Title of article: Why Our Children Don't Think There are Moral Facts

[St_Francis]

To be clear, a statement is not an “is” statement just because it contains that word. “Killing innocent human beings is wrong” is another way of saying “it ought not be the case that innocent human beings are killed”. It’s a “ought” statement that is dressed up to sound factual.

I would define a fact as being something that is true. You seem to me to be leaning towards the idea that a fact is something which is empirically true, or something which can be empiracally proven.

As a result of these different definitions, istm that we are missing something.

I would say that there are moral truths which are true, even tho not empirically or semantically provable, because, like geometry, they are axioms. And the fact (for lack of a better word) that moral truths are not *empirically *provable does not mean they are not true.

I would say they are facts because they are bits items of information, but I understand that you may be using a different definition and that may be the source of disagreement.

Or perhaps there’s just a grammatical reason for preferring the “is” phrasing. People generally prefer using the active voice, and “is” achieves that nicely, whereas the “ought” phrasing sounds awkward (though I think it makes the meaning clearer).

I do think all this may simply be sematic wordplay as a function of a bunch of people trying to get out from under moral obligations (referring to the “Enlightenment” thinkers…).

Notice, on the other hand, that a true “is” statement cannot possibly be translated as an “ought” statement. “My eye color is blue” has no such translation, for example.

To me this does not mean that the statement is not true.

 

[St_Francis]

I would define a fact as being something that is true. You seem to me to be leaning towards the idea that a fact is something which is empirically true, or something which can be empiracally proven.

As a result of these different definitions, istm that we are missing something.

I would say that there are moral truths which are true, even tho not empirically or semantically provable, because, like geometry, they are axioms. And the fact (for lack of a better word) that moral truths are not *empirically *provable does not mean they are not true.

I would say they are facts because they are bits items of information, but I understand that you may be using a different definition and that may be the source of disagreement.

I do think all this may simply be sematic wordplay as a function of a bunch of people trying to get out from under moral obligations (ETA: meaning the Enlightenment thinkers, not you).

To me this does not mean that the statement is not true.

 

[edwest2]

For some, morality does not exist except for a few possible exceptions like rape or murder, but we still have people who rape and murder (most murders are committed by people who know the victim), so we are left with science which doesn’t help much.

So based on the “fact” criteria, morality is a moving target. It’s not. Time to ignore that. Let’s remember that children are being born all the time. Where do they get their sense of right and wrong? Or do we try to impose the idea that right and wrong don’t exist? Fortunately, we have thousands of years of human history, religious and not, to examine. The end.

For kids, the world has to be pretty black and white. “This is wrong and here’s why. If you do that wrong thing there will be negative consequences.” Period. But gradually, due to a decades long marketing plan, the split second you become an adult you automatically gain powers and abilities you didn’t have two seconds ago. Wrong. If it was wrong when you were a kid, it’s still wrong when you’re an adult, not this “ADULTS ONLY” manure that has been spread far and wide, followed by the “consenting adults” perversion.

The whole thing better be consistent across the board or you end up with a broken society and whoever can get a law passed wins. Wins what?

Death for the unborn.
Death to families.
Death to real relationships.
Death to civil speech and behavior.
Death to realizing shame, guilt and sin even exist.
Death to the truth that your life is not your own.

Otherwise, you end up with ‘radical individualism’ as referred to by Pope Benedict, which results in tribalism. The remedy? Teach your kids the truth. Tell them that death is bad and living right is good, and leads to life. Tell them them to reject the bad and why.

If not, you end up with mediocrity. A society that degrades and has no standards. When you have no standards, there is no ideal to live up to. And there is no “failure.” Why commit to any standard? Why commit at all - with the exception of your job?

Ed

 

[PseuTonym]

For kids, the world has to be pretty black and white. “This is wrong and here’s why. If you do that wrong thing there will be negative consequences.” Period.

Wouldn’t that teach kids to not get caught, rather than to do no wrong? I think that one needs to win hearts and minds, because the alternative is perpetual, external enforcement.

A society that degrades and has no standards. When you have no standards, there is no ideal to live up to. And there is no “failure.”

Nobody wants to fail. There is no moral issue there. Given the options of possibly succeeding via cheating, or inevitably failing via not cheating, there is a moral judgment to be made.

 

[Oreoracle]

When you said that you cannot derive, and that it should be reducible to, were you referring to causation, and not to logical consequence?

I am referring to logical consequence. Specifically, ought statements are never logically implied if only is statements are used as premises. That is what I mean by saying that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is”. To get an ought, you must begin with at least one ought as an axiom.

Morality fails to be objective in that sense, because the morality you get depends on which moral axioms you choose, and there’s no way for you to prove that your axioms are better than mine. “Better” is a moral term, so you need a morality to make such an inference, which means you need to assume your moral axioms before making that declaration. Thus saying your own axioms are better would be a circular argument. It would amount to saying that you’re correct because you’re correct.

I would say that there are moral truths which are true, even tho not empirically or semantically provable, because, like geometry, they are axioms. And the fact (for lack of a better word) that moral truths are not *empirically *provable does not mean they are not true.

Okay, so we agree that morality depends on moral axioms. What do you think of my response to PseuTonym above?

 

[edwest2]

Wouldn’t that teach kids to not get caught, rather than to do no wrong? I think that one needs to win hearts and minds, because the alternative is perpetual, external enforcement.

Nobody wants to fail. There is no moral issue there. Given the options of possibly succeeding via cheating, or inevitably failing via not cheating, there is a moral judgment to be made.

Some years back, some expert decided he was on to something. So at the end of a Little League game (I watched this part on TV), both sides got trophies. The premise was that if you damaged a child’s sense of self-worth, he would remain damaged. That was one reason I stopped watching a lot of TV. When kids are led to believe this sort of thing, then what happens when they get a real job and the boss is not happy with their performance? How is that Little League nonsense going to help them cope?

Ed

 

[edwest2]

Wouldn’t that teach kids to not get caught, rather than to do no wrong? I think that one needs to win hearts and minds, because the alternative is perpetual, external enforcement.

Nobody wants to fail. There is no moral issue there. Given the options of possibly succeeding via cheating, or inevitably failing via not cheating, there is a moral judgment to be made.

Regarding your first paragraph. I trusted my parents. I believed they loved me and wanted the best for me so I just didn’t do the bad thing. On a few occasions, I did do a few not specifically spelled out bad things and got spanked or got a slap across the back of the head. It got easier not to do the bad things because my friends told me they had the same rules and similar punishments. We didn’t want to do bad because God was watching. We were developing a conscience where right and wrong meant something and did not require eternal enforcement. God was watching me then and He’s watching me today.

Ed

 

[PseuTonym]

I am referring to logical consequence. Specifically, ought statements are never logically implied if only is statements are used as premises. That is what I mean by saying that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is”. To get an ought, you must begin with at least one ought as an axiom.

Morality fails to be objective in that sense, because the morality you get depends on which moral axioms you choose, and there’s no way for you to prove that your axioms are better than mine.

You have not shown that such an embarrassment of riches occurs. Maybe we encounter the opposite problem: nobody being able to propose a system of axioms for morality. In practice, that seems to be the situation. Two corporations do not agree on a system of axioms of morality prior to doing business with each other. They are stuck with the law, which relies upon judgments rather than proofs. An anonymously written proof is just as effective as a proof that includes an author’s name. However, an anonymous judgment posted online would have no legal significance even if the facts of a court case were not in dispute.

The claim that morality fails to be objective is simply not persuasive, since a similar argument could be made that number theory is not objective. We can imagine having different and conflicting systems of axioms for number theory. In practice, we do not seem to run into such a problem.

Furthermore, there is something fundamentally wrong with the notion that we adopt as dogma some system of axioms, and that we can say nothing about how the axioms were developed, why we are committed to accepting them, and why we refuse to accept any proposed alternative.

 

[Bradski]

Furthermore, there is something fundamentally wrong with the notion that we adopt as dogma some system of axioms, and that we can say nothing about how the axioms were developed, why we are committed to accepting them, and why we refuse to accept any proposed alternative.

Axioms, by definition, are the basic building blocks from which we can develop a set of rules. They have to be a simple as possible without qualification and based on definitions with which we all agree. You cannot say that the shortest distance between two points is a straight line if…or unless… (assuming we’re talking Euclidian geometry). In other words, it is true in all cases at all times in all circumstances without further qualification assuming that your definition of straight line and point is the same as mine.

So what could a moral axiom be without an agreed definition or qualification? Do not kill? Well that is not true in all cases. The definition isn’t a problem but it needs qualification - kill in what circumstances? Do not steal? Again, not true in all cases. How about something as basic as possible: ’ Do no wrong’. Well, we’d need to agree on the definition of ‘wrong’ in this case before we can even begin.

So what is a moral axiom?

 

[PseuTonym]

Axioms …] have to be …] without qualification and based on definitions with which we all agree.

Are you saying that
#1 an axiom – as it is stated – must be true without any later addition of qualifications?

or

#2 The statement of an axiom must never include anything that you consider to be a qualification?

If you are saying #2, then perhaps you could clarify how you decide whether or not a statement includes a qualification.

For example,

1. Every non-empty set of positive integers has a smallest element.
   I specified “non-empty.” Is that a qualification, or not?
2. Every non-zero real number has a multiplicative inverse.
   I specified “non-zero.” Is that a qualification, or not?

Of course, it would be possible to create a definition and put all qualifications in the definition, and then rely upon the definition in formulating an axiom.

 

[Bradski]

Are you saying that
#1 an axiom – as it is stated – must be true without any later addition of qualifications?
or
#2 The statement of an axiom must never include anything that you consider to be a qualification?

If you are saying #2, then perhaps you could clarify how you decide whether or not a statement includes a qualification.

For example,

1. Every non-empty set of positive integers has a smallest element.
   I specified “non-empty.” Is that a qualification, or not?
2. Every non-zero real number has a multiplicative inverse.
   I specified “non-zero.” Is that a qualification, or not?

It’s both 1 and 2. They are not mutually exclusive.

As regards #1, an axiom must be true without any additional qualification because it cannot be qualified and remain an axiom. It must be self-evidently true as it stands.

As regards #2, you are correct in that it must not contain a qualification in the first instance. And you have not added a qualification in either of your examples. The clause: ‘Every non-empty set of positive integers’ is meaningless in itself. It cannot be an axiom because it is not a self-evident truth – it says nothing that could be considered true or false. Adding ‘has a smallest element’ is not a qualification but an integral part of the axiom itself.

If you were to say: ‘Every non-empty set of positive integers has a smallest element if…’ then whatever comes after the ‘if’ is a qualification. ‘The shortest distance between two points’ is similarly a meaningless statement but the addition of: ‘ is a straight line’ makes it an axiom. Were you to say: ‘The shortest distance between two points is a straight line if…’ then you are qualifying it and it is no longer an axiom.

Now consider what might be described as a basic moral axiom: ’Do not kill’. It is not self-evidently true without qualification – there are occasions when it is acceptable so it cannot be an axiom.

Even what we might consider to be a moral absolute: ‘It is wrong to rape’ is actually a qualified statement in itself. You are taking what might be considered a basic moral axiom: ‘Do no harm’ and qualifying it with any number of separate clauses. ‘Do no harm IF it consists of either physical or mental harm and IF it consists of a sexual act and IF the sexual act is not consensual even IF the person has not disagreed with it but IF he or she would have objected IF being in a position to make a decision.

There are no moral axioms.

 

[St_Francis]

I am referring to logical consequence. Specifically, ought statements are never logically implied if only is statements are used as premises. That is what I mean by saying that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is”. To get an ought, you must begin with at least one ought as an axiom.

Morality fails to be objective in that sense, because the morality you get depends on which moral axioms you choose, and there’s no way for you to prove that your axioms are better than mine. “Better” is a moral term, so you need a morality to make such an inference, which means you need to assume your moral axioms before making that declaration. Thus saying your own axioms are better would be a circular argument. It would amount to saying that you’re correct because you’re correct.

Okay, so we agree that morality depends on moral axioms. What do you think of my response to PseuTonym above?

I wrote a response and decided to re-write it but in the meantime, I tripped over a question:

How is saying “you can’t derive an ought statement from an is statement?” not an ought statment? Because of course one *can *say, This is a deisel car, and derive, One ought to use only deisel fuel in it, so the can’t in your sentence is really a mayn’t, no?

 

[Oreoracle]

The claim that morality fails to be objective is simply not persuasive, since a similar argument could be made that number theory is not objective. We can imagine having different and conflicting systems of axioms for number theory. In practice, we do not seem to run into such a problem.

As I said earlier in the thread, morality can be objective with respect to a certain set of axioms, just as number theory can. However, there is no “objectively correct” set of axioms. Any attempt to argue otherwise invokes circular reasoning.

As for the prevalence of one set of axioms for number theory, I think you’re playing a semantics game here. Number theory is the study of the natural numbers which are defined as members of a set satisfying certain axioms, so of course we have little choice about possible systems, since, if you changed the system too much, you’d no longer be dealing with natural numbers.

There are many different types of number systems in use, however. So the problem you mention is only nominal, as people do in fact dabble with axioms quite a lot.

How is saying “you can’t derive an ought statement from an is statement?” not an ought statment? Because of course one *can *say, This is a deisel car, and derive, One ought to use only deisel fuel in it, so the can’t in your sentence is really a mayn’t, no?

I disagree. We cannot derive that one ought to use deisel fuel without another moral to work with. We can only say that the car will not function as it was intended without deisel fuel.

To derive the moral that you ought to use deisel fuel, you would have to argue that one ought to be able to drive (or something to that effect). So again, you needed an original moral to fall back on.

 

[St_Francis]

As I said earlier in the thread, morality can be objective with respect to a certain set of axioms, just as number theory can. However, there is no “objectively correct” set of axioms. Any attempt to argue otherwise invokes circular reasoning.

As for the prevalence of one set of axioms for number theory, I think you’re playing a semantics game here. Number theory is the study of the natural numbers which are defined as members of a set satisfying certain axioms, so of course we have little choice about possible systems, since, if you changed the system too much, you’d no longer be dealing with natural numbers.

There are many different types of number systems in use, however. So the problem you mention is only nominal, as people do in fact dabble with axioms quite a lot.

I disagree. We cannot derive that one ought to use deisel fuel without another moral to work with. We can only say that the car will not function as it was intended without deisel fuel.

To derive the moral that you ought to use deisel fuel, you would have to argue that one ought to be able to drive (or something to that effect). So again, you needed an original moral to fall back on.

What would your definition of a moral be?

 

[Oreoracle]

What would your definition of a moral be?

Morals can take many forms, and I guess the best way to illustrate my usage is by example. So for example, I would consider all of the following to be more or less equivalent:

1. Donating to charity is good.
2. One should donate to charity.
3. Charities are valuable.
4. Donating to charity is the right thing to do.

The trend here is that, in each of these statements, a prescription is being made explicitly or implicitly for people to donate to charity. These are essentially requests for people to behave in a certain fashion. Notice that none of the facts pertaining to charity are elaborated upon. As such, two different people could assert each of these four claims and mean very different things by them. Perhaps one person approves of charities because they wish to help the homeless, while another may be an executive of a not-so-non-profit charity and wish to line their pockets.

 

[St_Francis]

…I disagree. We cannot derive that one ought to use deisel fuel without another moral to work with. We can only say that **the car will not function as it was intended without deisel fuel. **

To derive the moral that you ought to use deisel fuel, you would have to argue that one ought to be able to drive (or something to that effect). So again, you needed an original moral to fall back on.

OK, I thought maybe my lack of understanding of what you are saying here came about because we had different ideas of what a moral is. But what you wrote back was about moral statements, so I see I asked the wrong question about what you meant.

But maybe the crux of this entire issue is in the part I bolded: the car will not function as intended without deisel fuel.

I think that maybe you will never be able to convince me, as I will never be able to convince you, through discussions of this type because of our differences regarding that particular statement.

I see your statement as an analogy for all creation, because I believe in a Creator Who had intentions. Morals are the directions, so to speak, of how to make this world “work.” Behaving immorally is like putting sugar in the gas tank.

I believe that with natural knowledge we can come to even quite a lot of understanding of how to best maintain the world, because we are “programmed” to know that we have a purpose, and we are programmed to understand how to treat people at least in relation to ourselves.

I might try saying that morals have to do with the nature of things. Well, things as opposed to people would be by analogy or maybe minor morals, while dealing with people would be major morals.

Itt would go against the nature of a deisel car to use it as a decoration in a front yard, right? It would fulfill the nature of the deisel car to use it to transport 1–4 persons, right? And it would violate the nature of a deisel car to use something other than deisel to run it.

In the same way, there are ways to treat people which align with the nature of people, and to treat them in a way outside of that would be harmful to their human nature.

And we can know these things by how we expect others to treat us or those close to us under similar circumstances. We do not want others to steal from us, so that would be wrong, just as adding 2 and 2 and getting 5 is wrong. The effects of each “wrong” vary greatly in intensity, but each is going against the nature of the (grammatical) object.

But one might say, I wouldn’t want someone to tell me something bad about myself, but we ourselves might see the need for someone else to know something bad about themselves, or the need of others to behave better, no? So we can see that sometimes it is the better thing to do, to help others to fulfill their own nature by not hurting the nature of others.

Anyway, having set all this out, I think you might be able to see why I think there are indeed moral truths which we all can know, and why I think that defining the word fact in a way which excludes truths other than those perceptible by human physical senses and then ignoring the existence of other truths is disingenuous at best.

 

[PseuTonym]

defining the word fact in a way which excludes truths other than those perceptible by human physical senses and then ignoring the existence of other truths

I don’t think that anybody is going to claim to hold such a position, because it is too weak. Maybe this deserves a separate thread. You could put forward that position for consideration, not as something that you believe, but as something that somebody might believe.

Then we can look for the simplest and clearest examples of problems with that position. We can formulate questions for anybody who might hold that position. Somebody might take the devil’s advocate position and attempt to do what will be very difficult: give plausible answers to those questions.

 

[Bradski]

And we can know these things by how we expect others to treat us or those close to us under similar circumstances. We do not want others to steal from us, so that would be wrong…

Morality in a nutshell.

 

[PseuTonym]

As regards #2, you are correct in that it must not contain a qualification in the first instance. And you have not added a qualification in either of your examples.

If you were to say: ‘Every non-empty set of positive integers has a smallest element if…’ then whatever comes after the ‘if’ is a qualification.

Does the following statement contain a qualification in the first instance?

For any variables k, m, and n, where each has a value that is a positive integer,
(2 to the power of k) is not equal to (3 to the power of m) plus (5 to the power of n) if k is less than or equal to m and k is less than or equal to n.

It seems rather obvious that the statement is true.

For example:

8 = 3 + 5, but here k = 3 and m = 1 so we don’t have k less than or equal to m.

32 = 27 + 5, but here k = 5 and m = 3 so we don’t have k less than or equal to m.

128 = 3 + 125, but here k = 7 and n = 3 so we don’t have k less than or equal to n.

 

[Oreoracle]

Morals are the directions, so to speak, of how to make this world “work.” Behaving immorally is like putting sugar in the gas tank.

Okay, but that’s not enough to infer that we should do as God says. You still have to assume that the intended purpose of the universe is good, or, in line with our analogy, that the intended purpose of the car is good. Some things, like nuclear weapons, do not have good purposes. So attaching a purpose to something doesn’t necessarily imbue it with moral value.

Now you may argue that the purpose of nuclear weapons isn’t good because it contradicts God’s own purposes for the world, but then you have to address why God’s purposes are somehow more “special” than our purposes. Christians typically just take that as axiomatic.

It would go against the nature of a deisel car to use it as a decoration in a front yard, right? It would fulfill the nature of the deisel car to use it to transport 1–4 persons, right? And it would violate the nature of a deisel car to use something other than deisel to run it.

I would prefer to use “purpose” or “intention” rather than “nature”. We create tools with the intention of using them to achieve some goal. I see that as a mundane thing, and nothing metaphysical or spooky like “nature” needs to be invoked to explain it.