The Soul and the Brain

[RobbyS]

Not to every detail, because the technology is too crude as yet. Yet we do know these processes are associated with increased neuronal activity (for math mostly areas in the parietal lobe).

Yes we can. We can say that photons are incident on the retina, we can show how that produces a signal in the optic nerve, how that goes up the brainstem and into the thalamus and into the visual cortex, and then what areas of the brain are associated with perception of these things (shape, movement, etc.)

This does explain HOW the conscious experience occurs. We can’t explain WHY activity in these areas are correlated with the conscious experience.

Yes it does, if the experiment is properly designed.

That is not what is measured by fMRI. There appears to be an association between increased neuronal activity and the function of interest.

Well you just admitted that region has a function! Moreover, there are plenty of lesion and stroke studies to give you the evidence you want.

It is, and it completely refutes the old Thomist idea of the operation of the intellect. Surely we should not need the physical brain anymore once the mind has “abstracted” the concept of 2 and the concept of addition to do 2 + 2 = 4. Yet we do.

I don’t think you quite understand the Thomist idea. In any case, even the function of the body is more complicated than you suggest. We simply don’t know all actions associated with
its operation. Even the New agey idea of an aura around the body, a kind of field of energy analogous to the magnetic field around an electric but of unknown character needs to be explored. There is a tendency to think of the body as a machine, which is exactly the opposite. Every machine is a realized mathematical model of a human function, or better yet, an idea. We don’t know what ideas. are, at least now how they relate to a human person.

 

[Areopagite]

This means, there should be no brain activity associated with abstraction from the phantasm, nor with any intellectual activity after that point.

What do you mean “associated?” Aristotle and Aquinas would certainly deny that brain activity would be the only thing to solely constitute abstraction. They wouldn’t deny that certain brain activity would be go along with intellectual abstraction, as they said that the human mind must recall phantasms in order to bring a concept to mind.

The function of the brain is solely to produce the phantasm.

Aristotle and Aquinas mention four interior senses (i.e. brain powers) … the unifying sense, memory, estimation, and imagination. I could go into these if you want. But, no, they would not say that the function of the brain is solely to produce the phantasm.

Correct? Because the intellect proper is not the act of a bodily organ.

Yes.

And yet, this is what neuroscience refutes. Aquinas was wrong.

Wha? I think I address your objections above.

No, it is not an explanation that all brain activity is associated with the phantasm. Current neuroscientific research shows that higher-order cognitive function, when we control for the lower-order perceptual stuff, involves brain activity. It’s well-known, for instance, which areas of the brain are involved in semantic processing and integration - the brain has already abstracted the meaning of the word. Now how many references would you like me to cite showing this? The neuroscientific literature is simply overwhelming with such examples.

Well, from what you say here, it shows that different kinds of phantasms seem to be stored in different parts of the brain. What else does it prove?

 

[Fran65]

NowAgnostic,

You have not shown that the brain is sufficient for intellect. Before you appeal to the neuroscience litrature it does not show that the brain is *sufficient *either. It shows an interaction which we have agreed on. It does not show that the brain is all that is needed for the intellect to operate.

The laptop I’m using runs on software. The software doesn’t run anywhere else but on hardware. Destroying my laptop means that the software does not function. This does not show that the laptop is the software or that the software does not exist!

Please don’t say that it does…because that will ruin the impression that in many ways you are knowledgeable and rational.

 

[NowAgnostic]

NowAgnostic,

You have not shown that the brain is sufficient for intellect. Before you appeal to the neuroscience litrature it does not show that the brain is *sufficient *either. It shows an interaction which we have agreed on. It does not show that the brain is all that is needed for the intellect to operate.

If you’re asking for deductive proof, I’ll certainly concede I haven’t got that; that’s not something empirical science can furnish.

But the hypothesis that the brain is not sufficient for the operation of the intellect makes the prediction that there should be cases in which there is brain function without mental function. That’s not what we see in the neuroscience literature. Thus we can make the inductive inference that brain function is sufficient for mental function.

The laptop I’m using runs on software. The software doesn’t run anywhere else but on hardware. Destroying my laptop means that the software does not function. This does not show that the laptop is the software or that the software does not exist!

Please don’t say that it does…because that will ruin the impression that in many ways you are knowledgeable and rational.

Nowhere have I said the brain **is **the mind or that the mind does not exist, so I don’t know where you got that from.

But your analogy limps. The presence of the laptop is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition, for the software to run. Why? Because there are instances when the laptop is present and turned on but the software is not running.

 

[NowAgnostic]

What do you mean “associated?” Aristotle and Aquinas would certainly deny that brain activity would be the only thing to solely constitute abstraction. They wouldn’t deny that certain brain activity would be go along with intellectual abstraction, as they said that the human mind must recall phantasms in order to bring a concept to mind.

The question is whether abstraction and what follows (in themselves) are related to brain activity or not. Your claim, I think, is not, the brain is just used for the phantasms. And that is what neuroscience refutes.

Aristotle and Aquinas mention four interior senses (i.e. brain powers) … the unifying sense, memory, estimation, and imagination. I could go into these if you want. But, no, they would not say that the function of the brain is solely to produce the phantasm.

OK, but you could classify these as creating, manipulating or storing phantasms?

Wha? I think I address your objections above.

Not at all.

Well, from what you say here, it shows that different kinds of phantasms seem to be stored in different parts of the brain. What else does it prove?

Not at all. We can control in neuroscience experiments for the presence of the phantasms. We can design experiments in which the mind deals with abstract concepts.

 

[Areopagite]

The question is whether abstraction and what follows (in themselves) are related to brain activity or not. Your claim, I think, is not, the brain is just used for the phantasms. And that is what neuroscience refutes.

No, I said brain activity IS related to abstraction. It is related insofar as you need to recall phantasms in order to recall concepts. Brain activity is NOT related to abstraction insofar as brain activity is the sole responsible thing to make abstraction possible. These are two kinds of relations (both have the same subject and term, but differ in their foundation).

I may be misunderstanding you though.

OK, but you could classify these as creating, manipulating or storing phantasms?

The estimative sense neither creates, manipulated, nor stores phantasm. It deals with causing biological reactions when perceiving certain kinds of phantasms. Instinct, for example, falls under this.

Not at all.

Could you lay that out?

Not at all. We can control in neuroscience experiments for the presence of the phantasms. We can design experiments in which the mind deals with abstract concepts.

Well, if you can control the phantasms in the brain, you can then certainly “deal” the abstract concepts. Art does this to some extent. Pieces of art present the mind with phantasms in order to bring about particular abstract concepts. Aristotle and Aquinas always acknowledged this.

But maybe I’m missing your point. Is this the kind of thing you’re saying?

 

[GEddie]

But your analogy limps. The presence of the laptop is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition, for the software to run. Why? Because there are instances when the laptop is present and turned on but the software is not running.

A powered-on computer with no software running is equivalent to the head of a sleeping, unconscious, comatose or demented body. There is brain activity in each case.

 

[NowAgnostic]

No, I said brain activity IS related to abstraction. It is related insofar as you need to recall phantasms in order to recall concepts. Brain activity is NOT related to abstraction insofar as brain activity is the sole responsible thing to make abstraction possible. These are two kinds of relations (both have the same subject and term, but differ in their foundation).

I may be misunderstanding you though.

The latter is the sense that I meant relation. After the brain has created the phantasms, no further brain activity is associated with mental activity, for abstraction and subsequent processing, right, in this model?

The estimative sense neither creates, manipulated, nor stores phantasm. It deals with causing biological reactions when perceiving certain kinds of phantasms. Instinct, for example, falls under this.

All right, uses phantoms directly then without abstraction.

Could you lay that out?

The claim from neuroscience is that additional brain activity, over and above that used for the phantasms, is correlated with abstraction and other higher-order cognitive processing. Would you agree that this is not the prediction of Aquinas and, if shown, would refute his mdoel?

Well, if you can control the phantasms in the brain, you can then certainly “deal” the abstract concepts. Art does this to some extent. Pieces of art present the mind with phantasms in order to bring about particular abstract concepts. Aristotle and Aquinas always acknowledged this.

But maybe I’m missing your point. Is this the kind of thing you’re saying?

No. I said control for the presence of the phantasms to test the hypothesis of additional brain activation, over and above that used for them. Presenting pictures is one possible way to do that, not the only way. Now abstraction is presumably “automatic” - we can’t decide not to do it. But we can test mental functions which occur after the abstraction.

 

[NowAgnostic]

A powered-on computer with no software running is equivalent to the head of a sleeping, unconscious, comatose or demented body. There is brain activity in each case.

Sure, but there is a change from baseline, that’s what we mean by brain activity. So the point still stands.

 

[Areopagite]

The latter is the sense that I meant relation. After the brain has created the phantasms, no further brain activity is associated with mental activity, for abstraction and subsequent processing, right, in this model?

…

The claim from neuroscience is that additional brain activity, over and above that used for the phantasms, is correlated with abstraction and other higher-order cognitive processing. Would you agree that this is not the prediction of Aquinas and, if shown, would refute his model?

So, the question is: did Aquinas deny that a certain kind of brain activity would occur as an effect caused by immaterial abstraction processes? Well … not that I know of. He neither affirmed nor denied it. I can’t say how this “additional brain activity” would come into conflict with his model simply based on what has been said.

No. I said control for the presence of the phantasms to test the hypothesis of additional brain activation, over and above that used for them. Presenting pictures is one possible way to do that, not the only way. Now abstraction is presumably “automatic” - we can’t decide not to do it. But we can test mental functions which occur after the abstraction.

I’m not sure how this conflicts with Aristotelian epistemology.

 

[NowAgnostic]

So, the question is: did Aquinas deny that a certain kind of brain activity would occur as an effect caused by immaterial abstraction processes? Well … not that I know of. He neither affirmed nor denied it. I can’t say how this “additional brain activity” would come into conflict with his model simply based on what has been said.

I’m not sure how this conflicts with Aristotelian epistemology.

It seems to me you’re resorting to the equivalent of eccentrics and epicycles (that is, piling on ad hoc assertions) in an attempt to save a doomed model. The assertion that the brain activity would be an “effect” of an immaterial abstraction process, rather than intrinsically connected to it, is completely ad hoc without empirical basis, and doesn’t make sense anyway. There’s no good reason to think brain activity should occur after a completed immaterial abstraction process and subsequent processing.

How does brain activity occur as a result of a completely immaterial process for which it is not necessary? This is a very contradiction in terms. And again, if the intellect is supposed to be **intrinsically **independent of any bodily organ, why would brain activity occur?

 

[itinerant1]

It seems to me you’re resorting to the equivalent of eccentrics and epicycles (that is, piling on ad hoc assertions) in an attempt to save a doomed model. The assertion that the brain activity would be an “effect” of an immaterial abstraction process, rather than intrinsically connected to it, is completely ad hoc without empirical basis, and doesn’t make sense anyway. There’s no good reason to think brain activity should occur after a completed immaterial abstraction process and subsequent processing.

How does brain activity occur as a result of a completely immaterial process for which it is not necessary? This is a very contradiction in terms. And again, if the intellect is supposed to be **intrinsically **independent of any bodily organ, why would brain activity occur?

A previous post(s) asserts more about Aquinas’ knowledge of the brain than was possible during his time. He recognized the importance of the physical constitution for thinking but one only finds details about the brain in the writings of modern Thomists who are familiar with neurophysiology. Aristotle, though he was the greatest biologist of all time, according to Charles Darwin, he did not know much at all about the brain or what it does. Nonetheless, the related changes in brain states and mind states are consistent with Aristotelian and Thomistic psychology. The problem pertains to explaining just what those relations are. Are brain states and mind states ontologically identical and only logically distinct ? Or, are they distinct both logically and ontologically? Or, are they all logically distinct, while only a certain kind of mind activity is ontologically distinct also, while other activities of mind are not? Or, is there some other possibility?

On the question of abstraction being discussed here, it does not follow that no subsequent or continuous brain activity occurs or is required after abstraction. Conceptual thinking is not an isolated event. The intellect continually adverts to the phantasm in the processes of conceptualizing and judging.

Thinking is not an isolated one time event, except in my particular case. One time I stopped to think, and then I could not get started again.

But normal thinking involves processes of concept formation, adverting to the phantasm, memory or recollection, affirming and denying, and so on.

The intellect, to use your words is “intrinsically independent” of the brain in the sense that the power is not the act of any bodily organ, such as the brain. The intellect uses the phantasm produced in the brain. Furthermore, mind is not synonymous with intellect. There is more to the mind than the power of abstract reasoning.

Neither, is the power of abstract reasoning separate from the brain in the sense of it being the activity of some isolated entity like the Platonic or Cartesian soul. It is, rather, a power of that which first informs matter. It is the organizing principle that makes this body to be a living, human body.

Neurophysiology studies phenomenal reality related to the brain and it processes. Brain states are only parts of the whole. When you put all of those parts together, whatever they may be, they can never add up to the whole.

 

[Areopagite]

A previous post(s) asserts more about Aquinas’ knowledge of the brain than was possible during his time. He recognized the importance of the physical constitution for thinking but one only finds details about the brain in the writings of modern Thomists who are familiar with neurophysiology. Aristotle, though he was the greatest biologist of all time, according to Charles Darwin, he did not know much at all about the brain or what it does. Nonetheless, the related changes in brain states and mind states are consistent with Aristotelian and Thomistic psychology. The problem pertains to explaining just what those relations are.

Well said.

It seems to me you’re resorting to the equivalent of eccentrics and epicycles (that is, piling on ad hoc assertions) in an attempt to save a doomed model.

First of all, you haven’t given any virulent proof whatsoever that it’s a doomed model. If Aquinas had said, “There is necessarily no brain activity that follows after abstraction” then you would have a powerful case. But just because he was silent on the issue, doesn’t mean he denied it.

And you say it seems that I’m resorting to eccentrics, etc.? Well, disprove me. And the way to do that is proving that particular higher brain activity is what is necessary for abstraction. If you do, then I lose. The fact is, it hasn’t been proved. So you have no case. You are making premature assaults on things you have no business attacking yet. Perhaps some day. But you are very ill prepared at the moment.

There’s no good reason to think brain activity should occur after a completed immaterial abstraction process and subsequent processing.

And since there’s no good reason that we can see for this brain activity to occur after completed immaterial abstraction, thus we conclude that immaterial abstraction doesn’t exist. Right? Wow. That’s an impressive leap of logic.

Once again, if you prove that what goes on in that brain activity is sufficient for abstraction, then you will actually have an argument, rather than mere assertions … but once again, you don’t have that proof. No one does. Certainly the neuropsychology hasn’t flushed out the precise nature of this higher brain activity. Or has it? Probably not. Unless, of course, you know something I don’t. But the arguments you have laid out so far are sorely deficient and half-baked. But once again, correct me if I’m missing something here.

How does brain activity occur as a result of a completely immaterial process for which it is not necessary? This is a very contradiction in terms.

Really? Hmm. This must be proved. Obviously Aristotle and Aquinas believed quite the opposite. So, this at least is not a problem for their model. They certainly believed immaterial things CAN cause material changes. Otherwise, God and angels and their ability to interact with matter would be in trouble.

And, of course, we see in the natural world the ability of immaterial things causing changes in material things … such as with gravity (unless of course, you are being imprecise with your terminology and referring to “physical” when you actually said “material”)

And again, if the intellect is supposed to be **intrinsically **independent of any bodily organ, why would brain activity occur?

As Itinerant said, in the Thomistic model, the human intellect is not intrinsically independent of the brain. The are two different parts of a human, and they work together. Descartes was the one who claimed the intellect was completely separate from the brain. But he was wrong … in many ways.

 

[Touchstone]

And you say it seems that I’m resorting to eccentrics, etc.? Well, disprove me. And the way to do that is proving that particular higher brain activity is what is necessary for abstraction. If you do, then I lose. The fact is, it hasn’t been proved. So you have no case. You are making premature assaults on things you have no business attacking yet. Perhaps some day. But you are very ill prepared at the moment.

I don’t think that’s necessary to show the “epicycles” problem. Heliocentric models definitely showed the inferiority of epicycles, but even before the evidence came in on that, the very structure of Ptolemy’s explanation was clearly ad-hoc, not proceeding from the base theory itself, but “bandaids and string” that got applied to shore up problems that arose – retrograde motions, for example.

“Dual aspect monism”, or whatever label supernaturalists adopt here, has the same ad-hoc nature – it just “finds immaterial mind in the gaps”, and gerrymanders around the latest research, yielding back to nature what science demonstrates as natural, and says “Yeah, that’s the right epicycles for the mind, that’s how and were the immaterial parts obtain!”

Even just where we are, the “ad-hockery” is quite plain to see.

Once again, if you prove that what goes on in that brain activity is sufficient for abstraction, then you will actually have an argument, rather than mere assertions … but once again, you don’t have that proof. No one does. Certainly the neuropsychology hasn’t flushed out the precise nature of this higher brain activity. Or has it? Probably not. Unless, of course, you know something I don’t. But the arguments you have laid out so far are sorely deficient and half-baked. But once again, correct me if I’m missing something here.

It’s not clear what “show” or “prove” means when dealing with a supernatural hypothesis. What does “sufficient” mean in that case? There isn’t any “proof” that the immaterial mind doesn’t obtain, and THERE CANNOT BE. It’s perfectly unfalsifiable.

And, of course, we see in the natural world the ability of immaterial things causing changes in material things … such as with gravity (unless of course, you are being imprecise with your terminology and referring to “physical” when you actually said “material”)

Well, either way, we “see” gravity at work in objective and obvious ways that are conspicuously NOT the way we see angels and demons, etc. If angels (or their effects) were like gravity in that way, it’d be a whole different story.

As Itinerant said, in the Thomistic model, the human intellect is not intrinsically independent of the brain. The are two different parts of a human, and they work together. Descartes was the one who claimed the intellect was completely separate from the brain. But he was wrong … in many ways.

I think, given your position here, you have no basis for supposing Descartes was wrong. If his dualism can be dismissed, so can Thomist quasi-dualism. They are equally unfalsifiable, and any tools you might use against Descartes here beyond simple assertions would be defeaters for your beliefs as well. How could you show that the mind is NOT completely separable from the brain?

As you’ve said repeatedly here, Descartes would echo: So prove me wrong!

If you think about how intractable that challenge from Descartes would be, you can see the problem in the similar demands you make above.

-TS

 

[NowAgnostic]

Nonetheless, the related changes in brain states and mind states are consistent with Aristotelian and Thomistic psychology. The problem pertains to explaining just what those relations are. Are brain states and mind states ontologically identical and only logically distinct ? Or, are they distinct both logically and ontologically? Or, are they all logically distinct, while only a certain kind of mind activity is ontologically distinct also, while other activities of mind are not? Or, is there some other possibility?

You’re saying that if all brain and mind states are ontologically identical and merely logically distinct, that is consistent with Thomism? Or if they are ontologically distinct but mind is an emergent property of brain, that is consistent with Thomism? Doesn’t seem that way to me.

On the question of abstraction being discussed here, it does not follow that no subsequent or continuous brain activity occurs or is required after abstraction. Conceptual thinking is not an isolated event. The intellect continually adverts to the phantasm in the processes of conceptualizing and judging.

But normal thinking involves processes of concept formation, adverting to the phantasm, memory or recollection, affirming and denying, and so on.

The intellect, to use your words is “intrinsically independent” of the brain in the sense that the power is not the act of any bodily organ, such as the brain. The intellect uses the phantasm produced in the brain.

There is very strong evidence from neuroscience the brain is doing more than merely making phantasms available for the intellect. At this stage, as I said in another post, claiming that is all the brain does is like adding eccentrics and epicycles.

Neither, is the power of abstract reasoning separate from the brain in the sense of it being the activity of some isolated entity like the Platonic or Cartesian soul. It is, rather, a power of that which first informs matter. It is the organizing principle that makes this body to be a living, human body.

Exactly, if the soul is the essential form of the body, and the intellect is a faculty of the soul, why wouldn’t you expect a physical correlate to all intellectual processes?

Neurophysiology studies phenomenal reality related to the brain and it processes. Brain states are only parts of the whole. When you put all of those parts together, whatever they may be, they can never add up to the whole.

That’s just an unsupported bare assertion.

 

[grannymh]

I think, given your position here, you have no basis for supposing Descartes was wrong. If his dualism can be dismissed, so can Thomist quasi-dualism. They are equally unfalsifiable, and any tools you might use against Descartes here beyond simple assertions would be defeaters for your beliefs as well. -TS

Just a tiny comment since I am not in this discussion. Descartes dualism was distinctly separate and eventually led to the philosophy of materialism regarding human nature. Thomist moderate dualism was intimately united and keeps intact true human nature.

 

[Areopagite]

I don’t think that’s necessary to show the “epicycles” problem. Heliocentric models definitely showed the inferiority of epicycles, but even before the evidence came in on that, the very structure of Ptolemy’s explanation was clearly ad-hoc, not proceeding from the base theory itself, but “bandaids and string” that got applied to shore up problems that arose – retrograde motions, for example.

“Dual aspect monism”, or whatever label supernaturalists adopt here, has the same ad-hoc nature – it just “finds immaterial mind in the gaps”, and gerrymanders around the latest research, yielding back to nature what science demonstrates as natural, and says “Yeah, that’s the right epicycles for the mind, that’s how and were the immaterial parts obtain!”

Even just where we are, the “ad-hockery” is quite plain to see.

The primary reason why immaterial abstraction must exist for any abstraction to occur is that abstraction creates immaterial concepts. The intellect possesses immaterial concepts (and most atheists I’ve come across acknowledge this) and yet they hold on to the idea that material instruments can pull this off. I’ve never received an explanation how this isn’t absurd. Most of them just stop talking when I bring this up. Perhaps not this time though.

The naturalists, I would say, are finding “material mind in the gaps.” They don’t know how the brain works, certainly can’t explain abstraction at least, and sees something going on there and say “Uh, yeah, this is abstraction … yep, that’s what it is. No immaterial intellect necessary. Trust me.”

Aristotle and Aquinas argued that by necessity, no matter how the material brain works, is unable to abstract immaterial concepts. Naturalists try and disprove this by pointing to nebulous activity in the brain and say, “Nope, something’s going on here. You’re wrong.” Wha?

Bide your time. If you’re right, the truth shall side with you. Until then, your bold claims will not be scientific claims.

It’s not clear what “show” or “prove” means when dealing with a supernatural hypothesis. What does “sufficient” mean in that case? There isn’t any “proof” that the immaterial mind doesn’t obtain, and THERE CANNOT BE. It’s perfectly unfalsifiable.

One has to show that all the physical goings-on in the brain is what is sufficient to abstract immaterial principles. Various neuroscientists claim that this will be done someday. If they are successful, then the Thomistic model is legitimately trashed.

Well, either way, we “see” gravity at work in objective and obvious ways that are conspicuously NOT the way we see angels and demons, etc. If angels (or their effects) were like gravity in that way, it’d be a whole different story.

I do not deny that gravity and angelic actions are different in some way. My point was that immaterial things can affect material things, and one example of this is gravity. That’s all I was saying.

I think, given your position here, you have no basis for supposing Descartes was wrong.

If I’m not mistaken (and maybe I am because I could be thinking of a different philosopher) Descartes said that memory was immaterial. Neuroscience has disproved this.

If his dualism can be dismissed, so can Thomist quasi-dualism.

No because Thomas always maintained that memory was material.

How could you show that the mind is NOT completely separable from the brain?

As you’ve said repeatedly here, Descartes would echo: So prove me wrong!

If you think about how intractable that challenge from Descartes would be, you can see the problem in the similar demands you make above.

As said before, if memory, instinct, imagination, etc. can be proved to be powers of the brain, then Descartes is wrong. As far as I understand, these have been proven to be part of the brain (right?). And so Descartes is proven wrong.

But immaterial concepts are still immaterial. Hence, they are not in the brain.

Is this entirely unreasonable?

 

[Areopagite]

There is very strong evidence from neuroscience the brain is doing more than merely making phantasms available for the intellect. At this stage, as I said in another post, claiming that is all the brain does is like adding eccentrics and epicycles.

Once again, Aquinas never said “The Brain is just for making phantasms.” All he said is that there are four interior senses (imagination, estimation, memory, and the unifying sense). He didn’t even mention the word “brain.” He didn’t deny that there were more interior senses (right?). Just because he didn’t mention something isn’t evidence that he denied it or that it therefore necessarily contradicts his model.

Exactly, if the soul is the essential form of the body, and the intellect is a faculty of the soul, why wouldn’t you expect a physical correlate to all intellectual processes?

What do you mean a “physical correlate?”

The real issue that must be addressed is how a purely material mind can grasp immaterial concepts. This is the reason why Aristotle said abstraction was immaterial. So instead of pointing to obscure brain activity that no one understands yet, it would seem more fruitful to go at this question. No?

 

[NowAgnostic]

First of all, you haven’t given any virulent proof whatsoever that it’s a doomed model. If Aquinas had said, “There is necessarily no brain activity that follows after abstraction” then you would have a powerful case. But just because he was silent on the issue, doesn’t mean he denied it.

In Aquinas’ model the intellect does not use the brain to abstract from the phantasms or perform higher order processing, correct? The brain is necessary to make the phantasms available.

And you say it seems that I’m resorting to eccentrics, etc.? Well, disprove me. And the way to do that is proving that particular higher brain activity is what is necessary for abstraction. If you do, then I lose. The fact is, it hasn’t been proved. So you have no case. You are making premature assaults on things you have no business attacking yet. Perhaps some day. But you are very ill prepared at the moment.

All I can say is I hope that you’re prepared to be a gracious loser. I don’t think you’re up to date on the latest findings from neuroimaging. I’ll bring up Dehaene again:

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/17224409?ordinalpos=1&itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_SingleItemSupl.Pubmed_Discovery_RA&linkpos=1&log$=relatedarticles&logdbfrom=pubmed

Neuron. 2007 Jan 18;53(2):293-305.
A magnitude code common to numerosities and number symbols in human intraparietal cortex.

Piazza M, Pinel P, Le Bihan D, Dehaene S.

Institut National de la Santé et de la Recherche Médicale (INSERM), Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Service Hospitalier Frédéric Joliot, F-91401 Orsay, France. manuela.piazza@unitn.it

Comment in:

* Neuron. 2007 Jan 18;53(2):165-7.

Activation of the horizontal segment of the intraparietal sulcus (hIPS) has been observed in various number-processing tasks, whether numbers were conveyed by symbolic numerals (digits, number words) or by nonsymbolic displays (dot patterns). This suggests an abstract coding of numerical magnitude. Here, we critically tested this hypothesis using fMRI adaptation to demonstrate notation-independent coding of numerical quantity in the hIPS. Once subjects were adapted either to dot patterns or to Arabic digits, activation in the hIPS and in frontal regions recovered in a distance-dependent fashion whenever a new number was presented, irrespective of notation changes. This remained unchanged when analyzing the hIPS peaks from an independent localizer scan of mental calculation. These results suggest an abstract coding of approximate number common to dots, digits, and number words. They support the idea that symbols acquire meaning by linking neural populations coding symbol shapes to those holding nonsymbolic representations of quantities.

Or:

ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19781939?itool=EntrezSystem2.PEntrez.Pubmed.Pubmed_ResultsPanel.Pubmed_RVDocSum&ordinalpos=5

Curr Biol. 2009 Oct 13;19(19):1608-15. Epub 2009 Sep 24.
Deciphering cortical number coding from human brain activity patterns.

Eger E, Michel V, Thirion B, Amadon A, Dehaene S, Kleinschmidt A.

INSERM U562, F-91191 Gif/Yvette, France. evelyn.eger@gmail.com

BACKGROUND: Neuropsychology and human functional neuroimaging have implicated human parietal cortex in numerical processing, and macaque electrophysiology has shown that intraparietal areas house neurons tuned to numerosity. Yet although the areas responding overall during numerical tasks have been well defined by neuroimaging, a direct demonstration of individual number coding by spatial patterns has thus far been elusive. RESULTS: We used multivariate pattern recognition on high-resolution functional imaging data to decode the information content of fine-scale signals evoked by different individual numbers. Parietal activation patterns for individual numerosities could be accurately discriminated and generalized across changes in low-level stimulus parameters. Distinct patterns were evoked by symbolic and nonsymbolic number formats, and individual digits were less accurately decoded (albeit still with significant accuracy) than numbers of dots. Interestingly, the numerosity of dot sets could be predicted above chance from the brain activation patterns evoked by digits, but not vice versa. Finally, number-evoked patterns changed in a gradual fashion as a function of numerical distance for the nonsymbolic notation, compatible with some degree of orderly layout of individual number representations. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings demonstrate partial format invariance of individual number codes that is compatible with more numerous but more broadly tuned populations for nonsymbolic than for symbolic numbers, as postulated by recent computational models. In more general terms, our results illustrate the potential of functional magnetic resonance imaging pattern recognition to understand the detailed format of representations within a single semantic category, and beyond sensory cortical areas for which columnar architectures are well established.

So why would they be able to predict numerosities of dot sets above chance from the brain activation patterns evoked by digits, if all the brain was doing was storing the “phantasm” of the visual symbol of the digit?

I could go on and on with studies from language, auditory processing and other domains.

(Cont…)

 

[NowAgnostic]

And since there’s no good reason that we can see for this brain activity to occur after completed immaterial abstraction, thus we conclude that immaterial abstraction doesn’t exist. Right? Wow. That’s an impressive leap of logic.

No, it’s accepting the more parsimonious explanation that the brain activity is correlated with the “immaterial” abstraction, making it not immaterial. The idea that you can just explain away that activity as an unexplained “effect” for which there’s no good reason we can see for it to occur is completely ad hoc, the equivalent of eccentrics and epicycles.

Once again, if you prove that what goes on in that brain activity is sufficient for abstraction, then you will actually have an argument, rather than mere assertions … but once again, you don’t have that proof. No one does. Certainly the neuropsychology hasn’t flushed out the precise nature of this higher brain activity. Or has it? Probably not. Unless, of course, you know something I don’t. But the arguments you have laid out so far are sorely deficient and half-baked. But once again, correct me if I’m missing something here.

Yes I think you are missing something.

Really? Hmm. This must be proved. Obviously Aristotle and Aquinas believed quite the opposite. So, this at least is not a problem for their model. They certainly believed immaterial things CAN cause material changes. Otherwise, God and angels and their ability to interact with matter would be in trouble.

Yes, but God and the angels have a purpose in so interacting with matter, for which their interaction is necessary. Their interaction isn’t just proposed as an unexplained, unnecessary ad hoc thesis to save a doomed theory.

And, of course, we see in the natural world the ability of immaterial things causing changes in material things … such as with gravity (unless of course, you are being imprecise with your terminology and referring to “physical” when you actually said “material”)

???

The forces aren’t “immaterial” (not in the standard model, anyway), but that’s irrelevant anyway.

As Itinerant said, in the Thomistic model, the human intellect is not intrinsically independent of the brain. The are two different parts of a human, and they work together. Descartes was the one who claimed the intellect was completely separate from the brain. But he was wrong … in many ways.

Your statement directly contradicts Pius X, in the 24 Thomistic Theses:

From the human soul there issues forth in a natural sequence faculties belonging both the organic and inorganic order. The former faculties, to which pertain the senses, have as their subject the composite being, while the latter have the soul alone as their subject. Thus the intellect is a faculty that is intrinsically independent of any organ.