The problem with those that bring up "the problem with evil"

[anEvilAtheist]

One potential problem is that ST is generally applied against the evidential argument from evil. God lying however may itself be contradictory or incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor. God is a greatest conceivable being (GCB). If God could lie, then we could conceive of a greater being, one that could not lie, and that being would be God. So God cannot lie. If, then, it is not possible that God lie, then ST cannot applied to an evidential argument that maybe God lies in the same way that will lead to a greater good.

I think Spock brings up a great point regarding freedom, since Christians typically argue that a world in which persons have free will is better than one in which they do not, even if there is more suffering in the former.

Also, your view that lying is inferior is based on Christian moral teachings, which God could be lying about. A liar might still want to get everyone else to tell the truth.

Second, there is another difference between the two arguments. ST responds to the problem of evil, which begins with the observation that there is evil in the universe. A comparable tu quoque argument would have to begin with the observation that God lies. The arguments seem dis-analogous then.

The arguments do not have to be alike in all respects. The critical question is whether the kind of skepticism which is a premise of the skeptical theist response to the problem of evil also entails skepticism about God’s honesty. Wielenberg’s argument is that people who try to get around the problem of evil by saying that just because we can’t think of a justification for a particular evil doesn’t mean that there isn’t one must also accept that just because we can’t think of a justification for God lying to us doesn’t mean that there isn’t one.

This considered, God’s commands (revelation) thus provide us with reasons to act

I didn’t follow why you think they would provide reasons to act.

But even if they do, this does not show that we have any reason to trust that the things God says are true. Even if you could make an argument that Christians should continue acting as they always have, accepting that you have no reason to believe what God says about heaven would be quite a bullet for many Christians to bite.

• Even without these background beliefs, it is not entirely clear that Weilenberg’s argument is a good one. Suppose,
  a) we have reason to think God tells the truth
  b) we have no pro tanto reason to doubt it
  c) we have no reason to think we could find such a reason before we need to make a decision (to trust God or not)
  d). we ought then to assume God tells the truth.

But what reason to we have to think God tells the truth? A liar who controls your entire reality could easily make himself look honest.

Finally, I would suggest that while it might be true that we can’t know everything about all the possible goods there are, it doesn’t follow that we can’t know anything about them. We do not know enough to conclude that God can’t have morallly sufficient reasons for allowing evil, but I think we could say we do know enough to believe that God is telling the truth and would not, says, condemn everyone to hell.

To me, this seems a lot like responses to skeptical theism which recognize that our knowledge is imperfect but argue that there are some evils, like the Holocaust, that we can be confident there are no sufficient moral justifications for.

 

[danserr]

The duck principle is more precise then to say: “if it looks like a duck, it is probably a duck”. It offers all the possible tests, and if that “duck-looking thing” passes all the tests, then it becomes irrational to doubt any more. It is much deeper than just a simple “non-seeum”.

The point is that to doubt one needs an actual reason to doubt. If one becomes a “universal skeptic”, doubting everything, then he must doubt his own doubt, too, thus leading to a self-contradictory position. On the other hand, if he chooses to accept certain things, without doubting, then there must be a rational reason to decide where to draw the line.

You suppose a false dichotomy when you try to tell me that either I must be a universal skeptic or else admit that I am sufficiently well placed to assess whether an omnipotent, infinite, morally perfect, omniscient being has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. I see absolutely no reason this should be the case.

Your argument from evil is in essence, 1. we cannot see (by see I mean know, understand, find etc- I don’t mean only according to the sense of sight as you seem to have thought I meant) a reason God would allow the evil that exists, 2. therefore there isn’t one. You then argue that the existence of this gratuitous evil is incompatible with the existence of the God of classical theism.

Now you don’t really take on my objection too much and totally ignore my analogies. So I am going to come back to them, since they are pretty useful as I think you tacitly admit by ignoring them.

Your example is fairly confusing and not as clear as it needs to be if it will serve as a counterexample to my argument. You seem to be using it to argue that my position entails global skepticism (which it does not), and you say that if we do our best (all possible tests) to verify some hypothesis, then we should accept it. The application I suppose, would be that if we do our best to assess whether or not God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil and can’t think of any, then we are justified in believing there are none.

But this is obviously untrue. Consider a previous example I gave that you ignored:

It would be like someone drawing a complex mathematical problem on a board, and a child (or me ) looking at it and saying, “I don’t see an answer to that problem, so there must not be one.”

Now would it be rational of me to conclude: “I have done all the tests I can, and cannot see an answer to that problem so there must not be one” ? Certainly I would not be justified in making this conclusion, since I am not well placed to assess the answer to this problem. This does not entail global skepticism as you try to claim, it only entails that I recognize that in this case I am too limited to asses if there is an answer to the problem.

In the same way, finite, limited creatures like ourselves are simply not well placed to assess the justifying reasons that an omnipotent, omniscient, morally perfect, infinite being would have. Surely this is reasonable? If I am not well placed to asses whether or not a math equation drawn by an expert it true or has an answer, then why should I expect to be capable of fully assessing whether or not God has a justifying reason for allowing the existence of evil? But if I am not, as seems obvious, then my inability to see a reason does not entail that there is not one, and the apparent existence of evil is not a reason to doubt the God of classical theism.

So you animal suffering does not disprove the God of classical theism either for the same reason. You are simply not well placed to believe statement 2 (the circumstances that entailed the fiery death of an animal do not benefit anyone). This is simply a non-seum inference of the sort I have dealt with above.

the other example I gave: 1. if aliens existed, they would visit us, 2. they have not, therefore the don’t exist. Obviously number 1 is unwarranted. You have no way of knowing this. Likewise with God and the existence of evil.

I maintain that the amount of freedom we enjoy is partially too much - when it comes to administer pain and misery; and partially too small, when it comes to alleviate the pain and misery,

Being free to do good, but not evil, would be a pretty meaningless sort of freedom.

 

[Perplexity]

This is such a tricky issue…

What the atheist will want to do is show that, given God’s defined attributes, he cannot be morally justified in performing or permitting certain evils. For instance,suppose God incarnated as a woman, became pregnant and had an abortion. Many Christians think such an action is intrinsically evil. So, if God did this they’d have good reason to think God wasn’t perfectly good. The atheist wants to say there are observable evils like this. If he can find examples, the theist can’t say something like 'I have good reason to think God is perfectly good so while I may not know what God’s moral justifications are, I know that he’s morally justified."

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Is that this epistemic question presupposes the ontology of evil, and thus acknowledges it as a reality. If so, then the antithesis is also true. How does this argument “disprove” the existence of God for some, yet requires to ontologically prove evil first? Yet the same people that use this argument, later disregard the reality of good and evil.

Thoughts?

I tend to see the problem of evil as a epistemological problem rather than an ontological problem. By that i mean, while the problem of evil does present us with an intellectual puzzle, it is meaningless to perceive it as a disprove of God on the grounds that we don’t understand how its possible. The reason for this is simply that if evil, right and wrong, truly and objectively exists, then it follows logically from that fact that Moral law exists and thus it follows necessarily that God exists as the objective being which gives intrinsic meaning to those things. It seems self evident that moral evil exists objectively; this is to say that we discover moral evil in reality such as the raping of women and children. These things are truly wrong. To say that they are not objectively wrong, is to justify the rapist and the pedophile, which doesn’t seem rational according to our experiences. The Atheist is in denial.

Atheists, deep down know that this is case. So what the atheist tries to do, despite the unreasonableness of his or her position, is say that evil does not really exist but we know that subjective suffering exists and we don’t think a good God would allow that. But in removing the existence of their objective moral authority to say that some action or behavior is truly wrong, they reduce their argument to merely an expression of taste and not moral truth. You happen to like cheese and pickle sandwiches, but that has no rational bearing on whether or not you should like it. They don’t know what moral truth is because they say that it doesn’t objectively exist. By doing so, suffering loses its moral significance, and thus they lose the power to argue that it is objectively true that God would not allow suffering, because they cannot possibly know what an objectively good God would do. Good and evil, moral truth, has no meaning given their position. Therefore the problem of suffering is an objectively meaningless argument composed more of guilt tripping, trickery, and hypocrisy, rather than an appeal to a true objective moral standard. Notice that the problem of suffering doesn’t stop atheists from freely bringing children in to existence.

However, while their argument fails as a disproof of Gods existence, the problem of evil remains as an intellectual epistemological puzzle. This is to say that the existence of evil is a mystery that is difficult to solve. We should not pretend that its easy or ignore peoples emotional anguish, but at the same time it is impossible for me to perceive it as an excuse for disbelief if i truly believe it is wrong to rape a small child. This has always been the position of the Catholic faith.

 

[tonyrey]

This is such a tricky issue…

What the atheist will want to do is show that, given God’s defined attributes, he cannot be morally justified in performing or permitting certain evils. For instance,suppose God incarnated as a woman, became pregnant and had an abortion. Many Christians think such an action is intrinsically evil. So, if God did this they’d have good reason to think God wasn’t perfectly good. The atheist wants to say there are observable evils like this. If he can find examples, the theist can’t say something like 'I have good reason to think God is perfectly good so while I may not know what God’s moral justifications are, I know that he’s morally justified."

It follows that if it can be proved that any of the precepts or actions of Jesus were evil Christianity is refuted!

I should add that so far no one has performed that feat…

 

[Perplexity]

One potential problem is that ST is generally applied against the evidential argument from evil. God lying however may itself be contradictory or incoherent, like the idea of a married bachelor. God is a greatest conceivable being (GCB). If God could lie, then we could conceive of a greater being, one that could not lie, and that being would be God. So God cannot lie. If, then, it is not possible that God lie, then ST cannot applied to an evidential argument that maybe God lies in the same way that will lead to a greater good.

If we can infer that God wouldn’t lie because the GCB wouldn’t, we can also infer that God would at least permit less evil because the GCB would. That is, I can conceive of a greater being whose perfection precludes the amount of evil God is said to permit.

Second, there is another difference between the two arguments. ST responds to the problem of evil, which begins with the observation that there is evil in the universe. A comparable tu quoque argument would have to begin with the observation that God lies. The arguments seem dis-analogous then.

hmm, it seems to me that Wielenberg merely borrows a premise (or just an antecedent of a premise) from the ST argument. Something like this:

ST:

(1) If we’re not well placed to assess whether God has morally sufficient reasons for his actions, then we’re not well placed to assess whether there is an evidential problem of evil.

(2) We’re not well placed to assess whether God has morally sufficient reasons for his actions.

(3) We’re not well placed to assess whether there is an evidential problem of evil.

Seems like Wielenberg borrows (2).

 

[Equites_Christi]

Atheists seems to think of it this way:

(1) If God is good, He will not allow evil (or gratuitous evil) to exist
(2) Evil (or gratuitous evil) exists
(3) Therefore God either exists but is not good, or does not exist.

However, No.1 is unfounded and then it all falls apart. Why can’t God allow evil while being Himself good? He does not “value” the free will of the rapist above the free will of the victim. One imposes their will on the other, and God will not keep them from doing so. Nor would God keep the victim from later murdering the rapist or otherwise imposing their will. He respects all free wills to act as they will, despite His desire for them to act a certain way.

Then there is a problem for No.2. Spock defined ‘evil behavior’ as that which causes physical harm. Why? Why is this condemnable? From a secular perspective. Is maintaining life and the propagation of the human species the ultimate ‘good’? (If you’ll pardon the expression) If so, why??

 

[Perplexity]

I was just farting about with Wielenberg’s argument:

(1) If skeptical theism true, we have no reason to deny that God telling a lie has some justification we don’t know about. [Premise]

(2) If we have no reason to deny that God telling a lie has some justification we don’t know about, then we don’t know any propositions based solely on God’s word. [Premise]

(3) Skeptical theism is true. [Assume for reductio ad absurdum]

(4) We have no reason to deny that God telling a lie has some justification we don’t know about. (1), (3), M.P.]

(5) We don’t know any propositions based solely on God’s word. (2), (4), M.P.]

(6) If God cannot lie, then we have reason to deny that God telling a lie has some justification we don’t know about. [Premise]

(7) God cannot lie. [Premise]

(8) We have reason to deny that God telling a lie has some justification we don’t know about. (6), (7), M.P.]

(9) Skeptical theism isn’t true. (1), (8), M.T.]

(10) Skeptical theism is and isn’t true. (3), (9), Conj.]

 

[Spock]

You suppose a false dichotomy when you try to tell me that either I must be a universal skeptic or else admit that I am sufficiently well placed to assess whether an omnipotent, infinite, morally perfect, omniscient being has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. I see absolutely no reason this should be the case.

I see where you are mistaken. You “define” God differently now. In the original scenario we say that God is “omniscient” - knows about the suffering, “omnipotent” - is able to do something about the suffering, and “omnibenevolent” - does not allow gratuitous suffering. There is nothing else. There is no “morally perfect” - that is an addendum which would be the result - if you could prove that there is no gratuitous suffering. You cannot use it as an argument, since that is what you wish to prove. If we assume that God is morally perfect, there is no problem at all. We cannot assume that. You wish to prove that.

As such we are perfectly well equipped to evaluate and criticize this beings actions or inactions. As a matter of fact, we are equally ill-equipped to evaluate the actions of a fellow human being. We are not privy to his intentions either. But we are not supposed to assume that this fellow human is “morally perfect” and as such none of his actions should be scrutinized. The fallacy you commit is called “special pleading”. You are now committing the error displayed by the “fifth officer”:

“Look, there’s really no point in my trying to explain the details to you,” said the fifth officer, who we had nicknamed ‘Brainiac’ because he had an encyclopedic knowledge of literally everything and an IQ way off the charts. “There’s an excellent reason for why I did not intervene, but it’s just way too complicated for you to understand, so I’m not even going to bother trying. I mean, you admit you are nowhere near as knowledgeable as I am, so what right do you have to judge? Just so there’s no misunderstanding, though, let me point out that no one could care about Ms. K. more than I did, and that I am, in fact, a very good person. That settles that.”

It is as empty as it can be. The argument you propose is: we are not able to judge God’s actions and the reasons behind them so we should not attempt to make a judgment call. I deny this on the following ground: “we are not privy to all the details of the actions of a fellow human’s, and still we are able to make the judgment based upon the available evidence”. There is no “special pleading”.

Your argument from evil is in essence, 1. we cannot see (by see I mean know, understand, find etc- I don’t mean only according to the sense of sight as you seem to have thought I meant) a reason God would allow the evil that exists, 2. therefore there isn’t one. You then argue that the existence of this gratuitous evil is incompatible with the existence of the God of classical theism.

Not exactly. My point is that since there are no logical and reasonable arguments to support that God is “morally perfect” we can reasonably doubt it.

Your example is fairly confusing and not as clear as it needs to be if it will serve as a counterexample to my argument. You seem to be using it to argue that my position entails global skepticism (which it does not), and you say that if we do our best (all possible tests) to verify some hypothesis, then we should accept it. The application I suppose, would be that if we do our best to assess whether or not God has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil and can’t think of any, then we are justified in believing there are none.

I did not say that you must logically embrace universal skepticism. It is one of the possibilities, and if you reject it, you should be able to enumerate the logical and rational reasons why you accept certain actions without doubt and view other actions with doubt.

Certainly I would not be justified in making this conclusion, since I am not well placed to assess the answer to this problem. This does not entail global skepticism as you try to claim, it only entails that I recognize that in this case I am too limited to asses if there is an answer to the problem.

And why do you think that you are not “well placed” to rationally assess this question? That is the point!

So you animal suffering does not disprove the God of classical theism either for the same reason. You are simply not well placed to believe statement 2 (the circumstances that entailed the fiery death of an animal do not benefit anyone). This is simply a non-seum inference of the sort I have dealt with above.

Give me some rational argument then. Something more that “we are not well placed”.

Being free to do good, but not evil, would be a pretty meaningless sort of freedom.

Not at all. We would still be free to reject God, which is the ultimate “evil” in the eyes of the believers. We would not be able to perform evil acts against our fellow humans (or animals), but that is totally irrelevant in the face of the “ultimate evil” of rejecting God.

 

[Spock]

Atheists seems to think of it this way:

(1) If God is good, He will not allow evil (or gratuitous evil) to exist
(2) Evil (or gratuitous evil) exists
(3) Therefore God either exists but is not good, or does not exist.

However, No.1 is unfounded and then it all falls apart.

Amazing line of thought. If you say that “goodness” is compatible with allowing rape, torture, genocide et al. - then what does then “goodness” mean? With your definition of “good”, who needs “evil”?

Then there is a problem for No.2. Spock defined ‘evil behavior’ as that which causes physical harm.

Be precise: causes “unnecessary or gratuitous harm”. Huge difference.

 

[danserr]

I think Spock brings up a great point regarding freedom, since Christians typically argue that a world in which persons have free will is better than one in which they do not, even if there is more suffering in the former.

Also, your view that lying is inferior is based on Christian moral teachings, which God could be lying about. A liar might still want to get everyone else to tell the truth.
.

This seems too much like a dodge to me. Freedom under Spock’s view would be a poor sort of freedom, a freedom to do good but not evil.

I don’t think you can dismiss my argument either. You could claim that about just about any moral position, not only lying, which is implausible. And my reasoning is purely secular, based on the idea that it is better to tell the truth than not. You might dispute this, but it is a reasonable position. And to use it to hold that God cannot lie (because God lying would be incoherent), provides a coherent way of maintaining ST about the existence of evil, but also to hold that ST does not obligate us to doubt that God tells the truth.

just because we can’t think of a justification for a particular evil doesn’t mean that there isn’t one must also accept that just because we can’t think of a justification for God lying to us doesn’t mean that there isn’t one.

But because we know evil exists, we are warranted in ST regarding evil. However, since we do not know that God lies, then the default position to to believe that God does not lie. I’m not as sure about this, but here seems to be something not quite right in W’s application of ST from evil to divine lying.

But even if they do, this does not show that we have any reason to trust that the things God says are true.

Yes it does, because one action is our choice to believe what God tells us. So what I say about the importance of taking into account our background beliefs. Atheists hold that cognitive considerations alone warrant us in holding existence of God is improbable given evil. Skepticial theists suggest that on the contrary, cognitive considerations do not suffice because we are in too limited a position to be able to say. Applying this to whether we should trust God though, we do not need to act from cognitive considerations alone. We have revelation or other background knowledge about God. This allows to us act based on his commands or believe that he tells the truth. On the other hand, proponents of the argument from evil do not have this option open to them. They are limited by cognitive considerations alone. So the cases are not parallel.

But what reason to we have to think God tells the truth? A liar who controls your entire reality could easily make himself look honest.

Greatest Conceivable Being theology seems to me to provide such a reason. Alternately, one might have a reason based on revelation

 

[danserr]

If we can infer that God wouldn’t lie because the GCB wouldn’t, we can also infer that God would at least permit less evil because the GCB would. That is, I can conceive of a greater being whose perfection precludes the amount of evil God is said to permit.

Except such it may not be conceivable (as opposed to merely imaginable) that God could make a world with as much good as this one has without as much evil.

 

[danserr]

I see where you are mistaken. You “define” God differently now. In the original scenario we say that God is “omniscient” - knows about the suffering, “omnipotent” - is able to do something about the suffering, and “omnibenevolent” - does not allow gratuitous suffering. There is nothing else. There is no “morally perfect”

Sorry, 1 this does not help you, 2. when we speak of God’s goodness we always mean morally perfect. This is simply a red herring on your part. I have changed no definition. We discussed one aspect of God’s goodness, but it does not follow that I was treating that as the whole as God’s goodness. And no, I am not trying to prove anything. On the contrary, the skeptic, you is trying to prove the evil is incompatible with the God of classical theism (who is morally perfect).

As such we are perfectly well equipped to evaluate and criticize this beings actions or inactions. As a matter of fact, we are equally ill-equipped to evaluate the actions of a fellow human being. We are not privy to his intentions either.

As long as you ignore my analogies, which I note that you are very determinedly doing, then your answer is very incomplete and inadequate. On the other hand, I am dealing with your mistaken attempted analogies. For instance, your policeman analogy is misguided because it asks us to asses the morally sufficient reasons of another human being. But this is not the point! ! ! I grant that we can generally assess the motives of another finite, limited human being. But there is no inference from this to that we are well placed to assess whether an infinite, morally perfect, omniscient, omnipotent being has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. So there is no special pleading because God is a different type of being! One who we should not think that we are sufficiently well placed to assess. I have told you before that silly website is just caricatures of more serious arguments.

Consider again my analogies which you seem terrible unwilling to do. The mathematical example and the alien example.

Denying God on the basis of evil then would be like a child (or me) looking at a complicated mathematical equation drawn by an expert mathematician and concluding it is nonsense because I can’t understand it. I would be wrong, because I am not well placed to assess whether or not the equation is good or bad.

 

[danserr]

There are many problems with the concept of GCB. One is apparent here. You contend that a being who is unable to lie is “superior” or “greater” than another one who can lie, but chooses not to. (No one asserts that God is liar, the argument merely says that we cannot assume - coming from skepticism - that God will not lie.) That means that the being unable to lie has less freedom than the one who is not so constrained, and thus has more freedom. The whole concept of GCB deteriorates into a subjective “my GCB is greater than your GCB” type of childish argument. So, just based upon the GCB you cannot say that a possibly lying God is like a married bachelor.

By your logic I would have to argue that a being who can rape and torture a little child to death is a greater being that one who cannot. This seems foolish. Doing evil represents a defect and as as GCB, God is without defect. Sheer stubbornness on your part (insisting that a being who can do evil is greater than one who can’t) hardly makes the concept of a GCb purely subjective. We are discussing metaphysical conceivability, not mere subjective imaginability. But this is a topic for another thread.

 

[anEvilAtheist]

The reason for this is simply that if evil, right and wrong, truly and objectively exists, then it follows logically from that fact that Moral law exists and thus it follows necessarily that God exists as the objective being which gives intrinsic meaning to those things.

Would you mind outlining step by step how the existence of objective morality leads necessarily to the existence of God. I believe in objective morality, but can see no way of logically connecting the two other than through an appeal to ignorance. Saying God is the only explanation you can think of does not constitute a logical proof.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Would you mind outlining step by step how the existence of objective morality leads necessarily to the existence of God. I believe in objective morality, but can see no way of logically connecting the two other than through an appeal to ignorance. Saying God is the only explanation you can think of does not constitute a logical proof.

I might do in a couple of days. I don’t feel like it at the moment. Be patient.

 

[anEvilAtheist]

I might do in a couple of days. I don’t feel like it at the moment. Be patient.

No problem.

 

[StarFireKK]

A really good God would not allow to have his creation to be “ruined”. We, in our imperfect way try to limit the “freedom” of those who wish to do harm to others. Why would God not act similarly? Why does God “value” the free will of a rapist more than he “values” the free will of the victim? What is so valuable about the freedom of criminals?

How is the free will of the victim limited? In other words- why are you saying God values the free will of the crook over the victim’s free will?

 

[tonyrey]

Would you mind outlining step by step how the existence of objective morality leads necessarily to the existence of God. I believe in objective morality, but can see no way of logically connecting the two other than through an appeal to ignorance. Saying God is the only explanation you can think of does not constitute a logical proof.

A purposeless universe is necessarily valueless!

 

[Equites_Christi]

Amazing line of thought. If you say that “goodness” is compatible with allowing rape, torture, genocide et al. - then what does then “goodness” mean? With your definition of “good”, who needs “evil”?

Goodness, in one sense, is causing good things to happen - such as blessings - and not causing evil things to happen - such as rape. God is good because He is virtue, mercy, grace and love. He has given us the power to choose good or evil without His interference, though he has clearly spelled out what He does not want us to do. He allows rape, but it is clear through Scripture and the Church that He does not approve of it (if you will kindly assume for the sake of this argument that Scripture and the Church accurately communicate the will of God). If God caused rape, that would not be goodness. But it is man that causes it.

Be precise: causes “unnecessary or gratuitous harm”. Huge difference.

Alrighty then, by your definition ‘evil behavior’ is unnecessary or gratuitous harm, and - I presume - condemnable. I am very very interested, why?