The real problem with pain

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Not everyone on this forum has the same level of philosophical education, indeed I would say that many on this philosophy forum have no formal training in philosophy at all, but they still have very good questions and arguments. Can I suggest simpler argumentation forms and at least explain the technical terms you use, so as to engage people in a good philosophical argument and so that you can convince them that you make a valid point. There is no use throwing around terms like ‘efficent cause’ or ‘hylomorphic compound’ if people don’t understand them. Remember the point of the perennial philosophy is to explain rationally the reality of things not to baffle people. Rememer what it was like when you first read Aristotle esp the like of De Anima.
Never had formal training, will soon though as I am discerning which order I will go into. All I did was pick up such books like De Anima or Contra Gentiles and had them in one hand and the dictionary and/or internet in the other. Books like Aquinas by Feser helped as well. I wish I had the time to reduce the questions arguments I present, but I don’t and I wouldn’t if I did. Not an intellectual elitist but I expect a reader of a philosophy board to have a philosophical foundation.
 
Don’t take my word for it, John Searle and Edward Feser have already written works that demonstrates all forms of materialism denies the existence of the mind, intentional or not. Let’s face it, it’s the logical end to materialism; a desperate last resort option on hold hoping the present problems can be explained via monism and when reality finally settles in, the opt out awaits. Some, like the Churchlands, have put their money where their mouth is, the rest will follow sooner or later. If the last century has shown us anything concerning philosophy of mind and materialism, it has been a systematic movement towards abandoning the existence of the mind when theory after theory has been defeated and abandoned.
This is pretty evasive. A part of your argument depends on whether materialists should be eliminativists, when challenged to justify that, you just wave in Searle and Feser’s direction and shovel rhetoric. Unless you endorse every single argument in each work those two have published on this subject, you’ll have to specify which argument (of theirs?) that you’re endorsing here. Further, unless you can present that argument here, I don’t think anyone should take this fundamental part of your argument seriously.
An atheist would say the mind is a complete substance void of matter and exists apart from matter? Interesting… All dualists I know of, of this school of thought explains the gap between causal relation of mind and body by presenting a god of the gaps argument. What is the atheist response to this interaction problem?
Sure, check out Thomas Nagel, the infamous atheist anti-reductionist. I haven’t given much thought to that to be honest.
And with materialism there is no pain experienced and any association with concepts of suffering or evil with pain is absurd. With Cartesian dualism, whatever is experienced by the body really doesn’t matter, since the real and thinking person is elsewhere and non-contingent of the body.
I don’t think we should grant this, but supposing you’re right, we’d just end up rejecting materialism and Cartesian dualism. Pain does exist, and it does matter. We’d sooner question the sanity of the one who denies this than consider their argument.
I understand the muddleheaded argument and I’m not impressed by the emotional tears behind it. Since when was the boundaries of strict rational argumentation expanded for a single worthless argument? And whoever says it’s “evidence for atheism” is an idiot, as the argument aims at attributes of God rather than His existence.
Nah, I don’t think you have any idea what you’re playing with 😛 (and anyone who’s familiar with the evidential problem of suffering will agree with me)

As Robin Collins says:

“According to the Expectation Principle, if an event or state of affairs is more to be expected under one hypothesis, h1, than another, h2, it counts as evidence in favor of h1 over h2 – that is, in favor of the hypothesis under which it has the highest expectation. The strength of the evidence is proportional to the relative degree to which it is more to be expected under h1 than h2.” - Craig, William Lane., and James Porter Moreland. The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology. Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. p. 206.

Assume that, P(Theism|k) = 0.5, (to be charitable), and therefore that P(Atheism|k) = 0.5.

Within our background knowledge lies information such as the fact that in order for species’ to survive reproduction must take place, and all of the physiological things that occur during birth. Given that it’s unlikely such information is false, it’s virtually certain that suffering would occur, given our background knowledge.

There’s no reason to suppose anything changes on atheism. i.e., there’s no omni-guy running around that might want to prevent it.

So, P(Suffering|Atheism & k) = 0.95.

But, how likely is it that suffering would occur given theism (not Christian theism, mind)? It’s pretty surprising, as it turns out. Let me illustrate.

How likely is it that Bob would fail to prevent the brutal torture and murder of S? Well, you might say that depends on what Bob is like. Perhaps Bob is a coward, or a sadist. In those cases, it’s pretty likely. But, what if Bob is a morally outstanding individual of excellent mental and physical health? Well, you might say, this would seem to make it likely that Bob would try to prevent such an event if he could. Suppose that as far as you know, Bob could prevent the event without any of the involved sustaining injury. Would it be surprising then if Bob did nothing? Absolutely. Thus, regardless of why suffering occurs or whether it’s compatible with God’s existence, there are instances of suffering that should make our jaws drop if God exists.

Thus, P(Suffering|Theism & k) = 0.1 (again, to be charitable).

Therefore, P(Theism|Suffering & k) = 0.09, and P(Atheism|Suffering & k) = 0.9. That is, atheism is virtually certainly true given suffering.

Now, while you may dispute these calculations (and I’d expect nothing less from a theist), if you’re not familiar with this stuff you’ve got no business calling people idiots, mindless, irrational or anything else because of the stance they’ve taken on this issue.
 
This is pretty evasive. A part of your argument depends on whether materialists should be eliminativists, when challenged to justify that, you just wave in Searle and Feser’s direction and shovel rhetoric. Unless you endorse every single argument in each work those two have published on this subject, you’ll have to specify which argument (of theirs?) that you’re endorsing here. Further, unless you can present that argument here, I don’t think anyone should take this fundamental part of your argument seriously.
It really is simple, materialism can’t reduce qualia and they resort to the explanatory gap argument of which some, and more will, have abandoned this argument and gave into eliminativism. Cartesian dualism (which is substance dualism) can’t connect the mind-body through natural explanation and resort to the god of gaps argument. And property dualism has a problem with epiphenomenalism (as Daniel Dennett demonstrated), of which some resort to a supervenience-interaction property dualism that seeks to find some sort of law that reconnects the phenomenal to physical (another gap argument but this position is so close to reconnecting back to Aristotelian - Thomistic dualism.)
Sure, check out Thomas Nagel, the infamous atheist anti-reductionist. I haven’t given much thought to that to be honest.
He’s a property dualist though (or was? is he still alive?). I’ll read his essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, but summaries show it’s the very similar as Frank Jackson’s “Mary’s Room.” But I’m looking for a non-theist substance dualist, if there is such a person, who can settle the interaction problem.
How likely is it that Bob would fail to prevent the brutal torture and murder of S? Well, you might say that depends on what Bob is like. Perhaps Bob is a coward, or a sadist. In those cases, it’s pretty likely. But, what if Bob is a morally outstanding individual of excellent mental and physical health? Well, you might say, this would seem to make it likely that Bob would try to prevent such an event if he could. Suppose that as far as you know, Bob could prevent the event without any of the involved sustaining injury. Would it be surprising then if Bob did nothing? Absolutely. Thus, regardless of why suffering occurs or whether it’s compatible with God’s existence, there are instances of suffering that should make our jaws drop if God exists.
Another thread concerning this moral issue, which I’ll gladly debate, but for now I rather focus on pain as it is with philosophy of mind.
 
It really is simple, materialism can’t reduce qualia and they resort to the explanatory gap argument of which some, and more will, have abandoned this argument and gave into eliminativism. Cartesian dualism (which is substance dualism) can’t connect the mind-body through natural explanation and resort to the god of gaps argument. And property dualism has a problem with epiphenomenalism (as Daniel Dennett demonstrated), of which some resort to a supervenience-interaction property dualism that seeks to find some sort of law that reconnects the phenomenal to physical (another gap argument but this position is so close to reconnecting back to Aristotelian - Thomistic dualism.)
I asked why the materialist should be an eliminativist, you pointed to Searle and Feser. I asked which argument of theirs you were endorsing, and you replied: “materialism can’t reduce qualia and they resort to the explanatory gap argument of which some, and more will, have abandoned this argument and gave into eliminativism.”

Is this why the materialist should be an eliminativist?
He’s a property dualist though (or was? is he still alive?). I’ll read his essay “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”, but summaries show it’s the very similar as Frank Jackson’s “Mary’s Room.” But I’m looking for a non-theist substance dualist, if there is such a person, who can settle the interaction problem.
Yep, still alive, very interesting book soon to be released. I thought he was a substance dualist, struggling to find one way or another though. Hm, I’m not sure on the interaction problem, sorry.

**For another time, I think his What Is It Like to Be a Bat? implies an interesting challenge to the doctrine of the incarnation, and possibly omniscience.
 
I asked why the materialist should be an eliminativist, you pointed to Searle and Feser. I asked which argument of theirs you were endorsing, and you replied: “materialism can’t reduce qualia and they resort to the explanatory gap argument of which some, and more will, have abandoned this argument and gave into eliminativism.”

Is this why the materialist should be an eliminativist?
Perhaps not absolutely but if one is comfortable with a gap argument, then I, you or anyone can’t argue against that. In the perspective of intellectual assent in materialism, eliminativism bypasses a gap argument and is a simpler theory (the ol’ razor comeback). This is why I said in the first place that if a materialist who is intellectually honest will be an eliminativist. I have to read exactly why, but I get the feeling this is why Dennett is one.
Yep, still alive, very interesting book soon to be released. I thought he was a substance dualist, struggling to find one way or another though. Hm, I’m not sure on the interaction problem, sorry.
**For another time, I think his What Is It Like to Be a Bat? implies an interesting challenge to the doctrine of the incarnation, and possibly omniscience.
All critics I have read say that essay has been one of the strongest cases for property dualism. Going to read it tonight, see how he deals with the epiphenomenalism problem. Phenomenal emerging from physical is one thing but haven’t seen a good argument that establishes bi-direction. Funny though, if ever shown bi-directional it’ll knock the doors down for hylemorphic dualism (those whack job ancients were right after all, only took us five hundreds years of debate to understand why.)
 
Good essay, love his anti-reductionist attitude but seems to give too much slack for materialism at the same time, almost fearing that consciousness will be reduced and holds an open ground. Makes the same argument though about materialists, the position shouldn’t be held presently. Didn’t see any defense that pertains to the problem Dennett pointed out, probably was not aware of such a problem until pointed out. Good read overall.
 
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