Thomas Aquinas, The Unmoved Mover

[GloriousOrder]

God is not the material cause of the universe.

Ex nihilo is ex Deo, because God eternally precedes the void and the void of nothingness comes from His somethingness (as it were). We’re looking at a mystical, universal interpretation here. The holy Word of God, Genesis 1:1-2, says “In the beginning, God created Heaven and Earth, and the Earth was void and empty, and darkness was on the face of the deep”. If this void of emptiness was the initial state of material existence between “nothing” and “something”, it follows that even the “ex nihilo” comes “ex Deo”. Void is emptiness, and to be empty is to be nothing. If void empty nothingness was the initial state of material existence, then God must precede “nothing”, in some ineffable way.

I called God the material cause because it is from His eternally-extant Necessity and spiritual existence that all things whatever proceed. My notion is entirely opposed to Pantheism.

God is not the formal cause of all things or of the universe. Created forms are.

I believe the Church teaches that created forms were first conceived of in the infinitely perfect mind of God, the “Thought” who we call “the Father”. They were spoken into existence by the “Word” that we call “the Son”. The first form, out of which all forms in creation are taken, must be the Blessed Trinity - an intellectual and not a material or imagination-based form, but still a form of a sort. For example: since all created things are in relationship to one another, we can say that the Blessed Trinity is the initial form of universal relationship, because it is always perfectly in relationship, with its three Persons in one God.

Once more, this is a mystical interpretation of super-material ‘substance’, ‘essence’, ‘necessity’, and ‘form’. Please forgive me if I’m not clear, or if this is heretical. I am here to learn and be educated by experienced Thomists - something which I am definitely not. I’m applying his thought-system, not necessarily his answers.

No, not all things must end, and for things that do end, their substances do not revert back to God. That is not compatible with Catholic belief, surely? And I have no idea what you mean when you state that “all dependent things are eventually assumed into independent things by nature” - care to explain?

I admit that my first point was not explained well enough, and that the second point was left vague.

1. All things really must end, except God. If there was any one thing that never did end, it would share the eternal aspect of divinity, thus nullifying God’s necessity. For example: in our very substance, we human beings are not inherently immortal; God can destroy us, but in His beautiful and just love He does not. God alone cannot be destroyed by any means, and that means God alone has no end but Himself, no consideration but Himself, and no love but Himself. To say that all things must end is simply true, or else God does not exist (because then there would be at least one thing that self-sufficiently exists by itself, obviating the need for God).
2. By “all dependent things are assumed into independent things by nature”, I meant to say something like this: a plant is entirely dependent upon the sun for its essential functions. Despite the need for water and soil, we can say that the sun - and the photosynthesis which it initiates in the plant - is the prime mover of the plant’s essential life functions at an immediate level. In this little system, the sun is an independent creature and the plant is a dependent creature, relying on that one independent creature for its continued life.

In terms of causality: when the sun dies, the plant will die. The plant’s lack of necessity is assumed into the sun’s necessity, in this instance. When the former dies, it is only because the latter dies. This means that all things dependent on other things must inevitably be taken up or ‘assumed’ into that which they’re dependent upon. I’m not saying that God is dead, or that God will die at the end of time. I am saying that since God is the proper object of all creation, all things will, causally-speaking, be directed towards Him, the “Life” that is beyond mere living.

Sorry to be confusing.

 

[kbachler]

How is our concept of cause caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe?

Through experience and adaptation. Through selection.

What does that mean, and why is it absurd?

It means that the concept of time is implicit and necessary to the concepts of motion and cause. To then try to redefine motion and cause without time is like trying to make a cake without eggs, flour, water and heat.

It becomes nothing more than equivocation.

seem

to mean that the argument is a petitio principii (that sounds like a non sequitur).

I agree that it sounds like a truism, it’s not what I meant it to sound like.

What I mean is that by redefining the meaning of standard terms and making some implicit (not expressed) assumptions, Aquinas’ argument looks true; However, this only remains the case so long as one is blind to the redefinition of terms and the implict (and incorrect) assumptions.

As an example, Aquinas’ argument was brilliant in its day and in many ways continued to work well through Newton. As other philosophers raised new issues this became less clear. But as we hit the underlying philosophy (metaphysics) required of relativity and quantum electrodynamics, the the baseline changes in logic that became apparent from the work of Frege, Russell, and Whitehead we see that Aquinas’ argument is actually lacking.

I would find it difficult to believe, for example, that if Aquinas were alive in 1980 with a 20th century experience, that he would make the same arguments that he made.

Part of the problem with modern belief is probably that too much of the general population doesn’t understand the possibilities and the underlying metaphysical issues with these realities.

For example, we are all used to the Bohr model of the atom. (Picture the standard nucleus with electrons whirling around it that we all learned in high school.) But this model isn’t how scientists actually think things work. (It’s great for teaching basic concepts, but it isn’t “the real deal.” In “reality” we never know where the electrons are, or where they are whirling, NOR CAN WE. It’s not that it’s physically impossible to know, its that its LOGICALLY impossible to know (that’s what makes it so astounding and foreign to our experience.) The nucleus is not well-defined balls, but a cloud, as are the possible positions of the electron. And on the extreme end of possibilities (crazy sounding but logically possible) there is a workable theory that there is only 1 electron in the universe being shared by all atoms, and that electron is moving back and forth in time in order to accomplish the sharing. Wacky? Definitely. But potentially real.

We think of things in a very deterministic way. But things AREN’T that way. And frankly, if we want to believe in free will, they can’t be that way.

 

[kbachler]

Clip for space…
I admit that my first point was not explained well enough, and that the second point was left vague.

1. All things really must end, except God.

The meaning for this is unclear; the truth of the premise is also (consequently) unclear.

If there was any one thing that never did end, it would share the eternal aspect of divinity, thus nullifying God’s necessity.

This is not true. It is possible to show that there are different kinds, “sizes” of infinity. Thus two eternal things are not necessarily eternal in the same way.

For example: in our very substance, we human beings are not inherently immortal; God can destroy us, but in His beautiful and just love He does not. God alone cannot be destroyed by any means, and that means God alone has no end but Himself, no consideration but Himself, and no love but Himself. To say that all things must end is simply true, or else God does not exist (because then there would be at least one thing that self-sufficiently exists by itself, obviating the need for God).

For the reasons given above, the immediately above conclusion is false. There are “degrees” of infinity, and that alone is sufficient to invalidate this argument.

1. By “all dependent things are assumed into independent things by nature”, I meant to say something like this: a plant is entirely dependent upon the sun for its essential functions. Despite the need for water and soil, we can say that the sun - and the photosynthesis which it initiates in the plant - is the prime mover of the plant’s essential life functions at an immediate level. In this little system, the sun is an independent creature and the plant is a dependent creature, relying on that one independent creature for its continued life.

A number of issues can be raised with the above, but a simpler and more effective argument follows the next part.

In terms of causality: when the sun dies, the plant will die.

But your statement invalidates your argument. For if a thing can “die” then it’s existence is dependent upon something else. But if it’s existence is dependent upon something else, then it was not independent.

The result is that this is nothing more than a reiteration of the first argument, which has already been shown to be flawed. Hence, this argument is also flawed.

The plant’s lack of necessity is assumed into the sun’s necessity, in this instance. When the former dies, it is only because the latter dies. This means that all things dependent on other things must inevitably be taken up or ‘assumed’ into that which they’re dependent upon. I’m not saying that God is dead, or that God will die at the end of time. I am saying that since God is the proper object of all creation, all things will, causally-speaking, be directed towards Him, the “Life” that is beyond mere living.

Sorry to be confusing.

The last part of your argument isn’t important, because the entire argument is already shown to be invalid.

 

[Betterave]

Through experience and adaptation. Through selection.

So our concept of cause is caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe how? - through experience and adaptation; through selection.

Forgive me, but seriously: you call that an answer?! Please try again.

It means that the concept of time is implicit and necessary to the concepts of motion and cause. To then try to redefine motion and cause without time is like trying to make a cake without eggs, flour, water and heat.

It becomes nothing more than equivocation.

That’s nonsense. You can only say this, I’m afraid, because you are completely unfamiliar with what Aquinas means by ‘cause’ (and what Aristotle means by ‘aitios’). And remember: Aristotle and Aquinas come before Frege, Russell, and co. So Aristotle and Aquinas can’t be the ones doing the redefining, can they?

I agree that it sounds like a truism, it’s not what I meant it to sound like.

What I mean is that by redefining the meaning of standard terms and making some implicit (not expressed) assumptions, Aquinas’ argument looks true; However, this only remains the case so long as one is blind to the redefinition of terms and the implict (and incorrect) assumptions. [Which ones??]

As an example, Aquinas’ argument was brilliant in its day and in many ways continued to work well through Newton. As other philosophers raised new issues this became less clear. But as we hit the underlying philosophy (metaphysics) required of relativity and quantum electrodynamics, the the baseline changes in logic that became apparent from the work of Frege, Russell, and Whitehead we see that Aquinas’ argument is actually lacking. [How??]

I would find it difficult to believe, for example, that if Aquinas were alive in 1980 with a 20th century experience, that he would make the same arguments that he made.

Part of the problem with modern belief is probably that too much of the general population doesn’t understand the possibilities and the underlying metaphysical issues with these realities.

For example, we are all used to the Bohr model of the atom. (Picture the standard nucleus with electrons whirling around it that we all learned in high school.) But this model isn’t how scientists actually think things work. (It’s great for teaching basic concepts, but it isn’t “the real deal.” In “reality” we never know where the electrons are, or where they are whirling, NOR CAN WE. It’s not that it’s physically impossible to know, its that its LOGICALLY impossible to know (that’s what makes it so astounding and foreign to our experience.) The nucleus is not well-defined balls, but a cloud, as are the possible positions of the electron. And on the extreme end of possibilities (crazy sounding but logically possible) there is a workable theory that there is only 1 electron in the universe being shared by all atoms, and that electron is moving back and forth in time in order to accomplish the sharing. Wacky? Definitely. But potentially real. [Which is relevant…how??]

We think of things in a very deterministic way. But things AREN’T that way. And frankly, if we want to believe in free will, they can’t be that way.

In summary: “I think Aquinas is wrong [full stop].”

I’m afraid you’ll need to provide a few more details if you want to say something substantive and interesting about this topic.

 

[kbachler]

So our concept of cause is caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe how? - through experience and adaptation; through selection.

Forgive me, but seriously: you call that an answer?! Please try again.

Yes. It’s complete. If you have a question, ask it. Experience and adaptation is why we perceive and act upon an arrow of time. Causation functions within an arrow of time.

That’s nonsense. You can only say this, I’m afraid, because you are completely unfamiliar with what Aquinas means by ‘cause’ (and what Aristotle means by ‘aitios’). And remember: Aristotle and Aquinas come before Frege, Russell, and co. So Aristotle and Aquinas can’t be the ones doing the redefining, can they?

Sigh. Actually, I’m familiar with what Aquinas means by cause. And yes, I made the very point that Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Einstein and the plethora of minds involved in QED came later. And yes, I know that Aristotle and Aquinas can’t redefine. I don’t quite understand your point in pushing all that back at me.

My point is simple. Ideas evolve. We can see it in any “philosophic” endeavor. And part of the reasons ideas evolve is because the earlier versions of the ideas are found to be at best incomplete, and at worst outright wrong.

My point is that Aristotle and Aquinas, while important to know, do not stand up today. Aquinas’ arguments are faulty, in some cases petitio principii and in some cases equivocation, and in both cases often with additional implicit assumptions. Parts of the argument are no better than Socrates’ argument in Phaedo about things coming from their opposites.

In summary: “I think Aquinas is wrong [full stop].”

I’m afraid you’ll need to provide a few more details if you want to say something substantive and interesting about this topic.

I already did both. Like Nietsche following Hegel, you just didn’t like the answers.

 

[GloriousOrder]

It is possible to show that there are different kinds, “sizes” of infinity. Thus two eternal things are not necessarily eternal in the same way.

Can you explain this in detail, please? Infinity is simply the absence of constraints. How can true, proper infinity be shared by any being, or exist in “sizes”? Infinity is an absolute quality which can only be One, or else the other infinite thing would cancel out the first infinite thing’s infinity.

But your statement invalidates your argument. For if a thing can “die” then it’s existence is dependent upon something else. But if it’s existence is dependent upon something else, then it was not independent.

Well, that was something of the point…

The result is that this is nothing more than a reiteration of the first argument, which has already been shown to be flawed. Hence, this argument is also flawed.

The last part of your argument isn’t important, because the entire argument is already shown to be invalid.

I’m not understanding how you can come to such conclusions without any reasons. You’ve just said that my premise (and therefore conclusion) is flawed, but haven’t said why. It looks like you’ve misunderstood my argument, calling it unclear, and so you automatically invalidate it. Why? I’d appreciate an explanation!

 

[charlescritt]

What do we do when we think? I think to Aquinas and Aristotle the answer would be that we legislate, we make our own rules. We legislate what we will do and what we won’t do. We use our intellects to adequate with some thing.(adequatio intellectus et rei) We decide whether or not it is yucky or yummy, generative or destructive and then decide on our own causal response. All Aquinas was saying when he advocated Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover, is that any agent which must decide between the two extremes of yuck and yum cannot be the first mover. The first mover must be one which is at rest in the decision making processes.
As regards modern science, E=mc2, there are two absolutes, mass and light. The same difficulty exists, as any child can question, which originated first or what moved what? The infinite regress exists in excluding a third possibility that a third element outside the two absolutes has made a final decision or legislative act on the matter already. That’s who I call God. The essence of yuck or yum, which cannot be feasibly denied, precludes all judgment. For example, look at the genetic code, with out sugar and phosphate, yum and yuck, the four supervisors of the microcode, adenine, guanine, cytosine and thymine-urasil, can not function Aquinas called Aristotle the master of those who know for a reason, he had a rather formidable insight into reality.

 

[kbachler]

Can you explain this in detail, please? Infinity is simply the absence of constraints. How can true, proper infinity be shared by any being, or exist in “sizes”? Infinity is an absolute quality which can only be One, or else the other infinite thing would cancel out the first infinite thing’s infinity.

Georg Cantor was the first of several mathematicians who have shown that there are orders to infinity. Not all infinities are the same, there are in fact different sizes. This research is in the range of a century and a half old. It was shocking at the time, but is very well accepted as correct and mainstream mathematics.

Let’s consider a few simple examples of the very complex word he did:

1. The set of Natural Numbers (1,2,3,4,…) is the same order as the set of Whole numbers (0,1,2,3,4,…)

This can be proven. A very simplified version of the proof is this: Pair up the sets, Natural and Whole…

(1,0), (2,1), (3,2)…etc. It can with some mathematical rigor, be shown that these pairings can be made indefinitely. So, since the members of the two sets pair up, they must be the same size.

2. The set of Integers is the Same Order as the set of Natural Numbers or Whole Numbers

I can use the same argument to pair up the set of Natural numbers with the set of Integers. Someone may raise the argument “but you haven’t paired up the negative numbers”. Well, first I can show that I can start with -1 and move positively and pair up all the remaining integers to the right of -1 on a number line. Then I can show that I can start with -2 and pair up all the integers to the right of -2 on a number line. In fact, I can start with any negative number and can always pair up the remainder. Since I can start with any negative number, I can continue the process forever, and so the sets are the same order.

3. The set of Real Numbers is of a Higher Order as the set of Natural Numbers or Whole Numbers or Integers

I can start by trying to do the same kind of pairing between the Real Numbers and any of these other sets…but it doesn’t work. Between any two integers there are an infinite number of irrational numbers like ∏π and e. There is no way to pair up these numbers.

Hence, the set of Real Numbers is “bigger” than the set of Whole numbers, but both sets are infinite.

Thus, there are different sizes of infinity.

Well, that was something of the point…

I’m making a different point. You used the logic to show that all things “revert” to God. I am making the point that you can’t construct the argument, because by your definition there is no such thing as an independent thing, thus you can’t show that ANY dependent thing reverts to an independent thing since there is no independent thing, therefore you cannot construct the reduction you attempted to construct.

I’m not understanding how you can come to such conclusions without any reasons. You’ve just said that my premise (and therefore conclusion) is flawed, but haven’t said why. It looks like you’ve misunderstood my argument, calling it unclear, and so you automatically invalidate it. Why? I’d appreciate an explanation!

No, I understood your argument and invalidated it, but you didn’t understand the reasons; perhaps I needed to state more background up front, but I thought it was clear that with argument 2 I was making a different point than you were… Perhaps with the further explanation above that will be clear.

 

[Betterave]

Yes. It’s complete. If you have a question, ask it. Experience and adaptation is why we perceive and act upon an arrow of time. Causation functions within an arrow of time.

Okaaay… Here’s a question: How do the phrases “through experience and adaptation; through selection” constitute an answer to the question “How is our concept of cause caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe?”

Please note: the question is not the general one, “How are concepts caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe?”; it is the specific one: “How is our concept of cause caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe?”

Also please note: the meaning of “our concept of cause” is necessarily problematic in the context of this discussion, so your answer - if you’d actually like to give a good one this time - should be formulated with this fact in mind.

Sigh. Actually, I’m familiar with what Aquinas means by cause. And yes, I made the very point that Frege, Russell, Whitehead, Einstein and the plethora of minds involved in QED came later. And yes, I know that Aristotle and Aquinas can’t redefine. I don’t quite understand your point in pushing all that back at me.

You should read what you wrote more carefully, friend. You claimed that Aquinas’ argument looked good only because he redefined terms. So what gives? What are you referring to? And if you understand Aristotle and Aquinas, please go ahead and explain to me how their concepts of causality are entirely grounded in temporal processes.

My point is simple. Ideas evolve. We can see it in any “philosophic” endeavor. And part of the reasons ideas evolve is because the earlier versions of the ideas are found to be at best incomplete, and at worst outright wrong.

Evolution does not occur because preceding forms are ‘wrong’ and later forms are ‘right.’ You can’t show that an idea is ‘more true’ simply because it is more commonly held by people who lived later in the history of ideas, so your comments here seem to be based on a false premise and are thoroughly irrelevant to actually assessing the soundness of any real idea.

My point is that Aristotle and Aquinas, while important to know, do not stand up today. Aquinas’ arguments are faulty, in some cases petitio principii and in some cases equivocation, and in both cases often with additional implicit assumptions. Parts of the argument are no better than Socrates’ argument in Phaedo about things coming from their opposites.

Those are are blank assertions. Not interesting. If you want to claim that there is something wrong with some argument, you need to say what the argument is and make it clear where, specifically, you think it goes wrong.

I already did both. Like Nietsche following Hegel, you just didn’t like the answers.

You’re right about one thing: I didn’t like the answers. (Of course, that’s because they were terrible answers.)

 

[Betterave]

Ex nihilo is ex Deo, because God eternally precedes the void and the void of nothingness comes from His somethingness (as it were).

I’ll stop you right there: “comes from” is different from “is created by” - you’re conflating the two. This is because when we talk about “coming from a material cause,” “comes from” means “is made from” - and hopefully you can more easily see that “is made from” is different from “is created by.” I recommend reading questions 44 and 45 of part I of St. Thomas’ Summa Theologiae to see how he explains this.

I believe the Church teaches that created forms were first conceived of in the infinitely perfect mind of God, the “Thought” who we call “the Father”. They were spoken into existence by the “Word” that we call “the Son”. The first form, out of which all forms in creation are taken, must be the Blessed Trinity - an intellectual and not a material or imagination-based form, but still a form of a sort. For example: since all created things are in relationship to one another, we can say that the Blessed Trinity is the initial form of universal relationship, because it is always perfectly in relationship, with its three Persons in one God.

Obviously they exist as known in God’s mind. But substantial forms are not the same as the forms in God’s mind. Substantial forms are temporal creations; eternal ideas are not. All things proceed from God, but not all things that proceed from God are God. This is only true of the procession (and circumincession) of the persons of the Godhead.

1. All things really must end, except God. If there was any one thing that never did end, it would share the eternal aspect of divinity, thus nullifying God’s necessity. For example: in our very substance, we human beings are not inherently immortal; God can destroy us, but in His beautiful and just love He does not. God alone cannot be destroyed by any means, and that means God alone has no end but Himself, no consideration but Himself, and no love but Himself. To say that all things must end is simply true, or else God does not exist (because then there would be at least one thing that self-sufficiently exists by itself, obviating the need for God).

No, we believe our souls are immortal. They become ‘necessary’ beings, in a sense, but they are different from God because they *receive *their necessity from Him. Among necessary beings, God alone does not receive His necessity from another. His necessity is different in kind from any other eternal thing.

1. By “all dependent things are assumed into independent things by nature”, I meant to say something like this: a plant is entirely dependent upon the sun for its essential functions. Despite the need for water and soil, we can say that the sun - and the photosynthesis which it initiates in the plant - is the prime mover of the plant’s essential life functions at an immediate level. In this little system, the sun is an independent creature and the plant is a dependent creature, relying on that one independent creature for its continued life.

In terms of causality: when the sun dies, the plant will die. The plant’s lack of necessity is assumed into the sun’s necessity, in this instance. When the former dies, it is only because the latter dies. This means that all things dependent on other things must inevitably be taken up or ‘assumed’ into that which they’re dependent upon. I’m not saying that God is dead, or that God will die at the end of time. I am saying that since God is the proper object of all creation, all things will, causally-speaking, be directed towards Him, the “Life” that is beyond mere living.

Sorry to be confusing.

No problem, but sorry, you’re still confusing. I don’t see what your point is here.

 

[kbachler]

Response to Betterave part 1

Okaaay… Here’s a question: How do the phrases “through experience and adaptation; through selection” constitute an answer to the question “How is our concept of cause caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe?”

Please note: the question is not the general one, “How are concepts caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe?”; it is the specific one: “How is our concept of cause caused by our reason developing in a temporal universe?”

Also please note: the meaning of “our concept of cause” is necessarily problematic in the context of this discussion, so your answer - if you’d actually like to give a good one this time - should be formulated with this fact in mind.

Of course, its impossible to develop the specific answer without addressing the general answer, because billions of years of evolutionary pressure forced life forms to recognize the impact of an arrow of time, and of cause and effect. The modern quantum thoughts that effect can precede cause are breakaway thoughts possible only through very high reason accompanied by symbolic tools to assist in the reasoning and are clearly viewed as cases with structures that still preserve overall natural cause and effect.

Our concept of cause therefore is necessarily temporal in nature; it derives from reality. Aquinas’ versions are not and are fundamentally mistaken. He is correct that there may be functional relationships, but they are not causal.

You should read what you wrote more carefully, friend. You claimed that Aquinas’ argument looked good only because he redefined terms. So what gives? What are you referring to? And if you understand Aristotle and Aquinas, please go ahead and explain to me how their concepts of causality are entirely grounded in temporal processes.

They aren’t, which is my point, but should be, because reality is.

For example: “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.”

1. If true, the statement is implicitly temporal.
2. The statement is not true as worded, for it ignores key points, such as a reference frame or the idea that potentiality is implicit and vague

Or " For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold."
Is simply a false statement. The concept of potentially implicitly implies time, a temporal aspect, so of course a thing that is hot NOW can potentially be hot IN THE FUTURE.

Aquinas is very loose with his concept of time because a good concept of time (something with which we still struggle) did not exist in HIS time.

Or ". It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. " is simply a false statement, demonstrably so via mathematical reasoning. I posted an example to these forums yesterday. Again, it is false largely because of an incorrect grasp of the temporal aspect.

Evolution does not occur because preceding forms are ‘wrong’ and later forms are ‘right.’ You can’t show that an idea is ‘more true’ simply because it is more commonly held by people who lived later in the history of ideas, so your comments here seem to be based on a false premise and are thoroughly irrelevant to actually assessing the soundness of any real idea.

You’re making a straw man argument - what you say above is NOT what I said. I said ideas evolve because the truth is tested over time, gaps are found and corrected, and ideas therefore are refined and improve in an understanding of truth.

Aristotle had good ideas. But many of the ideas are just wrong. His logic, for example, is incorrect as shown by Russell, Whitehead and Frege. Aristotle’s logic allows for the “barber’s paradox”; Russell’s does not. Aristotle’s logic can be shown to implicitly require existence to work. Consequently some of his reasoning must be called into question whenever existence is in doubt.

This unfortunately continues for 2000+ years until the flaw is discovered and fixed. There is an implicit assumption of existence in Aristotle’s logic that taints things.

I can show that Western reasoning continued to evolve from Aristotle through Augustine through Anselm and Aquinas, through Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, through Erasmus, Machiavelli, Copernicus, More, through Bacon, Galileo, Descarte, Fermat, through Pascal, Spinoza and Newton; through Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume; through Voltaire, Kant, Bentham and Euler; through LaPlace, Hegel, DeMorgan, Boole, Mille, Darwin, Kierkegaard; through Mille, Weber, Poincare, Boole and others; through Young, Fresnel, Einstein; etc.

The ideas continue to evolve and are refined. There is a “natural selection” of ideas that improves them over time.

Aquinas was brilliant - his day. But he had neither the tools or the knowledge to stand up to modern mathematics and philosophy. He barely had arithmetic, had no algebra. His tools for reasoning were wanting.

Morphy as a chessplayer was brilliant, perhaps the most brilliant ever. But if a modern master played Morphy he would defeat him because of the additional knowledge of the modern master; could Morphy - or Aquinas - be among the best today given access to the additional tools? Of that I have little doubt. But that is just speculation.

 

[kbachler]

Response to Betterave part 2

Those are are blank assertions. Not interesting. If you want to claim that there is something wrong with some argument, you need to say what the argument is and make it clear where, specifically, you think it goes wrong.

They are not blank assertions - they aren’t even difficult assertions. They are well-known assertions. What is sad is when people act like such assertions are somehow insulting. They are not. They simply are what they are.

For example: “Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” - is demonstrably false, and I did so in this forum last night. Aquinas could not conceive of this possibility because he did not have the mathematical tools to help him conceive of this possibility. If he had lived a few years later, perhaps he would have done some of these things long-hand like Galileo, or invent the tools like Newton.

Or another: “The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.” Again, this statement is known today to be false. It can be shown mathematically, and there are examples within QED. (This is part of what makes QED difficult to understand. Aquinas’ argument SEEMS true, and is within our common experience, but unfortunately, our common experience IS NOT the common experience of the universe.)

Or another: “Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.” Notice the petitio principii there - He assumed true what he wished to prove: " the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause" - “the first”: assumes THERE IS A FIRST, “the ultimate” assumes there is an ultimate. He assumes this because this is what is in his experience. But there is no reason for this assumption. The resulting conclusion is petitio principii.

Need I go on?

You’re right about one thing: I didn’t like the answers. (Of course, that’s because they were terrible answers.)

I was right about more than one thing. And now I see that not only did you not LIKE the answers, but you also did not UNDERSTAND them.

 

[GloriousOrder]

Thank you for clearing me up, Betterave. I had become convinced that my own Aquinasishness was quite excellent and superior. Your brutal explication of the truth has humbled me into the dust, because I see you are much wiser than I am. More importantly, you deserve praise for having cited two specific questions in the Summa! That’s all you needed to do in the first place.

 

[levinas12]

And on the extreme end of possibilities (crazy sounding but logically possible) there is a workable theory that there is only 1 electron in the universe being shared by all atoms, and that electron is moving back and forth in time in order to accomplish the sharing. Wacky? Definitely. But potentially real.

As Alice said, “curiouser and curiouser” …

 

[Betterave]

Thank you for clearing me up, Betterave. I had become convinced that my own Aquinasishness was quite excellent and superior. Your brutal explication of the truth has humbled me into the dust, because I see you are much wiser than I am. More importantly, you deserve praise for having cited two specific questions in the Summa! That’s all you needed to do in the first place.

LOL! Hey, no problem. I do what I can!

 

[Betterave]

Response to Betterave part 1

Of course, its impossible to develop the specific answer without addressing the general answer, because billions of years of evolutionary pressure forced life forms to recognize the impact of an arrow of time, and of cause and effect.

That looks like a rather egregious non sequitur. Care to explain?

The modern quantum thoughts that effect can precede cause are breakaway thoughts possible only through very high reason accompanied by symbolic tools to assist in the reasoning and are clearly viewed as cases with structures that still preserve overall natural cause and effect.

In what sense can an effect precede its cause? (Please just answer with an actual explanation - no rambling hoity-toity name-dropping required. )

Our concept of cause therefore is necessarily temporal in nature; it derives from reality. Aquinas’ versions are not and are fundamentally mistaken. He is correct that there may be functional relationships, but they are not causal.

So you are claiming: “If A derives from ‘reality’(?), then A is necessarily temporal in nature”? Are you sure that’s true? What kind of truth is it? (How do you know it’s true?)

They aren’t, which is my point, but should be, because reality is.

So you say… but is it?

For example: “For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.”

1. If true, the statement is implicitly temporal.
2. The statement is not true as worded, for it ignores key points, such as a reference frame or the idea that potentiality is implicit and vague

1. Sure it’s temporal. So what?
2. Non sequitur?

Or " For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold."
Is simply a false statement. The concept of potentially implicitly implies time, a temporal aspect, so of course a thing that is hot NOW can potentially be hot IN THE FUTURE.

But your little attempted demonstration of the falseness of Aquinas’ statement is an obvious(!) ignoratio elenchi. Obviously Aquinas wouldn’t deny that and it doesn’t contradict his statement.

Aquinas is very loose with his concept of time because a good concept of time (something with which we still struggle) did not exist in HIS time.

Okay, if you say so.

Or ". It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. " is simply a false statement, demonstrably so via mathematical reasoning. I posted an example to these forums yesterday. Again, it is false largely because of an incorrect grasp of the temporal aspect.

Oh really, you did that? If you were expecting me to hunt it down and read it, sorry, I’m not going to. Instead I’m going to have to note that what you’ve given me here is again blank assertion, i.e., there is still nothing of substance here.

You’re making a straw man argument - what you say above is NOT what I said. I said ideas evolve because the truth is tested over time, gaps are found and corrected, and ideas therefore are refined and improve in an understanding of truth.

No, I don’t think it was a straw man. Your claim here again amounts to just what I said before, doesn’t it?

Aristotle had good ideas. But many of the ideas are just wrong. His logic, for example, is incorrect as shown by Russell, Whitehead and Frege. Aristotle’s logic allows for the “barber’s paradox”; Russell’s does not. Aristotle’s logic can be shown to implicitly require existence to work. Consequently some of his reasoning must be called into question whenever existence is in doubt.

This unfortunately continues for 2000+ years until the flaw is discovered and fixed. There is an implicit assumption of existence in Aristotle’s logic that taints things.

I can show that Western reasoning continued to evolve from Aristotle through Augustine through Anselm and Aquinas, through Duns Scotus and William of Ockham, through Erasmus, Machiavelli, Copernicus, More, through Bacon, Galileo, Descarte, Fermat, through Pascal, Spinoza and Newton; through Leibniz, Berkeley and Hume; through Voltaire, Kant, Bentham and Euler; through LaPlace, Hegel, DeMorgan, Boole, Mille, Darwin, Kierkegaard; through Mille, Weber, Poincare, Boole and others; through Young, Fresnel, Einstein; etc.

The ideas continue to evolve and are refined. There is a “natural selection” of ideas that improves them over time.

Aquinas was brilliant - his day. But he had neither the tools or the knowledge to stand up to modern mathematics and philosophy. He barely had arithmetic, had no algebra. His tools for reasoning were wanting.

Morphy as a chessplayer was brilliant, perhaps the most brilliant ever. But if a modern master played Morphy he would defeat him because of the additional knowledge of the modern master; could Morphy - or Aquinas - be among the best today given access to the additional tools? Of that I have little doubt. But that is just speculation.

No doubt, many things can be shown, some of them by you even - but I’m not so interested in more blank assertions from you that such-and-such can be shown. If you have an argument to make, don’t tell me that you can make it - just go ahead and make it!

 

[Betterave]

Response to Betterave part 2

They are not blank assertions - they aren’t even difficult assertions. They are well-known assertions. What is sad is when people act like such assertions are somehow insulting. They are not. They simply are what they are.

Blank assertions can be well-known - need I say more?

I’m sorry you got the impression that I was acting as if your blank assertions were insulting - where exactly did you get that impression??

For example: “Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another” - is demonstrably false, and I did so in this forum last night. Aquinas could not conceive of this possibility because he did not have the mathematical tools to help him conceive of this possibility. If he had lived a few years later, perhaps he would have done some of these things long-hand like Galileo, or invent the tools like Newton.

So what exactly did you say last night that demonstrated the falsity of this proposition??

Or another: “The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.” Again, this statement is known today to be false. It can be shown mathematically, and there are examples within QED. (This is part of what makes QED difficult to understand. Aquinas’ argument SEEMS true, and is within our common experience, but unfortunately, our common experience IS NOT the common experience of the universe.)

Or another: “Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one.” Notice the petitio principii there - He assumed true what he wished to prove: " the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause" - “the first”: assumes THERE IS A FIRST, “the ultimate” assumes there is an ultimate. He assumes this because this is what is in his experience. But there is no reason for this assumption. The resulting conclusion is petitio principii.

Need I go on?

Obviously you could go on and on, but obviously that would make for an unwieldy and onerous discussion. Just pick one point and we’ll discuss that. One argument that is well presented and well thought-out is worth six that are not (I mean, obviously, when the six are all independent arguments aiming to establish the same conclusion).

I was right about more than one thing. And now I see that not only did you not LIKE the answers, but you also did not UNDERSTAND them.

You fail to see that I did not understand them because you did not present them in a way that was understandable. In cases where you have done so, you seem to have manifestly made rather simple errors in your reasoning.

 

[kbachler]

Blank assertions can be well-known - need I say more?

Yes, since they are not blank and in fact are well-known.

I’m sorry you got the impression that I was acting as if your blank assertions were insulting - where exactly did you get that impression??

I guess from your response that basically assumed I was an idiot and then treated me as such.

So what exactly did you say last night that demonstrated the falsity of this proposition??

I noted that its mathematically demonstrable that something can arise from nothing. Therefore, motion can arise spontaneously.

Obviously you could go on and on, but obviously that would make for an unwieldy and onerous discussion. Just pick one point and we’ll discuss that. One argument that is well presented and well thought-out is worth six that are not (I mean, obviously, when the six are all independent arguments aiming to establish the same conclusion).

Pick any.

You fail to see that I did not understand them because you did not present them in a way that was understandable. In cases where you have done so, you seem to have manifestly made rather simple errors in your reasoning.

Of course. I must be to blame for you choosing to criticize what you did not understand rather than asking a question. How impolite of me to consider otherwise.

 

[Betterave]

Of course. I must be to blame for you choosing to criticize what you did not understand rather than asking a question. How impolite of me to consider otherwise.

You really have been rather impolite and your sarcasm is surely not warranted? I not only *did *ask you questions, I also criticized you specifically for failing to make an argument that could actually be understood as such (as opposed to a mere dismissal of the view you disapprove of). You can try to disprove that claim, but to assume that it is false so that you can throw this silly sarcastic reply back at me is simply to beg the question. Can you see that?

 

[kbachler]

That looks like a rather egregious non sequitur. Care to explain?

Its not a non sequitur, and the explanation is in the sentence. It appears that you’re simply resistant to the concept that brains evolve to see things in a particular way because that is what works (leads them to survive.)

Brains develop concepts within an arrow of time because they function, reason and are therefore able to survive and breed all within an arrow of time.

In what sense can an effect precede its cause? (Please just answer with an actual explanation - no rambling hoity-toity name-dropping required. )

An effect can precede its cause for any particle that has a reversed arrow of time. A positron is a particle that is know to exist - it is observed. It is an “anti-electron.” However, it has been shown that an electron traveling backwards in time has exactly the same characteristics as a positron. From a quantum perspective, a postron IS an electron traveling backwards in time, and is still an anti-electron. For such a particle effects can precede cause.

So you are claiming: “If A derives from ‘reality’(?), then A is necessarily temporal in nature”? Are you sure that’s true? What kind of truth is it? (How do you know it’s true?)

Yes.
Yes.
Truth can be tested against reality by using a hypothesis and testing. This statement has always been tested as true, so it must be assumed to be a fact.
Because it is testable. Reality is temporal.

So you say… but is it?

Lost your context.

1. Sure it’s temporal. So what?

If it’s temporal, it blows up Thomas’ argument, because He assumes that motion IS NOT temporal.

1. Non sequitur?

Nope. Probably just not understood.

But your little attempted demonstration of the falseness of Aquinas’ statement is an obvious(!) ignoratio elenchi. Obviously Aquinas wouldn’t deny that and it doesn’t contradict his statement.

Nope, its quite relevant. Aquinas WOULD deny it - but because he didn’t have the information to understand it.

Okay, if you say so.

good

Oh really, you did that? If you were expecting me to hunt it down and read it, sorry, I’m not going to. Instead I’m going to have to note that what you’ve given me here is again blank assertion, i.e., there is still nothing of substance here.

No, but I do expect that you would have a basic understanding of mathematics.

Consider sin x + sin (x+ π) = 0

Aquinas has no modern concept of this, a provable mathematical statement based on set assumptions. Yet consider what this statement says philosophically? It completely undermines Aquinas’ argument.

No, I don’t think it was a straw man. Your claim here again amounts to just what I said before, doesn’t it?

No, it doesn’t.

No doubt, many things can be shown, some of them by you even - but I’m not so interested in more blank assertions from you that such-and-such can be shown. If you have an argument to make, don’t tell me that you can make it - just go ahead and make it!

Please, I strongly suggest that when you don’t understand something that you don’t just label the thing a blank assertion and treat the other person badly. It’s not the other person that you are making look badly.