Title of article: Why Our Children Don't Think There are Moral Facts

[St_Francis]

In The NY Times (!!!) there is an guest piece with this title, which I can’t quote (grrr ios 8!!!) but what the writer is saying is that there facts, which are “provable,” and there are opinions, which are just what people believe, and children are being taught that morals fall into the latter category which causes them not to believe that morals are actual facts.

What is scary is how many of the comments merely prove what he is saying.

How do people refute moral relativism? Other than the “my morals allow me to kill moral relativists,” and “Do you absolutely believe there are no absolutes?”

It seems like morals are a priori, which makes it difficult.

ETA: from the article: “‘Fact: Something that is true about a subject and can be tested or proven.’” “‘Opinion: What someone thinks, feels, or believes.’”

 

[Gorgias]

The thing, though, is that the author attempts to argue a dichotomy between ‘fact’ and ‘opinion’ that’s being taught in the schools, but he mentions a third that’s being taught: ‘reasoned judgment’. After mentioning the third, he completely ignores it. One might suspect that the reason he ignores it is that it hurts his argument.

As I read his article, I couldn’t help but think of Newman’s ‘illative sense’, and how it fits into this discussion. If we ignore the illative sense – or ‘reasoned judgment’ – then we can be led to believe falsely that there’s only (provable) ‘fact’ and (personally-held) ‘opinion’. :sad_yes:

 

[Oreoracle]

Morals are facts in some senses but not in others. I think the best way to illustrate is with an analogy.

Consider the word “small”. Everyone more or less agrees on the word’s intended purpose. When you say something is small, you are suggesting the object’s size is less than expected, desired, or required for a given application. But this means that whether or not something is small depends on the application you have in mind, so it is a subjecive notion in that sense. However, once you offer a precise definition, e.g., being small means having a volume less than or equal to a certain amount, then the assertion that something is small is objectively true or false.

And so it is with words like “good”. We can all agree on the intended purpose of the word. When you say something is good, you are saying more or less that it should be the case. But, like the purpose of the word “small”, this is vague enough to allow for multiple interpretations. What “should be” the case? This isn’t really any more helpful than asking what’s good–they are essentially the same question. So typically every moral theory begins by stipulating that some particular thing should be the case and the theory proceeds from there. Since people can choose different starting points, morality is subjective in this sense. However, once we have a precise definition, e.g., goodness is compliance with the Categorical Imperative (for example), then the question of whether or not something is good becomes an objective matter.

 

[GEddie]

If there are no fixed moral principles, then there can be no moral imperatives.

ICXC NIKA.

 

[Bradski]

I think that we need to make sure we have our definitions correct.

A fact is an objective statement about reality. ‘There is a bunch of keys on the table’. I don’t have to qualify that in any way whatsoever. There is undoubtedly a reason for them being there (I put them there when I got home), but that reason has nothing to do with the fact itself: The keys are on the table. The fact as it stands is not dependent on anything else.

The statement: ‘It is wrong to kill somebody’ is not a fact. It does not stand alone because it needs qualification. ‘It is wrong to kill somebody because…’ and you need to fill in the dots otherwise we’re all going to stand around waiting for the qualification. But when you fill in the dots, it is not then an objective statement about reality but a relative statement. Relative to the qualification.

When McBrayer adds the qualification, effectively saying that ‘…because killing for fun is wrong’, he is making it, by definition, a relative statement. No more and no less than any other qualifier would be, such as ‘…because killing as a means of retribution (legalised execution) is wrong’. Whether you agree with the qualification or not (and this is the critical point - you must agree or disagree), it becomes a personal decision that you make. Do I agree or not.

It is not valid to ‘make a decision’ as to whether the keys are on the table. They either are or they are not. It isn’t even a valid question to ask someone for their opinion on the matter (much like asking someone’s opinion of who was the first president). But as to whether it is wrong to kill someone, you DO need to make a personal decision. In other words, you have to give an opinion.

Now McBrayer takes the easy way out here and suggests a qualification with which nobody would disagree. Yes, we would all consider that killing someone…for fun, would be wrong. But this isn’t a matter of taking a vote on whether something is right or wrong. The principle still stands. The qualifier needs to be added and then opinions sought. The fact that everyone might give the same answer doesn’t change the fact of that whatsoever. All you have done (as McBrayer surely knows) is give an example whereby he can virtually guarantee universal acceptance.

So does universal acceptance in itself make something a fact? Well, it isn’t difficult to think of scenarios where what is considered perfectly acceptable today may well be universally considered abhorrent in the future. If there is universal agreement, does it make it right or wrong? Are we going to have a vote on it? I think not.

But that is what he is proposing.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

And so it is with words like “good”. We can all agree on the intended purpose of the word. When you say something is good, you are saying more or less that it should be the case. But, like the purpose of the word “small”, this is vague enough to allow for multiple interpretations. What “should be” the case? This isn’t really any more helpful than asking what’s good–they are essentially the same question. So typically every moral theory begins by stipulating that some particular thing should be the case and the theory proceeds from there. Since people can choose different starting points, morality is subjective in this sense. However, once we have a precise definition, e.g., goodness is compliance with the Categorical Imperative (for example), then the question of whether or not something is good becomes an objective matter.

This is also the case with words like “cow”. We can all agree on the intended purpose of the word. When you say something is a cow, you are saying more or less that it bovine. But, like the purpose of the word “small”, this is vague enough to allow for multiple interpretations. What is “bovine”? This isn’t really any more helpful than asking what’s a cow --they are essentially the same question.

Does it follow that claims that “that is a cow” are philosophically problematic?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I think that we need to make sure we have our definitions correct.

A fact is an objective statement about reality. ‘There is a bunch of keys on the table’. I don’t have to qualify that in any way whatsoever. There is undoubtedly a reason for them being there (I put them there when I got home), but that reason has nothing to do with the fact itself: The keys are on the table. The fact as it stands is not dependent on anything else.

The statement: ‘It is wrong to kill somebody’ is not a fact. It does not stand alone because it needs qualification. ‘It is wrong to kill somebody because…’ and you need to fill in the dots otherwise we’re all going to stand around waiting for the qualification. But when you fill in the dots, it is not then an objective statement about reality but a relative statement. Relative to the qualification.

When McBrayer adds the qualification, effectively saying that ‘…because killing for fun is wrong’, he is making it, by definition, a relative statement. No more and no less than any other qualifier would be, such as ‘…because killing as a means of retribution (legalised execution) is wrong’. Whether you agree with the qualification or not (and this is the critical point - you must agree or disagree), it becomes a personal decision that you make. Do I agree or not.

It is not valid to ‘make a decision’ as to whether the keys are on the table. They either are or they are not. It isn’t even a valid question to ask someone for their opinion on the matter (much like asking someone’s opinion of who was the first president). But as to whether it is wrong to kill someone, you DO need to make a personal decision. In other words, you have to give an opinion.

Now McBrayer takes the easy way out here and suggests a qualification with which nobody would disagree. Yes, we would all consider that killing someone…for fun, would be wrong. But this isn’t a matter of taking a vote on whether something is right or wrong. The principle still stands. The qualifier needs to be added and then opinions sought. The fact that everyone might give the same answer doesn’t change the fact of that whatsoever. All you have done (as McBrayer surely knows) is give an example whereby he can virtually guarantee universal acceptance.

So does universal acceptance in itself make something a fact? Well, it isn’t difficult to think of scenarios where what is considered perfectly acceptable today may well be universally considered abhorrent in the future. If there is universal agreement, does it make it right or wrong? Are we going to have a vote on it? I think not.

But that is what he is proposing.

McBreyer does NOT suggest that universal acceptance implies a moral rule.

 

[dmar198]

what the writer is saying is that there facts, which are “provable,” and there are opinions, which are just what people believe, and…morals fall into the latter category

The argument fails if morals are provable.

What is scary is how many of the comments merely prove what he is saying.

How do people refute moral relativism? Other than the “my morals allow me to kill moral relativists,” and “Do you absolutely believe there are no absolutes?”

First, I think those are great ways to disprove moral relativism. Their position reduces to an absurdity, and those comments illustrate that. We shouldn’t shy away from using those points just because they are absurd – they are the logical result of moral relativism, and we should ask relativists how they answer them.

Second, I think there are other ways to prove that there are moral facts. For example, I think you can deduce the existence of an all-good Creator through the traditional arguments for the existence of God, without assuming that there are moral facts. Once you have proven that there is an all-good Creator, I think there are valid arguments proving that real moral obligations follow from that. For example, I think it follows that we owe Him praise and worship, and we owe it to Him to pursue His all-good will.

It seems like morals are a priori, which makes it difficult.

I don’t think they are. I think you can derive morality without assuming that it exists, so long as you realize that something exists. For example, if you realize that you exist, or that the world exists, you can use simple reason to deduce certain conclusions from that fact, including these: something must be eternal, it must be the source of everything else, it must be personal, and this being must be good. The moral obligation to praise and worship this being, and follow His all-good will, follows quickly from that point.

ETA: from the article: “‘Fact: Something that is true about a subject and can be tested or proven.’” “‘Opinion: What someone thinks, feels, or believes.’”

I think their definitions are problematic. First, their definition of fact seems too complicated. Why shouldn’t we shorten it to simply “Something that is true”? Second, I think their definition of opinion includes facts. For example, at least some facts are believed, and that seems to make them both facts and “what someone…believes.” Doesn’t that destroy at least some of the distinction between the two definitions?

Google defines an opinion as “a view or judgment formed about something, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge.” I think that is a better definition, because it seems to involve less overlap with my definition of fact as “something that is true.”

Anyway, those are my thoughts. Please let me know if they are helpful.

 

[Oreoracle]

Does it follow that claims that “that is a cow” are philosophically problematic?

I wasn’t saying that claims that something is good are philosopically problematic. I’m saying that you have to be sufficiently specific before objectivity comes into play. Indeed, your example is accurate, as biologists have long struggled to reduce the subjectivity involved in identifying animals’ species, or even defining “species”. So if you aren’t careful, it could become problematic, but problems can be avoided once definitions are agreed upon.

If memory serves, our own discussions often involve us agreeing that our reasoning is flawless. We disagree on the definitions. So neither of us commit factual errors or utter falsities, we just disagree on conventions. We could discuss why there is such a disagreement in the first place, but that’s not directly relevant to the matter at hand.

 

[St_Francis]

The argument fails if morals are provable. First, I think those are great ways to disprove moral relativism. Their position reduces to an absurdity, and those comments illustrate that. We shouldn’t shy away from using those points just because they are absurd – they are the logical result of moral relativism, and we should ask relativists how they answer them.

I guess I see those as negative arguments and would like some positive arguments. It’s hard, because moral relativism is slippery and is usually held by people who are relativists in other areas and say stuff like they don’t believe in concepts (!).

Second, I think there are other ways to prove that there are moral facts. For example, I think you can deduce the existence of an all-good Creator through the traditional arguments for the existence of God, without assuming that there are moral facts. Once you have proven that there is an all-good Creator, I think there are valid arguments proving that real moral obligations follow from that. For example, I think it follows that we owe Him praise and worship, and we owe it to Him to pursue His all-good will. I don’t think they are. I think you can derive morality without assuming that it exists, so long as you realize that something exists. For example, if you realize that you exist, or that the world exists, you can use simple reason to deduce certain conclusions from that fact, including these: something must be eternal, it must be the source of everything else, it must be personal, and this being must be good. The moral obligation to praise and worship this being, and follow His all-good will, follows quickly from that point.

This is an area one cannot go into in public schools

I think their definitions are problematic. First, their definition of fact seems too complicated. Why shouldn’t we shorten it to simply “Something that is true”? Second, I think their definition of opinion includes facts. For example, at least some facts are believed, and that seems to make them both facts and “what someone…believes.” Doesn’t that destroy at least some of the distinction between the two definitions?

Yes, I too thought there was a problem with the definitions.

Google defines an opinion as “a view or judgment formed about something, not necessarily based on fact or knowledge.” I think that is a better definition, because it seems to involve less overlap with my definition of fact as “something that is true.”

Anyway, those are my thoughts. Please let me know if they are helpful.

Thank you for your thoughts They are helpful because maybe the more positive argument I am looking for involves both using the reductio argument and discussing definitions.

 

[clem456]

Perhaps a thread subtitle might be “what does it mean to have common sense”.

Common sense implies the context of a common standard to which all beliefs must have reference, something outside one’s self. Instead of that, we have exalted an exclusively personal belief system, out of reference to a common standard.
Even in Christianity we have this separation from common standards or beliefs.

 

[unstoppable_II]

…
How do people refute moral relativism? Other than the “my morals allow me to kill moral relativists,” and “Do you absolutely believe there are no absolutes?”
…

If morality is relative, what is it relative to?

 

[MacBP]

Without getting into the actual debate about moral absolutism versus moral relativism, I’m not entirely sure that children and young adults are as morally relativistic as people claim. I find it hard to believe that people could witness the average young person’s response to perceived inequality owing to sexual identity or sexual orientation and still believe that young people are a moral blank slate. Clearly, they do believe that there is right and wrong; they may simply differ with tradition in what right or wrong entails.

 

[dmar198]

I guess I see those as negative arguments and would like some positive arguments.

That is understandable, and I think there is value in asserting positive arguments for morality. However, I do not think you can logically derive morality without God. I think that is the major premise in the moral argument for God’s existence, and I think it is logically sound.

However, perhaps there are ways to format the negative arguments into a positive one. For example:

Premise 1. Either morality is absolute or it is not.
Premise 2. The position that morality is *not absolute is false because it reduces to absurdity.
Conclusion. Therefore, morality is absolute.

That seems to be a positive reformulation of the negative argument. (It also helps establish the minor premise in the moral argument for God’s existence.)

It’s hard, because moral relativism is slippery and is usually held by people who are relativists in other areas and say stuff like they don’t believe in concepts (!).

Yes, that does make it hard, but you can use the same reductio argument against that position: every belief can be reformulated as a concept. The position “I don’t believe in concepts” expresses a belief. Therefore, it can be reformulated as a concept. But then it contradicts itself, and therefore reduces to absurdity, and therefore is false.

This is an area one cannot go into in public schools

I think there are public schools with philosophy classes. It seems to me that you could present an argument for God’s existence without asserting that it is true.

That said, I’m not sure you really *can’t teach that God exists in public schools. I’m not aware of any law saying that God’s existence can’t be taught in schools, and if there is such a law, it would seem to be unjust and therefore invalid, and ought to be challenged in court. (Not saying *you should be the one to challenge it, but I think it ought to be done by somebody – if there is such a law, that is.)

Thank you for your thoughts They are helpful because maybe the more positive argument I am looking for involves both using the reductio argument and discussing definitions.

Glad I could help, I hope this post is helpful too.

 

[unstoppable_II]

…
How do people refute moral relativism? Other than the “my morals allow me to kill moral relativists,” and “Do you absolutely believe there are no absolutes?”
…

If morality is relative, why do we have to accept the morality of moral relativists?

 

[Bradski]

McBreyer does NOT suggest that universal acceptance implies a moral rule.

He certainly seems to be implying it. He is suggesting that ‘killing for fun is wrong’ is a brute fact because everyone would agree with it. Whereas it is a relative statement in the first instance and therefore dependent on the opinion of the individual. Notwithstanding that there are a lot of people who go hunting who would disagree with him. He would then have to qualify his statement further. Maybe killing something to enable your family to eat is OK but it is morally wrong to enjoy it.

If morality is relative, what is it relative to?

It is relative to the situation. ‘Killing is wrong’ is morally acceptable or unacceptable depending upon the scenario.

If morality is relative, why do we have to accept the morality of moral relativists?

You don’t. It’s your call.

 

[St_Francis]

Without getting into the actual debate about moral absolutism versus moral relativism, I’m not entirely sure that children and young adults are as morally relativistic as people claim. I find it hard to believe that people could witness the average young person’s response to perceived inequality owing to sexual identity or sexual orientation and still believe that young people are a moral blank slate. Clearly, they do believe that there is right and wrong; they may simply differ with tradition in what right or wrong entails.

I totally agree with you. It floors me that someone can advocate moral relativism when it comes to, say, sexual activity, but then turn around and utterly lambast someone for expressing reservations about homosexual marriage.

So imo, the kids are learning as fact *certain *moral principles, just not traditional moral principles, which are held to be mere opinion.

 

[Aloysium]

During a conversation with a very old friend, she reported that unlike her parents, she herself raised her now adult daughter not to experience any guilt.
Now, this is related to a view that understands guilt as merely a negative emotion which disorganizes and inhibits the will.
If one is to move ahead in the world, filled with confidence and meeting all challenges head-on, this guilt would be a bad thing.
It seems there is only one thing should really feel guilty about; and, apparently it is being judgemental. If one induces guilt in another, one deserves to feel guilty.
Somewhat horrified, but also trying to keep myself from laughing, I just listened. The friend seemed all too happy to extolt her own “virtues”. It was very surreal for me.

 

[St_Francis]

I think that we need to make sure we have our definitions correct.

A fact is an objective statement about reality. ‘There is a bunch of keys on the table’. I don’t have to qualify that in any way whatsoever. There is undoubtedly a reason for them being there (I put them there when I got home), but that reason has nothing to do with the fact itself: The keys are on the table. The fact as it stands is not dependent on anything else.

The statement: ‘It is wrong to kill somebody’ is not a fact. It does not stand alone because it needs qualification. ‘It is wrong to kill somebody because…’ and you need to fill in the dots otherwise we’re all going to stand around waiting for the qualification. But when you fill in the dots, it is not then an objective statement about reality but a relative statement. Relative to the qualification.

When McBrayer adds the qualification, effectively saying that ‘…because killing for fun is wrong’, he is making it, by definition, a relative statement. No more and no less than any other qualifier would be, such as ‘…because killing as a means of retribution (legalised execution) is wrong’. Whether you agree with the qualification or not (and this is the critical point - you must agree or disagree), it becomes a personal decision that you make. Do I agree or not.

I don’t understand what you mean by relative here. First, you imply that the statement, “it is wrong to kill someone,” is somehow incomplete without an explanation of *why, *but then you complete the statement like this: “It is wrong to kill people because killing people for fun is wrong.”

So, why would a statement like, “It is wrong to kill an innocent person,” need a qualification? Or, “It is wrong to kill people for fun?” Are you saying that because sometimes killing people is not-wrong that killing people when it *is *wrong is relative?

It is not valid to ‘make a decision’ as to whether the keys are on the table. They either are or they are not. It isn’t even a valid question to ask someone for their opinion on the matter (much like asking someone’s opinion of who was the first president). But as to whether it is wrong to kill someone, you DO need to make a personal decision. In other words, you have to give an opinion.

Why is it an opinion instead of a fact to say, “It is wrong to kill innocent people”?

Now McBrayer takes the easy way out here and suggests a qualification with which nobody would disagree. Yes, we would all consider that killing someone…for fun, would be wrong. But this isn’t a matter of taking a vote on whether something is right or wrong. The principle still stands. The qualifier needs to be added and then opinions sought. The fact that everyone might give the same answer doesn’t change the fact of that whatsoever. All you have done (as McBrayer surely knows) is give an example whereby he can virtually guarantee universal acceptance.

I think he was just trying to make a point and chose an example which he believed even moral relativists could agree with. However, the reason everyone would agree is that it actually is a fact that we all know that killing people for fun is wrong; he is not saying, because so many people would agree with the statement that it is a fact.

What is relative in the situation of killing people is the circumstances, not the moral statement. For example, everyone would agree that killing people for fun would be wrong. However, people would disagree about whether killing people of a different religion would be wrong, no? So Nazis and Islamic extremists believe that killing people of other religions is *not *wrong. The question hinges on circumstances, because while almost everyone would agree that killing people for fun is morally wrong, they would almost all also agree that killing someone who is trying to kill a child would be all right.

So does universal acceptance in itself make something a fact? Well, it isn’t difficult to think of scenarios where what is considered perfectly acceptable today may well be universally considered abhorrent in the future. If there is universal agreement, does it make it right or wrong? Are we going to have a vote on it? I think not.

But that is what he is proposing.

There are certain moral views which are held by most people through most times; again, the main points of difference revolve around circumstances. However, as CS Lewis said, there are no societies in which cowardice is considered a good thing, or selfishness is encouraged, etc.

For us Catholics, it is easy to understand that some will differ on details, because we all have the experience of being blinded to one extent or another by ignorance and/or sin. However, once one understands what morals are teaching, precisely, it is easy to see that they are facts, facts which are understood, sometimes better, sometimes not so well, pretty much universally.

 

[St_Francis]

Morals are facts in some senses but not in others. I think the best way to illustrate is with an analogy.

Consider the word “small”. Everyone more or less agrees on the word’s intended purpose. When you say something is small, you are suggesting the object’s size is less than expected, desired, or required for a given application. But this means that whether or not something is small depends on the application you have in mind, so it is a subjecive notion in that sense. However, once you offer a precise definition, e.g., being small means having a volume less than or equal to a certain amount, then the assertion that something is small is objectively true or false.

And so it is with words like “good”. We can all agree on the intended purpose of the word. When you say something is good, you are saying more or less that it should be the case. But, like the purpose of the word “small”, this is vague enough to allow for multiple interpretations. What “should be” the case? This isn’t really any more helpful than asking what’s good–they are essentially the same question. So typically every moral theory begins by stipulating that some particular thing should be the case and the theory proceeds from there. Since people can choose different starting points, morality is subjective in this sense. However, once we have a precise definition, e.g., goodness is compliance with the Categorical Imperative (for example), then the question of whether or not something is good becomes an objective matter.

How can we figure out what the “measuring stick” should be?