The problem with those that bring up "the problem with evil"

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Is that this epistemic question presupposes the ontology of evil, and thus acknowledges it as a reality. If so, then the antithesis is also true. How does this argument “disprove” the existence of God for some, yet requires to ontologically prove evil first? Yet the same people that use this argument, later disregard the reality of good and evil.

Thoughts?
 
Is that this epistemic question presupposes the ontology of evil, and thus acknowledges it as a reality. If so, then the antithesis is also true. How does this argument “disprove” the existence of God for some, yet requires to ontologically prove evil first? Yet the same people that use this argument, later disregard the reality of good and evil.

Thoughts?
👍 Excellent point Trevor. I once got into a conversation with a stranger sitting next to me on a jet: he didn’t like my using the term “evil,” preferring the specious term “not good.” I just plainly told him: “You eschew the term “evil,” because you know it implies that there’s some sort of objective standard of good, which in turn implies someone who’s able to determine those absolutes, and you don’t want to acknowledge that Someone.” He as much conceded I was right. (A little while later, I actually got him to read Romans 3! I’m hoping that worked on him in the long run…“My word will not return empty,” etc.)
 
I’ve thought about this before a lot. In to see some discussion.
 
Is that this epistemic question presupposes the ontology of evil, and thus acknowledges it as a reality. If so, then the antithesis is also true. How does this argument “disprove” the existence of God for some, yet requires to ontologically prove evil first? Yet the same people that use this argument, later disregard the reality of good and evil.

Thoughts?
No one ever said atheist arguments were logically consistent, although Catholic theology is required to be. Many atheist arguments are inconsistent with the premises of other arguments they use.

You bring up an excellent point - if we argue that the existence of Evil (or suffering, which we understand as an evil) requires certain conclusions, what does the existence of Good require as a conclusion? What does the arguably greater presence of Good tell us? From whence (or Whom) does it derive?

Is our existence (which allows us to experience Good and Evil, and make conclusions through our consciousness) the greatest Good we can conceive, such that it outweighs any other consideration of suffering or Evil?

How do we weigh the suffering that occurs in a single life compared to the enormous amounts of Good? A point system?
 
Is that this epistemic question presupposes the ontology of evil, and thus acknowledges it as a reality. If so, then the antithesis is also true. How does this argument “disprove” the existence of God for some, yet requires to ontologically prove evil first? Yet the same people that use this argument, later disregard the reality of good and evil.

Thoughts?
The problem is that there seems to be confusion over the definition of ‘evil’, as to whether it is a subjective interpretation of events, or is an actual ‘thing’ in the world that would exist whether there were anyone to experience it subjectively or not.

Most secular versions of the problem of evil tend to identify evil with suffering, in particular suffering that does not serve any apparent purpose, and especially if it is gratuitously inflicted for the perpetrator’s pleasure. This is not a definition of evil that requires any notion of a god, and it’s also one that is clearly evident in the world. The argument I’ve most often seen in response to this formulation is to claim that there is no reason to think suffering is bad (as if it were not self-evidently so) and furthermore, it does serve a higher purpose in the form of gains made in the afterlife (as if it were a proven fact that this existed).
 
Is that this epistemic question presupposes the ontology of evil, and thus acknowledges it as a reality. If so, then the antithesis is also true. How does this argument “disprove” the existence of God for some, yet requires to ontologically prove evil first? Yet the same people that use this argument, later disregard the reality of good and evil.

Thoughts?
  1. Evil is not an entity, it is the description of a certain behavior. As such your first sentence is already false.
  2. An evil behavior is intentionally allowing or causing unnecessary, gratuitous harm to a being with a nervous system.
  3. Harm is disrupting the working of biological functions and exciting certain nerve endings of the being.
  4. As such it is a perfectly secular concept, unlike the presupposition of an “ontological evil”, whatever that might be.
  5. It does not disprove the existence of God.
  6. It does disprove the assumption that God is both omnipotent, omniscient and good. (Euthyphro dilemma)
  7. Since the existence of unnecessary harm is obvious, the believers must come up with all sorts of “lame excuses” for God.
  8. An excellent summary of those excuses can be found here: read them and weep
 
👍 Excellent point Trevor. I once got into a conversation with a stranger sitting next to me on a jet: he didn’t like my using the term “evil,” preferring the specious term “not good.”
Actually, several Catholic theologians would also use “not good” rather than “evil”. St. Irenaeus, for example, considered evil as merely a privation (absence) of good. St. Thomas Aquinas did not regard evil as something that exists in itself, but a relational concept we compare to something that is good. St. Augustine of Hippo believed along the same lines. To consider something “evil” is to think that evil exists in its own right, when it doesn’t. In the natural state of things, everything is good since you as Catholics hold that God is at the centre of everything. As soon as God departs from something or somewhere, it becomes evil.
I just plainly told him: “You eschew the term “evil,” because you know it implies that there’s some sort of objective standard of good, which in turn implies someone who’s able to determine those absolutes, and you don’t want to acknowledge that Someone.” He as much conceded I was right.
Not necessarily. Immanuel Kant argued that objective morality alluded to God’s existence, but did not actually prove God’s objective existence.
 
  1. Evil is not an entity, it is the description of a certain behavior. As such your first sentence is already false.
Yes, you’re right in that sense. Though, evil is a reality in the sense of abstraction, only able by existing things. But I thought the modern definition of ontology incorporated concepts/abstracts/essence as realities, or is this still being debated? Regardless, I meant it in that sense, that evil is a privation of good.
  1. It does disprove the assumption that God is both omnipotent, omniscient and good. (Euthyphro dilemma)
  1. Since the existence of unnecessary harm is obvious, the believers must come up with all sorts of “lame excuses” for God.
I’ve heard the argument and the refutes. Why do you consider the rebuttals, “lame”?
 
Yes, you’re right in that sense. Though, evil is a reality in the sense of abstraction, only able by existing things.
I disagree. “Evil behavior” or “evil actions” are very much reality, not just an asbtraction.
But I thought the modern definition of ontology incorporated concepts/abstracts/essence as realities, or is this still being debated?
Very much debated. Abstractions are not “realities” they are an image of reality. When you look into a mirror, you see a reflection of reality, not the reality itself.
Regardless, I meant it in that sense, that evil is a privation of good.
Not accepteble. Evil is a term which is only appicable to conscious beings, who actively cause harm or passively allow harm - while knowing what they do. The drought is a privation of rain, and therefore “bad” for certain plants, but to call that “evil” only serves confusion. Something can be “bad” without “evil”. The term “natural evil” is a very bad misnomer. There is nothing wrong with a drought or a tsunami or an earthquake in a godless universe. They are natural catastrophies, and no malice is involved. They become problematic only if a benevolent and powerful god is assumed. That is when the contradiction arises.
I’ve heard the argument and the refutes. Why do you consider the rebuttals, “lame”?
Read the quoted link. Those are the distilled arguments - and they are ridiculous.
 
The truth is rarely simple. Nothing is intrinsically evil because everything is created by God. Yet evil is real because physical existence inevitably has negative aspects. Only God is perfect in every respect. In The Divine Names by Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite evil is summed up in one imposing sentence:

“Evil is a lack, a deficiency, a weakness, a disproportion, an error, purposeless, unlovely, lifeless, unwise, unreasonable, imperfect, unreal, causeless, indeterminate, sterile, inert, powerless, disordered, incongruous, indefinite, dark, unsubstantial, and never in itself possessed of any existence whatever.”!

books.google.co.uk/books?id=sBosFJ1-uBYC&pg=PA127&lpg=PA127&dq=evil+is+then+a+lack,+a+deficiency,+a+weakness,+a+disproportion&source=bl&ots=_qcmjf_vvK&sig=nS10PpsTK40Fnl7dwx2eigiXY0c&hl=en&ei=2dyGTqiCDqef0QW9oIwK&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CBsQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=evil%20is%20then%20a%20lack%2C%20a%20deficiency%2C%20a%20weakness%2C%20a%20disproportion&f=false

Evil is simply the misdirection of valuable forces. In the case of moral evil misdirection has a direct cause: the misuse of free will! 🙂
 
Most secular versions of the problem of evil tend to identify evil with suffering, in particular suffering that does not serve any apparent purpose, and especially if it is gratuitously inflicted for the perpetrator’s pleasure.
You are right with regard to physical evil but moral evil exists only if “gratuitously” is associated with free will. Otherwise it is an event for which no one is responsible.
 
Is that this epistemic question presupposes the ontology of evil, and thus acknowledges it as a reality. If so, then the antithesis is also true. How does this argument “disprove” the existence of God for some, yet requires to ontologically prove evil first? Yet the same people that use this argument, later disregard the reality of good and evil.
Not at all. It would be perfectly reasonable for even a moral nihilist to talk about the problem of evil. An atheist does not need to prove what evil is and that it exists. She could merely grant the Christian definition for the sake of argument and show that it leads to a logical contradiction. For example, she could argue that it would be possible to have a world with less evil and more good (using Christian definitions of good and evil). She could then argue that an all powerful God could create such a universe and an all loving God would. If the premises of this argument are true, then Christianity is internally inconsistent and therefore false. Whether morality actually exists is irrelevant.
 
Not at all. It would be perfectly reasonable for even a moral nihilist to talk about the problem of evil. An atheist does not need to prove what evil is and that it exists. She could merely grant the Christian definition for the sake of argument and show that it leads to a logical contradiction. For example, she could argue that it would be possible to have a world with less evil and more good (using Christian definitions of good and evil). She could then argue that an all powerful God could create such a universe and an all loving God would. If the premises of this argument are true, then Christianity is internally inconsistent and therefore false. Whether morality actually exists is irrelevant.
Well, Atheist, an all powerful God could create such a universe and an all loving God DID create such a universe.

It was by our own free will that we turned away from the good and continue to do so.
 
Well, Atheist, an all powerful God could create such a universe and an all loving God DID create such a universe.

It was by our own free will that we turned away from the good and continue to do so.
I understand that that is Catholic teaching, but I respectfully disagree. Regarding free will, I don’t find the Catholic view of it to be very coherent.
 
Well, Atheist, an all powerful God could create such a universe and an all loving God DID create such a universe.
Did he, now? Have you been there and seen it?
It was by our own free will that we turned away from the good and continue to do so.
A really good God would not allow to have his creation to be “ruined”. We, in our imperfect way try to limit the “freedom” of those who wish to do harm to others. Why would God not act similarly? Why does God “value” the free will of a rapist more than he “values” the free will of the victim? What is so valuable about the freedom of criminals?
 
Not at all. It would be perfectly reasonable for even a moral nihilist to talk about the problem of evil. An atheist does not need to prove what evil is and that it exists. She could merely grant the Christian definition for the sake of argument and show that it leads to a logical contradiction. For example, she could argue that it would be possible to have a world with less evil and more good (using Christian definitions of good and evil). She could then argue that an all powerful God could create such a universe and an all loving God would. If the premises of this argument are true, then Christianity is internally inconsistent and therefore false. Whether morality actually exists is irrelevant.
Wouldn’t the atheist have to argue:
  1. If gratuitous evil exists, then God goes not exist
  2. gratuitous evil exists
  3. therefore God does not exist.
But to use evil as a reason to doubt theism, the atheist would have to defend premise 2, that gratuitous evil exists. If premise 2 is not true, then there is no reason to think that God does not exist.

But Trevors’ point (if I understand him) is that in defending premise 2, that gratuitous evil exists, the atheist seems to be committed to the idea that a real (non-subjective) evil exists, and therefore good would have to exist. But many think that good (or objective moral values) could not exist without God (the agnostic philosopher of science, Michael Ruse, for instance). So, the existence of (moral) evil actually provides a reason to believe in God (and his goodness since, goodness is based in God’s essentially just, loving nature).

Now the skeptic could do what Spock does and use the term “evil” to mean “suffering”, as opposed to moral evil, which is a much better argument, though it also has its problems and ultimately, does not provide a reason for doubting God’s goodness, power, or existence.God may have morally sufficient reasons (or a justifying reason) for allowing the existence of suffering. For a skeptic to argue that suffering disproves (the Christian) God, he would have to show that God can not have such a reason for allowing the existence of evil. This is a heavy burden of proof that I don’t see how he can meet.
 
A really good God would not allow to have his creation to be “ruined”. We, in our imperfect way try to limit the “freedom” of those who wish to do harm to others. Why would God not act similarly? Why does God “value” the free will of a rapist more than he “values” the free will of the victim? What is so valuable about the freedom of criminals?
You don’t understand that God couldn’t intervene because if you limit free will in any way, it won’t be free will. If I were to knock a gun out of a murderer’s hands, I would be taking away his free will.
 
Wouldn’t the atheist have to argue:
  1. If gratuitous evil exists, then God goes not exist
  2. gratuitous evil exists
  3. therefore God does not exist.
But to use evil as a reason to doubt theism, the atheist would have to defend premise 2, that gratuitous evil exists. If premise 2 is not true, then there is no reason to think that God does not exist.

But Trevors’ point (if I understand him) is that in defending premise 2, that gratuitous evil exists, the atheist seems to be committed to the idea that a real (non-subjective) evil exists, and therefore good would have to exist. But many think that good (or objective moral values) could not exist without God (the agnostic philosopher of science, Michael Ruse, for instance). So, the existence of (moral) evil actually provides a reason to believe in God (and his goodness since, goodness is based in God’s essentially just, loving nature).

Now the skeptic could do what Spock does and use the term “evil” to mean “suffering”, as opposed to moral evil, which is a much better argument, though it also has its problems and ultimately, does not provide a reason for doubting God’s goodness, power, or existence.God may have morally sufficient reasons (or a justifying reason) for allowing the existence of suffering. For a skeptic to argue that suffering disproves (the Christian) God, he would have to show that God can not have such a reason for allowing the existence of evil. This is a heavy burden of proof that I don’t see how he can meet.
No, an atheist would not have to argue that. An atheist just has to argue that things exist which Christianity considers evil, and they exist to a gratuitous degree.
 
Now the skeptic could do what Spock does and use the term “evil” to mean “suffering”, as opposed to moral evil, which is a much better argument, though it also has its problems and ultimately, does not provide a reason for doubting God’s goodness, power, or existence.
To be precise, evil is “intentional causation - or passive allowance - of unnecessary harm”. There is no problem if a “caused or allowed” harm brings along some greater good, which justifies the suffering (though it might run afoul of the good secular and also catholic doctrine that the end does not justifies the means). But the assertion that any and all of the observed sufferings fall into this category cannot be sustained.

The only logically correct argument (made by a theist) I have ever seen was produced by Rabbi Kushner in his book: “When bad things happen to good people” - and he understood that one of God’s supposed attributes (omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence) must “go”. He chose omnipotence.
 
You don’t understand that God couldn’t intervene because if you limit free will in any way, it won’t be free will. If I were to knock a gun out of a murderer’s hands, I would be taking away his free will.
To be more precise, it would impose a limit of the freedom, though obviously our “free” will is not really “free” due to our physical limitations. But your point is important. Why is the free will or a rapist or murderer be more “valuable” than the free will of the victim, who merely wishes not to be raped or murdered? And it is more “valuable” to God, since if it were not, God would take the side of the victim.

Let’s review the Tale of the twelve officers…
 
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