Title of article: Why Our Children Don't Think There are Moral Facts

[Charlemagne_III]

We are all born with an innate sense of the existence of right and wrong. That is a fact that applies to everyone except possibly a mentally retarded person or an insane person. Those two exceptions aside, that moral fact alone is sufficient to refute moral relativism. The only matter that remains is to sort out which moral acts are objectively right or wrong.

It’s true that this is a matter of opinion because reason some is a whore and can be paid to adopt any value or act it likes, or repudiate any value or act it doesn’t like. But when reason is upright and firm, it will not sell itself to the highest bidder. That’s when the majority rule comes in to play as the final arbiter of right and wrong. And so the majority generally are right in matters pertaining to morality, and we see that fact played out in the laws of the land that judge rape, murder, theft, etc. to be crimes of fact, not merely opinion. That is also why no one is exempt from these laws because they are rooted in fact, not mere opinion.

The child who has been exposed to the principle of moral relativism in the classroom by his teacher finds that principle easily refuted by the class bully during recess. The bully is a fact, and an ugly fact wherever he may appear. That he needs to be disciplined and counseled is another fact.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

He certainly seems to be implying it. He is suggesting that ‘killing for fun is wrong’ is a brute fact because everyone would agree with it. Whereas it is a relative statement in the first instance and therefore dependent on the opinion of the individual. Notwithstanding that there are a lot of people who go hunting who would disagree with him. He would then have to qualify his statement further. Maybe killing something to enable your family to eat is OK but it is morally wrong to enjoy it.

He said nothing like anything you describe here. Please quote me the relevant passages to substantiate your claims.

Everything he says is pretty much standard fare among professional, secular philosophers.

 

[Oreoracle]

How can we figure out what the “measuring stick” should be?

Continuing with the analogy, I would proceed as I would if asked how one decides what “small” should mean. It’s ultimately a matter of the application at hand. A flea is small if the concern is seeing objects with the naked eye, but fleas would be quite large if the application were particle physics. There is no “correct” measuring stick, just measuring sticks best adapted to certain applications.

So the crucial question is what one expects their morality to “do”. What is abiding by that morality meant to change about the world? Answering that will eventually lead to a moral code adapted to that purpose, i.e., the “best” morality for the chosen application.

Of course the next natural question is what the application should be. I would say that is not an ethical question, but at best a metaethical one, since the question is essentially “what should be good?” rather than the ethical question “what is good?”

 

[St_Francis]

Continuing with the analogy, I would proceed as I would if asked how one decides what “small” should mean. It’s ultimately a matter of the application at hand. A flea is small if the concern is seeing objects with the naked eye, but fleas would be quite large if the application were particle physics. There is no “correct” measuring stick, just measuring sticks best adapted to certain applications.

So the crucial question is what one expects their morality to “do”. What is abiding by that morality meant to change about the world? Answering that will eventually lead to a moral code adapted to that purpose, i.e., the “best” morality for the chosen application.

Of course the next natural question is what the application should be. I would say that is not an ethical question, but at best a metaethical one, since the question is essentially “what should be good?” rather than the ethical question “what is good?”

So what’s the difference between what you are saying and moral relativism?

 

[Oreoracle]

So what’s the difference between what you are saying and moral relativism?

Firstly, I think we should distinguish between two types of moral relativism. There is what I will call the “descriptive” kind and the “prescriptive” kind. The descriptive relativism basically says that every society has its own distinct culture and that the prevailing morality of that society depends on its culture. That much is beyond dispute, I would say.

Prescriptive relativism takes that a step further and says that societies should be allowed to conduct themselves in accordance with their respective moralities. So the “application” of prescriptive relativism–that is, what it’s supposed to do for the world–is to grant societies the autonomy to enforce their own views at the expense of, say, an intercultural agreement of morality.

I am not a relativist in the above sense. I have moral views that, ideally, I believe every culture should adopt. That is, I see morality as a sort of tool and I feel everyone should coordinate their efforts and use it in the same way. I wouldn’t call my position “moral absolutism”, because absolutists are known for claiming morality is objective in a way that I would not. An absolutist wouldn’t stop at saying morality is determined by the application; they would insist there is a “correct” application.

 

[Bradski]

He said nothing like anything you describe here. Please quote me the relevant passages to substantiate your claims.

Everything he says is pretty much standard fare among professional, secular philosophers.

He is talking about moral facts. It’s actually the title of the article. And he complains that children are being taught that moral questions are a matter of opinion as opposed to a matter of fact and he asks: ‘How does the dichotomy between fact and opinion relate to morality?’

But there is no dichotomy. Facts and opinions are entirely different concepts. The examples that he uses do not refute this. A fact does not have to be qualified in any way. The fact that Washington was president does not require an ‘if’ clause – the statement stands on its own and is either true or false. And a fact does not need anyone’s opinion for it to be true. Washington was president whether you believe he was or not.

On the other hand, an opinion is someone’s personal interpretation of a given scenario. And whatever you believe about that scenario, whether you are right or wrong, doesn’t change the facts of the matter. A fact is true or false whether anyone has an opinion on it or not.

But moral questions need qualifiers, so they are not facts. If you say that killing is wrong, you have to qualify it for the statement to make any sense: ‘Killing is wrong if…’ It needs a conditional clause and therefore cannot be described as a fact. But this is what McBrayer suggests. He implies that the statement: ‘killing a cartoonist is wrong’ is a moral fact when it is simply a statement that is true for all reasonable people.

If you say that it is wrong because all reasonable people believe it to be so, then we’re in very dangerous territory. If you say it’s wrong despite what anyone believes, then without recourse to religion, how do we know?

 

[Prodigal_Son]

He is talking about moral facts. It’s actually the title of the article. And he complains that children are being taught that moral questions are a matter of opinion as opposed to a matter of fact and he asks: ‘How does the dichotomy between fact and opinion relate to morality?’

But there is no dichotomy. Facts and opinions are entirely different concepts. The examples that he uses do not refute this. A fact does not have to be qualified in any way. The fact that Washington was president does not require an ‘if’ clause – the statement stands on its own and is either true or false. And a fact does not need anyone’s opinion for it to be true. Washington was president whether you believe he was or not.

On the other hand, an opinion is someone’s personal interpretation of a given scenario. And whatever you believe about that scenario, whether you are right or wrong, doesn’t change the facts of the matter. A fact is true or false whether anyone has an opinion on it or not.

But moral questions need qualifiers, so they are not facts. If you say that killing is wrong, you have to qualify it for the statement to make any sense: ‘Killing is wrong if…’ It needs a conditional clause and therefore cannot be described as a fact. But this is what McBrayer suggests. He implies that the statement: ‘killing a cartoonist is wrong’ is a moral fact when it is simply a statement that is true for all reasonable people.

If you say that it is wrong because all reasonable people believe it to be so, then we’re in very dangerous territory. If you say it’s wrong despite what anyone believes, then without recourse to religion, how do we know?

He doesn’t say things are wrong by popular opinion. You can scour the article, and you won’t find that.

As for the notion that moral facts must always be qualified, that’s just not true. “Rape is wrong.” Always. Period. End of story. No qualifications.

 

[catholictiger]

great article and speaks so truly to the situation of today’s culture.

We have reduced things into materialism meaning I only believe things which are scientifically verifiable. Even basic claims like Murder is wrong, is opinion because you can’t scientifically verify it.

 

[catholictiger]

In The NY Times (!!!) there is an guest piece with this title, which I can’t quote (grrr ios 8!!!) but what the writer is saying is that there facts, which are “provable,” and there are opinions, which are just what people believe, and children are being taught that morals fall into the latter category which causes them not to believe that morals are actual facts.

What is scary is how many of the comments merely prove what he is saying.

How do people refute moral relativism? Other than the “my morals allow me to kill moral relativists,” and “Do you absolutely believe there are no absolutes?”

It seems like morals are a priori, which makes it difficult.

ETA: from the article: “‘Fact: Something that is true about a subject and can be tested or proven.’” “‘Opinion: What someone thinks, feels, or believes.’”

no disrespect but I don’t think you closely read this article.

He is talking about this in criticism I hope you realize this.

Common core assignments which he cites all throughout his article, use examples which are CLEARLY facts and cites them as examples.

one of the clear examples he uses cheating on your homework, this is a fact wrong action, but common core doesn’t believe it.

This author does a good job of opening the public to the problem that is happening in this society. We have become completely dependent on something that doesn’t encompass everything, science.

Again this is a criticism piece not affirmation piece.

 

[dmar198]

\I am not a relativist in the above sense. I have moral views that, ideally, I believe every culture should adopt.

Why should any culture adopt your moral views? Are they inherently better than others?

That is, I see morality as a sort of tool and I feel everyone should coordinate their efforts and use it in the same way. I wouldn’t call my position “moral absolutism”, because absolutists are known for claiming morality is objective in a way that I would not. An absolutist wouldn’t stop at saying morality is determined by the application; they would insist there is a “correct” application.

Why should anyone follow that morality if you don’t claim it is correct? If I want to do X and think I can get away with it, the statement “that is unappealing in our collective opinion” doesn’t seem to hold persuasive power. But if I grow up hearing that it is wrong and objectively verifiable reasons why, that does seem to hold persuasive power. What am I missing?

 

[Bradski]

He doesn’t say things are wrong by popular opinion. You can scour the article, and you won’t find that.

That’s pretty much where the article leads. Otherwise he is saying that some things are just wrong because they are wrong because…well, why? Because all reasonable people would agree? Does that make it a fact? No it doesn’t. So if he wants to tell us that there are moral facts, then how come he doesn’t tell us how we discover these?

As for the notion that moral facts must always be qualified, that’s just not true. “Rape is wrong.” Always. Period. End of story. No qualifications.

Ah, so we need no process to differentiate moral opinions from moral facts. We apparently just know. They’re always wrong. Period.

What you are actually saying above is a qualified statement in itself. That causing harm is wrong in certain circumstances. That’s precisely what rape is. You are saying: ‘Causing harm is wrong if…it entails having sex with a woman without her consent or who would not willingly give her consent if the situation allowed’. And this is the important point - you have to give a reason. Facts stand alone without a reason. You can say: ‘Washington was president’. But it makes no sense at all to say that ‘Washington was president if…’.

In any case, I’m not going to argue with you that rape is wrong. Although both of us agreeing to that statement together with every other reasonable person agreeing with it does not make it a fact otherwise all statements to which everyone agreed would be a fact, which is patently absurd.

But if we discuss other moral problems, you make a statement and I disagree, then how are we to decide who is right? I will give my opinion and you yours. If you want to qualify your statement to make your point (it is wrong if…), then it cannot be a fact.

 

[Usagi]

As for the notion that moral facts must always be qualified, that’s just not true. “Rape is wrong.” Always. Period. End of story. No qualifications.

While I agree completely, I assure you that there exist people who would not accept that as a moral fact – and even more who would insist on qualifiers.

That does make the statement unlike “the keys are on the table” (when the keys are verifiably there or not). It is also unlike “green is prettier than blue,” I would argue, but there is reason not to put it in the same category as a completely factual statement.

Usagi

 

[St_Francis]

Firstly, I think we should distinguish between two types of moral relativism. There is what I will call the “descriptive” kind and the “prescriptive” kind. The descriptive relativism basically says that every society has its own distinct culture and that the prevailing morality of that society depends on its culture. That much is beyond dispute, I would say.

Prescriptive relativism takes that a step further and says that societies should be allowed to conduct themselves in accordance with their respective moralities. So the “application” of prescriptive relativism–that is, what it’s supposed to do for the world–is to grant societies the autonomy to enforce their own views at the expense of, say, an intercultural agreement of morality.

Well, since you do not advocate either of these, I won’t argue about them (altho I think you might have used the wrong word for the latter).

I am not a relativist in the above sense. I have moral views that, ideally, I believe every culture should adopt. That is, I see morality as a sort of tool and I feel everyone should coordinate their efforts and use it in the same way.

This begs the question: Why *your *way? Why not my way? Why not the Aztecs’s way? On what basis would we decide among them?

I wouldn’t call my position “moral absolutism”, because absolutists are known for claiming morality is objective in a way that I would not.

If there is no basis for determing right from wrong, then what’s the point? For example, if a fox kills my neighbor’s chickens, he’lll be bummed out, but he won’t feel *wronged. *But if I kill my neighbor’s chickens, he will feel wronged. But if it’s just a matter of differing opinions, what’s the problem? Why does he feel a totally different way when I do it?

(Not that I would do that…)

An absolutist wouldn’t stop at saying morality is determined by the application;

I think there are nuances in what a moral absolutist would (or ought to) say which this way of putting it overlooks.

they would insist there is a “correct” application.

Please forgive me for not sticking this back up with the rest of the sentence. It’s practically impossible. The preceding comment should be here

 

[Prodigal_Son]

That’s pretty much where the article leads. Otherwise he is saying that some things are just wrong because they are wrong because…well, why? Because all reasonable people would agree? Does that make it a fact? No it doesn’t. So if he wants to tell us that there are moral facts, then how come he doesn’t tell us how we discover these?

Because ontology is different from epistemology.

But if you like, study the field of ethics. Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Epicurus, Bentham, Mill, Kant, and Parfit all have theories of moral facts, none of which depend on God. Augustine, Aquinas, Anscombe, and others have theories of moral facts which do depend on God. This is not fringe philosophy.

Ah, so we need no process to differentiate moral opinions from moral facts.

Opinions exist in the mind. Facts do not. An opinion is correct if a fact corresponds to it. That’s the way all philosophers use the word “fact” and “opinion”. If you disagree with such usage, please define what you mean by the terms.

What you are actually saying above is a qualified statement in itself. That causing harm is wrong in certain circumstances. That’s precisely what rape is.

No, rape is not “causing harm in certain circumstances”, especially since rape doesn’t always involve harm. Rape is “forcing someone else to have sex.”

In any case, I’m not going to argue with you that rape is wrong. Although both of us agreeing to that statement together with every other reasonable person agreeing with it does not make it a fact otherwise all statements to which everyone agreed would be a fact, which is patently absurd.

No one here claimed that popular opinion made truth.

But if we discuss other moral problems, you make a statement and I disagree, then how are we to decide who is right?

Similar problems exist if we try to compare various scientific theories of the same phenomenon. Moreover, some scientific theories (string theory, multiverse theory) are in principle unprovable. Nevertheless they are intelligent theories that might be true.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

While I agree completely, I assure you that there exist people who would not accept that as a moral fact – and even more who would insist on qualifiers.

Sure. And insofar as they believe rape is morally permissible, they have a bad moral system.

That does make the statement unlike “the keys are on the table” (when the keys are verifiably there or not). It is also unlike “green is prettier than blue,” I would argue, but there is reason not to put it in the same category as a completely factual statement.

What’s your definition of a “fact”?

 

[dmar198]

Plato, Aristotle, Epictetus, Epicurus, Bentham, Mill, Kant, and Parfit all have theories of moral facts, none of which depend on God.

I’m not really sure that’s true in the case of Plato and Aristotle, but in the non-divine moral systems that I’ve looked at, it seems to me that they are all based on assertions without evidence. For example, if I understand Kant’s categorical imperative correctly, with no evidence he asserts that there is a fundamental moral imperative that everyone ought to follow: do whatever would be good if everybody did it.

If I’ve summarized his moral theory correctly, it seems to assert a major premise without evidence: that his theory really is a moral imperative. I also think there is a problematic undefined word at the hear of his theory: the word “good.” I think this makes his theory beg the question, unless my summary misses something. Isn’t objectively defining good behavior very nearly the same as objectively defining what people ought to do? If they are nearly synonymous, then it seems circular to objectively define what people ought to do by telling them to do good. You haven’t told them what good is, and if it is left undefined, it seems open to the same relativist objections that are at the heart of this discussion.

As for Mill, IIRC his theory is that we ought to do whatever gives the most pleasure to the most people. But like Kant, I don’t think Mill gives any evidence that this really is a moral imperative.

It’s the is/ought problem. How do you overcome the is/ought problem without God? With God, you can say, there is really certain logical proof that God exists, that His will really is good, that it really is a moral imperative to do His will, and that His moral will can be known through creation. That’s the only way I know to bridge the is/ought gap. Do non-divine philosophies even claim to be able to do that? Because I don’t think they can.

 

[Prodigal_Son]

I’m not really sure that’s true in the case of Plato and Aristotle, but in the non-divine moral systems that I’ve looked at, it seems to me that they are all based on assertions without evidence.

God played no meaningful role in Plato or Aristotle’s ethics. Nor does God play much of an active role in many deeply Christian understandings of ethics – e.g. the view of Alistair McIntyre.

For example, if I understand Kant’s categorical imperative correctly, with no evidence he asserts that there is a fundamental moral imperative that everyone ought to follow: do whatever would be good if everybody did it.

That is a complete misrepresentation, actually. Kant says that rational activity entails ascribing an equal value to all rational agents, and that this involves the refusal to encroach upon another person’s autonomy. He derives a moral imperative from the nature of rationality.

As for Mill, IIRC his theory is that we ought to do whatever gives the most pleasure to the most people. But like Kant, I don’t think Mill gives any evidence that this really is a moral imperative.

He certainly gives evidence of an equal sort of weight and value as the sort of evidence we give in arguments about religion. Obviously, that’s not the same type of evidence as scientific evidence.

It’s the is/ought problem. How do you overcome the is/ought problem without God?

Anscombe answers this perfectly. See her essay “Modern Moral Philosophy”. Consider the word “owes”. If I lend you $100, isn’t it clear that you owe me $100? But then, we’ve just derived an “owes” statement from an “is” statement. We do basically the same thing when we derive “ought” statements from “is” statements.

With God, you can say, there is really certain logical proof that God exists, that His will really is good, that it really is a moral imperative to do His will, and that His moral will can be known through creation. That’s the only way I know to bridge the is/ought gap. Do non-divine philosophies even claim to be able to do that? Because I don’t think they can.

Where does this moral imperative to do His will come from? You seem to have pulled it out of thin air. Why SHOULD I do what God says?

Even in “divine ethics”, you have to derive “ought” from “is”.

 

[Oreoracle]

Why should any culture adopt your moral views? Are they inherently better than others?

“Better” translates to “more good”. Since one’s moral views account for what they believe to be good, asking whether certain moral views are better than others is like asking “is one conception of good more good than another conception of good”. It’s a completely nonsensical question. It’s like asking if wetness is wet.

Conceptions of good are not good in themselves; they determine what is good relative to that conception. To suppose otherwise is to treat moral codes like moral agents, labelling some “good” and others “evil”. You would have to have a morality of moralities, which is either trivial or nonsensical depending on what you take that to mean.

Why should anyone follow that morality if you don’t claim it is correct? If I want to do X and think I can get away with it, the statement “that is unappealing in our collective opinion” doesn’t seem to hold persuasive power. But if I grow up hearing that it is wrong and objectively verifiable reasons why, that does seem to hold persuasive power. What am I missing?

It’s easy to see for yourself that any moral is based on a subjective notion of value that cannot be objectively verified. Take any action that you would prohibit, and ask why it is wrong. Then for any justification you give, ask why that is the case. Rinse and repeat.

For example, let’s take the moral “killing innocent humans is wrong”. Why is it wrong? I assume the Christian would answer roughly as follows: “It’s wrong because human life has inherent value. Why does human life have inherent value? Because God dictates that we have inherent value. Why does it matter what God says? Because he is the arbiter of morality.”

But why is he the arbiter of morality? This is as far as Christian morality can take us, because God is defined to be the arbiter of morality from the outset. The assertion takes various forms. Some say he is perfect, or maximally great, or Goodness itself, but it all boils down to the same assumption, namely that goodness is defined to be whatever God approves of. Thus God’s approval is valued in itself, and nothing can objectively verify that valuation. It’s simply taken as axiomatic. Someone could very well agree with you on every fact of reality and disagree on defining goodness in that manner.

This begs the question: Why *your *way? Why not my way? Why not the Aztecs’s way? On what basis would we decide among them?

While that’s an interesting question, I think it’s beyond the scope of this thread. Why a moral view is chosen is not an ethical question, but a psychological question. It’s analogous to the difference between asking why something is true and why someone believes something is true.

I think there are nuances in what a moral absolutist would (or ought to) say which this way of putting it overlooks.

Such as? I’ve never met a single absolutist who would hesitate to say that there is a “correct” morality. That is essentially their entire thesis.

 

[Charlemagne_III]

But moral questions need qualifiers, so they are not facts. If you say that killing is wrong, you have to qualify it for the statement to make any sense: ‘Killing is wrong if…’ It needs a conditional clause and therefore cannot be described as a fact. But this is what McBrayer suggests. He implies that the statement: ‘killing a cartoonist is wrong’ is a moral fact when it is simply a statement that is true for all reasonable people.

If you say that it is wrong because all reasonable people believe it to be so, then we’re in very dangerous territory. If you say it’s wrong despite what anyone believes, then without recourse to religion, how do we know?

Why is it dangerous territory when all reasonable people believe an act to be wrong?

In a democracy, the majority should rule. If all reasonable people agree that an act is wrong, and establish a law against that act, that seems to be the only way to go. The alternative is to sit down and let unreasonable people rule, much as the Nazis ruled in Germany.

Without recourse to religion we still know that an act is wrong if we follow the natural law, which is universal, as opposed to the positive law, which is particular. The question remains: what exactly is the natural law? It is whatever all reasonable men agree it is. For example, all reasonable men agree that the sexual exploitation of children is wrong. This is not an “if” question. It is a universal proposition with absolute merit. Likewise concerning many of our laws, such as laws against murder, rape, and theft. It is not entering dangerous territory that such laws should exist and that the vast majority of reasonable men should be look to as the authority for such laws.

 

[St_Francis]

…

While that’s an interesting question, I think it’s beyond the scope of this thread. Why a moral view is chosen is not an ethical question, but a psychological question. It’s analogous to the difference between asking why something is true and why someone believes something is true.

Why is it that a person can say, upon hearing some bizarre tale, “there ought to be a law…” Why do we care that extremists are shooting up journalists, executing innocents, selling girls into sexual slavery… *Why do we care? *

Such as? I’ve never met a single absolutist who would hesitate to say that there is a “correct” morality. That is essentially their entire thesis.

Oh, I agree, absolutely I was responding to your saying: “An absolutist wouldn’t stop at saying morality is determined by the application; they would insist there is a ‘correct’ application.” By which I thought you meant that even moral absolutists were subjective in their application of morality. Actually I may have misunderstood what you were saying there.