The Ontological Arguments

[adamlsp]

ShweetPrinshesh:

I guess what I’m asking is for you to explain why a maximally great being is possibly necessary in any world.
~Steve~

Because that it what a maximally great being does. It necessarily exists. That is in its definition. IT is possible to exist in some world because we can imagine it, conceive of it, or because it is not logically contradictory. Either way you chose, that makes it possible. And If it is possible it is possibble necessary because that is in its definition. If you understand the concept of a maximally great being I think you should be with me so far. Definition = maximally great being = necessary. We do one of the three things above and that makes it possible. Definition, possibly true = maximally great being, possibly exists = possibly necessary. Got it? I hope so. If not, continue independent research and try and understand others explanations.

Adam

 

[adamlsp]

Oh, and to everybody thinking of arguing subjectivity. God is perfect in himself without any reference to us.

Adam

 

[adamlsp]

Krebsbach:

Hi Adam,

I guess I’m still struggling to understand how Plantinga’s proof improves on the original, which, properly understood, is also a modal argument.

What is wrong with the Anselm’s modal argument and how does Plantinga’s remedy that defect?

kordially,

karl

Anselm did not entail the being with any specific properties. This is like an abstract triangle with no specified side length or angles. This is unimaginable because we will have to attribute to it properties. But if we do this to God he becomes a type of being rather than being and we run into problems.

Another problem is existence as a property. If we consider it a property then there exist a great number of things with the property of nonexistence and this is nonsense.

And there are also many misunderstandings. The only real “improvement” is that Plantinga uses better definitions and and his logical structure of the argment is more properly set up. Whereas Anselm makes sets of assumptions that will logically follow his other assumptions but have the above flaws. Plantinga’s also makes use of the S5 axiom which is beyond critical to his argument and not to Anselm’s. The above problems could be applied to Plantinga’s argument but this would be just a misunderstanding of his argument whereas in ANselm’s version these objections cause actual problems. Helpful at all?

Adam

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Omniscient: presumably means that someone possessing this attribute knows everything that can be known. That is this being can decide about any proposition whether it is true, false or undecidable. Does omniscience incorporate the future, which simply has not happened yet? There are questions that cannot be answered simultaneously, the Heisenberg uncertainty principle forbids it.

an omniscient being will know the answers to these questions if there are answers to be known - i.e., if there are true propositions regarding them.

Hitetlen:

Omnipotent: this is hairy. What does it mean? Can this being perform acts that are logically impossible? Can this being perform acts which contradict the currently known laws of nature?

it means something in the vicinity of capable of actualizing any logically possible state of affairs.

yes, an omnipotent being could act in contravention of the known laws of nature.

Hitetlen:

Omnibenevolent: to whom? Since different beings have different needs and desires, which contradict to each other, therefore it is logically impossible to satify all of them at the same time. So the question arises: benevolent to whom? Himself? Others?

for himself, if i understand your question: an omnibenevolent creature will unfailingly choose in a morally rectifiable manner. and what counts as morally rectifiable will in some way depend on what count as intelligible goods for that being. however, i would also suggest that all moral agents will have certain moral commonalities, so that you could not, for instance, be a rational being for whom the moral thing to do would be to murder someone.

Hitetlen:

Another question: existence. Existence is different for physical beings and for abstract concepts. Does this being exist as a physical object? Or does the proponent assume some kind of a non-physical existence, which is somehow “real”? On what ground? We have experience with only physical existence and mental abstractions which do not exist in any physical form…

a maximally great being would have a non-corporeal mode of being.

Hitetlen:

Necessary existence: what does this mean?

it means existing in every possible world.

Hitetlen:

Does it mean that the denial of this being’s existence leads to a logical contradiction?

in the end, yes, but not necessarily in any particularly compelling way.

Hitetlen:

Another question: Whose definition is this “greatness”? Different beings can define “greatness” differently. An intelligent warrior species may have a different idea just what greatness is. Maybe their concept of greatness incorporates a feature “maximally boodthirsty”. Likewise an intelligent herbivore species values “maximal cowardice” above all.

great for us as rational agents. which means great, period.

see my comments above for a response to the bloodthirsty thing.

Hitetlen:

One of my problems is that the selected “attributes” are not general at all, not only are they highly anthropomorphic, but beyond that they are simply “borrowed” from the alleged attributes the Chistian God is supposed to have.

that’s because the christian god is maximally great.

 

[precious_roy]

Sorry, I lost this thread a bit.

I still am not convinced about the existence is better than non existence concept.

Krebsbach:

It seems very counter-intuitive to maintain otherwise. Besides, if someting only exists in the mind and not in reality, it has no independent existence and no freedom to act. It seems very reasonable to say that the latter state of being is superior.

kordially,

karl

See, I would word it differently. If something did not exist then it would not be bounded as something that does exist, which is necessarily bounded by its existence.

 

[john_doran]

precious_roy:

See, I would word it differently. If something did not exist then it would not be bounded as something that does exist, which is necessarily bounded by its existence.

i don’t understand this. for one thing “it” wouldn’t actually be anything, bounded or otherwise. but be that as it may, it strikes me as the most serious “bound” of all not actually to be able to do anything. right? i mean, it’s a pretty serious limitation not to be able to act or effect any changes in anything, isn’t it?

 

[precious_roy]

john doran:

i don’t understand this. for one thing “it” wouldn’t actually be anything, bounded or otherwise. but be that as it may, it strikes me as the most serious “bound” of all not actually to be able to do anything. right? i mean, it’s a pretty serious limitation not to be able to act or effect any changes in anything, isn’t it?

Well, actually, it (a reference to nothing) wouldn’t have any limitations because you cannot ascribe any properties to nothingness. I guess if you were to refer to nothingness (which you couldn’t actually) all things that were in fact non-existent would be one non-existence. The problem is that you are saying that this entity is better than nothingness, which you cannot say because you cannot say that anything is better or worse, more perfect or less perfect than nothingness.

In essence, by saying that this perfect being is more perfect than nothingness, you are saying that nothingness is less perfect than this being, which you cannot say because you cannot ascribe any property to nothingness.

Do you see what I am trying to get at here?

EDIT sorry, I didn’t finish my though before I submitted.

You could go about stating that “Existence is more perfect than non-existence” as an axiom of the proof (premise). But I think that is a necessary axiom, and it is just that, an axiom. You cannot present proof for this (I don’t think).

 

[john_doran]

precious_roy:

In essence, by saying that this perfect being is more perfect than nothingness, you are saying that nothingness is less perfect than this being, which you cannot say because you cannot ascribe any property to nothingness.

not exactly. you’re saying X is better than ~X, plain and simple.

 

[precious_roy]

john doran:

not exactly. you’re saying X is better than ~X, plain and simple.

Right, which is an axiom, not something that you can prove.

 

[john_doran]

precious_roy:

Right, which is an axiom, not something that you can prove.

sure.

 

[adamlsp]

precious_roy:

Well, actually, it (a reference to nothing) wouldn’t have any limitations because you cannot ascribe any properties to nothingness. I guess if you were to refer to nothingness (which you couldn’t actually) all things that were in fact non-existent would be one non-existence. The problem is that you are saying that this entity is better than nothingness, which you cannot say because you cannot say that anything is better or worse, more perfect or less perfect than nothingness.

In essence, by saying that this perfect being is more perfect than nothingness, you are saying that nothingness is less perfect than this being, which you cannot say because you cannot ascribe any property to nothingness.

Do you see what I am trying to get at here?

EDIT sorry, I didn’t finish my though before I submitted.

You could go about stating that “Existence is more perfect than non-existence” as an axiom of the proof (premise). But I think that is a necessary axiom, and it is just that, an axiom. You cannot present proof for this (I don’t think).

When you think of better you may think more perfect or greater somehow. These imply more not less. Nothingness is the ultimate less. God is exactly the opposite of nothingness. When you think greater, do you think diminishing? Or do you think increased in some way? What is greater to you? It should be easy enough to define, afterall it is but a word to describe another. Would A be greater than ~A? I think so because greater implies more not nothing. Nothing by definition cannot be greater than anything else because it is less than all.

 

[adamlsp]

You are refering to a being with the property of non-existence. This is clearly self-contradictory. You are saying nothing just is and that no properties can be ascribed to it. But actually nothingness just isn’t, that is why no properties can be ascribed to it. Not because of our lack of ability but because there is nothing to describe. Nothingness does not exist by its very definition. Thus the entire idea of nothingness is but a concept with no actualization in reality. God has infinite properties of perfection. Thus he is infinitely greater than nothingness. Just as infinity is infinitely greater than 0. This is on an absolute scale without negatives.

Adam

 

[Hitetlen]

Thank you for your clarification. Before going into detailed criticism, I have one more question. I asked about the concept of “necessary existence” and you said:

it means existing in every possible world.

What does the phrase “every possible world” mean here? I don’t want my definition to taint my answer, I would like to see your definition for it.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Thank you for your clarification. Before going into detailed criticism, I have one more question. I asked about the concept of “necessary existence” and you said:

What does the phrase “every possible world” mean here? I don’t want my definition to taint my answer, I would like to see your definition for it.

a possible world is more or less just a way the world could have been. a proposition is possibly true (or a state of affairs possibly obtains) if it is true (or obtains) in some possible world.

thus, if something obtains/exists/is true in every possible world, there is no possible world that doesn’t contain it - i.e. it’s impossible that it not exist.

i’m not sure how helpful that is, since it’s just a re-statement of the concept of “necessary”, but there you have it.

 

[Krebsbach]

Mornin Adam,

adamlsp:

Anselm did not entail the being with any specific properties. This is like an abstract triangle with no specified side length or angles. This is unimaginable because we will have to attribute to it properties. But if we do this to God he becomes a type of being rather than being and we run into problems.

Anselm’s definition of God, that than which none greater can be conceived, ends up being totally abstract. But the definition, while entailing necessary existence, does not entail that God is necessarily actualized in any particular way. But he is necessarily actualized in some way. To use your analogy, God must be triangular but not necessarily an equilateral triangle with sides of 5.2314 inches or any other particular triangle.

I don’t see this as a problem. Attributing ultimate greatness to God does not preclude him from having more specific properties (e.g. all-knowing, etc.). We just can’t say that any one must be actualized in any specific way. It just has to surpass any other being’s actualization of that attribute.

Another problem is existence as a property. If we consider it a property then there exist a great number of things with the property of nonexistence and this is nonsense.

I agree, provided we are talking about mere existence. But the argument in Proslogian III is talking about necessary existence verses contingent existence. It is proper to ascribe the property of necessarily existing to God. He alone, of all existing beings, has this property.

kordially,

karl

 

[Krebsbach]

Like Anselm, Plantinga begins with a definition, not of God, but of maximal greatness. Maximal greatness means maximal excellence (omnipotence, etc.) in every possible world.

So he begins by defining a property. Then he starts supposin’. Given our definition of maximal greatness, let’s entertain the possibility that a maximally great being exists “in some world.”. However, as soon as we do so, we realize it must exist in every world.

It seems that no matter what version of the OA is being discussed, the objection can be raised: Just because a greatest conceivable being or maximally great being must be thought of as existing, does that mean that He really exists? How in the heck can we go from an idea to reality, necessarily?

I think the answer was implicit in Anslem all along. God is in a category all by Himself. He is the only necessarily existing being.

Those who object really are maintaining that there is no such thing as necessary existence. All existnece is contingent, they say. Why must that be true?

 

[Vietnatalians]

What about nature, or matter, or the smallest parts of matter. I have a feeling people might say the smallest parts of matter (whatever they truly are) necessarily exist because without them there would be no existence. They may change form for eternity, but their existence is necessary for eternity.
~Steve~ (I got a new screen name)

 

[john_doran]

Krebsbach:

Those who object really are maintaining that there is no such thing as necessary existence. All existnece is contingent, they say. Why must that be true?

the problem is, in order to motivate such an argument, it would have to be shown that the concept of a necessary being is impossible - i.e. self-contradictory. and there’s no obvious way to do such a thing.

 

[Hitetlen]

john doran:

a possible world is more or less just a way the world could have been.

Yes, I gather that, but what is “possible”? Whatever we can imagine? I can imagine a world where there are no set laws of physics (for example). I can imagine a world where there are fairies, dragons and magicians. Are these worlds possible? M. C. Escher has created fabulously detailed pictures of worlds where there is no “up” or “down”, are those worlds “possible”? I can imagine a world where the laws of logic do not apply, so is such a world “possible”?

In other words, what kind of extrapolations can we make from our existing world - the only one we know - into these imaginary worlds? It is the word: “possible” that would like to be clarified, not the phrase: “necessary existence”.

 

[melbourne_guy]

Hey can someone translate this thread into english