“Better” translates to “more good”. Since one’s moral views account for what they believe to be good, asking whether certain moral views are better than others is like asking “is one conception of good more good than another conception of good”.
Agreed.
It’s a completely nonsensical question. It’s like asking if wetness is wet.
I don’t think it’s nonsense. As an example, I think Martin Luther King Jr.'s conception of good is better than Hitler’s conception of good. Do you think that’s a nonsense statement? Because if you think it is, then it seems to follow that you think MLKJ and Hitler had morally equivalent conceptions of good. But I doubt you think that, so what am I missing?
Conceptions of good are not good in themselves; they determine what is good relative to that conception.
Do you mean that MLKJ’s view, that racial equality is good, is not a good view in itself? And that Hitler’s view of racial supremacy is not bad in itself?
To suppose otherwise is to treat moral codes like moral agents, labelling some “good” and others “evil”.
I don’t think that moral agents are the only things that can be good and bad.
You would have to have a morality of moralities, which is either trivial or nonsensical depending on what you take that to mean.
I don’t think it’s trivial because I think one’s view of the goodness or badness of various moral theories has world-changing consequences, and I don’t think it’s nonsense because I think we can validly defend the view that Hitler’s morality was bad and that MLKJ’s is better. But that’s what I think. What do you think?
It’s easy to see for yourself that any moral is based on a subjective notion of value that cannot be objectively verified. Take any action that you would prohibit, and ask why it is wrong. Then for any justification you give, ask why that is the case. Rinse and repeat.
Okay. Let me number the steps for easier citation:
- I think murder is wrong because I think murder violates human dignity, 2. which I think we ought not to violate, 3. because I think it is a creation of God, 4. which I think we ought to respect, 5. out of respect for God, 6. Whom I think we ought to respect because I think respect is part of creation, 7. which I think belongs to God, 8. because I think God created everything that has being, 9. which I think because of the traditional arguments for the existence of God, 10. which I think are logical certitudes.
I think the movement from is to ought comes in steps 6-7 and is perfectly defensible.
Why does human life have inherent value? Because God dictates that we have inherent value. Why does it matter what God says? Because he is the arbiter of morality."
But why is he the arbiter of morality? This is as far as Christian morality can take us
I think my explanation is different from and more defensible than this explanation.
Thus God’s approval is valued in itself, and nothing can objectively verify that valuation.
I think we can verify that God’s will is goodness itself if we can verify that moral values exist. If I could formulate that as a logical argument, I think it would look like this:
- If moral values exist, then God is maximally good.
- Moral values exist.
- Therefore, God is maximally good.
To defend #1, I think we could infer the “then” statement by using St. Thomas Aquinas’ argument that God is being itself. This argument involves identifying God’s essence with His existence, and inferring that all other real things are participants in the divine existence. If good is a real thing, and evil is a negation, it seems to follow from this argument that God’s nature is maximally good.
To defend the second premise, one reason I think we can verify that moral values exist is because I think the alternative reduces to absurdity. For example, I think the view that there are no moral values results in the view that Hitler and MLKJ had morally equivalent viewpoints, which I think is absurd.