The Modal Ontological Argument

[empther]

So, you have to have evidence of something before you define it?

No. You can dream up all the definitions you want,
but before saying any of these definitions define really existing things you have to find evidence.

But, wouldn’t you have to have the definition to give evidence for it? It doesn’t make any sense.

No. Scientists constantly find surprises in nature ( *** ). After investigating and determining the causes they develop definitions of what they’ve found.

( *** Like the two Bell Telephone engineers who built a large radio receiver for listening to radio signals and heard an annoying hiss. They had no idea what it was and hadn’t been looking for it. They talked around and other scientists realized it might be the “background noise” left over from the Big Bang. It was. )

 

[polytropos]

Now, we do have a reason that supports the idea that an MGB’s existence does not violate any necessary truths, and that is the Modal Perfection Argument devised by Robert Maydole. Now, in order to understand this argument, you have to understand that when an entity or statement is impossible, everything entails its negation, including the statement itself. As an example to prove that it is possible to have something entail its negation, take the statement, “Every statement that cannot be demonstrated true by direct observation is false.” If this statement were true, it would entail that it was false, since the statement cannot be demonstrated true by direct observation. So, a version of the argument (from this video) goes like this:
P1: If a property is a great-making property (a fancy word for a property which is better to have), its negation is a lesser-making property (a fancy word for a property which is worse to have)
P2: Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties. (if one did, it wouldn’t be a great-making property after all)
P3: Maximal greatness is the greatest great-making property.
C1: Therefore, maximal greatness cannot entail its negation of non-maximal greatness
C2: Therefore, maximal greatness is possible.

Here is my issue with this line of thinking: The negation of an impossible proposition is entailed by every other proposition. This stems from the fact that a conditional whose consequent is true is always true.

But I do not see how we can use this fact in a non-circular way. Suppose I give you a proposition p. As long as “p” is not impossible, it will be the case that “L~(p ->~p),” that necessarily, p does not entail not p. But in order to make use of that fact, we have already assumed that p is possible.

The argument does “try to get around this” using P2 and P3. It attempts to show rather than assume that if you take maximal greatness to be a great-making property, then it will not entail its lesser-making property.

But I don’t think this will work non-circularly. Let’s make another parallel argument:
P1: If a property is a great-making property, its negation is a lesser-making property.
P2: If and only if a proposition p is possible, it will not entail its negation.
P3: Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties.
P4: p is a great-making property. (Assumption)
C1: ~p is a lesser-making property.
C2: p does not entail ~p.
C3: p is possible.
C4: All great-making properties are possible.

The problem with this argument is that it works for everything that we call a great-making property. By saying that something is a great-making property, we implicitly assume that it is possible. So the modal perfection argument does not seem to get above declaring that maximal greatness is possible. The circularity of the modal perfection argument implies that P2 in your shorter formulation gets support just from the lack of atheistic arguments for God’s impossibility:

P2 is supported by the Modal Perfection Argument, as well as the lack of any atheistic arguments for His impossibility that hold up to scrutiny.

So it does, as I said, rely on the premise that consistent conceivability implies real possibility.

Here is a potential atheistic objection that I find this argument vulnerable to: If maximal greatness implies immateriality, and an atheist is a physicalist, then he will find maximal greatness to be impossible.

On the contrary, Aquinas’s First Way, for instance, claims that the motion in the physical world requires that there exists some immaterial entity sustaining it. If one wants to get to immateriality from this modal argument, however, it is not clear how one does so, especially if the argument is presented to those with physicalist sympathies. I think a good argument should give a physicalist good reasons to abandon physicalism. But this argument does not, so it seems like the physicalist will not find reason to accept P2.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

This argument clearly equivocates on “possible.” For the argument to be valid, “possible” must indicate an ontological state of the world. In other words, consider the contrapositive of “If it is possible that God exists, then God necessarily exists.” This is:

A. If God does not necessarily exist, then it is not possible that God exists.

What non-question-begging reason do we have to believe that the antecedent to A is false? None at all. For all we know, God does not necessarily exist. To deny God’s necessary existence is equivalent to denying God’s existence tout court, and the skeptic does this. So the above argument is completely unconvincing to the skeptic.

In what sense is God’s existence clearly possible? Not a metaphysical sense, but an epistemological sense. No one can deny that, for all we know, God exists. But then again, for all we know, gravity is a manifestation of a deep magnetism in the universe. That does not even mean that it is even (ontologically) possible that gravity is a manifestation of deep magnetism. Possibility, in an epistemological sense, is merely a measure of our ignorance.

All this is to say that S5 could only possibly work if we use “possibility” in a strict metaphysical sense. But if we use “possibility” that strictly, it becomes very difficult to see why “It is possible that God exists” is a plausible premise.

“Possible” is used in both premises as logically coherent, and not violating a necessary truth. It never uses it as “for all we know, it’s possible”, like many misconceptions of the argument.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

No. You can dream up all the definitions you want,
but before saying any of these definitions define really existing things you have to find evidence.

No. Scientists constantly find surprises in nature ( *** ). After investigating and determining the causes they develop definitions of what they’ve found.

( *** Like the two Bell Telephone engineers who built a large radio receiver for listening to radio signals and heard an annoying hiss. They had no idea what it was and hadn’t been looking for it. They talked around and other scientists realized it might be the “background noise” left over from the Big Bang. It was. )

You don’t have to say something exists before you define it. You can define an alien as an extraterrestrial life form, without believing that one exists.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Here is my issue with this line of thinking: The negation of an impossible proposition is entailed by every other proposition. This stems from the fact that a conditional whose consequent is true is always true.

But I do not see how we can use this fact in a non-circular way. Suppose I give you a proposition p. As long as “p” is not impossible, it will be the case that “L~(p ->~p),” that necessarily, p does not entail not p. But in order to make use of that fact, we have already assumed that p is possible.

The argument does “try to get around this” using P2 and P3. It attempts to show rather than assume that if you take maximal greatness to be a great-making property, then it will not entail its lesser-making property.

But I don’t think this will work non-circularly. Let’s make another parallel argument:
P1: If a property is a great-making property, its negation is a lesser-making property.
P2: If and only if a proposition p is possible, it will not entail its negation.
P3: Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties.
P4: p is a great-making property. (Assumption)
C1: ~p is a lesser-making property.
C2: p does not entail ~p.
C3: p is possible.
C4: All great-making properties are possible.

The problem with this argument is that it works for everything that we call a great-making property. By saying that something is a great-making property, we implicitly assume that it is possible. So the modal perfection argument does not seem to get above declaring that maximal greatness is possible. The circularity of the modal perfection argument implies that P2 in your shorter formulation gets support just from the lack of atheistic arguments for God’s impossibility:

So it does, as I said, rely on the premise that consistent conceivability implies real possibility.

Here is a potential atheistic objection that I find this argument vulnerable to: If maximal greatness implies immateriality, and an atheist is a physicalist, then he will find maximal greatness to be impossible.

On the contrary, Aquinas’s First Way, for instance, claims that the motion in the physical world requires that there exists some immaterial entity sustaining it. If one wants to get to immateriality from this modal argument, however, it is not clear how one does so, especially if the argument is presented to those with physicalist sympathies. I think a good argument should give a physicalist good reasons to abandon physicalism. But this argument does not, so it seems like the physicalist will not find reason to accept P2.

Yeah, you can deduce that a great-making property is possible, but that’s not the definition. The argument would only be circular if great-making properties were defined as possible, which it does not. P2 is supported by the idea that something cannot actually be better, if it requires something worse.

How does it imply that?

Yeah, he’ll find it to be impossible, but that doesn’t make it so.

Necessity’s implying immateriality is supported by philosophical and scientific arguments for the beginning of the universe.

 

[polytropos]

Yeah, you can deduce that a great-making property is possible, but that’s not the definition. The argument would only be circular if great-making properties were defined as possible, which it does not. P2 is supported by the idea that something cannot actually be better, if it requires something worse.

How does it imply that?

You are missing my point. The modal perfection argument has these two premises:

P1: If a property is a great-making property (a fancy word for a property which is better to have), its negation is a lesser-making property (a fancy word for a property which is worse to have)
P2: Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties. (if one did, it wouldn’t be a great-making property after all)

Add to these the logical truth that “if and only if p is possible, p does not entail not p.” Those together give us the conditional, “If P is a great-making property, then P is possible.” So stating that maximal greatness is a great-making property is tantamount to claiming that it is possible. So if we want to show that maximal greatness is possible, we do not get there non-circularly just by claiming that maximal greatness is a great-making property, because it is the case that you have defined great-making properties in such a way that they are all possible. (It is a direct corollary of P1 and P2.)

The issue is that if you are letting lesser-making properties be the negation of great-making properties, then saying that great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties is equivalent to saying that great-making properties do not entail their negations, which is to say that great-making properties are possible. For that reason, if you define maximal greatness as a great-making property, you don’t gain anything by the modal perfection argument that you don’t gain by simply asserting that maximal greatness is possible.

Necessity’s implying immateriality is supported by philosophical and scientific arguments for the beginning of the universe.

I agree that there are philosophical arguments to the effect that a necessary being would be immaterial. But the point of an ontological argument, I gather, is to avoid other philosophical and scientific debates.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

You are missing my point. The modal perfection argument has these two premises:

Add to these the logical truth that “if and only if p is possible, p does not entail not p.” Those together give us the conditional, “If P is a great-making property, then P is possible.” So stating that maximal greatness is a great-making property is tantamount to claiming that it is possible. So if we want to show that maximal greatness is possible, we do not get there non-circularly just by claiming that maximal greatness is a great-making property, because it is the case that you have defined great-making properties in such a way that they are all possible. (It is a direct corollary of P1 and P2.)

The issue is that if you are letting lesser-making properties be the negation of great-making properties, then saying that great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties is equivalent to saying that great-making properties do not entail their negations, which is to say that great-making properties are possible. For that reason, if you define maximal greatness as a great-making property, you don’t gain anything by the modal perfection argument that you don’t gain by simply asserting that maximal greatness is possible.

I agree that there are philosophical arguments to the effect that a necessary being would be immaterial. But the point of an ontological argument, I gather, is to avoid other philosophical and scientific debates.

It seems that you are just recreating the argument to say that it is circular. Here are two true premises that, when taken together and with a necessary truth that an impossible truth entails its negation, you get that maximal greatness is impossible.

 

[polytropos]

It seems that you are just recreating the argument to say that it is circular. Here are two true premises that, when taken together and with a necessary truth that an impossible truth entails its negation, you get that maximal greatness is impossible.

It is circular, though; I am recreating it to show you why.

P2 of the main argument claims that maximal greatness is possible. An atheist disputes that maximal greatness is possible. Then you say, “But I have the modal perfection argument. The negations of great-making properties are lesser-making properties. Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties. Maximal greatness is a great-making property. Therefore, maximal greatness can’t entail non-maximal greatness, so maximal greatness is possible.”

But this does not add anything to the original claim that maximal greatness is possible.

Suppose I claim: p is possible. You say, “I don’t think p is possible.” I respond by saying, “~F is non-F. Furthermore, F does not imply non-F. And p is F. Therefore p is possible.” This is not an effective way of arguing. It simply moves the possibility claim to the proposition “p is F.” For “p is F” to be a proposition that has any sense, p must be possible. But that is the question we are attempting to settle.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

“Possible” is used in both premises as logically coherent, and not violating a necessary truth. It never uses it as “for all we know, it’s possible”, like many misconceptions of the argument.

But then you’re assuming that “logically coherent” implies “metaphysically possible”. You’re confusing logical possibility with metaphysical possibility.

Hume made the same mistake, and upon his mistake is founded a great deal of very bad modern philosophy.

 

[empther]

You don’t have to say something exists before you define it. You can define an alien as an extraterrestrial life form, without believing that one exists.

How tall is this alien? Number of arms and legs? Eyes? Color? Smell? Language? Religion? Girlfriends? Nice guy or serial killer?

Can’t define him until you meet him, or see his effects: video tapes etc.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

It is circular, though; I am recreating it to show you why.

P2 of the main argument claims that maximal greatness is possible. An atheist disputes that maximal greatness is possible. Then you say, “But I have the modal perfection argument. The negations of great-making properties are lesser-making properties. Great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties. Maximal greatness is a great-making property. Therefore, maximal greatness can’t entail non-maximal greatness, so maximal greatness is possible.”

But this does not add anything to the original claim that maximal greatness is possible.

Suppose I claim: p is possible. You say, “I don’t think p is possible.” I respond by saying, “~F is non-F. Furthermore, F does not imply non-F. And p is F. Therefore p is possible.” This is not an effective way of arguing. It simply moves the possibility claim to the proposition “p is F.” For “p is F” to be a proposition that has any sense, p must be possible. But that is the question we are attempting to settle.

The MPA is a demonstrative argument; it basically argues that one proposition (maximal greatness is possible) is equivalent to true proposition (great-making properties do not entail lesser-making properties). In other words, it is a deductive argument. Take for example the Kalam Argument. Premise 2 of it says that the universe began to exist. But given the fact that everything that begins to exist has a cause, doesn’t that mean that it’s equivalent to the conclusion, that the universe has a cause? You see, if you use that kind of argumentation to try to prove that an argument is circular, deductive arguments begin to collapse.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

To put it another way, a deductive argument does just that; it claims that the conclusion is a corollary of the premises.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

How tall is this alien? Number of arms and legs? Eyes? Color? Smell? Language? Religion? Girlfriends? Nice guy or serial killer?

Can’t define him until you meet him, or see his effects: video tapes etc.

You don’t have to k ow absolutely everything about something in order to define it. We define a serial killer as someone who kills a lot of people; but what what language does he speak? How tall is he? How old?

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

But then you’re assuming that “logically coherent” implies “metaphysically possible”. You’re confusing logical possibility with metaphysical possibility.

Hume made the same mistake, and upon his mistake is founded a great deal of very bad modern philosophy.

You were accusing me of using “possible” as epistemically possible, if I’m not mistaken. Metaphysically possible means logically coherent AND it doesn’t violate a necessary truth. So for example, a world in which evil is more powerful than good is logically possible, but in our view, it isn’t metaphysically possible, because it contradicts the necessary truth of God’s existence.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

You were accusing me of using “possible” as epistemically possible, if I’m not mistaken. Metaphysically possible means logically coherent AND it doesn’t violate a necessary truth. So for example, a world in which evil is more powerful than good is logically possible, but in our view, it isn’t metaphysically possible, because it contradicts the necessary truth of God’s existence.

If God does not exist, then it would seem to be a necessary truth that God does not exist. In which case “It is possible God exists” would be metaphysically impossible.

So, in essence, in order for your argument to work, you would need to *first *prove that it is not a necessary truth that God does not exist. But I have no idea how you could prove that.

 

[empther]

You don’t have to k ow absolutely everything about something in order to define it. We define a serial killer as someone who kills a lot of people; but what what language does he speak? How tall is he? How old?

**Who **is he? :bigyikes:

Until you know that you can’t arrest him.

God is a ‘who’.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

If God does not exist, then it would seem to be a necessary truth that God does not exist. In which case “It is possible God exists” would be metaphysically impossible.

So, in essence, in order for your argument to work, you would need to *first *prove that it is not a necessary truth that God does not exist. But I have no idea how you could prove that.

In order for God’s nonexistence to be a necessary truth, He’d have to be logically incoherent, or violate ANOTHER necessary truth.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

**Who **is he? :bigyikes:

Until you know that you can’t arrest him.

God is a ‘who’.

Love can only be done by a person; it can be deduced from maximal greatness that hod would have to be a “who.” Don’t worry, I’m not John Dominick Crossan.
EDIT: :bigyikes: is an awesome smily. I wish I could use it on other forums!

 

[Prodigal_Son]

In order for God’s nonexistence to be a necessary truth, He’d have to be logically incoherent, or violate ANOTHER necessary truth.

Yes, but that just means that **you **must prove that there are no necessary truths that contradict God’s existence. How do you plan to do that?

Mind you, **I **don’t need to demonstrate such a truth, since I’m not trying to prove anything. Moreover, I believe in God, so I imagine there is no such necessary truth contradicting his existence. But I am quite sure that I can’t *prove *such a thing.

 

[CatholicSoxFan]

Yes, but that just means that **you **must prove that there are no necessary truths that contradict God’s existence. How do you plan to do that?

Mind you, **I **don’t need to demonstrate such a truth, since I’m not trying to prove anything. Moreover, I believe in God, so I imagine there is no such necessary truth contradicting his existence. But I am quite sure that I can’t *prove *such a thing.

It’s up to the atheist to provide proof that God is incoherent, not mine (sorry, Matt Dillahunty, you actually have to prove something.) But, actually, the MPA meets the burden of proof that the atheist has.