Thomistic Argument

[empther]

Well…this is embarrassing…I guess you’ve never studied set-theory. Check it out mate:

The imaginary number*** i*** is defined as the square root of minus 1.
Of course, there’s no such thing in the real world.
Imaginary mathematics has nothing to do with the real world.
I prefer living in the real world.

Enjoy your Fantasyland. ****

 

[Perplexity]

The imaginary number*** i*** is defined as the square root of minus 1.
Of course, there’s no such thing in the real world.
Imaginary mathematics has nothing to do with the real world.
I prefer living in the real world.

Enjoy your Fantasyland. ****

Well, this just dodges the fact that your initial claim that sets don’t have infinite members is false Regardless of your quibbles about whether these sets can reflect reality, I think you should retract your claim.

 

[Sarpedon]

I don’t see how it’s a mistake to say that every act was an actualizing potency at some point. That’s all I mean: every actualization of a potency (1), itself has the potency (2) to actualize that potency (1). Further, unless (2) is actualized, (1) won’t be.

Are you saying that every actuality has the potency to actualize itself? That’s what your sentence structure seems to indicate, as I am reading it. Are you trying to say something else? The potency-act process is linear- an actuality has the potency to actualize a different actuality, and so on.

My definition of potency is sufficiently different from Aquinean understandings to avoid this objection. My definition of potency requires that actualizations of potencies themselves have potencies to do their actualizations.

OK, so now you have to explain how exactly an actuality can move its own potency to actuality. That’s like showing how the position of a finger has the ability to move the very same finger in the very same same position at the same time as the original. If you have an actuality, then you have an actuality, not a potency. You can’t say that an actuality can actualize its own potency, because merely by having an actuality, you no longer have the potency to actualize.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Well, this just dodges the fact that your initial claim that sets don’t have infinite members is false Regardless of your quibbles about whether these sets can reflect reality, I think you should retract your claim.

You are confusing mathematical concepts with ontological numbers. In the real world we deal with real quantities, not set theory. Since you are determine to think otherwise there is not much point in anybody showing you why you are deluded.

Perhaps i shouldn’t be too harsh on you; since there is at the very least some good comedy material in your writing. Ever thought of doing stand up?

This is my last post to you.

 

[Bohm_Bawerk]

The imaginary number*** i*** is defined as the square root of minus 1.
Of course, there’s no such thing in the real world.
Imaginary mathematics has nothing to do with the real world.
I prefer living in the real world.

Enjoy your Fantasyland. ****

Yes it does. If you study electrical engineering, imaginary numbers play a significant part. Simply because the application of imaginary numbers are esoteric doesn’t mean it hasn’t got anything to do with the real world.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Yes it does. If you study electrical engineering, imaginary numbers play a significant part. Simply because the application of imaginary numbers are esoteric doesn’t mean it hasn’t got anything to do with the real world.

But the imaginary numbers themselves are not “ontological quantities” (which they would have to be in-order for perplexities argument to make sense); they are not real distinct objects; they are simply abstract tools which happens to allow people - in so far as the relevant context is concerned - to make inferences about real quantities; but it does not define what a quantity is. It cannot determine whether or not there is an infinite quantity in the real world.

Therefore it is irrelevant to whether or not there can be a real ontological actually infinite quantity.

Do you understand?

 

[Ghosty]

Well Ghosty, you’re basically saying there’s this thing, act, and I’m not describing that thing accurately. But, I’m not speaking about that thing when I’m talking about act. So, we’re using the same word to describe different things. It follows that my definition isn’t ‘wrong’ because it’s different. To avoid confusion I could adopt a different word. Philosophy is riddled with neologisms lol, I’m just accustomed to that, my apologies.

There are two problems I’ve raised that you’re not addressing (I’ll leave the infinite regression to others) and your post here simply dances around them.

First off you are free to define act however you like, but in doing so you are not addressing the concept of God which is your stated intent. If you seek to disprove God you must work with the definitions that are really used to describe God, otherwise you are merely disproving something of your own invention which no one claims to believe in. Since no one has claimed that God is pure act in the sense that you’re using the term you’re ultimately not disproving anyone’s concept of God.

Secondly, and you completely ignored this part, you are begging the question in your argument. It doesn’t matter how you choose to define “act” for this to be a problem. You have chosen a definition of “act” which assumes that every act is necessarily an actualized potency, and then you use this definition in your “proof” that an act that isn’t an actualized potency can’t exist. Essentially all you’ve really done is restated your initial assumption/premise without actually proving it independently.

In D2 you define act as an actualized potential, a dubious definition at best, then in D3 you say that actualization is the process of a potency becoming act, but then in D4 you propose a definition for Unactualized Actualizer which is a self-contradiction given your two previous definitions. Skipping right ahead you use this assumed contradiction in order to “prove” that an Unactualized Actualizer is impossible by showing that it’s a contradiction, but this means is that your conclusion was contained in your premise, indeed it was assumed by the definitions you chose.

In order to avoid this problem you must utilize definitions which aren’t inherently self-contradicting, or you must utilize an argument that doesn’t seek to prove this self-contradiction. I tried to help you out by supplying a definition of “act” that 1) really reflects the definition of act used in describing God, and 2) doesn’t contain the assumption you’re seeking to prove. You didn’t accept this definition and I can only presume that this is because your argument fails once you remove the logical fallacy.

Peace and God bless!

 

[empther]

Well, this just dodges the fact that your initial claim that sets don’t have infinite members is false

I never said anything like that. That’s a complete fabrication intended to confuse the issue, ( whatever the hell it is ).

You’re getting confused by your own quibbling. :hey_bud:

 

[Perplexity]

You are confusing mathematical concepts with ontological numbers. In the real world we deal with real quantities, not set theory. Since you are determine to think otherwise there is not much point in anybody showing you why you are deluded.

Perhaps i shouldn’t be too harsh on you; since there is at the very least some good comedy material in your writing. Ever thought of doing stand up?

This is my last post to you.

Fair enough. I was initially ignoring you because…surprise…all our discussions end like this. I don’t know exactly what the issue is but we don’t seem to be able to have a friendly dialogue. Thanks for your participation nonetheless.

As to the other participants, I’ll try and respond as soon as I get the chance. Lately I’ve been trying to respond on my phone, I’ll put some more time into this soon though.

 

[empther]

Originally Posted by Bohm Bawerk

forums.catholic-questions.org/images/buttons_khaki/viewpost.gif
Yes it does. If you study electrical engineering, imaginary numbers play a significant part. Simply because the application of imaginary numbers are esoteric doesn’t mean it hasn’t got anything to do with the real world.

mindovermatter2 replied:
But the imaginary numbers themselves are not “ontological quantities” (which they would have to be in-order for perplexities argument to make sense); they are not real distinct objects; they are simply abstract tools which happens to allow people - in so far as the relevant context is concerned - to make inferences about real quantities; but it does not define what a quantity is. It cannot determine whether or not there is an infinite quantity in the real world.

Therefore it is irrelevant to whether or not there can be a real ontological actually infinite quantity.

Do you understand?

Not really.

I was going to reply to Bohm Bawerk by saying if you can’t point to something a mathematical expression describes than it isn’t “real world-ish”,
but mindovermatter2’s reply is more in step with the confusion of this thread. :extrahappy:

 

[Perplexity]

I never said anything like that. That’s a complete fabrication intended to confuse the issue, ( whatever the hell it is ).

You’re getting confused by your own quibbling. :hey_bud:

and in the real world a set can only contain a finite number of elements

• empther

So, sets are abstracta: necessarily existents. I think a few things are in order here. First, you’ve not studied any set-theory, so you’re not in a position to say what sets can or can’t have. Second, I’m weary of your condescending and insulting attitude, especially because you’re in way over your head but don’t have the sense to realize it. I haven’t found this thread particularly confusing, your posts on the other hand are quite another matter.

 

[empther]

( Let’s see if I can out-quibble the King )

So, sets are abstracta: necessarily existents. I think a few things are in order here.

First, you’ve not studied any set-theory,

Sure I did, in high school 45 years ago

so you’re not in a position to say what sets can or can’t have.

I can say that if a set contains an infinite number, it isn’t real.

Second, I’m weary of your condescending and insulting attitude,

And I’m tired of the way you keep trying to confuse people out of their faith.

especially because you’re in way over your head but don’t have the sense to realize it.

And you’re way over your head if you think you can make Catholics doubt God’s existence.

I haven’t found this thread particularly confusing,

Because you’re confused by your own quibbling and don’t realize it.

your posts on the other hand are quite another matter.

Yes they are. I use plain English to give simple explanations. “Everything becomes simple by explanation” said Sherlock Holmes, but if you can’t explain something you don’t understand it.

---

Well, I couldn’t equal the King. :bighanky:
My stuff makes sense. Maybe I should stay that way.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Not really.

I was going to reply to Bohm Bawerk by saying if you can’t point to something a mathematical expression describes than it isn’t “real world-ish”,
but mindovermatter2’s reply is more in step with the confusion of this thread. :extrahappy:

Is my reply confusing?

I think that you are correct to point out that mathematical concepts pertaining to quantity are not always describing real world quantities.

 

[empther]

.

I think that you are correct to point out that mathematical concepts pertaining to quantity are not always describing real world quantities

The we are in agreement.

 

[Perplexity]

I can say that if a set contains an infinite number, it isn’t real.

Case in a point. Study set-theory, and then get back to me. You can’t just quibble mathematical entities out of existence because they don’t make you feel nice inside.

And I’m tired of the way you keep trying to confuse people out of their faith.

I never try to confuse people about their faith. I don’t think I need to.

And you’re way over your head if you think you can make Catholics doubt God’s existence.

I’m not sure what’s so special about Catholics that you mention them like that lol. I’m just seeing if I can find a good objection to my argument. Still looking.

 

[tdgesq]

Perplexity

I don’t think (1) is very plausible. Or I should say, without any proposed reason to believe it I just kind of shrug my shoulders: it’s not obvious to me.

Here is Craig’s argument:

*f actual infinites that neither increase nor decrease in the number of members they contain were to exist, we would have rather absurd consequences. For example, imagine a library with an actually infinite number of books. Suppose that the library also contains an infinite number of red and an infinite number of black books, so that for every red book there is a black book, and vice versa. It follows that the library contains as many red books as the total books in its collection, and as many red books as red and black books combined. But this is absurd; in reality the subset cannot be equivalent to the entire set. Hence, actual infinites cannot exist in reality.

Kalam

A common objection to this argument is that Cantor set theory does not mathematically require this result; however, there are a couple of reasons why I believe it is inapplicable to Craig’s analysis. First, the Kalam argument is limited to the impossibility of an “actual” infinite - meaning that an infinite series of x cannot exist in the physical universe. Second, Craig’s use of the term “infinite” seems to reflect the algebraic definition of the absence of a bound.

With regard to aleph numbers, they are not (at least in my understanding) defined as infinite sets in the sense used by Craig. By definition the size of certain infinite sets are different from the size of others. I have no problem with this, and it is clear to me that mathematically the distinctions work. The issue I do have is that when reference is made to a “universe that has always existed” or “an infinite series of causes in the universe,” it is in fact a reference to a completely unbounded series with no limit. Cantorian set theory posits very very large “infinite” sets and subsets, but not limitless. My experience with the concept of infinity in mathematics is that it proxies (successfully) for very large quantities or numbers, but when applied to the ontological existence of the universe it is difficult to see how anything other than a series without bound is being posited.

(2) seems to assume a theory of time that I reject. I accept b-theory. So, for me, (2) makes about as much sense as saying that the segments of a ruler are formed by successive addition. But, of course the entire ruler exists regardless where, when or how you try to count its segments.

I don’t understand this objection. While the B-theory of time maintains tenseless propositions, it still describes a series of events. The argument stands that an actual infinite cannot exist, even with respect to a B-theory of time.*

 

[Perplexity]

First off you are free to define act however you like, but in doing so you are not addressing the concept of God which is your stated intent. If you seek to disprove God you must work with the definitions that are really used to describe God, otherwise you are merely disproving something of your own invention which no one claims to believe in. Since no one has claimed that God is pure act in the sense that you’re using the term you’re ultimately not disproving anyone’s concept of God.

I’m not sure this kind of reasoning can be generalized: I suppose it just depends on how plausible the definitions are.

Secondly, and you completely ignored this part, you are begging the question in your argument. It doesn’t matter how you choose to define “act” for this to be a problem. You have chosen a definition of “act” which assumes that every act is necessarily an actualized potency, and then you use this definition in your “proof” that an act that isn’t an actualized potency can’t exist. Essentially all you’ve really done is restated your initial assumption/premise without actually proving it independently.

Two responses are in order here. First, only premises can beg the question, not definitions. So, on that basis, it’s not fair to say my argument begs the question. Now, you might say I’ve proposed gerrymandered definitions to define God out of existence. I agree that ad hoc definitions suffice to defeat an argument. However, you said I’ve defined God as an act which isn’t an obtained potency. This is incorrect, and I think that suffices to rebut your objection. God is here said to be an unactualized actualizer not a non-act, act. An unactualized actualizer is something which induces actualization in something, but whose potency for such inducement isn’t actualized. My argument tries to show that such a thing doesn’t exist. In my mind this is the only kind of thing which could falsify an infinite regress of the relevant sort.

 

[Perplexity]

Are you saying that every actuality has the potency to actualize itself? That’s what your sentence structure seems to indicate, as I am reading it. Are you trying to say something else? The potency-act process is linear- an actuality has the potency to actualize a different actuality, and so on.

OK, so now you have to explain how exactly an actuality can move its own potency to actuality. That’s like showing how the position of a finger has the ability to move the very same finger in the very same same position at the same time as the original. If you have an actuality, then you have an actuality, not a potency. You can’t say that an actuality can actualize its own potency, because merely by having an actuality, you no longer have the potency to actualize.

Ooooooh, I see the disconnect! I’m not saying the actualization of a potency actualizes its own potency to actualize the former. I’m saying (i) it has that ‘secondary’ potency, and (ii) the actualization of that secondary potency is a necessary condition of the primary potencies actualization. I’d like to think that something else must actualize the secondary potency, and that thing is itself actualized by something else etc. In more Aquinean terms, I mean something along the lines of the following principle: anything that moves is moved by another.

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

Well, is was there or wasn’t there any outside of Himself?

At the end of the day, regressing back to the first motion in the series it is demanded that motion was caused by an external agent that has no motion itself. Either the agent was/is able to create a different plain of existence that allows motion that does not affect the agent or “being” and “not being” existed parallel. The former takes precedence for “not being” is simply that and all that was, prior to the first move, was being. Motion within the agent is a logical impossibility for the agent would be just another member in the series of motion and we thus must regress again to seek the unmoved mover. What is more impossible? That motion was caused outside the agent when all that was in being was the agent or accounting for motion without an unmoved mover? The latter is the greater impossibility and thus making the former a possibility.

 

[belorg]

At the end of the day, regressing back to the first motion in the series it is demanded that motion was caused by an external agent that has no motion itself.

That is only ‘demanded’ by Thomists. There is no logical contradiction in something unmoving starting to move all by itself. It’s counter-intuitive, yes, but it cannot be proved logically impossible.

Either the agent was/is able to create a different plain of existence that allows motion that does not affect the agent or “being” and “not being” existed parallel.

An agent able to create a different plain of existence means that the potentiality for the 'different plain of existence resides in the agent, which is impossible since the agnt is said to be pure act. Pure act cannot create a differnent plain of existence.

Motion within the agent is a logical impossibility for the agent would be just another member in the series of motion and we thus must regress again to seek the unmoved mover.

That’s question begging. Of course if there is an unmoved mover, then we must regress from the first moving mover to an unmoved mover. But the point is: there is no reason to think that a first mover cannot move out of itself. I am not disputing that ther was a first mover, I am disputing the idea that the first mover was unmoved.

What is more impossible? That motion was caused outside the agent when all that was in being was the agent or accounting for motion without an unmoved mover? The latter is the greater impossibility and thus making the former a possibility.

Actually the fiormer is logically impossible while the latter may be counterintuitive, but as yet, nobody has been able to prove its impossibility. If you can, I am all ears, and I will consider theism as a serious option. But if you can’t, ,the intellectually honest thing for you would be to quit Thomism… .