The Right-to-Life doesn't include

[Ana_v]

As I indicated in my first post to you, I would emphasize that the natural consequences of actions are not something to which we can “consent.” I would instead shift the discussion toward what would constitute a bioethically acceptable way to respond to the consequence.

I agree and think this is well-worded.
Consent, properly speaking, applies to actions, not consequences, whether foreseen or unforseen.

Therefore, in that sense, to say that “consent to sex is not consent to pregnancy” is a moot point.

The question is “How should a man and woman respond to a pregnancy?” and “What, if anything, should be legislated in regards to human pregnancies?”

 

[goout]

Actions like intercourse have consequences.
However, a human being is not a consequence of actions, a human being is what he/she now is. That “is” is an important word here.
It’s somewhat fruitless to debate whether an individual should be held responsible for “the consequences of intercourse” when the life of a distinct and unique human being hangs in the balance.

That gets the moral equation all wrong. It reduces the human being which is the object of the moral equation to a dry thing like “just consequences”.
This is why the eagerness to punish mothers who abort children is counterproductive.

 

[neophyte]

Consider the following:

Just as the Violinist doesn’t have the right to impose a violence against an innocent in order to frustrate the natural progression of life, a woman doesn’t have the right to impose a violence against her baby in order to frustrate the natural progression of life

 

[FCS]

Abortion is an unnatural death performed solely to kill a human. Someone having organ failure and dying because they didn’t get a transplant (which is horrible and sad) is a natural death from natural causes. It is not homicide, whereas abortion is.

Please correct me if I’m wrong.

 

[AlbertDerGrosse]

Yes, it is most certainly natural, but did you miss the part about her (the atheist I talk about in my OP) shooting this down by calling it a “naturalistic fallacy”.

The idea that a conclusion about what “ought” or “ought not” to be the case (e.g. that abortion should be illegal/ a woman should carry a pregnancy to term) holds true simply based on what “is” the case (pregnancy is natural).

I’m not saying that pregnancy must be allowed to progress because it’s natural, otherwise I would indeed be committing the naturalistic fallacy (cancer is also natural therefore it should be allowed to progress unimpeded).

I’m saying that pregnancy does not constitute an extraordinary means of saving other individual lives, unlike blood transfusions, organ transplants, etc. A life that comes to depend upon us by normative means ought to be saved. While I’m not obligated to tend to the life of a violinist who is parabiotically attached to me during a SciFi surgery without my consent, I am obligated to tend to the life of a beggar who finds himself on my porch asking for basic necessities like food and water (we’re of course assuming that my denial of food and/or water will necessarily and with full knowledge cause his death).

 

[AlbertDerGrosse]

In regards to your assessment of Thomson’s argument. I don’t think Thomson’s argument is stupid; I think it’s clever. But it’s power of persuasion rests on the assumption that the reader will agree that he is not morally required to stay connected to the violinist.

It rests on the reader not understanding natural law, that is, as nature has deigned certain things to exist in certain ways, we are obligated to behave in a manner that is commensurate to its ends.

And if that is the view of the reader, the question Thomson (or those who use her argument) would pose is: why not?

And if you give any answer to the effect of:

• Because I have the right to make medical decisions about my body, or that involve my body

Retort: The “right to abortion” is merely the “right to bodily autonomy” applied to a different circumstance (pregnancy) that involves a tension between someone else’s right and your own

• I am not responsible for the life of a stranger

Retort: the violinist is your child, relative, friend, the Pope, etc, [insert person of significance to you or to the world]

• Because of the degree of burden involved in sustaining the life of the violationist

(Retort: stress the ways in which pregnancy is burdensome)

How about this:

Parabiosis is not the natural state of the human circulatory system. While it’s quite benevolent of a (wo)man, of his or her own free will and Christian charity, to offer up their circulatory system to be united with that of a dying violinist who is in need of it, there’s nothing in nature to demand it, otherwise parabiotic organisms would be common in nature and not just in laboratories.

 

[blackforest]

What I hope to promote in this thread is precision of argument and the spirit of the medieval axiom: never deny, seldom, affirm, always distinguish.

No, I now catch what you’re doing. It’s rare to find in online forums, though, so my cynicism kicked in. Mea maxima culpa.

I am not compelled by Thomson’s argument, but I understand why it has sway with people.

It initially did with me. My first mental response was, “Uh-oh. Am I still pro-life?” Today, I see holes in the analogy that a Mack truck can pass through, but it initially sounded compelling.

The question is “How should a man and woman respond to a pregnancy?” and “What, if anything, should be legislated in regards to human pregnancies?”

I often stay away from the legislation can of worms because it leads down the rabbit trail of public policy - coat hangers and the like. In my experience, opponents welcome this opportunity because being forced to defend that whole killing part of abortion makes them squirm. Your pro-choice cohorts are obviously an exception . . .

 

[Ana_v]

It initially did with me. My first mental response was, “Uh-oh. Am I still pro-life?” Today, I see holes in the analogy that a Mack truck can pass through, but it initially sounded compelling.

Also with me when I first read it. I came upon the argument some years ago and had to really sit with it, think it through, and read some online pro-life apologetics to be reassured that my pro-life position was defensible. There was a time when I had a little blog and, being persuaded that Thomson’s argument was flawed, I decided to write a response, though it was more provoked by Beth Presswood’s promotion of the argument on social media than Thomson’s essay itself. I no longer have that blog but I saved a copy on Word. I wrote this back in 2012 but as you can see (or hopefully see, the font size in the screenshot is small) I covered a lot of the same ground then as I do in this thread, and I agree with the commenters who have pointed out the ethical problems associated with the standard of consent that Thomson defends.

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What I point out at the end of my own essay is that the bodily rights argument that Thomson’s promotes is basically a property-rights claim. The claim that my body is my property, and having ownership over this property, I am allowed to determine what happens to it or inside it.

However, property rights have limitations, especially when the interests and property rights of another are at stake. Hence the “Demolition Thought Experiment” that I describe in the essay.

 

[Flopfoot]

I have also considered the option that it might be immoral for someone to unplug themselves from the violinist, because when they wake up to find themselves plugged in, it’s a new initial state that’s independent of how they got there in the first place

 

[Ana_v]

Abortion is an unnatural death performed solely to kill a human. Someone having organ failure and dying because they didn’t get a transplant (which is horrible and sad) is a natural death from natural causes. It is not homicide, whereas abortion is.

Correct, and that is the most crucial disanalogy in Thomson’s argument. And it is a dianalogy even if she were to modify her violinist argument to make it resemble pregnancy more acutely: For example, if instead of the violinist, it were a newborn baby who has been attached to you because the baby’s biological mother died during birth, and the child has been diagnosed with a fatal condition that can be mitigated by connecting him to your circulatory system…even then, it is still the case that disconnnecting the child is demonstrably not an act of homicide.

Of course, we can debate whether it is an act of moral negligence, but the point is that abortion (with the possible exception of induced labor) is not “mere negligence” or “omission of care” but deliberate killing.

 

[Ana_v]

I have also considered the option that it might be immoral for someone to unplug themselves from the violinist, because when they wake up to find themselves plugged in, it’s a new initial state that’s independent of how they got there in the first place

I have as well. I am not persuaded that we are morally obliged (given that I have arrived at the conclusion that disconnecting the violinist is not an act of murder, whereas I have arrived at the conclusion that abortion is), but I am open to that position because moral decisions are something that we make in the present regardless of past causes that created the situation we are having to respond to in the present.

This sort of reminds me the of the whole debate concerning “embryo adoption”, the morality of which is an open question in moral theology which Catholics are free to disagree on.

While the means by which the embryos were brought into existence is immoral – artificially-achieved fertilization that occurred outside the context of sexual intercourse – they exist now, they are frozen, and what are our options? To keep them frozen, to kill them, or to implant them.

 

[Ana_v]

The sure sign of an ethical dead end is the proposal of near impossible hypothetical dilemmas that only obscure straightforward moral values and imperatives.

By analogy:
“So let’s say the starving man was already mostly dead, and he was a thousand miles away, and I have a broken leg, and we can’t get food to him on a timely basis, and he has a stomach condition that won’t allow him to eat, and also has a cancer, and he has no family and no job anyway, and
So is it really a moral imperative to feed hungry people?”

Don’t let hypotheticals get in the way of a struggling conscience. Do the hard but simple work. Make the hard moral choices no matter how difficult. Society will be more sane, more just, more healthy for everyone.

The hypothetical of artificial wombs is not far-fetched. Much of our technological advancements have been growing at an exponential rate, not a constant rate. Which means that the rate of the advancements are speeding up.

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Do you think 100 years ago we could have predicted the actualization of in vitro fertilization? In 1919 would it seem plausible that by the 1970’s in-vitro fetilization pregnancies would be achieved?

(By the way, this is a very interesting and succinct overview of the history of IVF:
The Birth and History of IVF | RMA Network - Fertility Clinic)

Anyways, my point is that the idea of artificial wombs is certainly relevant to the abortion debate and would have a huge impact on the topic of “alternatives to abortion”.

 

[Ana_v]

‘removing the fetus’ would be fancy talk for killing here. Because the intention is to still kill. You’re still killing the kid because you’re intentionally removing a non viable baby out of the womb, because the woman doesn’t want the pregnancy.

Hmm…is intention determined by the act of removal – the sheer fact that removal is occurring – or by the subjective intention of the person performing (or cooperating) with the act? In other words, does the act determine the intention or does intention determine the act?

There are cases where non viable fetuses have to be removed to save the mother. Some women have to have their wombs removed with the fetus, for example. This isn’t abortion because it’s not the direct killing. It’s to directly save the mother’s life which results in the death of her child. So in the case where the mother is unable to carry, removing is not immoral.

You agree that foreseeing the consequence (death of the child) does not necessarily mean that the mother or the physician intends the death of the child.

Technically speaking – and I truly mean technically – a mother could will the removal of the child from her womb without her willing its death.

I remember learning in ethics (and the course I took was based on the philosophy of Aristotle) that a human person “wills” the end, and “chooses” the means.

So choice, properly speaking, refers to the means, not the ends achieved.
If the end willed is “not be pregnant” then “removal of the fetus” is the choice directed toward that end.

If the end willed is to “save the life of the mother” then “removal of the fetus” (indirectly, per Catholic ethical directives for healthcare) is the choice directed toward that end.

But yes, I agree with you that the viability of a fetus is somewhat relative if we bring technology into the discussion.

 

[Ana_v]

I’m trying to focus your attention on this fact:
Your assertion equates the development and flourishing of a unique human being with any old involuntary process like menstruation or digestion.

Do you think your readers don’t know what biological processes are? I assure you that even the most elementary understanding of biology knows what involuntary biological processes are.

What is tragically missing is an appreciation for the development and flourishing of human life.

Think for a minute:
the purpose of process like peristalsis is to provide nourishment for the body, and to discard the remains.
the purpose of menstruation, in a similar fashion.

You are equating the trajectory and status of human life and development and giving it a disposability that equates to ejecting a pile of dung, or a clump of blood to be ejected and discarded.

You are reading something into my post that just isn’t there.

When someone makes a comparison between two things (e.g. the digestive system and the reproductive system), you have to consider the specific variable that is being compared before objecting to the comparison.

So for example. Is it fallacious to compare apples and oranges? Not necessarily. It depends on the point I’m trying to make. If I am trying to make the point that they are both fruits, then the comparison holds true. If I am trying to make the point that one is edible, and one is not edible, then my comparison is false.

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(Credit: https://datadeb.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/compare-and-contrast-apples-to-oranges.pdf)

With that in mind, let us revisit the comparison I made earlier. I compared menstruation and digestion with reproduction. I was comparing the internal aspects of these processes, which are involuntary, even though (in the case of digestion and reproduction) there is a voluntary element, eating and sexual intercourse, respectively.

You are scandalized by this.

I have not argued that a human being’s value is determined by the circumstances of his conception. I was simply saying that I have no problem conceding that “pregnancy” is not something we consent to in the sense that we cannot control it the way we do a light switch. When two people have sex, they do not have the power to determine that “we conceive tomorrow” and “not tonight”. It doesn’t work that way. Like I said, control over the process ceases after ejaculation.

Certainly, there are factors which we do have control over and which affect the probability of conception, such as the timing of sex, ages of the partners, their health-related lifestyle choices, diet (lots of things impact fertility), etc.

But conception =/= sex.

The sheer fact that contraception exists is proof positive that pregnancy (the process) is involuntary.

Don’t you think if people could control whether they conceive, without recourse to contraception/sterilization, and without abstaining from sex, they would?

 

[Ana_v]

I’m saying that pregnancy does not constitute an extraordinary means of saving other individual lives, unlike blood transfusions, organ transplants, etc. A life that comes to depend upon us by normative means ought to be saved. While I’m not obligated to tend to the life of a violinist who is parabiotically attached to me during a SciFi surgery without my consent, I am obligated to tend to the life of a beggar who finds himself on my porch asking for basic necessities like food and water (we’re of course assuming that my denial of food and/or water will necessarily and with full knowledge cause his death).

I am very amused by your rhetoric. I don’t object to it…it’s the art of persuasion after all and you’ve done it very seamlessly. I just wanted to mention that your phrase “during SciFi surgery” is very funny.

I get what you’re saying, and I agree with you that pregnancy is ordinary and not extraordinary. But it’s one thing to say that making the distinction between ordinary and extraordinary care is necessary in order to refute Thomson’s argument, and it’s another to say that this distinction is both necessary and sufficient. I hold the former view but not the latter. It’s a distinction that has to be made but I don’t think that, by itself, it gets us to the conclusion:

“Therefore, abortion is never morally permissible.”

You know, an interesting exercise would be for the commenters on this thread to collectively author a deductive argument based on everything that has been covered. It would probably involve several drafts and refinements but would’t it be great if the last post published was one we all agreed?

 

[goout]

goout:

The sure sign of an ethical dead end is the proposal of near impossible hypothetical dilemmas that only obscure straightforward moral values and imperatives.

By analogy:
“So let’s say the starving man was already mostly dead, and he was a thousand miles away, and I have a broken leg, and we can’t get food to him on a timely basis, and he has a stomach condition that won’t allow him to eat, and also has a cancer, and he has no family and no job anyway, and
So is it really a moral imperative to feed hungry people?”

Don’t let hypotheticals get in the way of a struggling conscience. Do the hard but simple work. Make the hard moral choices no matter how difficult. Society will be more sane, more just, more healthy for everyone.

The hypothetical of artificial wombs is not far-fetched. Much of our technological advancements have been growing at an exponential rate, not a constant rate. Which means that the rate of the advancements are speeding up.

(Please Note: This uploaded content is no longer available.)

Do you think 100 years ago we could have predicted the actualization of in vitro fertilization? In 1919 would it seem plausible that by the 1970’s in-vitro fetilization pregnancies would be achieved?

(By the way, this is a very interesting and succinct overview of the history of IVF:
The Birth and History of IVF | RMA Network - Fertility Clinic)

Anyways, my point is that the idea of artificial wombs is certainly relevant to the abortion debate and would have a huge impact on the topic of “alternatives to abortion”.

So then your hypothetical justifies the subjection of human life to other lesser goods and considerations?

Not really sure what your point actually is?
What does “artificial wombness” have to do with the objective value of a human life?

 

[goout]

philosophical puzzles are always interesting and can be fun, but this discussion could really progress if you simply gave some values and meaning to your point.

After all, doesn’t philosophy have a trajectory, a point that it moves towards, a purpose? Does it enrich human life and meaning or is it simply mental gymnastics?

 

[Cirdan_XII]

I don’t think arguments about organ donation are very helpful in this context.

Contrary to what is maybe summarily assumed, organs are not removed from dead bodies but from bodies that are still medically alive at the time. If the body is dead, the organs are dead and nobody can revive a dead organ.

So consenting to your organs going to help others is not at all the same as writing in your will whether your savings account, your house or your car should pass to your children or better be given to the Church or to charity.

A pregnancy is one living individual relying on the body of another living individual for survival.

 

[Cirdan_XII]

• I am not responsible for the life of a stranger

Retort: the violinist is your child, relative, friend, the Pope, etc, [insert person of significance to you or to the world]

is this not the Cane vs Abel argument, I am not my brother’s keeper, and all that.

Of course I am responsible for a death that I am able to avert but chose not to.

Murder does not become less abhorrent because I don’t know the victim, or do but dislike him.

 

[Ana_v]

is this not the Cane vs Abel argument, I am not my brother’s keeper, and all that.

Of course I am responsible for a death that I am able to avert but chose not to.

Murder does not become less abhorrent because I don’t know the victim, or do but dislike him.

It sure does go back to Cane and Abel and “Am I my brother’s keeper?”, as well as the Parable of the Good Samaritan, as well as the whole “Seamless Garment” or “Consistent Life Ethic” approach to social justice.

I don’t want to derail the thread, since the original topic isn’t about how opposition to abortion fits in within the whole of Catholic social teaching; HOWEVER, it is quite obvious to me that Christian charity calls us to heights beyond black and white obligations.

Isn’t this obvious in the story of the rich man who has kept all the commandment since his youth? And then when Jesus asks something difficult of him (to sell all his possessions to give to the poor) he walks away sad.

So, if we wanted to incorporate the “insights from Revelation” in the analysis of the Violinist Argument, we might ask: Does Jesus expect a different response to the violinist scenario from non-Christians than from his followers?