Thomistic Argument

[tonyrey]

That is only ‘demanded’ by Thomists. There is no logical contradiction in something unmoving starting to move all by itself. It’s counter-intuitive, yes, but it cannot be proved logically impossible.

The onus is on you to produce evidence that it is factual. To appeal to logical possibility is a sign that you have no other reason for your assertion…

 

[belorg]

The onus is on you to produce evidence that it is factual. To appeal to logical possibility is a sign that you have no other reason for your assertion…

the onus is on the one claiming that something is impossible to prove it is impossible. I do not have to provide any sort of evidence that it is factual, because that’s not what i am claiming.
Otherwise, unless you can prove that Goid is factual, you should drop any assertion about God.

 

[tonyrey]

the onus is on the one claiming that something is impossible to prove it is impossible.

Science is not based on logical possibilities but facts.
I do not have to provide any sort of evidence that it is factual, because that’s not what i am claiming.
Your claim takes you nowhere!

Otherwise, unless you can prove that God is factual, you should drop any assertion about God.

Ultimately it is impossible to prove any facts whatsoever. Probability is the guide of life…

 

[belorg]

Science is not based on logical possibilities but facts.

Who is talking about science here?

Your claim takes you nowhere!

It may be better for you, Tony, to delay your comment until you actually understand the argument.

Ultimately it is impossible to prove any facts whatsoever. Probability is the guide of life…

That may be so, but as it is, Trevor claims that what I say is impossible and the onus is on him to provide some evidence for that. I have already constructed an argument for why Thomistic cosmology is impossible. Not improbable but impossible. Even if my claim is improbable (which has to be shown first, BTW) it is still infinitely better than an impossible claim.

 

[empther]

Ultimately it is impossible to prove

any facts whatsoever. Probability is the guide of life…
That may be so,

This is insanity.
It’s impossible to prove a Cadillac weighs more than a squirrel?
It’s impossible to prove the movie* Gone With the Wind* was made?

This is quibbling, the putting together of strings of words that make no sense.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

the onus is on the one claiming that something is impossible to prove it is impossible

You are saying here that a thing can happen for no reason. This is anti-rational, and that is to say you have not come to this conclusion rationally and in fact it is impossible to do so.

It would be different if we had no good reason to think that it is impossible. But we do have good reason to think that its impossible.

Out nothing comes nothing, therefore out of non-motion comes non-motion. Its not clear at all that it is logically possible for change to occur out of something that is by nature not changing/is timeless. Since timelessness is apart of its nature, it requires a sufficient cause to make it change. For it to change by itself would be to manifest that which was not apart of its nature to begin with; it is to get change out of nothing. Since it is evidently impossible, it is rational to reject your statement of possibility in-order to preserve rational distinctions, since the acceptance of your statement as being true would be to remove all rational distinctions entirely.

In otherwords you are not just arguing for the possibility of something, but rather you are arguing against rationality itself, and at the same time attempting to use rational principles to defend your position. This is clearly contradictory behavior and is unacceptable

 

[Ghosty]

I’m not sure this kind of reasoning can be generalized: I suppose it just depends on how plausible the definitions are.

You really do have to work with the definitions of God that people actually use if you want to disprove God; it doesn’t matter how plausible your new definitions are. I don’t understand your response here at all.

Two responses are in order here. First, only premises can beg the question, not definitions. So, on that basis, it’s not fair to say my argument begs the question. Now, you might say I’ve proposed gerrymandered definitions to define God out of existence. I agree that ad hoc definitions suffice to defeat an argument.

Your definition is what you’re using to build your proposition, so a loaded definition will lead to question begging.

However, you said I’ve defined God as an act which isn’t an obtained potency. This is incorrect, and I think that suffices to rebut your objection. God is here said to be an unactualized actualizer not a non-act, act. An unactualized actualizer is something which induces actualization in something, but whose potency for such inducement isn’t actualized. My argument tries to show that such a thing doesn’t exist. In my mind this is the only kind of thing which could falsify an infinite regress of the relevant sort.

This is exactly what I’m saying, and it’s precisely where you beg the question. You assume by your definition that there must be an underlying potency for an act, in this case the act of actualizing, and you then seek to prove that there must be an actualized potency for any act to occur. Not only is this a flawed definition of act because it contains elements that aren’t necessary, it doesn’t apply to any actual definitions for act used in describing God, and your argument is merely demonstrating the contradiction you built in to your novel.

Peace and God bless!

 

[belorg]

You are saying here that a thing can happen for no reason. This is anti-rational, and that is to say you have not come to this conclusion rationally and in fact it is impossible to do so.

It would be different if we had no good reason to think that it is impossible. But we do have good reason to think that its impossible.

Never heard of quantum mechanics, Mind?

Out nothing comes nothing, therefore out of non-motion comes non-motion.

OK. That’s your assertion. If you would be so kind as to present an argument, then maybe we could have a discussion.

 

[Perplexity]

You really do have to work with the definitions of God that people actually use if you want to disprove God; it doesn’t matter how plausible your new definitions are. I don’t understand your response here at all.

What I mean is if I offer plausible definitions, then they can’t be dismissed. And if these definitions, along with my premises are more plausible than their contradictions, then we should accept the conclusion regardless of whether they’re in popular use. If I wanted to refute a particular argument for God I’d obviously use its definitions.

This is exactly what I’m saying, and it’s precisely where you beg the question. You assume by your definition that there must be an underlying potency for an act, in this case the act of actualizing, and you then seek to prove that there must be an actualized potency for any act to occur. Not only is this a flawed definition of act because it contains elements that aren’t necessary, it doesn’t apply to any actual definitions for act used in describing God, and your argument is merely demonstrating the contradiction you built in to your novel.

Ok, I see what you’re saying. Sure, I’ll concede that. My definitions do preclude an unactualized actualizer. I suppose I don’t see this as damning though because my priors for these definitions are so high they seem quite obvious to me. Thanks for the feedback, that’s the best response I’ve received. I’ll have to cease proposing the argument for now unless I can reformulate the definitions accordingly. (This doesn’t mean the argument is bad, it just means if you don’t find these definitions obvious it’s not gonna be very persuasive).

 

[Sarpedon]

I’m saying (i) it has that ‘secondary’ potency, and (ii) the actualization of that secondary potency is a necessary condition of the primary potencies actualization. I’d like to think that something else must actualize the secondary potency, and that thing is itself actualized by something else etc.

So now you have reductions from potency-act in a looping pattern. You have an actuality that has a secondary potency, but the actualization of that secondary potency is a necessary condition for the original actualization. Can you provide a real-world example of what you claim? For example:

1. We have an actual snail.
2. The snail has the secondary potency of being in a different physical location.
3. The snail actually being a different physical location is necessary for the snail to be in the first place.

Does this last part make any sense?

 

[Perplexity]

Here is Craig’s argument:

f actual infinites that neither increase nor decrease in the number of members they contain were to exist, we would have rather absurd consequences. For example, imagine a library with an actually infinite number of books. Suppose that the library also contains an infinite number of red and an infinite number of black books, so that for every red book there is a black book, and vice versa. It follows that the library contains as many red books as the total books in its collection, and as many red books as red and black books combined. But this is absurd; in reality the subset cannot be equivalent to the entire set. Hence, actual infinites cannot exist in reality.

“These arguments against an actual infinity, however, are all based on a confusion between two notions of “bigger than.” One notion is numerical: a set is bigger than another if it has a greater number of members. The other notion is in terms of part-to-whole relations: a whole is bigger than any proper part. When dealing with finite quantities, anything that is bigger in the part-to-whole sense is also bigger in the numerical sense. But this is not so in the case of infinite quantities. Although in the part-to-whole sense there are more people in the hotel after a new guest arrives and there are more members of the original series of events, in the numerical sense there are not. Indeed, mathematicians take the failure of the part-to-whole sense of “bigger than” to imply the numerical sense to be the defining feature of infinity.” - Martin, Michael. The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. New York: Cambridge UP, 2007. p. 93

It seems to me then, what Craig is doing is holding infinite sums to the same expectations he holds finite sums to. No wonder he thinks this is absurd. But, when you stand the argument on its head and say it’s that oddity which is a defining feature of infinity, it’s not that surprising.

I don’t understand this objection. While the B-theory of time maintains tenseless propositions, it still describes a series of events. The argument stands that an actual infinite cannot exist, even with respect to a B-theory of time.

 

[Perplexity]

Sarpedon: There is something about snail examples lol

A snail [Bob], has the potency to be in a different physical location ** than it is currently at [A].

Bob’s acceleration from A to B is the actualization of Bob’s potency to be in B rather than A.

Since Bob’s acceleration is the actualization of Bob’s potency to be in B rather than A, unless Bob accelerates, Bob’s potency will not be actualized. (In our scenario)

But, Bob’s acceleration from A to B obviously had the potency to actualize before it actualized.

So, unless Bob’s potency to accelerate was actualized, he wouldn’t accelerate. Therefore, unless Bob’s potency to accelerate is actualized, Bob’s potency to be in B rather than A will not be actualized.**

 

[Sarpedon]

Sarpedon: There is something about snail examples lol

A snail [Bob], has the potency to be in a different physical location ** than it is currently at [A].

Bob’s acceleration from A to B is the actualization of Bob’s potency to be in B rather than A.

Since Bob’s acceleration is the actualization of Bob’s potency to be in B rather than A, unless Bob accelerates, Bob’s potency will not be actualized. (In our scenario)

But, Bob’s acceleration from A to B obviously had the potency to actualize before it actualized.

So, unless Bob’s potency to accelerate was actualized, he wouldn’t accelerate. Therefore, unless Bob’s potency to accelerate is actualized, Bob’s potency to be in B rather than A will not be actualized.**

First, obviously there is a distinction between actuality itself and a process of actuality. Acceleration can be a process by which the actuality of being in B is realized, but it is not the actuality of being in B itself. In other words, you have a reduction of potency to act. Let’s label this process R.

So, in schematic form, your last paragraph looks like this:

Bob–R–>acceleration–R–>being in B.

A potency is rooted in that which underlies it and makes it possible. Thus, the potency of acceleration is rooted in Bob. The potency of being in B lies in the aggregate of actual Bob and actual acceleration. The important point is that potency is rooted in what underlies it, and the composition of this underlying “stuff” changes depending on what you are considering and what actually underlies it. The act-potency couplet can be “scaled” however we want as long as the potency does in fact fully precede the actuality metaphysically.

So, I fail to see how your take of my example demonstrates anything particularly unusual in Thomistic metaphysics- you have a pretty standard chain of potency-act distinctions.

 

[Perplexity]

First, obviously there is a distinction between actuality itself and a process of actuality. Acceleration can be a process by which the actuality of being in B is realized, but it is not the actuality of being in B itself. In other words, you have a reduction of potency to act. Let’s label this process R.

So, in schematic form, your last paragraph looks like this:

Bob–R–>acceleration–R–>being in B.

A potency is rooted in that which underlies it and makes it possible. Thus, the potency of acceleration is rooted in Bob. The potency of being in B lies in the aggregate of actual Bob and actual acceleration. The important point is that potency is rooted in what underlies it, and the composition of this underlying “stuff” changes depending on what you are considering and what actually underlies it. The act-potency couplet can be “scaled” however we want as long as the potency does in fact fully precede the actuality metaphysically.

So, I fail to see how your take of my example demonstrates anything particularly unusual in Thomistic metaphysics- you have a pretty standard chain of potency-act distinctions.

The only thing I’m trying to show is that “if something moves, then it is moved.” The previous example illustrated this in the following way:

Bob ‘moves’ in so far as he accelerates from A to B. But, since that motion will not obtain unless something already in motion actualizes that acceleration’s potency, Bob must be moved in order to move. Therefore, if Bob moves, then he’s moved.

 

[JDaniel]

“These arguments against an actual infinity, however, are all based on a confusion between two notions of “bigger than.” One notion is numerical: a set is bigger than another if it has a greater number of members. The other notion is in terms of part-to-whole relations: a whole is bigger than any proper part. When dealing with finite quantities, anything that is bigger in the part-to-whole sense is also bigger in the numerical sense. But this is not so in the case of infinite quantities. Although in the part-to-whole sense there are more people in the hotel after a new guest arrives and there are more members of the original series of events, in the numerical sense there are not. Indeed, mathematicians take the failure of the part-to-whole sense of “bigger than” to imply the numerical sense to be the defining feature of infinity.” - Martin, Michael. The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. New York: Cambridge UP, 2007. p. 93

Perplexity: Here’s the problem with the above account: the specific difference that determines or measures multitude into, say, the number ten is the final unit in this number. (Comm. on the Met., Bk. VIII, les. 3, n. 1725) Varying the final unit in any such way varies the specific difference, i.e, the species of any number, i.e., all numbers. And, when we vary the final unit, whether in a “set” or in a series of real numbers, we are changing its species, its specific difference. (This is in no way a confounding of “bigger or smaller.” Mr. Martin’s contention is utter Non-sense.)

IOW, we would then be allowed to equivocate the word, “infinity” (or “infinite”), with each and every new modification, or speciation, that it was supposed to represent. Can you imagine what such an indefinitely changing set of rules would do to the exigency of understanding? There would definitely be no more need for communication. What we would end up with then is on-going gibberish.

We have things that waiver from this to that, such as wave lengths, the crests and valleys of frequencies, but these things “exist,” i.e., they exist in mediums. On the other hand, number does not have this kind of existence. Number has only immaterial existence. As St. Thomas defines mathematical abstraction:

“The mathematician, scientific in Aristotle’s sense, makes two abstractions: one, to go from the sensible world to the order of individual intelligible matter; the other, to go to the universal or common consideration of intelligible matter itself.” - Com. on the Trin., q. 5, a. 3

What St. Thomas means by his use of the word, “intelligible,” is precisely, “imaginable” - nothing more and nothing less. So, let’s not get wrapped around that axle.

It seems to me then, what Craig is doing is holding infinite sums to the same expectations he holds finite sums to.

Of course. If not, then finite mathematics is also absurd.

No wonder he thinks this is absurd. But, when you stand the argument on its head and say it’s that oddity which is a defining feature of infinity, it’s not that surprising.

Likewise; standing your argument on its head as the defining attribute of ‘infinity’ is not merely fiction, it is infinitely more Non-sense.

Bill Craig, in The Blackwell Companion to Natural Theology, p. 118, objects to an infinite past by saying:

“In order for us to have “arrived” at today, temporal existence has, so to speak, traversed an infinite number of prior events.”

He here references The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, citing a response to this by Richard Gale (a response I find quite convincing):

“Richard Gale protests, “This argument depends on an anthropomorphic sense of ‘going through’ a set. The universe does not go through a set of events in the sense of planning which to go through first, in order to get through the second, and so on” (Gale 2007, pp. 92–3). Of course not; but on an A-Theory of time, the universe does endure through successive intervals of time. It arrives at its present event-state only by enduring through a series of prior event-states. Gale’s framing the argument in terms of a “set of events” is maladroit since we are not talking about a set but about a series of events which elapse one after another.”

I think Gale states what I was getting at. On B-theory, there is ontological parity between all temporal events (i.e., it’s not like time is actually moving from future to present to past). The only “series” of events on B-theory is our experience of time, but there is no such temporal progression in reality. So, Gale and I accuse this argument of depending on an anthropomorphic sense of ‘going through.’ We needn’t speak of sets, so Craig’s last remark is more of a quibble. But as you’ll note, Craig doesn’t actually dispute this, in fact he says “Of course not.”

This is unequivocally (even) more Non-sense. If time were not an asymmetrically advancing aggregating exigency, then we would be witness to all sorts of contradictory states! You need to think this through a bit more, I think. There must be a “temporal progression to reality.” If not, then my old dog would not be dead, he’d be alive and dead! I must say that I’m very happy that this is not the case, and truly do not mind such a conception being called, “anthropomorphic.”

God bless,
jd

 

[Trevor_Stamm]

That is only ‘demanded’ by Thomists. There is no logical contradiction in something unmoving starting to move all by itself. It’s counter-intuitive, yes, but it cannot be proved logically impossible.

That’s question begging. Of course if there is an unmoved mover, then we must regress from the first moving mover to an unmoved mover. But the point is: there is no reason to think that a first mover cannot move out of itself. I am not disputing that ther was a first mover, I am disputing the idea that the first mover was unmoved.

The agent must also be the maximum of being, if the agent moved itself then all motion would not be just a mere participatation of being, all motion would be the maximum of being. In other words, Essence and Existence would exist as one and privation of form would not exist. Hence the agent was not the subject of change.

 

[MindOverMatter2]

Never heard of quantum mechanics, Mind?

If you truly understood quantum physics and the epistemological context in which it is expressed, you would not make reference to it as a defence.

Yes, and out of non-water can only come non-water.

If something is not changing, then you cannot get change from it since change is not in it. It is either changing or it is not at all.

It is not clear? I think it is abundantly clear that something that is by nature eternally unchanging cannot change. That’s just logic.

I see a straw-man brewing. But Yes. And so you should have no problem with understanding that something which is not changing cannot spontaneously change by itself or in virtue of itself without a sufficient cause. Thats just logic.

Do you mean a part or apart?

What do you think?

Not at all.

Then demonstrate that i am wrong, and stop pretending that you know something we don’t know.

So, some strange entity just waving its hand and all kinds of things appearing out of nothing at all is rational? You could have fooled me.

You are dodging the argument. Your straw-man version of God is not relevant to whether or not your argument is rational, which it isn’t. It seems strange to me that you would attempt to refer me to your straw-man understanding of quantum physics as a defense and yet here you are discriminating against the rationality of your straw-man version of God. You don’t know what you are talking about. You are clearly not interested in what people truly teach about Gods creative act or quantum physics. You just love your straw-men a bit too much, and its getting tiresome constantly refuting them. No doubt you are going to present another straw-man about quantum physics in the next post about how it proves that contradictions can exist. Stick to what you know or go back to school instead of wasting our time. I have heard it all before, and its all irrational.

OK. That’s your assertion. If you would be so kind as to present an argument, then maybe we could have a discussion.

Why would i bother with somebody who clearly is not mature enough to accept when their wrong; let alone acknowledge when a valid argument is presented. You just want to be rebellious because you think its cool; you are not a true intellectual. I have no more time for you.

 

[belorg]

The agent must also be the maximum of being, if the agent moved itself then all motion would not be just a mere participatation of being, all motion would be the maximum of being. In other words, Essence and Existence would exist as one and privation of form would not exist. Hence the agent was not the subject of change.

That’s all true on Thomas of Aquino’s ideas of reality, which the majority of contemporary philosphers reject, BTW.
There is no reason, other than Aquinas’ vivid phantasy, to think that the first mover must be the maximum of being. The first mover just has to be able to move itself, nothing more, nothing less.
And, FYI I do not believe there is any real difference between essence and existence, but that’s not so imporatant for the current discussion.

 

[JDaniel]

I think Gale states what I was getting at. On B-theory, there is ontological parity between all temporal events (i.e., it’s not like time is actually moving from future to present to past). The only “series” of events on B-theory is our experience of time, but there is no such temporal progression in reality. So, Gale and I accuse this argument of depending on an anthropomorphic sense of ‘going through.’ We needn’t speak of sets, so Craig’s last remark is more of a quibble. But as you’ll note, Craig doesn’t actually dispute this, in fact he says “Of course not.”

Perplexity:

What else is there that would “go through” time? Other animals perhaps? Other animals that have no awareness of time? Do radioactive isotopes calculate? Do they understand “half-life?” Do they get furtive when they realized that they have reached it? Or, how about the “universe?” Does the universe get frightened when it realizes that it is progressing, in time (no less) inexorably towards maximum entropy? (I wonder what’s on the other side of maximum entropy?)

I noticed that you indicated that you are on the side of the “b-theorists.” The problem I have with b-theory is that we have harshly existing models of what is meant by past and future. I possess item “A.” I accidentally drop “A” down into a bottomless pit. I must assume that I have lost it for good. Whether or not it still exists, does not, in the scheme of things, matter. It may, or it may not. But, for all intents and purposes, it does not. It now has “parity of being” but only in my “mind,” as a memory. As you said, time has “ontological parity” of existence. That it also has “cosmological parity” of existence is a completely different matter. Whom shall we try to convince if we didn’t all experience it?

Past time is the same. It is forever lost. It has ontological being, in a way, but no cosmological being. It is forever lost.

God bless,
jd

 

[Sarpedon]

The only thing I’m trying to show is that “if something moves, then it is moved.” The previous example illustrated this in the following way:

Bob ‘moves’ in so far as he accelerates from A to B. But, since that motion will not obtain unless something already in motion actualizes that acceleration’s potency, Bob must be moved in order to move. Therefore, if Bob moves, then he’s moved.

There’s simply nothing that requires the underlying part. A potency has to be rooted in actuality, not actualization.. You’re randomly stringing a potency-act distinction out farther then it should be. A potency does not need to be rooted in something already in motion, whether metaphysical or physical.

This is born out by an analysis of what the words potency and actuality mean. Potency of course comes from the Latin “potentia,” which comes from the Greek “dunamis,” translated as ability, capacity, or power.

“Actuality” comes from the Latin “actus” which is actually an assimilation of two Greek words, “energeia” and “entelecheia.” Energeia translates roughly as “being at work,” while entelecheia translates as “in completeness.” Aristotle intends the meaning of these two terms to converge, but he uses them because they each indicate a slightly different way of being in the full sense.

For example, suppose we compare the capacity to move with movement. The former is an ability/dunamis, while the latter is that being-at-work/energeia. In contrast, compare clay with a clay statue. The clay is a statue in ability/dunamis, while the statue is in completeness/entelecheia.

Obviously, the potency/act distinction is really a distinction between something in ability and that same thing in completeness, whether that completeness is static or involves motion. Your error is looking at a specific example of potency and act and concluding that this tells us something about potency and act in general.

For example, you say “Bob must be moved in order to move.” There are situations in which this can be the case- the potency of arriving at a destination can be completed/actualized by the actuality of acceleration underlying the potency. In this case, physical motion is the actuality. This is of no concern however, because this does not equate actuality with motion. We have an example in which the specific actuality is motion, but it is not necessary to identify actuality itself with motion. In fact, we can draw a distinction between motion and actuality in our minds- we can know that motion is a reality without equating reality with motion. Thus, we can make conclusions about the actuality of _____ reality, without requiring any specific entity to fill the blank.