The Ontological Arguments

[Krebsbach]

from 153:

We don’t have to explicitly deny the possibility of the existence of a necessary being. We can just say that we have no evidence for such a being.

This is true. We can hold out C1 existence as a “possibility” or something that hasn’t been clearly ruled out but also something not adequately demonstrated. And because I am not convinced C1 existence makes sense, I will not be a theist. That is a reasonable agnostic position to take if that is what you believe. IOW, be without belief pending adequate proof, but keep an open mind about it. But keep in mind that proof, if we keep our thinking straight, will not be found in consulting facts. Rather it will be logical analysis. Once we embark on our C1-3 journey, empirical atheism or empirical theism no longer make sense.

Besides, why should a necessary being be called God?

achh! ran out of time. finish my very important thought later. Have a great weekend.

kordially,

karl

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

Hey Hiteman,

Re yer post @ 155:

Let’s work with your categories:

1. category “C1” (exists in all possible worlds)
2. category “C2” (exists in some but not all worlds) and
3. category “C3” (does not exist in any world).

But let me amplify and clarify their definitions.

C1 refers to the individual who, when it comes to actual worlds, must exist therein, and when it comes to possible worlds, cannot be conceived of not existing therein, ever. Theists say God is the only logical candidate for C1.

C2 refers to beings who exist “normally” or contingently. In any given actual world, or in any possible or conceivable world, they may or may not exist. If existing, they might cease to exist. This includes you, me, and mah huntin’ dawg Zoe. I would also include in C2 any vegetarian sharks, which while practically impossible in the normal course, could still happen, say through genetic engineering. Not so farfetched. (I know of a vegetarian cat who only eats tomatoes, fresh, canned or any which way.)

C3 refers really refers to nothing, nonsense, or absurdities. e.g. round squares, or, if you are an anti-Anselmian, the maximally great being.

Your clarifications are good, though I am not sure if they were necessary. I even agree with the highlighted sentence, but it still brings up a question: “if we presuppose that God is the only entity which can belong to category ‘C1’”, then we cannot use the ontological argument to substantiate that God exists, because the whole argument will be circular. Therefore it is a methodological error to assume that God is the only candidate for this category. Makes sense?

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

I think it is legitimate to use “possibly necessarily true” in this sense:

We are just ordinary folks striving for understanding. We have conceived of 3 modes of existence, C1-3. We haven’t yet determined through analysis whether our categories even make sense. So at this point we posit or suppose C1 and say C1 existence is possible.

But as we work through the analysis and come to the conclusion that C1 existence is meaningful, then we no longer can talk in terms of “possibly necessarily true.” That would be sel-contradictory.

I don’t really understand what you mean. Whether the analysis is premature or not, those three categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. As I said before: to say that “a red apple is either red or not red” is nonsense. If it is red it cannot be not-red, to posit such a disjunction is meaningless, it is just bogus. Of course if we say that “an apple is either red or not-red” would be completely legitimate, but it would not be useful for the ontological argument.

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

This is true. We can hold out C1 existence as a “possibility” or something that hasn’t been clearly ruled out but also something not adequately demonstrated. And because I am not convinced C1 existence makes sense, I will not be a theist. That is a reasonable agnostic position to take if that is what you believe. IOW, be without belief pending adequate proof, but keep an open mind about it. But keep in mind that proof, if we keep our thinking straight, will not be found in consulting facts. Rather it will be logical analysis. Once we embark on our C1-3 journey, empirical atheism or empirical theism no longer make sense.

A logical analysis can never adequately establish the existence of anything, except whatever is a logical corollary of the axioms. And since God is not a corollary of the three simple axioms of logic, the proponents have to try and define a different set of axioms, as they do in the field of “modal logic”. Notable among those is the S5 system (used in the Plantinga-type of reasoning), which tries to establish the “possibly necessary existence” as an axiom, with rather dissatisfying results, as we can see from the analysis above.

Krebsbach:

achh! ran out of time. finish my very important thought later. Have a great weekend.

I wish the same to you.

 

[Krebsbach]

Mornin Hitetlen,

You spoke thusly:

“A logical analysis can never adequately establish the existence of anything, except whatever is a logical corollary of the axioms.”

This is the gravaman of the charge against the OA and any a priori proof. Why must this be so? I am reaching way back now, but I seem to recall that A.N. Whitehead, of blessed memory, taught the contrary in his metaphysics. He believed that there are necessarily true propositions which affirm the existence of things. Such a universally true proposition would have to be logically consistent and coherent as well as “empirically adequate.” Unfortunately I can’t offer anymore detail (it’s been more than 30 years–any Whitehead scholars out there?) But anyway, he seemed to think that one can conceive of universally true and applicable propositions. Naturally such would be of a high degree (the highest, actually) of abstractness and generality. But if that is true, then the only way to arrive at such a truth is through analysis. It would be impossible to verify a universal truth empirically.

 

[Krebsbach]

Hitetlen:

I don’t really understand what you mean. Whether the analysis is premature or not, those three categories are exhaustive and mutually exclusive. As I said before: to say that “a red apple is either red or not red” is nonsense. If it is red it cannot be not-red, to posit such a disjunction is meaningless, it is just bogus. Of course if we say that “an apple is either red or not-red” would be completely legitimate, but it would not be useful for the ontological argument.

I guess all I am saying is that we have conceived of three exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories of existence (no small feat, when you think about it!). It has been brought to my attention that some folks think C1 existence is a bunch of hooey. But I am nevertheless entertaining the “possibility” that C1 existence can be demonstrated logically. I persist in this seemingly futile enterprise for several reasons, one of which is that I suspect the proof lies in the very categories we have conceived. I am taking for granted that it is possible to make statements that are necessarily true. I strongly suspect that “God exists” is such a statement.

I agree that if one believes in C1 existence, it doesn’t make sense to talk in terms of “possible C1 existence.” That’s confusing the C1 and C2 categories. But isn’t this another way to say that C1 either expresses a logical and coherent thought or it is impossible nonsense (C3)? But if one concludes C1 is meaningful, then logic compels one to accept that some thing (we won’t call him God yet) necessarily exists.

 

[Hitetlen]

john doran:

look, the existence of abstract objects is entailed by our most foundational beliefs about the world; if it so happens that another implication of such an entailment is that there are all sorts of additional abstratca, then so be it - it makes far, far more sense to accept such a conclusion than it does to give up our belief in the necessity of mathematical and logical truths.

Not my most fundamental belief, and many others agree with me. Abstract ideas, or mental images of real world objects do exist in our mind,though not in everone’s mind (children’s mind does not contain an image of differential equations). These abstract ideas do not correspond to any real world object precisely, they just contain whatever we think are the most important features, attributes or characteristics of those objects. That is why they are abstractions.

As we go from the specific to the more and more abstract, the mental images change. The image of a “hunting dog” is different from the image of a “work dog”. As we go even further, the mental concept of a “generic dog” emerges.

When someone imagines a “dog”, his mental image will be probably different form my abstract image of a dog. Some autistic people (so I read) do not even have a mental image of a “dog”, when they hear the word “dog”, in their mind they replay all the images of all the dogs they have ever seen.

In this sense, the concept of numbers is unique. We strip away all the actual attributes of the objects, and keep just one feature, its existence. Therefore my image of “7” is the same as your image of “7”. There is nothing “mysterious” about this. Some philosophers like to think that there is an abstract “7” out there, of which we have a mental image, but this is an unnecessary assumption. For some people (children and primitive tribes) the concept of “7” does not exist at all.

Once we go from this level of abstraction to less generalized ones, it becomes obvious that my “abstract dog” is not the same as your “abstract dog”. From this fact we draw different conclusions. You say that there are infinitely many “abstract objects”, while I say that even the concept of “abstract objects” is nonsense. The idea of mental images does not necessitate an objectively existing “repository”, from which we “draw” our images.

Let’s bring this idea to its logical conclusion. Your assertion renders ALL our thoughts (since they are mental images) to the status of a “borrowed” object from this “repository”. Whatever we thought, could have thought, will think, could think, but never will are all just borrowed “objects”. And why stop here? Even our emotions and desires are mental images. When you think of your wife, does this process somehow borrow a mental image from this “repository” and transfers it to your mind?

I almost forgot, that logical contadictions are also mental concepts. From your assertion it follows that abstract objects exist which denote such contradictions. So do these contradictions somehow “exist”?

Effectively you reduced our whole mental process to an empty storage status, where some imaginary process “imposes” images into our minds. If this picture is valid, we lose even our free will. Do you really think this is a valid picture?

As before, I have linguistic observations, too. The word “object” has the connotation of physical existence. The word “being” implies a “conscious being”. We really should replace them with a neutral word “entity”. And finally, this alleged or “supposed repository” we should just abbreviate to “suppository”, becuase it is a major pain in the posterior. This last one is of course just a pun, imposed onto my mind by this imaginary process from the non-existent storage device which holds the “abstract objects”.

 

[Hubriss]

Sorry, I don’t have enough time to read the whole post, so I don’t know if this has already been said or not but, back to Hitletin’s question of, “how do we define these,” in his first post. Back to Platina’s first premise.

The question that pops out to me the fastest when I first read it is, What does “perfectly good” mean?

How can we have any idea of what perfection in the real world would entail? And it does not necessarily have to be a being. If perfection means eternal then as far as we know, the universe is eternal, and therefore perfect. Mass and energy cannot be destroyed, only transfered from one state to another. We can see this in Einstein’s Mass-Energy Equivalence equation E=mc². So since a perfect entity does not necessarily have to be a being, it will not be omniscient, omnipotent, or omnibenevolent.

Now about, “good.” What is good? Everyone’s perception of good and bad is based on thier experiences and what they are taught. It is foolish to think that humans always have a tendancy to do good. This can be explained like this: Humans will always, some time or another, feel pain. Our natural reaction to pain is very unpleasant, causing us to avoid it as much as possible. (By the way, saying God gave us pain so that we can realize this is based on nothing. It is required of every animal to be able to experience pain in order to survive.) We try to avoid this pain that we tend to not like, entirely, even when done to other people. We do not sympathize with others that are in pain because we are “good” however, but because we imagine ourselves in thier place. We can see that humans do not always tend towards the “good” as we have had societies that value defeating and killing thier enemies. We still do in the Muslim world.

There is no universal definition of good, so we can not apply it to describe a “perfectly good ultimate being.”

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

This is the gravaman of the charge against the OA and any a priori proof. Why must this be so? I am reaching way back now, but I seem to recall that A.N. Whitehead, of blessed memory, taught the contrary in his metaphysics. He believed that there are necessarily true propositions which affirm the existence of things. Such a universally true proposition would have to be logically consistent and coherent as well as “empirically adequate.” Unfortunately I can’t offer anymore detail (it’s been more than 30 years–any Whitehead scholars out there?)

Unfortunately I am not familiar with this person, or his works.

Krebsbach:

But anyway, he seemed to think that one can conceive of universally true and applicable propositions.

I don’t doubt that, we can imagine pretty much anything, even totally impossible things.

Krebsbach:

Naturally such would be of a high degree (the highest, actually) of abstractness and generality. But if that is true, then the only way to arrive at such a truth is through analysis. It would be impossible to verify a universal truth empirically.

Any statement about the real world (the one we know of) is an empirical statement. Of course we hypothesize about “possible worlds” and infinitely many ideas like that, and those ideas cannot be empitically verified. So far I agree.

What good are they? Not a whole lot, in my eyes.

An axiomatic system (like logic and mathematics) cannot reach into the real world and substantiate the existence of something, though it may be able to show that something is impossible. But from the fact that a “something” is not logically impossible, it does not follow that this “something” is physically possible. For example the temperature of the minus one degree Kelvin (below the absolute zero) is not logically impossible, but it is physically impossible.

Using axiomatic systems you can say that an arbitrary “possible world” is logically stable, but without empirical research you can never prove if it is physically possible. So abstract analysis is no help. This is the “weakness” of axiomatic systems: they are only useful within the constraints of the axioms. And since the real world is not axiomatic, these systems are useless for the analysis of the real world.

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

I guess all I am saying is that we have conceived of three exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories of existence (no small feat, when you think about it!). It has been brought to my attention that some folks think C1 existence is a bunch of hooey.

Mybe so, but whatever some people think does not validate their opinion, unless it can be substantiated. As I said before I can conceive an empty world without anything in it. It is an abstraction, of course, but logically it cannot be excluded. If it would exist, then we would have a validation that C1 is false. If such a world does not exist, then the problem is more complicated.

Suppose there are many worlds with just ONE entity in each. That is also a logical possibility, and if all these worlds contain a different entity (which is also logically possible), then C1 is again false.

We can go even further, and imagine two (or many or infinitely many) worlds, with a bunch of different entities in each, but without overlap. This is also possible, and it also invalidates C1. An analogy would be the set of even numbers and another set of odd numbers. Both have infinitely many elements without sharing one element.

Krebsbach:

But I am nevertheless entertaining the “possibility” that C1 existence can be demonstrated logically. I persist in this seemingly futile enterprise for several reasons, one of which is that I suspect the proof lies in the very categories we have conceived. I am taking for granted that it is possible to make statements that are necessarily true. I strongly suspect that “God exists” is such a statement.

As I said, you can take granted practically anything, but that is neither here nor there. If you do not accept my example of a “null-world” as a possible world, why should I entertain the notion that “necessarily true” statements exist?

Krebsbach:

I agree that if one believes in C1 existence, it doesn’t make sense to talk in terms of “possible C1 existence.” That’s confusing the C1 and C2 categories. But isn’t this another way to say that C1 either expresses a logical and coherent thought or it is impossible nonsense (C3)? But if one concludes C1 is meaningful, then logic compels one to accept that some thing (we won’t call him God yet) necessarily exists.

Logical and coherent thought does not mean that an entity corrsponding to that thought can be instantitated. A temperature of minus one degree Kelvin is logically coherent thought, but it cannot exist.

 

[Krebsbach]

Mornin Hiteman,

Alfred North Whitehead was a contemporary of Bertrand Russell. They collaborated on the Principia Mathematica. After overdosing on math they turned to their respective philosophical pursuits. Whitehead was a theist but not a Christian, although he did flirt with Catholocism for a time. He wrote lots of stuff including a book called Process and Reality.

 

[Krebsbach]

Logical and coherent thought does not mean that an entity corrsponding to that thought can be instantitated. A temperature of minus one degree Kelvin is logically coherent thought, but it cannot exist.

Yes, I can have lots of logical and coherent thoughts that are empirically impossible. But is it true that all logical and coherent thoughts which affirm the existence of some X could be empirically false or empirically impossible? That is still the issue, I guess.

I’ve run out of time and may not be able to correspond for several days. I greatly appreciate the conversation.
have a greate week.

kordially

karl

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Here is your opening statement: “a necessary being is either necessary or impossible”. That statement is already incorrect. It should say:

“A being either exists in all possible worlds, or in some (but not all) possible worlds, or cannot exist in any possible world”.

In the first case, the being exists necessarily, in the second case it exists conditionally, in the third case it does not exist at all. Or putting it into a succint sentence:

“A being is either necessary, possible or impossible.”

You made two errors: inserted the word “necessary” before the word “being”, and left out the most probable case: “a being exists in some worlds, but not in others”.

this is really wrong.

what you’re doing is simply talking about beings in general, which is certainly your prerogative, but which, i’m afraid, has absolutely nothing to do with what i am doing, which is trying to ask questions about the kind of beings that are necessary: what can we know about them, if anything? what must be true of them? what must be false?

one can do the same thing with possible and impossible beings.

surely you see this.

Hitetlen:

The sentence you stated is circular: “a necessary being is either necessary or impossible”, you say something akin to: “a red apple is either red or green”. Since a red apple can only be red, your opening part of the syllogism already entails the result, thus it constitutes a circular argument.

not quite: as i have said again and again, the proposition “a being that exists in every possible world” might be self-contradictory, in which case there can be no such thing as a necessary neing. so it’s not “true by definition”.

let me try and be clearer:

the concept “a being that exists in every possible world” is either self-contradictory, or it is not. if it is, then there can be no such thing. if it is not self-contradictory then it is at least possible that there is a being that exists in every possible world (since anything that is logically possible inhabits at least one possible world). but if there is one possible world in which there exists a being that exists in every possible world, then there is a being that exists in every possible world. but the actual world is a possible world: it is the possible world that is actual. therefore there is at least one necessary being that exists in the actual world (and every other possible world).

Hitetlen:

If you would wish to make an utterance about a “necessary being” it could only be “a necessary being is necessary” (which would be tautological) or “A necessary being exists in all possible worlds”, which would indeed be a definition.

why should anyone believe this? i believe that the proposition “1+1=2” is a necessary being. as such, i can say all kinds of things about it, like “at least one necesary being is true”, or “at least one necessary being is a proposition”. and so on.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

How could a necessary being be impossible? Your statement poses a bogus disjunction.

not at all. here’s an example. when frege came out with his opus on logic (Grundgesetze der Arithmetik), he included, as an axiom, that there was a concept for every specifiable predicate, and that a class was the extension of a concept. this was a set-theoretical formulation, and, as is the case with all set-theory and other math, its propositions are either necessarily true or necessarily false (you may not believe this, but cantor, russell, frege, zermelo, frankel et al. certainly did). the fregean system revolutionized logic, and frege naturally believed it to be true, and necessarily so, because as far as he (and everyone else) could tell, it was consistent.

then russell came along and identified the now eponymous russellian paradox: under frege’s description (and the description of naive set theory), there can be a class of all classes that do not contain themselves, which is self-contradictory and thus necessarily false. so the theory had to be revised.

the point of this is simply that self-contradictions and their attendant necessary falsehoods aren’t always obvious, but that discovery of a self-contradiction in what is otherwise a necessary truth is a genuine discovery and an advance in human knowledge: it shows that an entity once believed to exist in every possible world in fact exists in none.

so. if you can show how the concept of “a being that exists in every possible world” conceals a similar contradiction, then we will have learned something, and something critically important. until then, though, we are stuck with the eminently reasonable conclusion that there isn’t any such contradiction, and that there is at least one thing that is present throughout the universe of possible worlds.

 

[john_doran]

Hitetlen:

Logical and coherent thought does not mean that an entity corrsponding to that thought can be instantitated. A temperature of minus one degree Kelvin is logically coherent thought, but it cannot exist.

it cannot exist in **this **world (we think), but there are plenty of other possible worlds with different physical laws in which -1K is an empirically possible temperature.

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

Yes, I can have lots of logical and coherent thoughts that are empirically impossible. But is it true that all logical and coherent thoughts which affirm the existence of some X could be empirically false or empirically impossible? That is still the issue, I guess.

It depends on the “X”…

Krebsbach:

I’ve run out of time and may not be able to correspond for several days. I greatly appreciate the conversation.
have a greate week.

Likewise. See you when you return.

 

[Hitetlen]

john doran:

what you’re doing is simply talking about beings in general, which is certainly your prerogative, but which, i’m afraid, has absolutely nothing to do with what i am doing, which is trying to ask questions about the kind of beings that are necessary: what can we know about them, if anything? what must be true of them? what must be false?

Those are pertinent questions, IF such an entity can be shown to actually exist, and the purpose of the ontological argument is to substantiate it. Therefore your questions are premature until the basic “existence” is substantiated.

I am talking about the general problems of categorizing “things” or entities into mutually exclusive categories. Whether the entity in question has some special attributes or not, is irrelevant for the purposes of categorization. And I keep pointing out that using the word “being” is misleading, because it insinuates a “conscious” entity. IF such an entity can be shown to exist, THEN it is a different task to decide whether that this entity is “conscious” or not.
john doran:

let me try and be clearer:

the concept “a being that exists in every possible world” is either self-contradictory, or it is not. if it is, then there can be no such thing. if it is not self-contradictory then it is at least possible that there is a being that exists in every possible world (since anything that is logically possible inhabits at least one possible world).

You are very clear, and I understand your argument. I think that this is the major point of contention. I simply do not accept that everything that is logically possible MUST exist in some possible world, unless there is some reason you can show that it is a valid statement.

Here is the reason: from the fact that something that is logically possible it does not follow that this “something” is also physically possible, this is simply a logical non-sequitur. I already stated one counter-example, but you might have missed its significance, so I will repeat it.

The attribute of “temperature” has a special feature, namely that it has a theoretical (and physical) lower limit, but no upper limit. This minimum in our world is -273.16 Celsius, which is the absolute zero (0 Kelvin degrees). We can imagine a lower temperature, so it is not logically impossible, but physically it is.

In another world the value of this absolute zero may be different, it may be -3000 Celsius, or whatever else. The point is that this absolute zero is the place where all motions cease, so physically there cannot be a lower temperature than that. Therefore we have at least one phenomenon (-1 degree absolute temperature), which is logically possible, but physically impossible. Reflecting back on your post I point out that the actual value of the absolute zero may differ from world to world (therefore it may not be “absolute” across the worlds, but “absolute” in any specific world). If a “world” contains no physical objects, the concept of temperature is undefined; in the other worlds, where there are physical objects, the matter which forms them cannot have a lower temperature than absolute zero, where the Brownian motion of the molecules ceases.

Even if you would not accept this specific example (and I don’t see how you could do that), it is still unproven that “logical possibility” entails “physical possibility”. Until you can prove that, we cannot go any further.
john doran:

why should anyone believe this? i believe that the proposition “1+1=2” is a necessary being. as such, i can say all kinds of things about it, like “at least one necesary being is true”, or “at least one necessary being is a proposition”. and so on.

In the post #165 above I wrote that the concept of “abstract objects” leads to all sorts of absurdities, so this idea is nonsensical.

 

[Krebsbach]

Originally Posted by john doran
*let me try and be clearer:

the concept “a being that exists in every possible world” is either self-contradictory, or it is not. if it is, then there can be no such thing. if it is not self-contradictory then it is at least possible that there is a being that exists in every possible world (since anything that is logically possible inhabits at least one possible world).*

Then the Hittite said:

You are very clear, and I understand your argument. I think that this is the major point of contention. I simply do not accept that everything that is logically possible MUST exist in some possible world, unless there is some reason you can show that it is a valid statement.

Here is the reason: from the fact that something that is logically possible it does not follow that this “something” is also physically possible, this is simply a logical non-sequitur. I already stated one counter-example, but you might have missed its significance, so I will repeat it.

Let’s ax the question differently. Must it be true that all conceivable things (logical possibilties) might or might not exist in some possbile world (i.e. exist contingently)?

When we are talking about fairly specific things like temperature below absolute zero or vegetarian sharks, it seems that we must acknowledge that such logical possibilities might not exist in any possible world. In these cases it seems absurd to suggest that the mere conception of something must make it real in some world.

But as we work our way up the ladder from specific and concrete to abstract and general, we get the sense that the rules are different. IOW, as we move from “vegetarian sharks must exist” (absurd) to “life exists” (probably still not necessary) to “something must exist,” we oughtn’t feel quite so certain of ourselves. Maybe there is a special and unique case, an X which must exist in some world somehow. IOW, might there be an X which exists necessarily but whose actuality (the way it becomes real and concrete) is contingent? Might there be an X necessarily actualized somehow?

kordially

karl

 

[Hitetlen]

Krebsbach:

Let’s ax the question differently. Must it be true that all conceivable things (logical possibilties) might or might not exist in some possbile world (i.e. exist contingently)?

I wonder if john doran has lost interest in this thread. If so, too bad. It was a fun thread, and I am still curious how would he respond that according to his assertion we are simply empty buckets, whose thoughts are imported from a remote “suppository” by some magical means. How does this magic work out, so when I think of my wife, her correct picture appears in my mind, and when he thinks of his wife, her wife’s picture gets “projected” into his mind. Quite a complex “machinery” should be involved, to avoid screw-ups…

 

[precious_roy]

Apologies as I have been trolling because I don’t have much time to post to this argument:

Did you guys ever establish a rigorous definition of existence for the purpose of this thread?