 

[raikou]

Okay, so I missed this conversation about the particle being necessary vs contingent.

I can be either necessary or contingent, I make no claim about that.

If you’ve claimed that the “non-personal” particle is eternal, then it cannot be contingent. If it can only be either necessary or contingent, then the particle should be necessary.

If that’s the case, I agree that the theist will only need to demonstrate that the necessary being you have conceived still requires the existence of a personal God by means of other proofs (ex. Argument from necessity and the First Cause argument) in order to refute P1 or P2.

 

[belorg]

Okay, so I missed this conversation about the particle being necessary vs contingent.

If you’ve claimed that the “non-personal” particle is eternal, then it cannot be contingent.

That is simply false. Brute facts can be eternal.

 

[raikou]

You are confusing Aquinas’ use of necessary , which means something like ‘eternal and indestructible’ with logically necssary, which means that its non-exsitence would violate some logical truth.
There is nothing contradictory in an eternal, contingent entity. Richard Swinburne e.g. believes God is such a being.

Okay. It’s good that you have clarified what you mean by your terms, because it would indeed be contradictory in another sense of the term.

 

[raikou]

That is simply false. Brute facts can be eternal.

It’s not simply false. It’s simply a case of differences in definition. My statement is true if contingent referred to “real beings that can not exist at some point.” Such a thing cannot be an eternal being. Likewise, an eternal being cannot not exist at some point, and therefore cannot be contingent.