The problem with those that bring up "the problem with evil"

[Spock]

As long as you ignore my analogies, which I note that you are very determinedly doing, then your answer is very incomplete and inadequate.

Ok, let’s deal with them. I do it below.

On the other hand, I am dealing with your mistaken attempted analogies. For instance, your policeman analogy is misguided because it asks us to asses the morally sufficient reasons of another human being.

The policeman stands for God, not just a human being. The argument simply says what you say: “we are not in the position to judge God”. Why would that be a “caricature”?

But this is not the point! ! ! I grant that we can generally assess the motives of another finite, limited human being. But there is no inference from this to that we are well placed to assess whether an infinite, morally perfect, omniscient, omnipotent being has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. So there is no special pleading because God is a different type of being! One who we should not think that we are sufficiently well placed to assess.

It is called special pleading. Another poster said that whatever God does is by definition the “best” solution. If he orders rape, then rape is moral. If he commits genocide, the genocide is moral. That is not how “goodness” is defined. You may redefine it to suit your purposes, but that redefinition is not accepted.

Consider again my analogies which you seem terrible unwilling to do. The mathematical example and the alien example.

Denying God on the basis of evil then would be like a child (or me) looking at a complicated mathematical equation drawn by an expert mathematician and concluding it is nonsense because I can’t understand it. I would be wrong, because I am not well placed to assess whether or not the equation is good or bad.

The analogy fails for very good reason. You can ask the mathematician and expect an explanation. If the mathematician can provide it, everything is fine. If, however, he just says (Brainiac again) that you must accept it on his authority, or does not say anything at all, then you are free to draw your own conculsions.

The alien example is even sillier. The premise that if there are aliens they would visit us, is totally groundless.

The “duck principle” stands. All the believers use it (instinctively or consciously) for every possible dilemma - except for those which affect their core beliefs. It does not “prove” that God does not exist, or that God is not benevolent but it makes it extremely unlikely.

God is always welcome to come and give us the explanation. If he does not do it, then we are free to draw our conclusions.

 

[You]

It sounds like you’re defining freedom as the ability to choose between good and bad rather than defining it as the ability to choose between multiple options. Obviously then it would lead to the conclusion that morality exists, but then you’re just smuggling it into the definition of freedom. I don’t see why anyone would accept the former definition of freedom rather than the latter unless they had some other reason to believe that morality exists. In that case, that reason is the reason they have for believing in morality. Freedom itself is not.

Its easy to say multiple options, its rather more difficult to do.

Here is our instinctual animal. It has no options. It is instinctual. Its morality is neutral.
Here we are with the ability to chose or seek a moral neutral or a good or evil.

 

[Spock]

By your logic I would have to argue that a being who can rape and torture a little child to death is a greater being that one who cannot. This seems foolish. Doing evil represents a defect and as as GCB, God is without defect.

The ability to do evil, however, is not a defect.

There is a very interesting corollary to what you say. You insisted that if humans have the freedom to make one morally charged decision, namely to choose or to reject God, is a “puny” little freedom. You also insist that God is not capable to do anything “immoral”, and not because he chooses not to do it, but he is totally unable to do it. Of course that is just a different way of saying that God has no “free will” at all. So if God has no free will, and it is a positive aspect of God’s existence, then why do we “need” free will?

Of course “free will” is simply the freedom to make a decision with at least two options. if we have the freedom to choose to eat cereal or eggs for breakfast, then we have “free will”. It is not necessary to make a morally siginficant decision.

 

[danserr]

The ability to do evil, however, is not a defect.

There is a very interesting corollary to what you say. You insisted that if humans have the freedom to make one morally charged decision, namely to choose or to reject God, is a “puny” little freedom. You also insist that God is not capable to do anything “immoral”, and not because he chooses not to do it, but he is totally unable to do it. Of course that is just a different way of saying that God has no “free will” at all. So if God has no free will, and it is a positive aspect of God’s existence, then why do we “need” free will?

Of course “free will” is simply the freedom to make a decision with at least two options. if we have the freedom to choose to eat cereal or eggs for breakfast, then we have “free will”. It is not necessary to make a morally significant decision.

If God makes us so that we cannot do evil, then we are unable to do evil because he made us so. That is to say, our inability to do evil is dependent on how God made us. God, on the other hand is unable to do evil. But he was not made so by anyone. Hence the two cases are dis-analogous. God is free to do different goods, simply not to do evil. But for the reason I say above, he cannot make human beings so.

And as to us being free to eat cereal or eggs but not make morally significant decisions, this would be a fairly pathetic and meaningless form of free will.

 

[danserr]

Ok, let’s deal with them. I do it below.

The policeman stands for God, not just a human being. The argument simply says what you say: “we are not in the position to judge God”. Why would that be a “caricature”?

It is called special pleading. Another poster said that whatever God does is by definition the “best” solution. If he orders rape, then rape is moral. If he commits genocide, the genocide is moral. That is not how “goodness” is defined. You may redefine it to suit your purposes, but that redefinition is not accepted.

I am not that poster and so that is irrelevant. I deny that God is capable of commanding such things because a being that did would not be God. God’s commands are necessary expressions of his just, loving nature, so saying “what if God commanded child abuse” is like saying “if a square circle existed…”

You ignored or did not understand my main point with the policeman analogy, so please go back and read my previous post again. There is no special pleading because the policeman is a different type of being than God, so the comparison is of apples and oranges (to put it mildly). Your reply to this was a non-sequitur. We are well placed to asses the motives of another finite limited being (the policeman), there is no logical inference from this to suggesting that we are similarly well placed to assess the motives and reasons of a finite, omnipotent, morally perfect, omniscient being (God).

The analogy fails for very good reason. You can ask the mathematician and expect an explanation. If the mathematician can provide it, everything is fine.

What if the child (or I) cannot understand the explanation? I should not expect to be able to understand the explanation to a complex math equation. Hence being poorly placed to understand such a reason, I am unwarranted in concluding that there is no explanation. Likewise with God.

As to the alien example, you understand the point, but miss the application. Of course the point is that the idea “if aliens existed they would visit us” is groundless. It is groundless because we are not placed to understand the motives and minds of aliens. Likewise with God. We (infinite, fallible) are not well placed to asses if God (infinite, omnipotent etc.) has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. To conclude that he does not exist (or is not omnipotent or morally perfect) on the basis of evil is to make the sort of failed non-seum inference of the alien or math example. The inference is ungrounded.

 

[Spock]

If God makes us so that we cannot do evil, then we are unable to do evil because he made us so.

And conversely, we are able to do evil, because God made us so. What do you wish to achieve here? God is resonsible either way.

That is to say, our inability to do evil is dependent on how God made us. God, on the other hand is unable to do evil.

Just look at your last sentence:

And as to us being free to eat cereal or eggs but not make morally significant decisions, this would be a fairly pathetic and meaningless form of free will.

So God is being unable to to do evil does not deprive God of his free will. But if we are unable to do evil, then we do not have free wiil??? This is either a blatant contradcition, or special pleading. You cannot have two different definitions of “free will”, one for humans and one for God.

Of course you keep bypassing my question: “if we are able to make the ultimate morally significant decision: to choose God, or to reject God, why is our free will insufficent?”.

I am not that poster and so that is irrelevant. I deny that God is capable of commanding such things because a being that did would not be God. God’s commands are necessary expressions of his just, loving nature, so saying “what if God commanded child abuse” is like saying “if a square circle existed…”

Better read the old testament. It is loaded with morally reprehensible actions of God.

You ignored or did not understand my main point with the policeman analogy, so please go back and read my previous post again. There is no special pleading because the policeman is a different type of being than God, so the comparison is of apples and oranges (to put it mildly). Your reply to this was a non-sequitur. We are well placed to asses the motives of another finite limited being (the policeman), there is no logical inference from this to suggesting that we are similarly well placed to assess the motives and reasons of a finite, omnipotent, morally perfect, omniscient being (God).

You really shot yourself in the foot here. Your argument is that we cannot pass a negative judgment considering God, because we are not “well-placed” to do so. Now do you think that we are “well-placed” to make positive judgments about God? If you say that we are not, then you cannot argue that God is “morally perfect”. If, however you say that we are “well-placed” to make positive judgments but not negative ones, then you again committed the fallacy of “special pleading”, but this time you try to carve out some epistemic toehold for the believers and deny it for the non-belivers… It will not work. If you are “well placed” to evalute God’s actions in a positive light, then I am equally “well placed” to evaluate the actions in a negative light. Believers are not “better placed” than non-believers.

What if the child (or I) cannot understand the explanation? I should not expect to be able to understand the explanation to a complex math equation. Hence being poorly placed to understand such a reason, I am unwarranted in concluding that there is no explanation. Likewise with God.

If you cannot understand it, you can ask for clairification. No “likewise” with God. God never comes down and gives us an explanation, complicated or otherwise. We are even asking for it, many of us do. We are willing to listen to his side of the story. But since he does not answer, that gives us the right to use our reason and draw our conclusions.

As to the alien example, you understand the point, but miss the application. Of course the point is that the idea “if aliens existed they would visit us” is groundless. It is groundless because we are not placed to understand the motives and minds of aliens.

The example was silly, because no one has any information about those aliens. However, we are supposed to have some information about God. Maybe you say that we are not “better placed” with God than we are with the aliens? Indeed, we have no idea if those aliens exist or not. Likewise with God. Indeed we have no idea what the value system of those aliens might be, even if they existed. Likewise with God. If that is what you say, I will accept your reasoning as correct. But somehow I doubt it.

 

[danserr]

And conversely, we are able to do evil, because God made us so. What do you wish to achieve here? God is resonsible either way.

Just look at your last sentence:

So God is being unable to to do evil does not deprive God of his free will. But if we are unable to do evil, then we do not have free wiil??? This is either a blatant contradcition, or special pleading. You cannot have two different definitions of “free will”, one for humans and one for God.

I explained this previously, you are forcing me to do nothing more than repeat myself.

God made us free. This entails freedom to choose him (do good) or reject him (do evil). God is not responsible for the evil we do because he made us free. This is an elementary point. It is not comparable to a workman being responsible for building a bad computer because the computer is not free, people are.

Now if God had made us incapable of doing evil. Then we would not do evil. But we would not do evil because he made us incapable of it. Therefore our not doing evil would not be a free choice.

On the other hand, no one made God, so this would not apply to him. He can be free to do good but not evil. If humans could not do evil, it would be because God made us so, hence our choice would not be free. This however does not apply to God because he was unmade.

As I keep telling you, you are fond of claiming “special pleading” but this does not apply when you are comparing apples and oranges.

You question as to why can’t our only choice be to accept God or not be sufficient. Some think this may have been the case with the angels, but it is hard to see how it could be the case for embodied creatures. Why then did God bother to create embodied creatures? Because it was good to do so, and He (being morally perfect and omniscient) knows that in the end it will be worth it.

Better read the old testament. It is loaded with morally reprehensible actions of God.

This is simply a red herring, since I could escape it simply by giving up biblical inerrancy and holding the Israelites were mistaken in attributing such commands to God. I don’t even have to do that though since your objection is based on a poor understanding of the Old Testament. You can remedy it by reading Paul Copan’s Is God a moral monster?.

You really shot yourself in the foot here. Your argument is that we cannot pass a negative judgment considering God, because we are not “well-placed” to do so. Now do you think that we are “well-placed” to make positive judgments about God?

I argued that we are not well-placed to assess if God (a morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscent, infinite being) has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. This is in response to the atheist attack (in this case yours) that the existence of evil is incompatible with the God of classical theism.

You then try to use this in a misguided attempt to suggest that we can’t assess if God is really good. Your argument, if really parallel to mine, would have to run like:
-“We are not well placed to assess is a morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, infinite, metaphysically necessary being has morally sufficient reasons for being good”

• Or else, “maybe such a being (morally perfect, etc.) has morally sufficient reasons for not being good.”
  That is just incoherent nonsense. The problem of evil seeks to show that such a being cannot exist given the evil of the world. The skeptical theist replies that such a non-seum inference is unwarranted because we are not well placed to make it. There is no logical inference from this to the idea “maybe God is evil and we don’t know it.” (since one of the qualities of the being we are discussing is moral perfection).

Now maybe your question is not really so incoherent. Maybe, you just mean "How do we know God is good? A fair question, but it is the topic for another thread, where the theist might point to different versions of the moral argument (the existence of objective moral values and duties implies the existence of God), the ontological argument, or revelation.

If you cannot understand it, you can ask for clairification

And if I can’t understand the clarification? You really just repeated yourself. Suppose I am not good at math and can’t understand the explanation or clarification? I would still not be warranted in doubting the equation because I would have to recognize that I am not well placed to understand it.

The example was silly, because no one has any information about those aliens. However, we are supposed to have some information about God.

The point of the example is that we do not have sufficient information about those aliens to make such a decision. Likewise with God, we know some goods, perhaps many, but from our finite limited viewpoint. we do not have sufficient information to assess if such a being has morally sufficient reasons to allow evil.

 

[Perplexity]

I’m not sure free-will entails the ability to choose evil.

“St. Augustine and others urged most admirably against the Pelagians that, if the possibility of deflection from good belonged to the essence or perfection of liberty, then God, Jesus Christ, and the angels and saints, who have not this power, would have no liberty at all, or would have less liberty than man has in his state of pilgrimage and imperfection.” (Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum, emphasis mine).

Further, due to certain Frankfurt cases, I don’t think alternative possibility is a necessary condition of free-will.

 

[tonyrey]

I’m not sure free-will entails the ability to choose evil.

“St. Augustine and others urged most admirably against the Pelagians that, if the possibility of deflection from good belonged to the essence or perfection of liberty, then God, Jesus Christ, and the angels and saints, who have not this power, would have no liberty at all, or would have less liberty than man has in his state of pilgrimage and imperfection.” (Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum, emphasis mine).

Further, due to certain Frankfurt cases, I don’t think alternative possibility is a necessary condition of free-will.

Even with free will we can lose our liberty - to varying degrees - by becoming slaves to our desires!

 

[Spock]

On the other hand, no one made God, so this would not apply to him. He can be free to do good but not evil. If humans could not do evil, it would be because God made us so, hence our choice would not be free. This however does not apply to God because he was unmade.

Totally irrelvant. Freedom is freedom, whether one was “made” or “not made”.

As I keep telling you, you are fond of claiming “special pleading” but this does not apply when you are comparing apples and oranges.

No apples and oranges here. A simple definiton of “freedom”.

You question as to why can’t our only choice be to accept God or not be sufficient.

That is the question. Of course, I don’t care about the “extra” freedom to make morally significant decisions, at all. We have freedom if we can choose to wear a red tie, or a blue tie, or no tie at all. But since you insist that there is a need for “morally significant” decisons, too (even though it is just an empty assertion, without any argument so support it - to say that it is a “puny” freedom is not an argument) I say that having ONE important morally significant decision is enough.

This is simply a red herring, since I could escape it simply by giving up biblical inerrancy and holding the Israelites were mistaken in attributing such commands to God.

The story of the flood describes a moral atrocity committed by God - not simply ordered by God. Sure you may say that it is just a “story” (and I would agree with you) but if you do that, you will either have to discard the whole Bible or keep some parts - and that would be cherry picking.

I argued that we are not well-placed to assess if God (a morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscent, infinite being) has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. This is in response to the atheist attack (in this case yours) that the existence of evil is incompatible with the God of classical theism.

You then try to use this in a misguided attempt to suggest that we can’t assess if God is really good. Your argument, if really parallel to mine, would have to run like:
-“We are not well placed to assess is a morally perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, infinite, metaphysically necessary being has morally sufficient reasons for being good”

Wrong. The problem goes much deeper. I argue that you are not “well placed” at all to make any claims about God, you cannot start with the positive claim that God is “morally perfect”. Also “benevolence” does not equal “morally perfect”. To claim that they are one and the same is incoherent nonsense.

And if I can’t understand the clarification? You really just repeated yourself. Suppose I am not good at math and can’t understand the explanation or clarification? I would still not be warranted in doubting the equation because I would have to recognize that I am not well placed to understand it.

The point was that God does not come and give an explanation. Therefore your analogy is inapplicable.

The point of the example is that we do not have sufficient information about those aliens to make such a decision. Likewise with God, we know some goods, perhaps many, but from our finite limited viewpoint. we do not have sufficient information to assess if such a being has morally sufficient reasons to allow evil.

No, you do not have any information about God. It is all faith, not grounded in realiity. You are just as “ill placed” with God as you would be with the aliens.

 

[You]

I’m not sure free-will entails the ability to choose evil.

“St. Augustine and others urged most admirably against the Pelagians that, if the possibility of deflection from good belonged to the essence or perfection of liberty, then God, Jesus Christ, and the angels and saints, who have not this power, would have no liberty at all, or would have less liberty than man has in his state of pilgrimage and imperfection.” (Leo XIII, Libertas Praestantissimum, emphasis mine).

Further, due to certain Frankfurt cases, I don’t think alternative possibility is a necessary condition of free-will.

It seems to me that “God, Jesus Christ, and the angels and saints, who have not this power,” all experienced this effect at one time. The angels on their creation when they chose freely; God Jesus Christ, when He was tempted in the Garden and sweated blood and asked for this cup to pass if possible. He experienced the force of the choice even though He was the one person who could overcome it. The saints were once subject to free choices.

 

[Perplexity]

It seems to me that “God, Jesus Christ, and the angels and saints, who have not this power,” all experienced this effect at one time. The angels on their creation when they chose freely; God Jesus Christ, when He was tempted in the Garden and sweated blood and asked for this cup to pass if possible. He experienced the force of the choice even though He was the one person who could overcome it. The saints were once subject to free choices.

I don’t think we need alternative possibilities to have free choice, but even if we do, we don’t need to have the possibility of choosing evil. i.e., evil doesn’t have to be among the alternate possibilities.

I don’t think Jesus was being tempted with an evil in your example. Granting that the saints and angels chose between good and evil, they can’t choose evil now that they’re in heaven. It’s impossible for them to sin.

 

[You]

I don’t think we need alternative possibilities to have free choice, but even if we do, we don’t need to have the possibility of choosing evil. i.e., evil doesn’t have to be among the alternate possibilities.

I don’t think Jesus was being tempted with an evil in your example. Granting that the saints and angels chose between good and evil, they can’t choose evil now that they’re in heaven. It’s impossible for them to sin.

The saints and angels are constantly now in the presence of Good, I could say they are constantly choosing good in heaven so the possibility of choosing evil is 0. They would not be conscious or subject to other possibilities in the face of goodness.
Christ was tempted by the devil on the mountain and from a rooftop and before He died He prayed for that cup of suffering to pass by. But I think that was necessary to fulfill everything correctly not that it was ever possible He would not continue. His choice, - being the only one to have seen the Father who is Goodness -, was like the choice between Goodness and a fallen world. He would always continue but who is to say He wouldn’t still experience the force of another choice as part of the cross He would bear.

 

[danserr]

Totally irrelvant. Freedom is freedom, whether one was “made” or “not made”.

No apples and oranges here. A simple definiton of “freedom”.

Imagine God does what you want. He says: I will make Spock unable to do evil.
If he did so, you would, obviously never choose evil. But this would not be a free choice. You would never choose evil because you would be prevented from being so by God, hence your not choosing evil would not be a free choice, but one you make being compelled by an external power, God.

God, however, is unmade. So he can be free to do good but not evil because his inability to do evil is not dependent on anyone making him so.

We have freedom if we can choose to wear a red tie, or a blue tie, or no tie at all. But since you insist that there is a need for “morally significant” decisons, too (even though it is just an empty assertion, without any argument so support it - to say that it is a “puny” freedom is not an argument) I say that having ONE important morally significant decision is enough

And yet I do say that freedom to do no more than choose a red or blue tie would be a pathetic sort of freedom. Do you seriously think otherwise? That this choice would somehow be meaningful? What if the government took away every freedom you had. Every single one, except, it allowed you to choose to wear a blue or a red tie in the morning. Would you be satisfied with this “freedom”?

A morally significant freedom allows us to accept or reject God, thereby accepting or rejecting eternal happiness. That seems an obviously desirable reason to have morally significant freedom. I have addressed why not have only one choice above, I will not repeat myself except to say that it is hard to imagine how this would work with embodied creatures.

The story of the flood describes a moral atrocity committed by God - not simply ordered by God. Sure you may say that it is just a “story” (and I would agree with you) but if you do that, you will either have to discard the whole Bible or keep some parts - and that would be cherry picking.

I historians took your idea seriously “all or none” they could never do history. You always take what is useful from a source and reject the rest. What makes it not cherry picking is to have a good reason for it. There are principles that guide how we decide to interpret the Old Testament. If you want to do more than simply mock, then read the book I suggested, Is God a Moral Monster. Your argument is even worse though, because the Bible is made of different books written at different times by different authors. Rejecting the history of the flood as literal in no way entails that we reject Paul’s letter to Corinthians. That is just silly.

I argue that you are not “well placed” at all to make any claims about God,

Well then, you have essentially just admitted that you can not claim that God would not allow evil. Excellent.

The reason I can make other claims about God, of course, that that when discussing the problem of evil (POE) the atheist is claiming that cognitive considerations alone suffice to warrant his conclusion that God can’t have a justifying reason for allowing evil.

On the other hand, when making other claims about God, I have other tools than the cognitive considerations used by the atheist. I have reason (the moral argument to show God is good, historical evidence to show Jesus rose, evidence that God created the universe, etc.,). Next, there is revelation, which can also be believed in rationally. The full reason why is a talk for another thread, but my point is that the theist has more sources of information than the cognitive considerations alone that the atheist is using to make his non-seum inference.

The point was that God does not come and give an explanation. Therefore your analogy is inapplicable.

Your dodge doesn’t work, because it is just that, a dodge.
In the situation I gave, (a complicated mathematical equation drawn on a board) I would be unjustified in concluding the equation has no answer because I cannot see one. This is because I am not well placed to assess if such an equation has an answer or not.

You try to claim “because God does not give an explanation, there isn’t one,.” Or "if there was a reason, God would give it to us.

This begs the question by assuming we would be placed to understand such a reason. My point is that we are not.

Second, this ignores the main point. It still remains the case the we are not placed to assess God’s reasons for allowing evil in the same way I am not placed to assess if the mathematical equation is true or not. The point is that a non-seum inference is unwarranted if we are not well placed to make it. In the case of the mathematical equation, I am not. Similarly, as finite, limited being, we are not well placed to assess if an omnipotent, morally perfect, omniscient etc, being has morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil. Therefore, we are not warranted in believing he has no such reason.

 

[danserr]

Originally Posted by danserr View Post
The point of the example is that we do not have sufficient information about those aliens to make such a decision. Likewise with God, we know some goods, perhaps many, but from our finite limited viewpoint. we do not have sufficient information to assess if such a being has morally sufficient reasons to allow evil.

No, you do not have any information about God. It is all faith, not grounded in realiity. You are just as “ill placed” with God as you would be with the aliens.

Your answer is almost incoherent; certainly it misses the point of the analogy. If I am really as ill-placed with God as you claim, that you are also admitting that you are ill-placed to claim that he does not have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil and your whole argument falls apart. This is correct, as with the aliens, you are ill-placed to says he does not have morally sufficient reasons for allowing the existence of evil.

And I reject your misuse of the word faith to be “blind belief without evidence.” I am well placed to say many things about God, and I have rational grounds for thinking them, as I mention briefly above. But now you are trying to change the subject and start an argument on “is Christian belief warranted,” which is a question for another thread.

p.s. I have no idea what you are talking about with your claim that moral perfection is not the some as benevolence. My argument is that the existence of evil does not show that God is not morally perfect. Benevolence would be a part of this. Please explain what you mean and why you think this is relevant.

 

[anEvilAtheist]

God made us free. This entails freedom to choose him (do good) or reject him (do evil). God is not responsible for the evil we do because he made us free. This is an elementary point. It is not comparable to a workman being responsible for building a bad computer because the computer is not free, people are.

If God is omniscient, he knew what we would do when he created us. If he is all powerful, he could choose which people (out of infinitely many possible people) he would create. He could have chosen to create those who would do the most good. And if he created humanity itself, he could have made human nature slightly different than it is. He could have made us more loving for example. God could have done either or those without in any way interfering with our free will.

 

[jochoa]

If God is omniscient, he knew what we would do when he created us.If he is all powerful, he could choose which people (out of infinitely many possible people) he would create. He could have chosen to create those who would do the most good.
And if he created humanity itself, he could have made human nature slightly different than it is. He could have made us more loving for example. God could have done either or those without in any way interfering with our free will.

If he only chose those who would do the most good or made us more loving, Humanity as a whole would never be of a free nature.

Thoughts?

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

If God is omniscient, he knew what we would do when he created us. If he is all powerful, he could choose which people (out of infinitely many possible people) he would create. He could have chosen to create those who would do the most good. And if he created humanity itself, he could have made human nature slightly different than it is. He could have made us more loving for example. God could have done either or those without in any way interfering with our free will.

Seems to me that all you have done is proved that the best possible reality is the reality that would be created and follows was created, our reality.

 

[Spock]

If he only chose those who would do the most good or made us more loving, Humanity as a whole would never be of a free nature.

Thoughts?

Humanity cannot be either free or not free. Only individuals can be. We would be better off if God would not have created the people who turn out to be evil. And specifically, the victims certainly would be better off. And, please none of the nonsense that “suffering is good for you”.

Seems to me that all you have done is proved that the best possible reality is the reality that would be created and follows was created, our reality.

On the contrary, he proved that this is NOT the best of the possible worlds - since it is DYNAMIC, it is constantly changing. Only a static world (without changes) could be described as “best”.

 

[You]

Humanity cannot be either free or not free. Only individuals can be. We would be better off if God would not have created the people who turn out to be evil. And specifically, the victims certainly would be better off. And, please none of the nonsense that “suffering is good for you”.
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And the Son of man indeed goeth, as it is written of him: but woe to that man by whom the Son of man shall be betrayed. It were better for him, if that man had not been born.

Freedom is an awesome responsibility - the benefits eternally must be as awesome as the drawbacks.