The "Problem Of Evil" does not exist

[tdgesq]

You were the one who said that moral laws existed in the same realm as scientific (physical) laws. This means that they must contain, as scientific laws must contain, explanative, predictive power.

I believe you have inadvertently misrepresented what I said. You asked:

Originally Posted by Oreoracle
What do you mean by “moral law?” Are moral laws anything like mathematical, scientific, or philosophical laws?

I replied:

Yes, moral laws are like other laws. I already defined “moral” above.

So, yes, I affirmed then and I affirm now that moral laws are like other laws, including scientific laws. I did not claim they are identical in every respect. Then again, non-moral laws are not identical to each other in every respect either. My comments were merely meant to point this out to you. I also specifically claimed that moral laws have predictive power.

“Humans should not kill humans” doesn’t allow us to predict squat when given alone.

You are incorrect. As I previously stated, moral laws do allow us to predict whether or not human beings will be happy based upon their conduct. Its primary purpose though is to explain or describe how man can reach happiness. Thus, moral laws also have explanatory power like other laws.

“Humans feel that killing each other is wrong,” on the other hand, allows us to predict quite a lot; namely, that most humans will refrain from killing each other when possible.

I don’t deny that, but you are conflating ethical concepts here. There is a category of ethics that is descriptive and another category that is normative. We can certainly study societal belief systems and describe their teachings. To the extent you determined from such a study that most humans feel that killing each other is wrong, I suppose you could make some predictions about how those human beings will act. Normative ethics though doesn’t set out to predict how human beings will act. It sets out to determine how human beings ought to act. It is a guide for human behavior, just like all of Singer’s bioethical articles.

How exactly do humans violate laws, such as the law of non-contradiction?

You inadvertently misrepresented what I said. I stated that human beings engage in logical fallacies that “purport” to break those laws.

We might think illogically, but we can’t act illogically, so to speak.

Right, and the point I am trying to make is that the laws of logic do not necessarily have predictive force with respect to human conduct – not that human beings can actually violate those laws. For example, I have seen people literally post on this forum that the laws of logic are invalid. Of course they engage in a logical contradiction by doing so, because to establish their position they are appealing to logical principles. Now what predictive force did the law of non-contradiction have with respect to the action of someone who in writing affirms a logical contradiction?

What does “Humans should not kill humans” tell us about killing? All we can infer is that whoever utters this phrase apparently detests killing humans.

Or it can explain that killing other human beings will not lead to happiness. That’s what much of utilitarianism is all about.

 

[tdgesq]

. . . continued

This depends on what laws we choose to advocate. I don’t care how people go about attaining happiness, so long as they can avoid causing suffering. Not every ethical system demands that you seek happiness “its way or the highway.”

It is true that there is the metaethical question of the ultimate standard of morality that obtains. Surely your ultimate standard of ethics differs from mine, but it isn’t necessary for us to agree on a standard for a system of ethics to explain and predict what actions will lead to that standard. Isn’t that what Singer is writing all of those articles about? If you accept his standard, then he is proposing to give rules that will guide behavior to reach the standard. Whether he is correct or incorrect is another question. What isn’t in question is that normative ethical systems can have explanatory power and predictive force.

At this point, I’m beginning to wonder what this all has to do with the subject.

Let me explain. You stated that “numbers are concepts that represent objects, from what I can tell.” forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5625962&postcount=136
That isn’t correct, as shown in the case of negative numbers. There are no negative quantities of objects in the world. It does describe an action – the taking away of some objects from the vicinity of others. The reason it is an important concept is that normative ethics is also meant to describe actions – human actions, albeit actions that will lead to a certain end.

You can disagree with my explanation, but you’re simply lying if you say I haven’t explained it. I even rephrased one of your propositions to show its meaning as intended by the person who uttered it. Disagreeing with an explanation doesn’t make it non-existent.

Again, you inadvertently misrepresent me here. I made no assertion that you didn’t try to explain it. I stated that you didn’t in fact explain it. And it isn’t just mere disagreement on my part. Your attempted explanation was to rephrase my proposition and insert the word “worse” for “wrong.” You then concluded, without any analysis, that these words are inherently subjective even though their context suggests otherwise. Assuming that you were correct in everything you posted, the objection I made isn’t one you answered. You claimed early on that emotivism described moral sentences. I asked how that could be true in conditional statements where no expressive statement is made. Still no answer on that one.

Singer is not my “mentor.” Your cheeky comment aside, I believe he argued that severely disabled infants who were not sentient and would never be sentient were not of moral worth (besides the value that family and friends invested in them). This is quite consistent with my own statements.

No offense meant. I have no problem calling Aquinas, Plantinga, Maritain, etc. my mentors. I know from your past posts that you have been influenced greatly by Singer. I can see how that may have been a poor choice of words though. And no, Singer does not require that the infant would “never be sentient”:

Infants are sentient beings who are neither rational nor self- conscious. So if we turn to consider the infants in themselves, independently of the attitudes of their parents, since their species is not relevant to their moral status, the principles that govern the wrongness of killing non-human animals who are sentient but not rational or self-conscious must apply here too. utilitarian.net/singer/by/1993----.htm

Singer expressly states that these infants are sentient. He uses examples such as haemophilia and spina bifida, neither of which necessarily impairs rationality or self-consciousness, much less sentience.

When you say that Singer supports infanticide, be sure to explain why. He doesn’t just say, “It’s an infant, so it’s acceptable to kill it.”

I never said that he did. I literally stated “[h]e thinks that [it] isn’t wrong to kill severely disabled infants.” forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5637261&postcount=195 I directly quoted him for that proposition and even provided a link to his entire chapter on infanticide from his Practical Ethics.

I’ve never heard him approve of killing sentient infants, unless, of course, they are in a state of extreme suffering or will be later in their lives due to birth defects.

Then you are mistaken. I’ve given you the quote where he specifically states that infants are sentient and that in cases of disability, even ones that do not necessarily lead to a defect in cognition, killing an infant may be morally justifiable. I’m glad you disagree with him, but I still want to know why your opinion is any better than Singer’s.

 

[Oreoracle]

So, yes, I affirmed then and I affirm now that moral laws are like other laws, including scientific laws. I did not claim they are identical in every respect. Then again, non-moral laws are not identical to each other in every respect either. My comments were merely meant to point this out to you. I also specifically claimed that moral laws have predictive power.

My apologies. I thought you meant they were identical, or at least similar in the aspects relevant here.

You are incorrect. As I previously stated, moral laws do allow us to predict whether or not human beings will be happy based upon their conduct.

I agree that the ethic “Killing humans (insert scenario here) will reduce overall utility” is meant to explain what actions one shouldn’t perform in order to raise overall utility, or as Mill would say, the general happiness. (To be more specific, I don’t think the ethic itself explains a thing, but is rather the conclusion of an explanation.)

Where we’ve been misunderstanding each other is that I’m speaking of the ethical end itself. You are right to say that we can, somewhat objectively, prove whether obeying a rule in a given scenario will increase or decrease overall utility. Formulating and explaining the practicality of these situational rules (or rather “guidelines”) is the meat of utilitarian writings. What I’ve been trying to get at is that the end(s) of an ethical system, its central idea(s), or its axiom(s), whatever you wish to call it/them, cannot be proven in any such sense. We can’t prove or disprove the claim “I ought to increase the overall utility.” The standard is axiomatic, and so no other standard within the system allows us to judge its truth value, just as no other property or postulate in mathematics allows us to judge whether “A=A” is a true statement. This is assumed for the sake of the system.

This is where emotions come in. It seems to me that emotions are what cause us to assume ethical axioms. Is this clearer, or old news?

You inadvertently misrepresented what I said. I stated that human beings engage in logical fallacies that “purport” to break those laws.

My bad. It was not, as you’ve noticed, intentional.

For example, I have seen people literally post on this forum that the laws of logic are invalid. Of course they engage in a logical contradiction by doing so, because to establish their position they are appealing to logical principles. Now what predictive force did the law of non-contradiction have with respect to the action of someone who in writing affirms a logical contradiction?

I suppose it didn’t allow us to predict the action, but that’s not what the law is meant for, as we know.

Or it can explain that killing other human beings will not lead to happiness. That’s what much of utilitarianism is all about.

But to assume that the ultimate purpose of all actions should be to maximize happiness is in fact an assumption and a subjective assessment, is it not? The rules supporting the greatest happiness principle might be descriptive, in a way, but the principle itself is not. This makes the entire system, insofar as it is ethical, subjective, though it might be useful in determining how to prevent suffering or cause happiness.

 

[Oreoracle]

If you accept his standard, then he is proposing to give rules that will guide behavior to reach the standard. Whether he is correct or incorrect is another question. What isn’t in question is that normative ethical systems can have explanatory power and predictive force.

My point, and the reason for my emotivism, is that there is no objective reason to accept his standard. This is why morality is not objective; I only accept the greatest happiness principle because I prefer it. Reason and observation alone will not lead you to adopt an ethical system. You can nod your head and say, “Yes, this conclusion follows from the principle.” but you will see no reason to agree with the principle to begin with.

Let me explain. You stated that “numbers are concepts that represent objects, from what I can tell.” forums.catholic-questions.org/showpost.php?p=5625962&postcount=136
That isn’t correct, as shown in the case of negative numbers. There are no negative quantities of objects in the world. It does describe an action – the taking away of some objects from the vicinity of others. The reason it is an important concept is that normative ethics is also meant to describe actions – human actions, albeit actions that will lead to a certain end.

I see what you mean, now. But as you imply at the end of this quote, our consideration of normative statements as descriptive assumes that we know the end in mind when the statement was issued. Alone, the normative statements mean nothing, just as “4+3=3+4” is meaningless to those who have not yet assumed mathematical properties.

Again, you inadvertently misrepresent me here. I made no assertion that you didn’t try to explain it. I stated that you didn’t in fact explain it. And it isn’t just mere disagreement on my part. Your attempted explanation was to rephrase my proposition and insert the word “worse” for “wrong.” You then concluded, without any analysis, that these words are inherently subjective even though their context suggests otherwise. Assuming that you were correct in everything you posted, the objection I made isn’t one you answered. You claimed early on that emotivism described moral sentences. I asked how that could be true in conditional statements where no expressive statement is made. Still no answer on that one.

I hope my answers are clearer at this point. If not, I don’t know how I could go about answering.

No offense meant. I have no problem calling Aquinas, Plantinga, Maritain, etc. my mentors.

That’s alright. The reason I was offended is because “mentor” implies a student-teacher relationship. More often than not, the best students are considered to be those who don’t challenge the teacher and allow him to force-feed the lessons to them in silence. We know that this isn’t the case with Singer and I. I’m more than willing to question any philosopher.

I know from your past posts that you have been influenced greatly by Singer.

Actually, I bought Practical Ethics when I was already utilitarian. He helped me refine my arguments against pro-lifers, but everything else was just for reinforcement and entertainment.

Dang, I thought the latter condition you mentioned was said to impair sentience. Thanks for letting me know.

But Singer, as you know, uses what he calls the “principle of equal consideration of interests.” Here, he doesn’t seem to be saying that infants are of no value but that they don’t deserve any more consideration than other animals (we cannot tip the scales in their favor simply because they are human). He does seem to think that, most of the time, human interests will win out over other animals because of our superior emotional capacity.

Then you are mistaken. I’ve given you the quote where he specifically states that infants are sentient and that in cases of disability, even ones that do not necessarily lead to a defect in cognition, killing an infant may be morally justifiable.

Perhaps if the infant would be severely physically disabled for life, I would consent to killing it (think of the misery involved with possessing useless limbs or facial defects). But even though the fetus has little awareness, I think its desire to live would still outweigh its mother’s desire to live without tending to children, so I obviously don’t approve of killing the fetus in every occasion.

I’m glad you disagree with him, but I still want to know why your opinion is any better than Singer’s.

It seems to me that Singer’s examples of children born with certain conditions do not necessarily allow for their killing according to utilitarianism. He could be overestimating the child’s future suffering, or, in some examples, the mother’s/couple’s distaste for tending to children. I think his judgments on these matters sound a bit too close for comfort when it comes to weighing the positive and negative utility values. I’d like for him to be more certain with his judgments.

 

[tdgesq]

My apologies. I thought you meant they were identical, or at least similar in the aspects relevant here.

No apology necessary. They are similar to the aspects relevant here, although not identical. Moral laws can have explainitive and predictive power, just not necessarily about the same object or action.

You are right to say that we can, somewhat objectively, prove whether obeying a rule in a given scenario will increase or decrease overall utility.

Then we agree here. I don’t think Utilitarianism in its various forms can give any meaningful rules, but that is something I will talk about later.

We can’t prove or disprove the claim “I ought to increase the overall utility.” The standard is axiomatic, and so no other standard within the system allows us to judge its truth value, just as no other property or postulate in mathematics allows us to judge whether “A=A” is a true statement.

Believe it or not, metaethical claims can be proven. The problem? It can take a very long time to prove, and it may require a complete revision of a person’s metaphysic and epistemology. That isn’t an easy way to prove something as you might imagine, but sometimes things that are true are very difficult to prove. That is the way of things.

Mill made a metaethical claim. He claimed that pleasure (which is really more akin to happiness in his view) is the end of morality. He bases his claim on the premise that as a matter of human psychology and study there isn’t any other choice for human beings but to seek pleasure. This is something we must do. Utilitarianism supposedly provides a method by which this end can be accomplished.

This is where emotions come in. It seems to me that emotions are what cause us to assume ethical axioms. Is this clearer, or old news?

Emotions might cause us to do many things, but it is far from evident that they cause us to accept ethical axioms. Mill’s analysis is compelling from a purely logical standpoint. I don’t need to accept or reject his metaethical claim based upon my emotions. I accept parts of his claim and reject others. Emotivism is supposed to explain the content of moral statements, not metaethical presuppositions. So your assertion is new to me. I guess you would need to show me how emotions account for ethical axioms.

My bad. It was not, as you’ve noticed, intentional.

No worries.

I suppose it didn’t allow us to predict the action, but that’s not what the law is meant for, as we know.

I agree. Laws will always describe reality in some respects and may even predict future events in some respects, but not necessarily the aspects in which we are interested. More importantly though, people can make mistakes about such laws. This is as true for mathematical and logical laws as it is for moral laws.

 

[tdgesq]

. . . continued

But to assume that the ultimate purpose of all actions should be to maximize happiness is in fact an assumption and a subjective assessment, is it not?

Mill didn’t think so. Consider this excerpt:

All ends are either pleasure or parts or of pleasure. This is a matter of psychological fact. As Mill puts it, “to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasure, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility” (Utilitarianism, Ch. 4). This implies that pleasure is the end of morality:The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable = worthy of desire], is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so (Utilitarianism, Ch. 4).Mill’s point is often criticized as making an illegitimate inference from “is” to “ought,” from “is desired” to “is worthy of desire.” G. E. Moore made such a criticism, calling it the “naturalistic fallacy.” It is indeed a move characteristic of Mill’s naturalism which makes experience the test of one’s principles, in ethics as in science. Moreover, such a move is in many cases a fallacy. Mill was himself to criticize just such a fallacious move in his late essay on “Nature.” But in the present case, the inference is not a fallacy. In his proof of the principle of utility, Mill does infer an ought from an is, but he does so legitimately. Mill’s point is that, just as we must make inductions, and must accept certain basic perceptual judgments, so we must seek pleasure. And since, as a matter of lawful fact about human beings, we must seek pleasure, it is unreasonable to suggest that anything else could be morally demanded of us.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/#MorUti

The rules supporting the greatest happiness principle might be descriptive, in a way, but the principle itself is not. This makes the entire system, insofar as it is ethical, subjective though it might be useful in determining how to prevent suffering or cause happiness.

Mill obviously does not agree. He does claim to close the is/ought gap. His argument is that human beings have no choice but to seek pleasure. They may do so unsuccessfully, but they must seek it nonetheless. If Mill is right, then to put forth any other standard of morality is an exercise in futility, and, therefore, unreasonable. If it is impossible for human beings to seek anything other than pleasure, then there simply is no other standard by which humans could follow.

I see what you mean, now. But as you imply at the end of this quote, our consideration of normative statements as descriptive assumes that we know the end in mind when the statement was issued. Alone, the normative statements mean nothing, just as “4+3=3+4” is meaningless to those who have not yet assumed mathematical properties.

This is a very important statement you just made. Just like the foundations of mathematics and logic where something must be assumed about the ability to know the truth of propositions, so we must assume that there is a true end to human behavior and action. That is not to say that there aren’t good reasons for assuming laws of mathematics, laws of logic, and ethical laws. One of those reasons is that the world and everything in it would be an absurdity otherwise. Anytime you (us) choose to do anything, we must (even if just implicitly) ask why we should do it. If your ultimate standard of human action is arbitrary, if the word “should” represents nothing more than emotivism, then it is just as valid for me to teach that it is moral to impart false knowledge, to deny the laws of logic and mathematics, to kill sentient life for personal pleasure, as it is for you to teach the converse. That is absurd.

It seems to me that Singer’s examples of children born with certain conditions do not necessarily allow for their killing according to utilitarianism. He could be overestimating the child’s future suffering, or, in some examples, the mother’s/couple’s distaste for tending to children. I think his judgments on these matters sound a bit too close for comfort when it comes to weighing the positive and negative utility values. I’d like for him to be more certain with his judgments.

I agree with you. I think his judgments are way too speculative even within his own framework of utility. That’s why I stopped reading his materials. It is what I have observed happens though when a person gives up on the possibility that there is any “reason” for choosing an ethical standard.

 

[Oreoracle]

Then we agree here. I don’t think Utilitarianism in its various forms can give any meaningful rules, but that is something I will talk about later.

I admit that that sounds a bit confusing, but I’ll wait until you’re ready to talk about it.

Believe it or not, metaethical claims can be proven.

Can you give me an instance in the history of philosophy that this has happened? Or am I unable to prove meta-ethics with my current understanding of the universe?

Mill made a metaethical claim. He claimed that pleasure (which is really more akin to happiness in his view) is the end of morality. He bases his claim on the premise that as a matter of human psychology and study there isn’t any other choice for human beings but to seek pleasure. This is something we must do. Utilitarianism supposedly provides a method by which this end can be accomplished.

As a sort of preliminary question, I’ll ask you this: Do you think the statements, “All humans seek pleasure.” and, “All humans should seek pleasure.” are synonymous? Why or why not? If not, what is lost or gained in the translation?

Emotions might cause us to do many things, but it is far from evident that they cause us to accept ethical axioms.

It would be difficult for me to know exactly how others go about accepting ethical axioms. This is the only mind I can experience, after all, but it seems rather evident to me.

Mill’s analysis is compelling from a purely logical standpoint. I don’t need to accept or reject his metaethical claim based upon my emotions. I accept parts of his claim and reject others. Emotivism is supposed to explain the content of moral statements, not metaethical presuppositions. So your assertion is new to me. I guess you would need to show me how emotions account for ethical axioms.

Again, don’t you see a difference between saying, “We all seek to attain pleasure.” and, “We should all seek to attain pleasure for ourselves and others?” (Besides the obvious inclusion of “others” of course.)

The way I see it, and I can only tell you how I see it, the reason for morality has always been our displeasure with reality as it is. It might seem that Mill claimed that something was a fact and derived an ethic from it directly, but a system wherein the ethics perfectly match reality could only claim that whatever happens should happen. No, Mill found what he believed to be factual and chose it over the other facts, such as the hate, suffering, and death that plagued the world, and deemed it better than those aspects of reality. Morality is a collection of systems we create to determine what belongs in reality and what doesn’t. As natural as it might seem to us, there is no objective reason to believe that one aspect of reality should be preserved over another, but ethicists attempt to do it all the same. Why? Well, I think I have a pretty good idea, but I could be wrong.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

Again, don’t you see a difference between saying, “We all seek to attain pleasure.” and, “We should all seek to attain pleasure for ourselves and others?” (Besides the obvious inclusion of “others” of course.)

Sorry for butting into the conversation here…

Moral judgments are, at very least, facts about our mental state.
Our practical decisions are all aimed at happiness. (Mill’s thought)
We seek to attain our practical goals through the exercise of practical reason.
The exercise of practical reason is a) aimed at happiness, and b) deeply impacted by our moral judgments.
We cannot escape facts about our mental state, which (in the case of moral judgments) can lead to self-condemnation.
If we are to be happy (without any aftertaste of self-condemnation or psychological denial), we are obligated to obey our moral judgments.

Will you agree to all of the reasoning above? I tried to make it as noncontroversial as possible, and I think it can serve as a foundation for agreement.

 

[Oreoracle]

Moral judgments are, at very least, facts about our mental state.
I would say that we could use them to infer facts about our mental states, yes. I don’t think it’s linguistically possibly to consider them facts in themselves, at least not until I know what “should” refers to in reality. Surely you’d agree that if a statement isn’t applicable to reality with all its terms, we can’t say that it accurately reflects reality?

Our practical decisions are all aimed at happiness. (Mill’s thought)

I agree with what I think you’re saying, however, I take issue with the usage of “obligated” in your last sentence. If we say things like, “we are obligated to obey morality” then this implies that obligation exists independently of morality, but we know this is not the case. It results in redundancy.

Will you agree to all of the reasoning above? I tried to make it as noncontroversial as possible, and I think it can serve as a foundation for agreement.

I agree with most of what was said, accept for some of the semantical ambiguities that I commented on. Do you agree with my ammendments?

 

[Oreoracle]

Tdgesq, I’ll continue my response to you tomorrow. I’m off to bed for now.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I would say that we could use them to infer facts about our mental states, yes. I don’t think it’s linguistically possibly to consider them facts in themselves, at least not until I know what “should” refers to in reality. Surely you’d agree that if a statement isn’t applicable to reality with all its terms, we can’t say that it accurately reflects reality?

“I believe murder is wrong”. This is a fact about my mental state. That’s all I’m saying.

This is applicable to reality with all its terms, because there is an action which we refer to by the word “murder”, and there is a person (myself) that has a belief about that action.

I suppose so. However, not all means to happiness are planned out, and so practical reason is not always present during pleasure-seeking.

You’re right. This is precisely why we find ourselves “having done” something we think is wrong. We did it on impulse.

At this point, it might be necessary to define “practical reason.” When we exercise practical reason, are we asking what is true, or what should be done based on what we know to be true? If it is the latter, I would prefer the term “ethical deliberation” over “practical reasoning.” Otherwise, it sounds as though it’s connected to other types of reasoning, such as mathematical calculation.

I prefer “practical reason” because it is not always about ethics. If I want to buy a Corvette, I use practical reason to achieve my goal. Practical reason is how I comport myself in relation to my internal psychology and my external goals.

I agree with what I think you’re saying, however, I take issue with the usage of “obligated” in your last sentence. If we say things like, “we are obligated to obey morality” then this implies that obligation exists independently of morality, but we know this is not the case. It results in redundancy.

But the obligation I’m talking about has nothing to do with morality. It is a conditional, an if-then statement. *If *I want to be strong, I must exercise. *If *I want to be happy, I must conform to my moral judgments. This is not the moral law. This is one of several “extra-moral” reasons that one ought to conform to one’s own conscience.

 

[Oreoracle]

Mill didn’t think so. Consider this excerpt:

All ends are either pleasure or parts or of pleasure. This is a matter of psychological fact. As Mill puts it, “to desire anything, except in proportion as the idea of it is pleasure, is a physical and metaphysical impossibility” (Utilitarianism, Ch. 4). This implies that pleasure is the end of morality:The sole evidence it is possible to produce that anything is desirable = worthy of desire], is that people do actually desire it. If the end which the utilitarian doctrine proposes to itself were not, in theory and in practice, acknowledged to be an end, nothing could ever convince any person that it was so (Utilitarianism, Ch. 4).Mill’s point is often criticized as making an illegitimate inference from “is” to “ought,” from “is desired” to “is worthy of desire.” G. E. Moore made such a criticism, calling it the “naturalistic fallacy.” It is indeed a move characteristic of Mill’s naturalism which makes experience the test of one’s principles, in ethics as in science. Moreover, such a move is in many cases a fallacy. Mill was himself to criticize just such a fallacious move in his late essay on “Nature.” But in the present case, the inference is not a fallacy. In his proof of the principle of utility, Mill does infer an ought from an is, but he does so legitimately. Mill’s point is that, just as we must make inductions, and must accept certain basic perceptual judgments, so we must seek pleasure. And since, as a matter of lawful fact about human beings, we must seek pleasure, it is unreasonable to suggest that anything else could be morally demanded of us.

plato.stanford.edu/entries/mill/#MorUti

That’s interesting. I guess his philosophy was a bit inconsistent at times, eh? Or perhaps he just worded his explanation poorly. Really, what is unreasonable to demand of someone is a matter of opinion, and is largely based on emotion. Claims that some ethics are too strict seem to result from a violation of our conception of fairness; Mill felt that it was unfair to ask people to settle for something other than happiness as an end, which they are naturally inclined to seek. This is very much an emotional sentiment, is it not?

If it is impossible for human beings to seek anything other than pleasure, then there simply is no other standard by which humans could follow.

I would disagree. What distinguishes the utilitarian ethic from our default position is that, at times, it requires us to secure the happiness of others. It also requires that we seek happiness in such a way that we can continue to increase the overall utility. While we are destined to act on our preferences, utilitarianism suggests that we will ourselves to prefer things beneficial to others. We can do this by learning to “love our neighbor,” as Mill would say.

In other words, utilitarianism differs from mere egoism in that it asks us to be concerned for the well-being of the herd, not just the individual.

That’s why I stopped reading his materials. It is what I have observed happens though when a person gives up on the possibility that there is any “reason” for choosing an ethical standard.

We don’t do that at all. We just realize that “reasons” are subjective. They’re persuasive in their nature, and so they’re often taken for granted, but that doesn’t make them facts.

 

[Shlomo]

The problem of evil may be nonexistent, but Evil exists for sure.
Just because God has created it, and for a reason.
I have already detailed it here:
vinishsky.com/what-lacked-in-paradise

 

[MindOverMatter]

We don’t do that at all. We just realize that “reasons” are subjective. They’re persuasive in their nature, and so they’re often taken for granted, but that doesn’t make them facts.

You haven’t proven anything or realized anything. You have chosen to believe that the universal good does not exist because you are a naturalist and you love being an atheist, and you know that a soon as you admit that universal moral values exist, there is no justification for your disbelief. Thats an emotional reaction on your part as well; it just manifests its self within a different context.

 

[warpspeedpetey]

You haven’t proven anything or realized anything. You have chosen to believe that the universal good does not exist because you are a naturalist and you love being an atheist, and you know that a soon as you admit that universal moral values exist, there is no justification for your disbelief. Thats an emotional reaction on your part as well; it just manifests its self within a different context.

bingo! thats all it boils down too, right there.

 

[SimonArizona]

“Humans, more often than not, can be identified as animals that are aware of being animals, and detest this knowledge. They’ll postulate any number of imaginary barriers between themselves and other animals to maintain the illusion of superiority or control over nature.” --Oreoracle

Humans know we are of the kingdom: animalia

We do not detest this but

Mother nature is far superior to mankind. No man can temper her wrath. However, it is interesting how we can destroy her harmony.

Man is superior to other creatures on earth. We briddle them for our use, and aside from abusing them, they don’t seem to mind plowing our fields, or allowing us to sit horseback. It is natural to them. even death for them isn’t the same as for a human. They kill each other, for them, that is natural.

 

[redhen]

Man is superior to other creatures on earth.

So might makes right? We can use other species as a commodity because we can? So when the superior aliens land on earth and start harvesting homo sapiens, you’ll have no problem with that?

We briddle them for our use, and aside from abusing them, they don’t seem to mind plowing our fields, or allowing us to sit horseback. It is natural to them. even death for them isn’t the same as for a human. They kill each other, for them, that is natural.

Sorry it’s not natural. Humans have **selectively bred **these species to be docile and plump with meat. In a word, domesticated. This is quite unnatural.

 

[tonyrey]

Originally Posted by SimonArizona
Man is superior to other creatures on earth.

So might makes right? We can use other species as a commodity because we can? So when the superior

 

[Oreoracle]

bingo! thats all it boils down too, right there.

…says the man who doesn’t know that “void” means “empty space.”

Man is superior to other creatures on earth. We briddle them for our use, and aside from abusing them, they don’t seem to mind plowing our fields, or allowing us to sit horseback. It is natural to them. even death for them isn’t the same as for a human. They kill each other, for them, that is natural.

“Aside from abusing them!” You speak as though only a small amount of abuse is dealt to animals. Have you looked in your refridgerator lately? Or at your local grocery store? Where do you think all that meat comes from? Don’t get me wrong, I eat meat, but I’m certainly not going to defend that on the grounds that “humans are superior to animals.”

(You are aware that what you quoted was my signature, and not part of my post, right?)

So might makes right? We can use other species as a commodity because we can? So when the superior aliens land on earth and start harvesting homo sapiens, you’ll have no problem with that?

Oh, I’m sure that these fellows will find some other ‘reason’ to believe that we’re superior to the aliens, even if said aliens have double our IQ, senses that surpass those of any other animals on Earth, and the ability to obliterate us in an instant with devices that make the whole of our technology look like a toybox of childhood playthings. Humans can assume the role of the victims just as quickly as they can the role of the aggressors.

 

[tonyrey]

.
Oh, I’m sure that these fellows will find some other ‘reason’ to believe that we’re superior to the aliens, even if said aliens have double our IQ, senses that surpass those of any other animals on Earth, and the ability to obliterate us in an instant with devices that make the whole of our technology look like a toybox of childhood playthings. Humans can assume the role of the victims just as quickly as they can the role of the aggressors.

Intellectual superiority does not justify ill treatment of other beings. It is more reasonable to believe all life is valuable but persons on this planet and elsewhere should have precedence. There is no reason to suppose we have a greater right to life than aliens or vice-versa. This is the fatal flaw in humanism. Why should man be the measure of all things? Theism is not anthropomorphic as is often suggested. It is ratiocentric, i.e. it regards rationality as the most fundamental aspect of reality…