The Right-to-Life doesn't include

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They have a problem with this because, even if they were to grant - for the sake of the argument- that line of reasoning, it only applies to cases of consensual sex and not rape.
You just proved my point - they don’t believe in a rape exception Before addressing the rape exception, ask the Pro Choicers if they now concede abortion is immoral for non-rape consensual sex. If they say no, then debate that. Don’t let them bring up a rape exception they don’t even acknowledge. They’ll have to either
(A) concede they’re wrong about abortion for consensual sex, which they won’t do, or
(B) defend abortion for consensual sex, which they can’t do
 
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Now with modern science proving that the baby has many human characteristics early on (of course we always knew the baby is a human being at conception) they say ok but even if that’s so here are arguments for aborting it anyway. By their logic the baby could be aborted up until birth. Morally reprehensible. All the
But Zach, the principle of charity requires us to assume - and engage - the strongest possible version of an argument, in the refutation process. We should consider these analogies not as “mere excuses” to be “pro-baby murder” but as genuine intellectual exercises. That doesn’t mean that we are saying that the pro-choicers are correct in their conclusion that abortion is morally permissible / should be legally permissible. We can disagree with the conclusion while still taking their argument seriously.

"The Principle of Charity is a methodological presumption made in seeking to understand a point of view whereby we seek to understand that view in its strongest, most persuasive form before subjecting the view to evaluation.
  1. While suspending our own beliefs, we seek a sympathetic understanding of the new idea or ideas.
  2. We assume for the moment the new ideas are true even though our initial reaction is to disagree; we seek to tolerate ambiguity for the larger aim of understanding ideas which might prove useful and helpful…
  3. Emphasis is placed on seeking to understand rather than on seeking contradictions or difficulties.
  4. We seek to understand the ideas in their most persuasive form and actively attempt to resolve contradictions. If more than one view is presented, we choose the one that appears the most cogent."
https://philosophy.lander.edu/oriental/charity.html
 
I can see why some women would believe a rape exception could be helpful however there are plenty of other options. You can look at adoption or you can even keep the child, the child has a right to life they didn’t ask to be conceived nor does an innocent baby deserve to die.
 
Yes charitable in considering the arguments but not charitable about the conclusions and their ramifications, especially when it’s a life and death issue. And I maintain the analogies here confuse the issues more than anything.
 
They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own.
Babies don’t kidnap their mothers. Instead, by virtue of the sexual act, mothers give consent to the natural processes that this act sets in motion.

The question isn’t whether mothers can deny consent of the use of their bodies; the question is whether mothers can withdraw prior consent, once a baby is present in their wombs.
 
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They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own.
Babies don’t kidnap their mothers. Instead, by virtue of the sexual act, mothers give consent to the natural processes that this act sets in motion.

The question isn’t whether mothers can deny consent of the use of their bodies; the question is whether mothers can withdraw prior consent, once a baby is present in their wombs.
And that’s not even the question. In fact there is no question to be asked.
There is an objective reality: a unique human being. And regardless of regret or the lack of consequential knowledge, that human being exists.
No question about it.
 
Babies don’t kidnap their mothers. Instead, by virtue of the sexual act, mothers give consent to the natural processes that this
It is true that babies don’t kidnap their mothers and they cannot be said to be committing a violation against her bodily autonomy in any reasonable (as opposed to polemical) sense of the term, since they lack intent and their coming to be within the mother is a result of a process, not an individual choice on the part of unborn child.

But the pro-choicers will state that consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy, because pregnancy is an involuntary process. Sex is an act; pregnancy is not. It’s a condition.

We cannot deny the statement that consent to sex is not the same as consent to pregnancy. It is possible to will sex without willing pregnancy. Couples who use fertility awarenees methods of family planning do this.
Even though the method itself is not contraceptive per the Magisterium’s definition of contraception, it is still the case that couples who use NFP are willing sex without willing pregnancy. If we say “but they are willing to go through with the pregnancy should it occur”, that’s fine and well, but it’s still the case that they didn’t will the pregnancy to occur.

So, in at least some sense, it is possible to “consent to sex and not to pregnancy”. The question is, does the lack of consent to pregnancy justify abortion. Which just takes us back to Thomson’s argument that no human being has a right to use the body of another without his/her consent.
 
consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy,
Yes it is because it is a reasonable consequence of sex.

It’s as absurd as saying I consent to eating junk food but don’t consent to gaining weight, or consent to drinking alcohol but dont consent to intoxication thus not responsible for the violence or sex I engaged in while intoxicated
 
It sounds plausible. But now let me ask you to imagine this. You wake up in the morning and find yourself back to back in bed with an unconscious violinist. A famous unconscious violinist. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help. They have therefore kidnapped you, and last night the violinist’s circulatory system was plugged into yours, so that your kidneys can be used to extract poisons from his blood as well as your own. The director of the hospital now tells you, “Look, we’re sorry the Society of Music Lovers did this to you–we would never have permitted it if we had known. But still, they did it, and the violinist is now plugged into you. To unplug you would be to kill him. But never mind, it’s only for nine months. By then he will have recovered from his ailment, and can safely be unplugged from you.” Is it morally incumbent on you to accede to this situation? No doubt it would be very nice of you if you did, a great kindness. But do you have to accede to it? What if it were not nine months, but nine years? Or longer still? What if the director of the hospital says. “Tough luck. I agree. but now you’ve got to stay in bed, with the violinist plugged into you, for the rest of your life. Because remember this. All persons have a right to life, and violinists are persons. Granted you have a right to decide what happens in and to your body, but a person’s right to life outweighs your right to decide what happens in and to your body. So you cannot ever be unplugged from him.” I imagine you would regard this as outrageous, which suggests that something really is wrong with that plausible-sounding argument I mentioned a moment ago."
A somewhat better analogy.

You are a judge and the following case has come in front of you:

Susie and Betty are conjoined twins who share a vital organ.

There is a transplant possible but approx a nine month waiting list.

If seperated now Susie would have a good chance of survival but Betty will die.

Susie would like to seperate immediately.

Betty is in a coma and cannot speak for herself. She is being represented by the twins parents.

How would you rule?

I’ll have to admit the best I’ve done with it was it’s a very good thought experiment and while instinctivilly I feel Susie should wait, to keep my views consistint I have to allow the seperation.

Hopefully you’ll do better.

To me it’s ordinary vs extraordinary care.
The fetus is receiving ordinary care from the mother. The violionist is receiving extraordinary care.
 
But the pro-choicers will state that consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy, because pregnancy is an involuntary process.
No; pregnancy is a natural process.
Sex is an act; pregnancy is not. It’s a condition.
Impregnation is an act. When one consents to the action which gives rise to impregnation, one consents to the possibility of the latter.
We cannot deny the statement that consent to sex is not the same as consent to pregnancy.
Maybe; but we can assert that willing one brings with it the ‘risk’ of the other, and one consents to taking that risk. No skydiver ‘wills’ dying a horrifying death; but he consents to taking that risk when he straps on a chute and jumps out of the plane.
It is possible to will sex without willing pregnancy.
Ahh, but it is not possible to will sex without consenting to the chance of impregnation.
 
The argument is that we must never save a baby’s life by forcing a mother to carry a pregnancy to term, just as we must never save someone’s life by forcing another to donate their organs.
This argument, if true, would only justify refusing aid to the baby die. It wouldn’t justify acting to kill the baby.
In practice this means that only removing the baby from the mother’s body, while providing possible care for the baby afterwards, would be justified.
Question rises, when is it justified to refuse aid? Is it justified to force people to give aid?
 
I think in the case of the violinist, it may well be the case that the violinist became dependent on my body through no informed choice of my own. But now that violation of my rights is in the past. So whether or not I consented or whether or not I knew what I was doing is irrelevant. A situation has been created in which the violinist depends on me for survival, and my refusal to allow a continuation of that dependency would kill the violinist. So even if the situation was maiciously engineered without my consent, I cannot turn the clock back so I must live with the result or terminate it. In that respect it is akin to a pregnancy caused through rape or ignorance. As a good pro-life catholic I would not terminate such a dependency. Period.

The violinist argument is not an arguiment that defends abortion. It is just constructed silliness that flies in the face of the people who invented it.
 
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pregnancy is a natural process.
I agree that it is a natural process. I also agree that it is involuntary.
Consider menstruation as an example of the same.
Impregnation is an act. When one consents to the action which gives rise to impregnation, one consents to the possibility of the latter.
I don’t have a problem with saying that consent to sex is consent to the possibility of pregnancy, in so far as the possibility is intrinsic to sex and the people involved know that (which would be most people unless they were very, very young).

However, we need to split hairs.
If the people having sex are using contraception, they are clearly not consenting to pregnancy. For what is contraception but the attempt to remove the possibility of procreation from the act?

Let’s consider the Catechism’s definition of contraception (contraceptive act):

“every action which, whether in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible” (CCC 2370)

So if the woman becomes pregnant, despite using contraception, and then seeks to have an abortion, it is quite clear to me that she is an example of someone who “did not consent to pregnancy”.

Impregnation merely refers to sexual intercourse that results in conception; more precisely, impregnation is “fertilization”. Fertilization is an effect. Sexual intercourse is the cause.

You have to be careful when saying that willing the cause means consenting to the effect. Again, you’ll have to split hairs. Why? Because otherwise you run the risk of undermining the entirety of the principle of double effect, for example. Which requires the distinction between willing an act without willing the evil effect.

I’m not saying pregnancy is evil. That’s not where I’m going with this. I’m just using the principle of double effect to show that the distinction between willing the cause and willing the effect.

Perhaps you can make a finer distinction between “willing” and “consenting”, if “consenting” is taken to me “tolerating”. Two people who have sex tolerate the possibility of pregnancy, but do not necessarily will it.
 
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Consent to sex is consent to the possibility of pregnancy and consent to the responsibility and obligation to care for and protect the child that results from the sex and the pregnancy. So there is consent excluding rape.

We are not talking about just any human being as in the violinist analogy. The parent has the responsibility and obligation to care for and protect the child until adulthood. If we agree that the baby in the womb is a human being, which is assumed in the analogy, that responsibility and obligation applies. We can quibble and split hairs all we want about consent but this is the key. The parent’s obligation to care for and protect that child’s life takes precedence over anything else short of saving the mother from dying.

Nobody has the responsibility and obligation to care for and protect a stranger or anyone who is not their offspring. There is zero consent and zero responsibilty and zero obligation - unlike the pregnant mother where all three apply - for the kidnapped person in the violinist analogy to keep the sick person alive. Even where there is no consent in pregnancy from rape there is still parental obligation.
 
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Consent to sex is consent to the possibility of pregnancy and consent to the responsibility and obligation to care for and protect the child that results from the sex and the pregnancy. So there is consent excluding rape.
Here’s the problem, Zach. The pro-choicer in question (the one which my original post is about) holds both of the following views:
  1. Consent to sex - in and of itself - is not consent to pregnancy.
  2. Consent can be withdrawn at any time.
Therefore, even if you reject #1, there is still #2.

Now, you are not bound to agree with her. After all, these are assertions which you can simply disagree with. But, what is at stake is the pursuasion of other people (people who are undecided about what the legal status of abortion should be, as well as current prochoicers or prolifers who may change their views according to the arguments they consider more compelling). I have tried my best to present her views, without strawmaning them, so that we can engage these views because as you have noted, they have real world implications.

So going back to #2 “Consent can be withdrawn at any time”. Why does his matter? Well, consider the analogy of an employment contract. An employee has a right to the wages of his labor, correct? But that is true only as long as he is an employee. Here’s the catch – if the contract is “at will employment”, the employee can quit at any time, and the employer can terminate him at any time. In which case, the employee no longer has the right to continuous wages.

Now, a fetus lacks intent or exercise of will, so cannot analogously “quit” it’s dependency on the mother.

But the mother can “quit” or “terminate” the fetus’ dependency on her.

By “can”, I do not mean it is morally permissible. Simply that, at a matter of physical power, she can do this, and as a matter of legal reality, she is permitted to.

Of course, the issue at hand is whether she has the moral right and the pro-choicer implies that she does.

As to biological parents having the obligation to protect the livelihood of their offspring – I agree with you. But here again, there’s is a catch. We can transfer this obligation to others as in the case of adoption or legal guardianship. This is the case for children who are born. What about the unborn?
 
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Rape pregnancy is a non-reason to justify abortion.

It’s the execution of the unborn child who did nothing wrong for the crime of the father, and the abortion doesn’t un-do the rape. A victim before the abortion is still a victim after.
 
This kind of argument is also logically fallacious. There is absolutely no comparison and no connection between organ donation, done to save a life, and pregnancy - the first stages of a brand new life, and a dependent relationship between mother and unborn child.
 
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As to biological parents having the obligation to protect the livelihood of their offspring – I agree with you. But here again, there’s is a catch. We can transfer this obligation to others as in the case of adoption or legal guardianship. This is the case for children who are born. What about the unborn?
In a scenario where a woman and baby were the only two people on earth would she be obliged to care for the baby?

Does that change if she is the childs mother?
 
Here’s an analogy I’ve used.

Suppose we’re in some form of disaster scenario. It’s me, a male friend, and his young baby. Due to whatever disaster scenario we’re in, there’s no formula available - but I happen to be either lactating or able to induce such. Do we think I have some sort of responsibility to feed this child, simply in virtue of being the only one present who is capable of it?

I find this a better scenario because (1) unlike the violinist scenario, breastfeeding is natural, and for much of history children being fed by other women was fairly common. In pre-industrial societies it was almost a necessity, due to the high maternal mortality rates and the lack of a safe alternative. And (2) it relies on the simple question of whether I have an obligation to keep the child alive, even by use of my body (and I am sure many women on here can attest that feeding a child is not a simple or easy process with no costs to the mother).
 
The argument is that we must never save a baby’s life by forcing a mother to carry a pregnancy to term, just as we must never save someone’s life by forcing another to donate their organs.
This argument, if true, would only justify refusing aid to the baby die. It wou
Exactly. At most, the violinist argument (to be truly analogous) can only, at most, justify the removal of the child from it’s mother’s womb, but it fails to justify the killing of the child.

Which brings me to the most crucial disanalogy between the violinist argument and abortion. Notice that the reason why the violinist has been “plugged” into you is because he has a “fatal kidney ailment”.

If the violinist we’re healthy, and were plugged into you, then unplugging him would not result in death, since he had no need to depend on your circulatory system in that first place. It would be inconsequential.

In Thomson’s scenario, death would occur, not because of the act of “unplugging” in and of itself, but because of the violinist’s kidney ailment. He would die in the same manner as he would had he never been “plugged” in the first place.

Whereas, in the case of abortion, the embryo or fetus dies regardless of his state of health. It could be the healthiest baby in the world and would nonetheless die as a direct result of the abortion procedure (such as a Dilation & Evacuation, which involves dismemberment).

So, whereas in the violinist scenario, the cause of death is the illness following it’s natural course, in an abortion the cause of death is the killing.
  • Pregnancy is not an intervention
  • Abortion is an intervention
  • Death due to illness is not an act of killing
    -Abortion designed to terminate the life of the fetus is an act of killing
  • “Unplugging” the violinist is withdrawal of intervention, arguably extraordinary intervention
-Removal of the child (induction of labor abortion) is withdrawal, not of extraordinary intervention, but ordinary care, as another person pointed out.

The question of the mere removal of a fetus from it’s mother’s womb, is an interesting one.

Theoretically, this can be down without intending the death of the child. Though in practice this would be done with the intention that the child die through the omission of care (i.e. the mother and/or person removing the child wills that the child die as a result).
 
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