Okay, so let’s compare moral laws to scientific laws. The law of gravity offers an explanation of observations that allows us to consistently predict the outcome of physical events (which is why it’s a law). What does the law “Humans should not kill other humans” allow us to predict?
Well, criticizing my system of ethics doesn’t solve the problems with your own, but I’m happy to answer anyway.
First, your requirement that laws must “predict the outcome of physical events” is clearly incorrect, particularly when it comes to characterizing human actions, conduct, and behavior. Some laws simply describe reality and do not necessarily predict “physical events” at all.
What exactly does the law of non-contradiction or the law of excluded middle predict with respect to “physical events”? I suppose you could say that
it can predict tomorrow that my car can’t exist and not exist at the same time and in the same sense. What about in terms of human action? Not much. In fact, human beings can and regularly do engage in logical fallacies that purport to break these laws. Sometimes laws can only describe reality without the power to predict.
Second, moral laws do in fact describe something about reality and in some instances have predictive force. Moral laws (under my system, and very possibly yours) describe those actions that human beings may take to maximize happiness. Furthermore, although these laws cannot necessarily predict how human beings will act, they do predict that man will be maximally happy if he follows them.
From what I can tell, it would be impossible for any should-statements to describe reality, since “should” has a nebulous meaning when only objects are considered. Can I observe an instance of duty or obligation in the same way that I can observe the addition and subtraction of objects?
Sure. You can observe human beings acting, and, therefore, observe an instance of a duty. I’m glad you brought up subtraction. Instances of subtraction in the world are actions. I can have 50 squashes and physically remove 49 squashes, leaving one squash. What you just observed was an instance of subtraction – an action. You didn’t actually see “subtraction” itself, because subtraction is a concept.
If “45” represents the addition of 45 objects, then “-45” represents the subtraction of 45 objects.
My point still stands then. There is no “object” that -45 describes.
I’m not an emotivist because of how I feel, I just don’t see how the word “should” can be meaningfully applied to reality. What does it describe? How can we observe what it describes?
It describes those actions that human beings can take to achieve the greatest good. That is why those who subscribe to utilitarianism seem to use it a great deal. You sought to have emotivism describe the content of moral statements. You have utterly failed to show how they describe conditional propositions that contain moral sentences.
He seems to spend a good deal of time at the beginning of Utilitarianism to point out that ethical statements can’t be supported by evidence or proven.
I don’t recall that. Please provide some quotes from Mill. Unlike you, Mill refers to moral “laws” and “obligations” quite frequently. I believe it is you who are projecting something of your own philosophy on Mill’s work.
That depends on what you mean by “infanticide.” Since a being has no moral significance in utilitarianism if it is not sentient (unless the being is cared for by others), I think that aborting within the first three months or so seems acceptable. I don’t approve of killing infants after they’re born just because the mother doesn’t want them, though. They’re obviously sentient and desire, albeit on a primitive level, not to be killed at that point.
Then you disagree with Singer. He thinks that isn’t wrong to kill severely disabled infants:
So the issue of ending life for disabled newborn infants is not without complications, which we do not have the space to discuss adequately. Nevertheless the main point is clear: killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often it is not wrong at all.
utilitarian.net/singer/by/1993----.htm
What is it that makes your opinion any better than your mentor, Singer?
