The necessary being

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There may be good arguments against an infinite regress of causes (I do not li,ke it myself), but this one certainly isn’t.
Of course an infinite regress of contingent beings means there is no necessary being, That’s the whole point. And of course, it wasn’t able to cause itself. The whole point of an infinite regress is that there is no first cause, so if there is no fist cuase, there is no cause ‘that caiused itself as a contingent being’, and at the same time, every single contingent cause has **another **contingent cause
Some people ask: What set this chain of events in motion? The answer is: The chnai of events was not set in motion; it has always been, is and will always be in motion.

Now, as I said, I am not fond of the infinite regress and there may be goood arguments against this, but the argument as it’s presented here seems an argument by a rank amateur.
Belorg, I think you may be conflating a couple of the cosmological arguments, namely the kca with the contingency one.

You keep using the word “cause”, but the issue with the cosmological argument from contingency (at least the modified leibnizian one I prefer and mention) is not “cause.” That is the KCA. The contingency cosmological arg (henceforth, LCA or CCA) does not seek a cause, but a sufficient explanation.

the version I mention for example says:
  1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own existence, or in an external cause.
  2. If the universe has an explanation of its existence, that explanation is God.
  3. the universe exists,
  4. the universe has an explanation of its existence
  5. the explanation of the universe is God
The only possible premise the “infinite regress” objection could apply to is premise 1. But it’s hard to see how it could possibly refute that premise. Every event in the chain is contingent, in which case the whole chain is contingent, in which case it demands explanation.
This, if I understand correctly I gather was Copelston’s point against Russell. Russell tried to claim that infinite regress avoided the need for an explanation of the universe. But this is evidently false. As Copelston and wsp say, even given an infinite regress of contingent beings, the whole chain itself is contingent and therefore in need of explanation.
 
An infinite regress does not entail necessity. That an infinite regress exists may be necessary, but the specific line of regressing things may be contingent.

Suppose each member of some infinite regress must cause its successor but can either cause successor a or successor b. Which successor is caused is not determined, but, is open to chance, choice or some relevant combination. For each possible combination (infinitely many) there is a distinct possible line of infinitely regressing things. Only one is actualized, as each successor is caused. Therefore, that a regress exists is necessary, but the content of it isn’t.
 
An infinite regress does not entail necessity.
…but the content of it isn’t.
the statement “An infinite regress” entails content. Something is regressing. In this case the claim is contingent beings. There is never a case of infinite regress of nothing after all. Without an object the phrase “infinite regress” has no meaning.
 
the statement “An infinite regress” entails content. Something is regressing. In this case the claim is contingent beings. There is never a case of infinite regress of nothing after all. Without an object the phrase “infinite regress” has no meaning.
hmm, let me try putting it like this. Suppose there are 3 possible infinite regresses, only one will actualize, which one will isn’t determined. That one will is necessary. Suppose #3 actualizes. That either 1, 2 or 3 actualize is necessary. That 3 will/does isn’t.
 
hmm, let me try putting it like this. Suppose there are 3 possible infinite regresses, only one will actualize, which one will isn’t determined. That one will is necessary. Suppose #3 actualizes. That either 1, 2 or 3 actualize is necessary. That 3 will/does isn’t.
3 infinite regressions of what? If it is contingent beings or something synonymous, I can demonstrate the contradiction.
 
hmm, let me try putting it like this. Suppose there are 3 possible infinite regresses, only one will actualize, which one will isn’t determined. That one will is necessary. Suppose #3 actualizes. That either 1, 2 or 3 actualize is necessary. That 3 will/does isn’t.
I understand what you are saying, but maybe it would help if you said more clearly what you think the relevance of the point is to the cosmological argument from contingency. This doesn’t seem to escape the problem. At least it raises a couple questions
Since either one of those 3 chains you mention is contingent, it still stands in need of explanation.

What makes it necessary that one of those 3 infinite chains exist? It seems like there is a possible world in which no such chain exist, but then what makes it necessary that one of those chains exist in every possible world?
 
Belorg, I think you may be conflating a couple of the cosmological arguments, namely the kca with the contingency one.
No, dan serr, I am not conflating anything.And I do not think there has been an infinite regress, so I don’t know why I still have to explain this.
You keep using the word “cause”, but the issue with the cosmological argument from contingency (at least the modified leibnizian one I prefer and mention) is not “cause.” That is the KCA. The contingency cosmological arg (henceforth, LCA or CCA) does not seek a cause, but a sufficient explanation.
Sure, but that’s irrelevant here.
the version I mention for example says:
  1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its own existence, or in an external cause.
Stop there. there is a chain of events …-1,0,1,2,3,4 …

4 is explained by 3, 3 by 2, etc.
So, everythijng that exists has an explanantion for its existence. name one thing that does not have an explanation.
The only possible premise the “infinite regress” objection could apply to is premise 1. But it’s hard to see how it could possibly refute that premise. Every event in the chain is contingent, in which case the whole chain is contingent, in which case it demands explanation.
Eeverytghing in the chain is explained, so the whole chain is ewplained, it’s as simple as that. But as I said, I am not fond of an infinite regress.
This, if I understand correctly I gather was Copelston’s point against Russell. Russell tried to claim that infinite regress avoided the need for an explanation of the universe. But this is evidently false. As Copelston and wsp say, even given an infinite regress of contingent beings, the whole chain itself is contingent and therefore in need of explanation.
There is no such ‘thing’ as ‘the whole chain’ the whole chain is not a thing, it is a collection of things, or a set, if you wish, each of its memebers is explained fully by the previous member of the collection.
 
…Stop there. there is a chain of events …-1,0,1,2,3,4 …

4 is explained by 3, 3 by 2, etc.
So, everythijng that exists has an explanantion for its existence. name one thing that does not have an explanation.
The entire series has no explanation, an infinite series of numbers does not add up to you, the cause of those numbers appearing on our screens.
 
Now, I am not going to adress things about the infinite regress anymore.
I do not believe in an infinite regress and there are far better objections to the contingency argument anyway.
 
Take as big a seglent of the series as you like, and then say whether it has an explanation or not…
I will take the entire infinite series and point out that it exists because of you. Its Creator. That means that any particular segment is also explained by you.
 
@belorg
There is no such ‘thing’ as ‘the whole chain’ the whole chain is not a thing, it is a collection of things, or a set, if you wish, each of its memebers is explained fully by the previous member of the collection.
Premise one (they key premise) of my preferred version of the argument, says:
  1. Everything that exists has an explanation of its existence, either in the necessity of its existence, or an external cause.
  2. if the universe has an explanation…
You have tried to claim that an infinite regress would solve this problem (though you do admit that such an idea is problematic) because it would leave every thing in the chain explained.

I replied: but this still leaves the chain itself (the universe) unexplained.

You then try to claim that the chain is not itself a thing, but rather a collection of things. Now here is the problem. Consider premise one above. We are discussing the universe, and what you are saying, to apply your objection to the premises above, is that “the universe is not a thing, but rather a collection of things.”

This is clearly absurd, though. You might as well say that a lego structure is not a thing because it is a collection of things or a car is not a thing because it is a collection of parts, or the united states not a thing because it is a collection of states. If every piece in the car were contingent and explained by another contingent piece. This would still leave the car as a whole being contingent and in demand of explanation. Even if every thing in the universe were explained in a circular fashion, this would still leave the universe as a whole, a contingent thing in need of explanation.
there are far better objections to the contingency argument anyway.
Agreed, though I still think it a good argument if phrased correctly. Feel free to list any objections you wish.
 
@belorg

You then try to claim that the chain is not itself a thing, but rather a collection of things. Now here is the problem. Consider premise one above. We are discussing the universe, and what you are saying, to apply your objection to the premises above, is that “the universe is not a thing, but rather a collection of things.”

This is clearly absurd, though. You might as well say that a lego structure is not a thing because it is a collection of things or a car is not a thing because it is a collection of parts, or the united states not a thing because it is a collection of states.
Just one thing , danserr. The universe is a collection of things and if each thing in the univetse is explained that does not mean that how the things interact is explained. But that can be explained contingently too. The intrecation of the parts is contingent on the properties of the parts.Each indiviual part explains another part and also (sometimes) interacts with the next part and with others too.
So the parts of the universe are explained and so is how the parts interac, which makes up 'the universe. Now, one of the reasons why I do not like the IR is that and an infinite chain of events, all of them contingent, some part may at some time cease to exist without causing another part. That way the chain could stopped and given an infinity of time the probability that it did indeed stop, appraoches 1. So, there wouldn’t be a universe now. That’s a big problem for the argument from IR…

Now, for other objections to the AoC, it’s geeting well after midnight here, so I’m too tired to explain that now, but maybe I’ll do so later on.
 
For those wondering:

The quote in the OP is from Thomas Aquinas’ Five Ways, namely the 5th. Here’s the article I got it from: peterkreeft.com/topics/first-cause.htm

And I can’t say I’m following all the objections here. I like philosophy but I’m not particularly strong in it. Based and what I did follow though, the objections didn’t seem too solid. 🤷
 
Now, I am not going to address things about the infinite regress anymore.
I do not believe in an infinite regress and there are far better objections to the contingency argument anyway.
Such as? And why don’t you believe in an infinite regress?

the last time i picked somebodies nose they got offended, so you better have a good bloody reason for picking mine!!!” M.A.J.Linton - Poems for Poets (1999)
 
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