P
Phage0070
Guest
This is what I view as an interesting apologetics question revolving around a heavily adapted version of “The Problem of Evil”. I am interested in hearing some different responses to this quandary.
Before getting into the meat of the question, there are a few basic premises to discuss. Disagreement in these premises will most likely derail the discussion of the question, but those objections will be interesting conversation as well. The first premise is the relationship between free will and worldly action. My view is that we, and God in the spiritual context, consider them to be two distinct things that may or may not occur in tandem. For example:
The second premise is that there are sins of commission, and sins of omission. Committing an evil action is of course ethically unacceptable, but it is also unethical for one to fail to take action in preventing an evil action if possible. For example:
Suppose there is a hypothetical evil action about to take place; the rape in the previous examples for instance. There is a third party individual observing this occurrence and presented with a button that will 100% stop the evil action from taking place, with no harm to the third party or either party involved in the rape itself. There is also no direct consequence to the third party for simply walking away; the rapist or victim will never know, and no worldly penalty will be levied.
My view is that the ability to stop or effect the evil action places the third party firmly on the “moral playing field” so to speak. The third party in no way excuses or reduces the responsibility of the rapist for their actions, but failure to take action to prevent the evil act would be unethical.
This is of course an idealized example, where in reality the attempt to stop such an act would carry significant danger and uncertainty to the third party. With increasing danger and uncertainty the ethical responsibility for inaction of the third party may be expected to decrease somewhat, the level of which likely being subject to differences in opinion, but the idealized instance seems clear.
The conclusion is that failure to take a zero-risk action to prevent evil action is unethical.
Now we get to the question itself:
Thoughts?
(PS: As a side note, I would like to preempt the inevitable “God needs that evil to bring out the good in people,” response. This is unconvincing to me because it means God’s plan requires the commission of evil acts; behaving ethically would paradoxically in some cases be contrary to God’s will. Being omnipotent God would be able to create a plan that didn’t require evil actions, and his hatred of sin would seem to demand such a thing.)
Before getting into the meat of the question, there are a few basic premises to discuss. Disagreement in these premises will most likely derail the discussion of the question, but those objections will be interesting conversation as well. The first premise is the relationship between free will and worldly action. My view is that we, and God in the spiritual context, consider them to be two distinct things that may or may not occur in tandem. For example:
- A paraplegic’s inability to move their legs and walk prevents them from taking the worldly action of walking, but it does not restrict their free will to desire or intend to walk. It only effects the success of those intentions.
- My inability to fly like Superman does not restrict or remove my free will to desire or intend such action. It only effects the success of those intentions.
- A rapist’s free will intent to rape someone is judged by God independently of their success in achieving that goal in the world; even if prevented for whatever reason from actually going through with it, the sinful intent “counts”.
- Equivalently, someone with pure intent to behave as God intends cannot be faulted for being forced to do evil, or prevented to do good, by events in the material world. Indeed, judgment may lie entirely within intention rendering worldly events a side issue.
The second premise is that there are sins of commission, and sins of omission. Committing an evil action is of course ethically unacceptable, but it is also unethical for one to fail to take action in preventing an evil action if possible. For example:
Suppose there is a hypothetical evil action about to take place; the rape in the previous examples for instance. There is a third party individual observing this occurrence and presented with a button that will 100% stop the evil action from taking place, with no harm to the third party or either party involved in the rape itself. There is also no direct consequence to the third party for simply walking away; the rapist or victim will never know, and no worldly penalty will be levied.
My view is that the ability to stop or effect the evil action places the third party firmly on the “moral playing field” so to speak. The third party in no way excuses or reduces the responsibility of the rapist for their actions, but failure to take action to prevent the evil act would be unethical.
This is of course an idealized example, where in reality the attempt to stop such an act would carry significant danger and uncertainty to the third party. With increasing danger and uncertainty the ethical responsibility for inaction of the third party may be expected to decrease somewhat, the level of which likely being subject to differences in opinion, but the idealized instance seems clear.
The conclusion is that failure to take a zero-risk action to prevent evil action is unethical.
Now we get to the question itself:
- If God is omniscient, he is a witness to every evil action ever attempted, or to be attempted in the future.
- If God is omnipotent, he has access to a zero-risk decision to prevent said evil actions. Doing so would not be a violation of the free will of anyone, and would be effectively moot with regard to his judgment of those involved.
- Evil actions have taken place, and continue to take place on a daily basis.
Thoughts?
(PS: As a side note, I would like to preempt the inevitable “God needs that evil to bring out the good in people,” response. This is unconvincing to me because it means God’s plan requires the commission of evil acts; behaving ethically would paradoxically in some cases be contrary to God’s will. Being omnipotent God would be able to create a plan that didn’t require evil actions, and his hatred of sin would seem to demand such a thing.)