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danserr
Guest
Belorg, I think you may be conflating a couple of the cosmological arguments, namely the kca with the contingency one.There may be good arguments against an infinite regress of causes (I do not li,ke it myself), but this one certainly isn’t.
Of course an infinite regress of contingent beings means there is no necessary being, That’s the whole point. And of course, it wasn’t able to cause itself. The whole point of an infinite regress is that there is no first cause, so if there is no fist cuase, there is no cause ‘that caiused itself as a contingent being’, and at the same time, every single contingent cause has **another **contingent cause
Some people ask: What set this chain of events in motion? The answer is: The chnai of events was not set in motion; it has always been, is and will always be in motion.
Now, as I said, I am not fond of the infinite regress and there may be goood arguments against this, but the argument as it’s presented here seems an argument by a rank amateur.
You keep using the word “cause”, but the issue with the cosmological argument from contingency (at least the modified leibnizian one I prefer and mention) is not “cause.” That is the KCA. The contingency cosmological arg (henceforth, LCA or CCA) does not seek a cause, but a sufficient explanation.
the version I mention for example says:
- Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own existence, or in an external cause.
- If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
- the universe exists,
- the universe has an explanation of its existence
- the explanation of the universe is God
This, if I understand correctly I gather was Copelston’s point against Russell. Russell tried to claim that infinite regress avoided the need for an explanation of the universe. But this is evidently false. As Copelston and wsp say, even given an infinite regress of contingent beings, the whole chain itself is contingent and therefore in need of explanation.