The Soul and the Brain

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Well, no. “She” doesn’t exist in my mind, even in a little bit. To say such is just to confuse the symbol and its referent. All that exists of her in my mind are indirections that point to her (or my percepts of her).
If this the case regarding the Halle Berry concept, then by implication this applies to other concepts too. The symbols embodied neurologically are not the referent! When thinking of number, all that exists of that concept in my mind are indirections pointing to this universal. Unless you are arguing that this only applies to particulars and not to universals. In which case we are back at the original problem of *how * abstracts (universals) are embodied.
 
Here’s study that’s come up in other conversations that I think is relevant to the issue of abstraction and conceptualization as natural phenomena, here:

Discriminating the Relation Between Relations: The Role of Entropy in Abstract Conceptualization by Baboons (Papio papio} and Humans (Homo sapiens)

The link is to the PDF of the entire article. Here’s an interesting fragment:

It’s important to grasp the distinctions being made here between simply identifying “difference”, and abstracting the concepts of “sameness” and “difference”. When the baboon (or human) is shown a grid of icons that are each different with respect to each other, the concept of “internal difference” is learned, and transported to new displays. That means that when the baboon subject is presented with a new grid of icons, icons which are NOT icons seen before, the baboon is able to apply the abstraction of “internal difference” or “instance variance” – images that are different with respect to each other.
I found this study by Fagot, et al singularly unimpressive.
Discriminating the Relation Between Relations: The Role of Entropy in Abstract Conceptualization by Baboons (Papio papio} and Humans (Homo sapiens)

The researchers’ employment of the terms (left undefined) conceptualization and abstraction is completely unwarranted, and almost reckless. The animal behaviors described are completely accounted for by perceptual thinking: perceptual discrimination, estimative sense, and so on. There is nothing at all in the Fagot study to suggest that the baboon exhibited abstract conceptualization.

The presence of abstract conceptualization appears to be projection by the researchers – anthropomorphic behavior on the part of Fagot and company.

In conclusion, my recommendation is that a scientific study of the researchers themselves be conducted by the baboon since the baboon is allegedly capable of abstract conceptualizations.
 
This suggests then that abstraction may be a uniquely human ability. I’ve also always been quite unimpressed by animal-language studies, it seems to me that the researchers are working incredibly hard to extract meaningful behaviours from the animals and that these ‘communications’ are then overinterpreted.

It might be suggested that the human brain is not only one that seeks and finds patterns, it also one that anthropomorphises. If you assume (even incorrectly) that other animals are capable of mentalization and abstraction, then you are less likely to be caught out and lose in any competition for survival. Don’t underestimate the abilities of your competitor is a valuable strategy for survival - of course this is sociobiology - that may or not be accurate - but it could account for this tendency in animal researchers and others 😉
 
Behavioral studies are boring, I agree. I want to know what the brain is doing. Nevertheless your critique is off-target, and a psychologist would say your smug dismissal might be evidence that your worldview is in fact threatened by it.
The researchers’ employment of the terms (left undefined) conceptualization and abstraction is completely unwarranted, and almost reckless.
The researchers are writing in a psychology journal. It isn’t necessary to define basic terms like these for the readership. And if the hypothesis involves conceptualization and abstraction, it’s not unwarranted to use those terms.
The animal behaviors described are completely accounted for by perceptual thinking: perceptual discrimination, estimative sense, and so on.
There is nothing at all in the Fagot study to suggest that the baboon exhibited abstract conceptualization.
Just reflexively dismissing studies of brain activation as only having to with phantasms or studies of animal behavior as only having to do with perceptual thinking, without actually showing how that is so, and why the data is more consistent with perceptual vs. abstract thinking, is mere obscurantism.

The fact is the authors discuss perceptual vs. relational matching in depth.
Our matching-to-sample task appears to require the discrimination of abstract same-different relations; there was no perceptual identity between the sample stimuli and the choice stimuli, only relational identity…
Additional evidence contrary to a purely perceptual account of our data is shown in Experiment 4 of the present study; there, the baboons achieved reliably above-chance relational matching performance when the sample contained only 2 (for B03) or 3 icons (for B08) and the choice stimuli contained 16 icons. Large perceptual differences between the sample and choice arrays due to differences in the number of icons greatly reduce the likelihood that the baboons were responding only on the basis of perceptual similarity.
Can you explain how mere perceptual discrimination and estimative sense can account for this result? Surely the explanation that the baboons have some rudimentary concept of “same” or “different” accounts for the data much easier?

Additionally, this performance was not achieved except after a lot of training. What is being perceptually discriminated, and why does it take so much training to achieve?
The presence of abstract conceptualization appears to be projection by the researchers – anthropomorphic behavior on the part of Fagot and company.
In conclusion, my recommendation is that a scientific study of the researchers themselves be conducted by the baboon since the baboon is allegedly capable of abstract conceptualizations.
Taking a swipe at the researchers because perhaps some part of your understanding of the universe doesn’t turn out to be the way you think is just silly. It’s like shooting the messenger.

This is just another case in which the reality of things may turn out to be more complicated than a simplistic pre-scientific view of things. Apes don’t solve math equations; therefore, they don’t think conceptually (pre-scientific view). The truth may be a little more complicated than that; apes may possess a rudimentary capacity for conceptual thinking which will only occur with lots of training which normally doesn’t occur in the wild.
 
Well…I’'m a psychologist (hence my interest in your research NowAgnostic) and I don’t find itinerant’s point as evidence of feeling threatened. That is a cheap shot and unmerited given the lack of evidence for a feeling of threat. I find it best to steer clear of armchair analysis of other posters 😉

In addition, it is good practice in academic circles and papers to define one’s terms. Non controversial terms such as statistical methods used and technical method/design terms don’t need explication, but terms that can be measured and conceptualised in differing ways such as conceptualisation, abstraction and consciousnessness do. Psychologists don’t always agree on terms 😃 So it *is *a problem that abstraction and conceptualisation are not defined.

Arguing that behaviour may be overinterpreted and that tasks may not be valid measures of abstraction and/or conceptualisation is not obscurantism at all. Those are legitimate points. Perhaps you mean that it is obscure to you why someone does not agree with your interpretation of the results? In fact, the conclusion of the authors themselves *is qualified *rather than stated as being an irrefutable fact. They do not conclude that relational matching-to-sample is similarly performed by humans and baboons, but that the answer is not a simple yes-no matter. In contrast, it has been presented here as a simple matter of yes they do! It is being cited here as evidence of non-human animals having similar abilities to conceptualise and abstract as humans and this research does not show that!
 
Well…I’'m a psychologist (hence my interest in your research NowAgnostic) and I don’t find itinerant’s point as evidence of feeling threatened. That is a cheap shot and unmerited given the lack of evidence for a feeling of threat. I find it best to steer clear of armchair analysis of other posters 😉
If you don’t like it, then you and itinerant should yourselves steer clear of armchair analyses of published researchers (projection and anthropomorphic identification), yes?. If you want to analyze, be prepared to be analyzed. Or, if you dish it out, you gotta be willing to take it, as we say in the US.
In addition, it is good practice in academic circles and papers to define one’s terms. Non controversial terms such as statistical methods used and technical method/design terms don’t need explication, but terms that can be measured and conceptualised in differing ways such as conceptualisation, abstraction and consciousnessness do. Psychologists don’t always agree on terms 😃 So it *is *a problem that abstraction and conceptualisation are not defined.
But why don’t psychologists agree on terms like that? Because, just like “intelligence”, it’s impossible to define them in a way that doesn’t use **other **terms that can be measured and conceptualized in differing ways - or else in desperation resort to a circular definition (intelligence is what intelligence tests measure).
Arguing that behaviour may be overinterpreted and that tasks may not be valid measures of abstraction and/or conceptualisation is not obscurantism at all. Those are legitimate points.
They would be legitimate points, if a real argument were actually given, rather than simply a bare assertion. It is obscurantism, if no reason is given to think that the behavior actually was overinterpreted or that the tasks were not valid measures of abstraction or conceptualization; it’s an argument to ignorance. You could just as well argue the authors were misreporting their findings and indulging in scientific misconduct, without any reason to think so. And no reason was given. Why is the data more consistent with the hypothesis of perceptual processing vs. conceptual processing. If you would actually show this, then you would have an argument. OTOH the authors do discuss why their data is more consistent with abstract/conceptual vs. perceptual processing.
Perhaps you mean that it is obscure to you why someone does not agree with your interpretation of the results?
It involves an a priori expectation. It’s like Scheiner’s mode of argumentation out to refute Galileo’s observation of sunspots; the sun is perfect, therefore it cannot have any spots.
In fact, the conclusion of the authors themselves *is qualified *rather than stated as being an irrefutable fact.
Absolute proof is for logic and whiskey. It doesn’t exist in science.
They do not conclude that relational matching-to-sample is similarly performed by humans and baboons, but that the answer is not a simple yes-no matter.
But what they also conclude is that both are able to transfer the relational matching-to-sample to novel stimuli, supporting the abstractness of the behavior in question, even if it is not performed in exactly the same manner.
In contrast, it has been presented here as a simple matter of yes they do!
Really? By whom? Not by me.
It is being cited here as evidence of non-human animals having similar abilities to conceptualise and abstract as humans and this research does not show that!
Well the evidence shows **some **rudimentary ability in non-human animals to conceptualize and abstract, not realized without a lot of training. No one is saying that ability is “similar” to humans, as though with the proper training a baboon could be writing scientific papers.
 
I am surprised that you don’t see the difference between accusing another poster of feeling personally threatened and an intellectual discussion of the methodology and validity of a published study 🤷

The question of how intelligence is defined is irrelevant. We are discussing the problems arising from a lack of definition of conceptualisation and abstraction in this study.

Your point about accusing researchers of scientific misconduct is also irrelevant. No one is making that accusation. Questioning whether a task is representative of the area referred to is absolutely legitimate. I’m very surprised that as a published author of neuroscience research you are unaware of this basic fact. In addition, if you had read my last post you would notice that I quote the authors’ own, qualified conclusion!

I do not make a prior asumption that animals do not have specific, limited cognitive abilities that are similar in some ways to our own. I have not seen any evidence that demonstrates that they have the same abilities.

TS presents this work as a plank in an argument that there is no difference between the abilities of non human and human animals in conceptualisation and abstraction, leading to the conclusion that the hypothesised human soul does not exist.

*Rudimentary *abilities in non human animals- yes, we agree there.

Are your published neuroscientific studies relevant to this area? Care to share any links?
 
The authors’ own words:
The results ………….further suggest that entropy detection may underlie same-different conceptualization, but that additional processes may participate in human conceptualization.
This suggests a difference in kind, not just in degree.
 
It seems to me, you are relying entirely on some subjective/intuitive sense of immateriality,
It also seems that you are relying on an intuitive and subjective belief that the mind is material as it has not been shown that it is not immaterial
I have a long career as a dualist, remember. I get the intuition, and agree its a strong one
It seems that you are referring to property dualism here, when what I am talking about is integrative dualism. This is the idea that consciousness and its contents, though generated by the brain, are distinct kinds of existent entity. The mind then is an emergent reality that is logically, (but not in this world) causally inseparable from the physical body.

Intuition in this case is relevant because it is regarding our conscious experience, not the material world. I agree that intuition is sometimes wrong on a strictly physical level, but it does work. If I behaved as if solid objects were not solid then I would be in difficulty very quickly.
On the evidence that’s emerged in the last two decades in neuroscience, the case for the intuition of the immaterial mind grows weaker and weaker…
I agree, the evidence is getting stronger that there is a close correlation between mind and brain, but that does not mean that the mind is the brain. Integrative dualism deals with this adequately in my view. The two are linked - no argument there!

Here is a quote from Keith Ward ( a Professor of Divinity at Oxford) and a man worth reading,
No matter how long you look at the sparking synapses of the brain, you will not see a thought. You will not even know what a thought is if all you see are electrochemical discharges in the brain.
 
Behavioral studies are boring, I agree. I want to know what the brain is doing. Nevertheless your critique is off-target, and a psychologist would say your smug dismissal might be evidence that your worldview is in fact threatened by it.
I like to know what the brain is doing, also. Any scientific information in that area is valuable. When my interest first developed in these matters, I took courses in psychology which included the history of experimental psychology and theories of perception, to mention just a couple. My world view is grounded in reality and so it is incapable of being affected in the slightest by baboon studies.
The researchers are writing in a psychology journal. It isn’t necessary to define basic terms like these for the readership. And if the hypothesis involves conceptualization and abstraction, it’s not unwarranted to use those terms.

Just reflexively dismissing studies of brain activation as only having to with phantasms or studies of animal behavior as only having to do with perceptual thinking, without actually showing how that is so, and why the data is more consistent with perceptual vs. abstract thinking, is mere obscurantism.
My comments may seem obscure to anyone who takes an unquestioning and uncritical approach to researchers’ conclusions.
The fact is the authors discuss perceptual vs. relational matching in depth.
I understand that. But I also see plenty of evidence that cognitive abilities on the perceptual level in higher animals and anthropoid apes are more sophisticated than what is generally acknowledged. Rather than understanding perceptual cognitive abilities deeper, the easier and less challenging route is taken by invoking “conceptual abstractions.” In this sense, I see many researchers going for the easy money explanation without realizing additional work is required.
Can you explain how mere perceptual discrimination and estimative sense can account for this result? Surely the explanation that the baboons have some rudimentary concept of “same” or “different” accounts for the data much easier?
Your comments raises a critical question about your use of terms. Unpack precisely what you mean by “rudimentary concept”. Darwin was very unspecific and ambiguous about the “rudimentary” and has drawn plenty of criticism up the present time by historians of science, philosophers, and so on. Perhaps you can do for us what Darwin could not do. Explicate precisely the notion of “rudimentary concept”.
Additionally, this performance was not achieved except after a lot of training. What is being perceptually discriminated, and why does it take so much training to achieve?

Taking a swipe at the researchers because perhaps some part of your understanding of the universe doesn’t turn out to be the way you think is just silly. It’s like shooting the messenger.

This is just another case in which the reality of things may turn out to be more complicated than a simplistic pre-scientific view of things. Apes don’t solve math equations; therefore, they don’t think conceptually (pre-scientific view). The truth may be a little more complicated than that; apes may possess a rudimentary capacity for conceptual thinking which will only occur with lots of training which normally doesn’t occur in the wild.
The training factor may be more significant in ways that have not yet been considered.

When the messenger brings a message that is ambiguous and violates Lloyd Morgan’s canon by invoking higher order cognitive abilities than what is required to explain phenomena deserves sharp criticism. Also, your dismissing a view as pre-scientific can be interpreted as a narrow-minded prejudice on your part. Truth is truth no matter where it is found. There are various methods for learning about human and animal behavior. The methods you general refer to are not the only valid and reliable ones.

The problem here centers on the nature itself of conceptual thinking and what is meant by your expression of a “rudimentary capacity for conceptual thinking”. How is it that you are not conflating conceptual thinking with perceptual generalizations? What is a rudimentary concept? I think when all of this is unpacked we will be in a position to discuss the disagreements.

BTW, I am not saying anything, as far as I know, that would conflict the views of one of the most brilliant of philosophers in modern times, one who taught experimental psychology for 30 or 35 years at various universities such as Columbia and also kept up with the research in neurophysiology until his death several years ago, i.e. Mortimer J. Adler. Your “pre-scientific” dismissals of a contrary view have no merit. Contemporary views that are asserted dogmatically have yet to pass the test of time.
 
I am surprised that you don’t see the difference between accusing another poster of feeling personally threatened and an intellectual discussion of the methodology and validity of a published study 🤷
Don’t lie, especially not with a patronizing attitude. That really sets people off in my area of the world. :mad:

You and itinerant took a potshot at the researchers’ motivations, playing armchair psychologists, accusing them of a desire to project and anthropomorphize, implicitly accusing them of bias. It’s clear for all to see upthread. That was not an “intellectual discussion of the methodology and validity” and it is thoroughly intellectually dishonest of you to pretend so.
The question of how intelligence is defined is irrelevant. We are discussing the problems arising from a lack of definition of conceptualisation and abstraction in this study.
And what problems are those, precisely? The question of how intelligence is defined is not irrelevant, it shows there are terms that one simply can’t provide a precise definition for. And yet, intelligence research goes on, and papers don’t provide a “precise” definition of intelligence. Are you suggesting all research into intelligence is worthless?

And, since you criticized the authors for not defining terms, you should be readily able to provide a possible definition of conceptualization or abstraction that doesn’t rely on **other **terms that can be measured and conceptualized in different ways, or a circular definition such as “conceptualization is the process by which concepts are formed”. Oh wait, you can’t. That is a problem in psychology in general and therefore it is unfair to critique this particular study for it.
Your point about accusing researchers of scientific misconduct is also irrelevant. No one is making that accusation. Questioning whether a task is representative of the area referred to is absolutely legitimate.
Talking about scientific misconduct is to show by analogy how vacuous an argument to ignorance is, you need actual evidence in support. No real “question” was raised about the representativeness of the task, only the unsupported bare possibility that “maybe” the task wasn’t representative, which makes it a mere argument to ignorance. Additionally, it was tacitly insinuated the authors weren’t really seriously aware of the possibility of task non-representativeness, being led by a desire to anthropomorphize and project, whereas in fact they discussed it in a fair amount of depth in their discussion.

You still haven’t provided an argument as to why perceptual processing is a more parsimonious or reasonable explanation for the researchers’ findings as opposed to a rudimentary form of conceptual processing. Until you do, you haven’t really “questioned” whether the task was representative.
I’m very surprised that as a published author of neuroscience research you are unaware of this basic fact.
More patronizing intellectual dishonesty on your part :mad:. I said this earlier:
They would be legitimate points, if a real argument were actually given, rather than simply a bare assertion. It is obscurantism, if no reason is given to think that the behavior actually was overinterpreted or that the tasks were not valid measures of abstraction or conceptualization; it’s an argument to ignorance.
So, obviously, I’m aware of the question.

To the extent that you’re taking a slap at neuroscience and neuroscientists in general rather than just me - why don’t you worry about the problems with your own discipline - they are far greater. It’s a veritable graveyard of failed hypotheses.
In addition, if you had read my last post you would notice that I quote the authors’ own, qualified conclusion!
You **selectively **quoted it. They do not conclude relational matching-to-sample is similarly performed by baboons and humans (they think the question is quite complicated for which the answer is not a simple yes-no), true, but they also conclude that the transfer to novel stimuli supports the abstractness of the behavior in question without such qualification. And, you are a psychologist so you know this.
I do not make a prior asumption that animals do not have specific, limited cognitive abilities that are similar in some ways to our own. I have not seen any evidence that demonstrates that they have the same abilities.
Me neither. I’d like to see a humpback whale compose a symphony though.
TS presents this work as a plank in an argument that there is no difference between the abilities of non human and human animals in conceptualisation and abstraction, leading to the conclusion that the hypothesised human soul does not exist.
Don’t equivocate on “no difference”. Clearly there is a difference in **how well **non-human animals can conceptualize or abstract compared to humans. But there may not be a difference in the fact that there is **some **ability for conceptualization and abstraction in both non-human and human animals.

This conclusion doesn’t squash the idea of a human soul in itself. It does, however, bury the Thomist/Aristotelian concept.
*Rudimentary *abilities in non human animals- yes, we agree there.
So if you concede non-human animals have rudimentary abilities for abstraction and conceptualization, what exactly are you disagreeing with?
Are your published neuroscientific studies relevant to this area? Care to share any links?
I don’t do research in animals.
 
TS presents this work as a plank in an argument that there is no difference between the abilities of non human and human animals in conceptualisation and abstraction, leading to the conclusion that the hypothesised human soul does not exist.
I eagerly point out that there certainly are differences between human cognitive faculties and those of other animals. There’s been some remarkable work done with chimps and other apes in the area of language, enough that I think it’s really a tortured claim to make that chimps do not have the underlying abstraction and conceptual infrastructure on which language processing is build (cf. Premack’s “Sarah”). Yet, chimps do not have language capabilities like we do, nor does any other animal (so far as we know).

The question is whether the differences are differences in kind or differences in degree. To the extent we find structures and developmental vectors that point toward human cognition in an evolutionary way, the “degree” answer becomes stronger.

I have more to say to your earlier post, by the way, but that will have to wait till I get back home to my bookshelf – hard copy there I can’t scrounge up online. The questions on symbols and referents you raised are called the “symbolic grounding” problem, and that’s a great setup you gave me to bring up the issue of grounding in terms of neuroscience. As you may know, cognitive psychology and neuroscience have been on different, and diverging tracks tracks, theoretically, for some time now, but that is starting to come together finally. The semantic memory models and amodal symbol structures that are the staples of cognitive psychology don’t fit will with the empirical findings in neuroscience – categorical knowledge appears to be grounded in sensory-motor parts of the brain, according to [sorry, can’t recall researchers’ names, will update in a later post from home]. For example, damage to the visual system complicates conceptualization of categories that are processed visually – “horses”, for example. That militates agains the amodal symbol system as conceived by cognitive pyschology right now (as I understand it).

Anyway, I’ll post some tidbits from the literature that support that, along with an examples concerning the Turing Pen Pal Test and the Turing Robot Test that illustrate how that symbolic grounding obtains.

-TS
 
It is significant that the researchers, Fagot, et al quote from Darwin about the mind of man differing in degree only from the mind of higher animals. I have traced Darwin’s thinking in this matter, beginning with early Notebooks. He clearly took that position prior to the acquisition of any supporting evidence or sound argument.

The Descent of Man is a failed attempt to prove his assumption. Darwin interpreted all of nature and the human mind through a philosophical materialism. The materialism in the Descent is toned down for reader palatability. The early Notebooks, however, reveal his rank materialism. The Descent of Man merely gives scientific veneer to an assumed philosophical position.

Darwin made no distinction between human mental operations that are strictly psychic, and those that are pyscho-somatic. He tried to be consistent with his theory of the continuum by always adding that some specifically human attribute exists in a rudimentary state, in various degrees of development, in other animals.

It seems that a majority of modern researchers in animal behavior, learning, language, and so on, assume the Darwinian model of the human and animal mind as part of a strict biological continuum. That is, a strict phylogenetic continuity is assumed to exist between man and other animals.

Some researchers set out to produce experimental evidence in support of the Darwinian view of mind, a view they would never think to critically question beforehand. This kind of situation partially accounts for the ambiguity and equivocation in their use of such terms as “concept” and “abstraction”.

The reliable modern scientific evidence about human cognitive abilities remains largely consistent with traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology. The scientific evidence, though, has presented a need for some minor revisions in traditional psychology.
 
When my interest first developed in these matters, I took courses in psychology which included the history of experimental psychology and theories of perception, to mention just a couple. My world view is grounded in reality and so it is incapable of being affected in the slightest by baboon studies.
Your world view is **not **grounded in reality if it can’t change with new evidence. If it can’t change, it’s fixed and dogmatic - why shouldn’t theories of perception and experimental psychology change with new evidence. In fact, they have - enormously - as you well know.
My comments may seem obscure to anyone who takes an unquestioning and uncritical approach to researchers’ conclusions.
Questioning and criticism are good and necessary but you have to do better than say, maybe the researchers’ conclusions are wrong because, well, maybe they just are. You actually have to provide some reason to think they are.
But I also see plenty of evidence that cognitive abilities on the perceptual level in higher animals and anthropoid apes are more sophisticated than what is generally acknowledged. Rather than understanding perceptual cognitive abilities deeper, the easier and less challenging route is taken by invoking “conceptual abstractions.” In this sense, I see many researchers going for the easy money explanation without realizing additional work is required.
This is still an argument to ignorance. If you don’t like the researchers’ explanation you should come up with a better one and show why it’s better. The fact is you don’t really have a good explanation for these results only using perceptual processing otherwise you’d provide it.
Your comments raises a critical question about your use of terms. Unpack precisely what you mean by “rudimentary concept”. Darwin was very unspecific and ambiguous about the “rudimentary” and has drawn plenty of criticism up the present time by historians of science, philosophers, and so on. Perhaps you can do for us what Darwin could not do. Explicate precisely the notion of “rudimentary concept”.
Darwin wasn’t referring to concepts when he used the term rudimentary. But anyway, a rudimentary concept is something which is basically understood, but not in as much detail as is possible, or by others. An 8-year-old (most of them, anyway) has a basic understanding of right and wrong. He is not going to find the answer to complex moral questions. The fact that he is unable to do so is not evidence against the fact that he has a basic understanding.
The training factor may be more significant in ways that have not yet been considered.
It may be. Then again, it may not be. This is still an argument to ignorance
When the messenger brings a message that is ambiguous and violates Lloyd Morgan’s canon by invoking higher order cognitive abilities than what is required to explain phenomena deserves sharp criticism.
You are begging the question here, assuming that Morgan’s canon was violated when that needs to be proved. To accuse someone of violating Morgan’s Canon you actually need to show that the data can be explained by lower-order processes. You can’t just make an argument to ignorance. Otherwise you could never infer the existence of a higher-order process because maybe, someway, just possibly, we don’t know right now, but maybe after 50 years, we’ll be able to explain the data by lower-order ones. I could deny conceptual processing in humans and you wouldn’t be able to refute it.

Now Morgan’s Canon is important, don’t get me wrong. Just like Ockham’s Razor. But sometimes adding additional entities is necessary to explain the data.
Also, your dismissing a view as pre-scientific can be interpreted as a narrow-minded prejudice on your part.
It would be, if it were **automatically **dismissed as wrong merely because it was pre-scientific. However, using scientific methods unavailable back then to disconfirm or confirm the view and, if and only if the evidence warrants, rejecting the view, is not a prejudice, but an open-minded viewpoint.
Truth is truth no matter where it is found. There are various methods for learning about human and animal behavior. The methods you general refer to are not the only valid and reliable ones.
No, but they are valid and reliable ones and the evidence from them carries significant weight.
The problem here centers on the nature itself of conceptual thinking and what is meant by your expression of a “rudimentary capacity for conceptual thinking”. How is it that you are not conflating conceptual thinking with perceptual generalizations? What is a rudimentary concept? I think when all of this is unpacked we will be in a position to discuss the disagreements.
I don’t see how my example of the “rudimentary” sense of right and wrong in an 8-year-old could possibly be confused with a perceptual generalization. Nor do I see how seeing a picture with two or three similar (or dissimilar items) and then being asked to match the similarity or dissimilarity to a subsequently presented picture of 16 objects (similar or dissimilar) could be a perceptual generalization. Tell me, what is the object and what is the equivalence class if this is a mere perceptual generalization? It looks awfully like the “object” is “similarity” or “dissimilarity” which means you need you-know-what.
BTW, I am not saying anything, as far as I know, that would conflict the views of one of the most brilliant of philosophers in modern times, one who taught experimental psychology for 30 or 35 years at various universities such as Columbia and also kept up with the research in neurophysiology until his death several years ago, i.e. Mortimer J. Adler.
Argument to authority. Fail.
 
Having failed on the science, itinerant1 does the next best thing and attack the scientists.
It seems that a majority of modern researchers in animal behavior, learning, language, and so on, assume the Darwinian model of the human and animal mind as part of a strict biological continuum. That is, a strict phylogenetic continuity is assumed to exist between man and other animals.
Well not according to the paper:
New behavioral investigations are prompting researchers to **reconsider **the common belief that animals entirely lack any abstract conceptual abilities.
Evidently they didn’t accept the Darwinian model at first. Nor do many of them now, or at least they didn’t not that long ago.
Some researchers set out to produce experimental evidence in support of the Darwinian view of mind, a view they would never think to critically question beforehand. This kind of situation partially accounts for the ambiguity and equivocation in their use of such terms as “concept” and “abstraction”.
Ah yes, the researchers are all biased. We’ve heard that one before. Geologists set out to produce experimental evidence in favor of uniformitarianism, physicists set out to produce experimental evidence in favor of long universe, biologists set out to produce experimental evidence in favor of biological evolution, because they were all biased in favor of “Darwinism”. And now, neuroscientists and behavioral researchers are getting in on the act, late to the party though they may have been. It’s a conspiracy, I tell ya!
The reliable modern scientific evidence about human cognitive abilities remains largely consistent with traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic psychology.
You can always stretch mightily on a Procrustean bed…
 
Your world view is **not **grounded in reality if it can’t change with new evidence. If it can’t change, it’s fixed and dogmatic - why shouldn’t theories of perception and experimental psychology change with new evidence. In fact, they have - enormously - as you well know.
My world view, as I intend the expression, is not grounded on the tentative conclusions of modern science. Paradigm shifts on a cosmic level would not threaten my world view, either.
Darwin wasn’t referring to concepts when he used the term rudimentary.
Whoa, there! I suggest you read more Darwin. Darwin definitely included conceptual thinking in what he considered to be of a part of the biological continuum and what exists in the higher animals in a rudimentary manner. To deny this is to misunderstand Darwin. Darwin also described human abstract thinking in terms of images, and he referred to thought as “secretion of brain”. My point is incontestable.
But anyway, a rudimentary concept is something which is basically understood, but not in as much detail as is possible, or by others. An 8-year-old (most of them, anyway) has a basic understanding of right and wrong. He is not going to find the answer to complex moral questions. The fact that he is unable to do so is not evidence against the fact that he has a basic understanding.
If this represents your definition of “rudimentary concept” then it is not much of an explanation at all. I thought perhaps you could articulate an explanation with some detail.
I don’t see how my example of the “rudimentary” sense of right and wrong in an 8-year-old could possibly be confused with a perceptual generalization.
I don’t see how they can be confused either. Certainly I don’t confuse them.
Nor do I see how seeing a picture with two or three similar (or dissimilar items) and then being asked to match the similarity or dissimilarity to a subsequently presented picture of 16 objects (similar or dissimilar) could be a perceptual generalization. Tell me, what is the object and what is the equivalence class if this is a mere perceptual generalization? It looks awfully like the “object” is “similarity” or “dissimilarity” which means you need you-know-what.
Do you think that when a human and an animal perform an identical task, and in the same manner, that the explanation of the cognitive functions involved are the same for the human and the animal?

Tossing around accusations of argument from ignorance or authority or whatever does not address the questions I posed. I merely asked that you define “conceptual abstraction” and “rudimentary notion”. You gave a weak and rudimentary description of rudimentary concept. And what about your definition of “conceptual abstraction”? It just seems that the possession of good working definitions are necessary tools of the trade.
 
Having failed on the science, itinerant1 does the next best thing and attack the scientists.
I suppose that comment represents your own conspiracy theory. Yawn!

Contrary to your assertion, the Darwinian model is alive and well in contemporary models. Whereas Darwin asserted a difference in degree only, the more recent models assert a difference in kind. However, the difference in kind is a superficial difference in kind because it is assumed that this difference in kind is reached when a threshold is crossed. And the threshold, which is explained solely in terns of neurophysiology and brain complexity, assumes an underlying continuum. So, it is an improvement over the past, but it has a ways to go.

The growing data from science actually supports not the Darwin’s difference in degree, nor the neo-Darwinian difference in kind that is superficial, a position implied in the conclusions or interpretations of many studies, but rather a difference in kind that is radical. If the sciences continue to make progress, scientists should begin to reach the latter conclusion.

What is implied by the distinction between a difference in kind that is superficial and a difference in kind that is radical makes your point moot. You are not talking about a radical difference in kind, which my interpretations assert between the mind of man and higher animals.

So, I could justify giving you an “F” grade in both science and philosophy.
 
NowAgnostic,

I ask you to retract your accusation that I am lying. That is a very serious accusation to make. You have switched to making peronal attacks and those need to stop for any discussion to take place. If you do not apologise and continue these attacks then I will not reply to you.

I apologize if I seem patronising, it is difficult to strike the right tone online.

The points that I and others have made still stand.

I asked about your research because the thread considers Soul and Brain, not simply animal cognition and its relation to human cognition. Neuroscientific studies of human cognition is relevant to your argument.
 
My opinion may not be worth much to some people on CAF, but I have reviewed the posts and can find nothing that would even remotely suggest that Fran65 was lying about anything. And there is no reason for her to lie. Hence, the accusation appears to me as malicious and completely unfounded.
 
My world view, as I intend the expression, is not grounded on the tentative conclusions of modern science. Paradigm shifts on a cosmic level would not threaten my world view, either.
Well there you go. NO amount of evidence would ever convince you that animals have conceptual/abstraction abilities, or that the Thomistic/Aristotelian model of human cognition is incorrect. You’re simply seeking evidence to confirm your a priori notions, and you will simply* ad hoc* your way around any contrary evidence. And this, to me, is as silly as the Jesuit astronomer who denied the existence of sunspots because the sun was a “perfect” body.
Whoa, there! I suggest you read more Darwin. Darwin definitely included conceptual thinking in what he considered to be of a part of the biological continuum and what exists in the higher animals in a rudimentary manner. To deny this is to misunderstand Darwin. Darwin also described human abstract thinking in terms of images, and he referred to thought as “secretion of brain”. My point is incontestable.
OK, maybe you’re right about what Darwin said or maybe I don’t understand Darwin. It’s irrelevant to the main point of discussion and frankly I’m not really too interested about what Darwin said anyway.
If this represents your definition of “rudimentary concept” then it is not much of an explanation at all. I thought perhaps you could articulate an explanation with some detail.
No, I can’t, because “rudimentary” is a qualitative, not a quantitive, description, and it’s a relative, not an absolute, term, just like “small” or “large”. It’s impossible to do. I can’t give you the “benchmark” at which a conceptual understanding is “rudimentary” or “more than rudimentary”. I gave you an example though which illustrates the point.
I don’t see how they can be confused either. Certainly I don’t confuse them. Do you think that when a human and an animal perform an identical task, and in the same manner, that the explanation of the cognitive functions involved are the same for the human and the animal?
Yes, that’s what Ockham’s Razor would say regarding the best explanation. If it’s not necessary to postulate higher-order conceptual abilities for animals performing the task, then it isn’t necessary for humans either. If it is necessary for humans, then it’s necessary for animals too.
Tossing around accusations of argument from ignorance or authority or whatever does not address the questions I posed.
No, and tossing around arguments from ignorance or to authority does not address the questions I posed either. You still haven’t provided an explanation as to how the data in the baboon experiment can be explained by perceptual processes alone.
I merely asked that you define “conceptual abstraction” and “rudimentary notion”. You gave a weak and rudimentary description of rudimentary concept. And what about your definition of “conceptual abstraction”? It just seems that the possession of good working definitions are necessary tools of the trade.
OK, then psychologists should just pack it up and go home, if precise definitions are necessary. (In fact, more than once I’ve wished for them to do just that…) These terms, in themselves, can have no precise definitions. Having a notion of what a concept is itself a concept, making any non-circular definition impossible. “Rudimentary” is a qualitative, relative term.

So arguing about the lack of precise definitions is just a cop-out. The “need” for “precise definitions” mysteriously comes up when research findings don’t go the way psychologists would like. Mysteriously, when evidence of genetic/racial differences in intelligence surface, all of a sudden we don’t know what “intelligence” really is. IQ tests must be biased and not really measure intelligence, because blacks and hispanics do worse than whites. And now, when evidence of conceptual/abstraction processing in animals surface, all of a sudden we don’t know what concepts and abstractions really are. Funny, before that evidence we were sure we knew what they were, and only humans used them.
 
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