uncaused cause

[JPrejean]

Your own quotation of St. Thomas’s argument belies the error (although it would be clearer if your translator hadn’t played fast and loose with the dynamic sense of the Latin). He states that “We do not, and cannot, find that something is its own efficient cause — for, if something were its own efficient cause, it would be prior to itself, which is impossible.” This is a statement of logical impossibility, and it is based on the absurdity of a thing being prior to itself (an effect preceding its cause), which implicitly assumes that all things have an efficient cause. And indeed, no effect with a physical cause ever precedes its cause in our observation. Even your example of a quantum fluctuation is a causeless thing, and not a thing that causes itself. Thus, even the example you have selected would not be a counter-example to defeat this argument, because it does not show an effect preceding its cause.

So it all comes back to the same thing that I have repeated again and again: does a physically causeless thing logically demonstrate that metaphysical causation is false? Obviously, it does not, and therefore, you have not demonstrated that St. Thomas’s axiom of metaphysical causation is false.

hecd2:

Don’t be insulting. Of course I know what an efficient cause is and I know how it differs from the other causes defined by Aristotle. Do you?

I’m not insulting you; I am objectively describing the state of your knowledge. Evidently, you do not understand what an efficient cause is. You said (incorrectly):

hecd2:

You seem to fail to understand the very elementary point that Aquinas is arguing from what we observe - his basic premise is that in all the observations of our senses things have efficient causes. That might have been true in his day and was true up to about 1920, but it is no longer true.

You seem to miss the even more elementary point that causation is not derived from those observations in St. Thomas’s argument; it’s an axiom. Furthermore, even the existence of a thing without a physical cause wouldn’t shown either what St. Thomas calls an impossibility (an effect preceding its cause) or even speak to the issue of efficient causes at all. Read up again on efficient causes: radicalacademy.com/studentrefphil6j.htm

hecd2:

It is this argument, that quite clearly starts from the observations of our senses and seeks to create a logical argument that concludes that God exists, that is invalidated by more recent observations of our senses.

Actually, it starts from the assumption about our ability to deduce things from observations based on the principle of cause and effect, THEN forms a logical argument based on the observations themselves.

hecd2:

It is also logically flawed in that it rejects ab initio the idea that the causes can go back infinitely far

True, he didn’t prove it formally. But it turns out that the absurdity he intuitively discerned is true from the axiom of metaphysical causation by the kalam argument, so it matters little.

hecd2:

You are yet to state clearly what other aspects of Aquinas’s axiomatic system lying outside the premises and conclusions of this argument must be brought to bear and why that invalidates my challenge and saves his argument.

Well, now I have. If you want to argue that the existence of a physically causeless thing makes St. Thomas’s presumption of metaphysical causation dubious, be my guest. I’ve already considered that question’s examination in the debates between William Lane Craig and Oppy, Hawking, et al., and I came down on Craig’s side. But regardless, there is no logical flaw in St. Thomas’s argument starting from the principle of causation and moving based on observations to the existence of God.

 

[JPrejean]

hecd2:

To claim, regardless of the fact that the basic observational premise is now known to be at best questionable, that his argument survives metaphysically even if it fails physically is to replace logic with magic.

Anyone can make an claim that all things must have metaphysical causes whether or not they have physical causes, because such a claim is not subject to test or the rigours of observational correction. It is logically flawed because it begs the question with a premise that assumes the conclusion, and it is definitely not in the spirit of Aquinas’s argument. It is tantamount to introducing the step ‘then a miracle happens’ which is OK if you believe it but is not what Aquinas was seeking to do.

I think your credibility about what St. Thomas was and was not trying to do and what the “spirit” of his argument was has been sufficiently established. First, the notion of causation was not a “basic observational premise” or even an observational premise at all in St. Thomas’s argument. It was an axiom. Second, it’s completely irrelevant whether an axiom is “subject to test or the rigours of observational correction.” Indeed, by definition, it ordinarily cannot be; you either accept it or you don’t. St. Thomas’s argument doesn’t provide any proof of whether the axiom is true; it simply states the logical conclusions if you accept the axiom. Third, it doesn’t “beg the question” if your argument isn’t addressed to people who are skeptical about the axiom. Since St. Thomas made little or no effort to prove the axiom, we must assume that it was not. Fourth, St. Thomas appears to assume that people would not be skeptical about matters that would ordinarily be considered obvious to any thinking human being, despite the technical possibility to logically deny them (e.g., the reliability of one’s senses, the notion that objective reality exists outside of one’s mind, the proposition that other minds exist, etc.). I imagine that he would consider anyone who would seriously advocate being skeptical of metaphysical causation either perverse or irrational, and regardless, sufficiently foolish as to be beneath rational discussion. If you consider the mere acceptance of metaphysical causation (or indeed, metaphysical motion from potentiality to actuality) to be equivalent to positing some kind of miracle, then I must wonder how serious discussion with you is even possible.

 

[hecd2]

Philthy:

Hi Alec - thank you for taking the time to respond to my questions.

Particles are observed who’s origin science does not have the means to detect. This, of course, does not mean that they are uncaused in the absolute sense, only in the scientific realm. The observation simply becomes that science has observed particles for which it has no scientific expanation. We’re very close to demonstrating Acquinas’ original principal…

Dear Phil,

It’s not about our ability to predict but whether these phenomena are random, uncaused and so unpredictable in principle. We can carry out rather precise observations that demonstrate the underlying randomness of certain phenomena - the violation of Bell’s inequality is one for example. In the first premise of his second way, Aquinas is quite clear that he is basing this premise ‘on the world that we sense’: - it is in the nature of cosmological arguments that we argue from observation of the universe to the conclusion that there is a God. But if we are forced to rely in the very first step on some sort of invisible and undiscoverable elf with the supernatural ability to communicate faster than the speed of light, then we are entitled to doubt the value of the rest of the argument. We might as well say that God’s existence is self-evident and axiomatic and have done with all the rest of the tedious (and flawed) logic.

You haven’t explained how a temporally infinite universe exists along with our dynamic universe. If I’m not mistaken, your saying that time doesn’t exist within a temporally infinite universe? Isn’t time considered a reality in our universe?

There are two answers to this (one of which is a question ):
a) What lies north of the North Pole?
b) time is not absolute in our universe, although in GR the 3+1 metric of space-time is. There are several cosmological ideas that are compatible with an infinite universe. I have posted one of these before (the Andrei Linde hypothesis of chaotic inflation - that hypothesis describes a statistically stationary universe - it is not static, it changes over time, but statististically it always looks the same - it can always have been so and will always be so. Another idea is the Steady State universe of Hoyle, Bondi and Gold, subsequently refined by Narlikar and others. In fairness this idea has been in deep trouble since the discovery of the CMB, but it won’t quite lie down.

No alec. Again, you went from positing a temporally infinite “being” (with no necesarry relationship to time or matter) to a temporally infinite PHYSICAL universe. Your premise remains invalid. And, the ability to simply posit it mathmatically does not make it a reality.

I said that if we can posit an infinite being, there is no logical reason why we can’t posit an infinite universe. I see no telling objection from you. Time and space, the fundamental laws of physics, even how many dimensions we live in, are all features of this local universe and might be different ‘elsewhere’.

Here we are, engaged in a cosmological discussion, and you are asking me to believe that the idea of an infinite Being is more compelling than that of an infinite physical universe. That’s ironic, since sentient beings that we observe depend on the physical properties of the universe, not vice versa. What we observe is the contingency of sentience on pre-existing matter; and yet we think it is compelling to argue from the existence of the physical universe to a sentient being that is the cause of the universe. That’s odd.

Thanks again - I know it must be frustrating for you to try and convey even some of all that you’ve learned regarding physics etc. - it’s greatly appreciated.

Phil
Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Hermione:

Dear Alec,

Thank you for responding to my post.

Dear Hermione,

And you to mine

Let me summarize what we’ve arrived at so far to make sure that I have got it right.

---

The Universe either:

1. Existed forever, in which case God is unnecessary. This idea is supported by the existence of theories that are consistent with our observations and propose an infinite universe.
2. Did not exist forever, but had a definite beginning in time when:

A) It was caused by a first cause that could be God. This idea is supported by observations pointing to the existence of a causal chain, and also by theories without randomness that have the universe begin at a definite moment in time.
B) It began randomly as a quantum fluctuation of the vacuum SNIP

As far as I understand the “first cause” argument, it goes like this:

1. Things in the universe exist contingently in that they don’t have to exist this way but could be very different.
2. Since things don’t have to exist this way but do, there must be a reason for it. (This is the point that you think randomness invalidates, because if things are random then there’s no “reason” for them being the way they are, right?)
3. Since the whole universe is composed of things that exist contingently, it too must exist contingently.
4. Since the universe exists contingently, there is a reason (or a cause) for its existence.

Then the argument for a first and necessary cause is made because otherwise you have an infinite regress of causes, which would be a paradox because for the chain to exist something had to start it.

Tell me if I have got any of this wrong.​

This is a good summary - I could quibble with one or two details in the science but in principle this is accurate (Note there are several arguments for God in the class that is called 'Cosmological arguments - Aquinas makes two separate arguments - the uncaused cause argument and the Prime mover argument that are quite similar but different in detail.)

I guess the point I’d make is that as long as the universe doesn’t have to exist the way it does it raises the question of WHY it exists the way it does, and why it exists at all.

For me, a Godless universe would be a universe that NECESSARILY exists forever in a certain way. I think that as long as there is room for “why” there is room for God. And there is room for “why” as long as it doesn’t have to be the way it is.

It seems that there is plenty of room for “why” even in theories that suggest an infinite universe. I remember reading about how there could be many curved universes, but that our universe seems to be a very special case sitting on the cusp between positive and negative curvature. It seems that a perfectly flat universe is very improbable. To me this raises a “why.”

The point you make is that because there is so much observed randomness, the “why” isn’t an appropriate question to ask, correct?

Continued…

No - ‘why’ is a very important and very valuable question. We have to accept that there might be no satisfying metaphysical answer, but that doesn’t invalidate the question. It is a fascinating question of religion, philosophy and science. I am not arguing FOR a godless universe - I am arguing against the logical necessity of God and specifically Aquinas’s proof.

With the conditions in the universe you are touching on the anthropic argument - I would argue the weak version. (the flatness of the universe is explained by inflation by the way).

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Hermione:

I was thinking about randomness and had a very strange idea about how randomness is actually a case FOR God rather than against. I wonder what you’ll think!

What got me thinking this way is what you said about not confusing quantum uncertainty with a universe that is chaotic and arbitrary.

I really don’t know. In a very compelling sense the inductive argument you put forward here is more powerful than Aquinas’s failed attempt to establish a deductive proof. Why should the universe exist in a way that is at all predictable and amenable to reason? Why is the mass of the proton what it is and why does it have just that realtionship to themass of the z-boson? My answer is the weak anthropic principle.

And this brings me to the important point of free will. Do you believe that human beings have free will?

This is also a very tough question: I answered this as follows on another thread: “I wouldn’t want to think that everything that I do is predetermined - I have at least an illusion off free will that is very precious to me. The understanding of the universe pre-quantum would make it even more problematical. If we regard will as decision making then we have the possibility of some very complex fuzzy logic with some quantum effects underlying our experience of will. Roger Penrose has interesting things to say about this. He also has some ideas about quantum effects in micrrotubules that would make the brain more than a Turing machine. But the fact is that the science of consciousness is in its infancy and we just don’t know how it works. It remains one of the great tasks of science for the future. One thing is for sure: it is unhelpful to surrender before we start by declaring that consciousness, will and other mind phenomena are immaterial or supernatural and forever beyond the reach of natural explanation. Searle’s Chinese box paradox has been thoroughly debunked.”

And a final point, consciousness and free will seem to be very important in quantum mechanics as well. From what I know it is our conscious awareness of the measurement that finally collapses the wave-function. I don’t understand why this should be at all, because if the brain is a quantum system, why shouldn’t it just enter a state of superposition as well? And in fact when we try to study the wave function of the universe where there is no one to collapse it (unless God is observing it ) we do have all the possibilities existing at once and hence the many-worlds theory. It seems to me that quantum mechanics assigns a very special role to consciousness, but if consciousness is just a part of the material world, doesn’t it seem contradictory that it should have a special role?

This is the quantum measurement problem. The thinking on this that was first postulated by Zieter Deh as long ago as 1970 9

• Deh deserves to be btter known) is known as the decoherence solution - that the wave function is collapsed by every interaction with the environment function.Schroedinger’s cat does not stay in a live/dead superposition for more than an attasecond before decohernce, the observation of the inanimate univers nudged it into one state or the other. Decoherence is not a fantastical hypothesis, we know its power from the difficulty we have in combatting it when we want to avoid collapse of the wave function, say for quantum computing. Decoherence is so re
  hal it has bcome a pest!)

Alec

I wonder what you think!

Thanks again for reading,
Hermione

 

[JPrejean]

sigh

hecd2:

In the first premise of his second way, Aquinas is quite clear that he is basing this premise ‘on the world that we sense’: - it is in the nature of cosmological arguments that we argue from observation of the universe to the conclusion that there is a God.

Your remarks here are really unsustainable. First, if you don’t consider causation to be a necessary metaphysical property, then the first premise of St. Thomas’s argument would actually be the following: “And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist.” But St. Thomas presents no argument for this principle and views the principle as self-evident; therefore, it is axiomatic in his thought. What is “quite clear” is that St. Thomas is not attempting to argue from observation in the Enlightenment-spawned manner that you are asserting.

hecd2:

We might as well say that God’s existence is self-evident and axiomatic and have done with all the rest of the tedious (and flawed) logic.

St. Thomas: “Therefore I say that this proposition, ‘God exists,’ of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (3, 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature–namely, by effects.”
newadvent.org/summa/100201.htm
But of course, St. Thomas explains that he means by “demonstration” the demonstration of causes from their effects, viz., he assumes metaphysical causation.
newadvent.org/summa/100202.htm
And the second way is exactly such a demonstration.
newadvent.org/summa/100203.htm
But you identify so strongly with your Enlightenment philosophy of naturalism that you can’t fathom the notion that someone might reject it and argue in another philosophical framework entirely.

hecd2:

We have to accept that there might be no satisfying metaphysical answer, but that doesn’t invalidate the question.

It absolutely does invalidate the question. You said yourself that there is no observational reason to assume there is a metaphysical answer, so therefore, the question is valueless by your own definition. Your statement that it is a “very important and very valuable question” and a “fascinating question” flatly contradicts your own standards for what valid questions are, unless you consider pointless speculation and random imaginings to be valuable (which would be incredibly patronizing).

 

[john_doran]

hecd2:

Yes - except that fundamental quantum randomness and uncertainty is only one argument. Others include self consistent hypotheses for a universe that is eternal (for example a universe with quantum fluctuations in a scalar field of just the right value inflate to form flat universes and where the stochastic properties of te omniverse are stationary and eternal such as Linde and others propose,or a universe that although not eternal has no boundary conditions a la Hawking or a temporally and spatially infinite multiverse as Tegmark suggests. As long as these hypotheses are logically consistent and consistent with observation they undermine the argument from the uncaused casue, which is a purely logical one. If a logical alternative that doesn’t need the uncaused cause is available, then there is no necessity for an uncaused cause (but that doesn’t mean it doesn’t exist). This isn’t an argument against the existence of God but an argument against the proof of Her existence.

linde doesn’t demonstrate that there is no need for a cause for the initial singularity - he just pushes it into the indefinite past.

the hawking hartle model goes a different route and refies imaginary time in order to avoid the initial singularity and the explanatory burden it imposes. which, again, isn’t a demonstration but more or less simply a rejection of one of aquinas’ initial premises by mere fiat.

The randomness of quantum mechanics is not simply a limitation of measurement. Of that we can be sure.

can we? hidden variables theorists would disagree.

the violation of Bell’s inequality - this can only be explained by concluding that the particles are non-locally entangled - in other words the spin of each particle about each is completely randomly selected at the point that it is measured but that the spin of one particle about one axis determines absolutelyt the spin of the entangled particle about the same axis over a non-local distance. EPR was wrong.

the violation of bell’s inequality simply shows that you can have a real or a local world, but not both - it doesn’t demonstrate that the world is not “real” (i.e. irreducibly and ontologically random). that is, the violation of bell’s inequality is entirely consistent with a world populated by classical particles with definite physical poperties like position and momentum - it’s just that such a world would include the possibility of information-transmission at superluminal (i.e. instantaneous) velocities.

but that is as may be: there are some who believe that the experiments used by aspect and others are deeply flawed, and ultimately unsuccessful, which means that it may even be possible to have a real and local world.

 

[john_doran]

hecd2:

Dear Matt,

You’ll excuse me if I refer you to things that I have already posted. I simply haven’t got the energy to regurgitate it all again. Let me give you some hints. Look up Werner Heisenberg, John Bell, Alan Aspect, Stuart Freedman, John Clauser, Nils Bohr, John Wheeler, Marlan Scully, Kai Druhl, Andrei Linde, David Bohm. Read a popular science book or two on quantum physics. The randomness that we measure is confirmed by the precision of the measurements. It is an underlying feature, not an artefact of the measurement techniques.

i think perhaps you misunderstand (some aspect of) bohm’s theorizing: it was his formulation of the pilot-wave theory that was meant precisely to show that hidden variables are in fact possible, and thus that (quantum) reality need not be irreducibly statistical.

If you can explain the violation of Bell’s inequality by anything other than fundamental randomness and non-locality, a Nobel prize awaits you.

you don’t mean “explain”, you mean something closer to “convince me and the other scientists to whose interpretations i adhere”.

the existence of hidden variables explains the randomness of quantum phenomena, just not to your satisfaction.

 

[oriel36]

hecd2:
There are two answers to this (one of which is a question ):
a) What lies north of the North Pole?
b) time is not absolute in our universe, although in GR the 3+1 metric of space-time is. There are several cosmological ideas that are compatible with an infinite universe. I have posted one of these before (the Andrei Linde hypothesis of chaotic inflation - that hypothesis describes a statistically stationary universe - it is not static, it changes over time, but statististically it always looks the same - it can always have been so and will always be so. Another idea is the Steady State universe of Hoyle, Bondi and Gold, subsequently refined by Narlikar and others. In fairness this idea has been in deep trouble since the discovery of the CMB, but it won’t quite lie down.

Alec
evolutionpages.com
One of the most exquisite comments I’ve seen on Time and the connection between the temporal and Eternal or what constitutes the fundamental tenets of Christian faith was by Henry Longfellow -

What is time?

The shadow on the dial,
the striking of the clock,
the running of the sand,
day and night, summer and winter, months, years, centuries

• these are but arbitrary and outward signs,
  the measure of Time, not Time itself.
  Time is the Life of the soul.

Henry W. Longfellow (1807-1882).

---

Incidently,Mach completely misinterpreted Newton’s comments on the distinction between absolute and relative time as metaphysical .

Mach: on Newton’s Absolute Time

“This absolute time can be measured by comparison with no motion; it
has therefore neither a practical nor a scientific value; and no one
is justified in saying that he knows aught about it. It is an idle
metaphysical conception.”
Mach, Analyse der Empfindungen, 6th ed.

Many Catholic readers here would be shocked at just how careless Mach was for Newton’s original distinction between absolute time and relative time is the commonplace astronomical correction known as the ‘Equation of Time’,in other words there is nothing metaphysical about absolute time or relative time.

"Absolute time, in astronomy, is distinguished from relative, by the
equation or correlation of the vulgar time. For the natural days are
truly unequal, though they are commonly considered as equal and used for a measure of time; astronomers correct this inequality for their more accurate deducing of the celestial motions. "

Principia

members.tripod.com/~gravitee/definitions.htm#time

For the interested reader,the Equation of Time is the correction which gives us the 24 hour/360 deg equivalency for axial rotation or the Earth rotates on its axis once every 24 hours.

The punchline is that due to Newton’s peculiar error derived from John Flamsteed,unfortunately scientists think the Earth rotates once every 23 hours 56 min 04 sec instead of the correct value and the principles behind it of 24 hours exactly.

hypertextbook.com/facts/1999/JennyChen.shtml

With all due respect,not knowing the fundamental rotation rate of the Earth and why it is that way is hardly a good way to approach the high logic displayed by Aquinas or other Christian writers.

 

[Hermione]

Dear Alec,

Thanks again for responding.

You mentioned the Weak Anthropic Principle as an answer to why the universe is this way and not another way. I looked it up and it states that:

“The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.”

I don’t know if my understanding of this argument is correct, but it seems to say that the reason the universe is this way and not another is that since carbon-based life exists the universe must be structured in such a way that would allow it to exist. Perhaps I completely misunderstood something, because I don’t see how it explains anything. Isn’t it like saying that the reason why a ball is covered with blue paint and not a paint of different color is that the ball is blue? It tells us that the ball must be covered with blue paint otherwise it wouldn’t be blue, just like the values of all physical and cosmological quantities must have the values that would allow carbon-based life to exist otherwise life wouldn’t exist. All the Weak Anthropic Principle seems to say is that since life exists the physical properties of the universe are such that it can exist. But how can we take the leap that those properties must be that way? Who says that carbon-based life must evolve? Wouldn’t it be like saying that the ball must be blue? It seems to me that the Weak Anthropic Principle only moves the question of “why is the universe the way it is” to “why should carbon-based life exist,” which is essentially the same question phrased differently. Have I misunderstood the Weak Anthropic Principle?

About consciousness, I definitely agree with you that we should not abandon the science of consciousness. It is probable that through science we will learn to understand more about it. However, from my perspective, a scientific treatment of consciousness would require us to redefine science itself because from how I see it neither determinism nor randomness can lead to conscious choices. How can it be possible for anything goverened purely by cause and effect or randomness to choose, much less conscoiusly choose? I read a little about Penrose’s ideas, and from what I know he proposes that consciousness arises from the effects of quantum gravity in microtubules. I don’t understand how he can do this since there is no theory of quantum gravity. (And if there isn’t, isn’t invoking something we don’t understand very similar to invoking something beyond the physical?) Can you tell me more about it?

Continued…

 

[Hermione]

I suppose in the end we can’t definitively conclude whether or not there is a God. As I see, a lot of evidence such as: the ordered structure of the universe and its existence, our free will, our moral conscience, our desire for God, a history of Divine Reveleation etc. point in that direction.

What do you think of this quote?

“There are only two ways to live your life. One is as though nothing is a miracle. The other is as though everything is a miracle.” --A. Einstein

Thanks again,

Hermione

 

[john_doran]

Hermione:

I suppose in the end we can’t definitively conclude whether or not there is a God.

i guess it depends on what you mean by “definitively”, hermione. if you mean something like “demonstrate with cartesian certainty”, then no. but then we can’t really definitively conclude anything with that sort of certitude. like that there’s an independently existing world, or that there are other minds, or that the future will continue to be like the past. or any of our scientific beliefs…

but if by “definitively” you mean something closer to “be more rationally assured of than not”, then i think we can definitively conclude that there’s a god.

 

[ISABUS]

I’ve been rereading A Mathematicians Apology by G. H. Hardy. He writes:

"I began by saying that there is probably less difference between the positions of a mathematician and of a physicist than is generally supposed, and that the most important seems to me to be this, that the mathematician is in much more direct contact with reality. This may seem a paradox, since it is the physicist who deals with the subject-matter usually described as ‘real’; but a very little reflection is enough to show that the physicist’s reality, whatever it may be, has few or none of the attributes which common sense ascribes instinctively to reality. A chair may be a collection of whirling electrons, or an idea in the mind of God; each of these accounts of it may have its merits, but neither conforms at all closely to the suggestions of common sense.

“I went on to say that neither physicists nor philosophers have ever given any convincing account of what ‘physical reality’ is, or of how the physicist passes, from the confused mass of fact or sensation with which he starts, to the construction of the objects which he calls ‘real’. Thus we cannot be said to know what the subject-matter of physics is; but this need not prevent us from understanding roughly what a physicist is trying to do. It is plain that he is trying to correlate the incoherent body of crude fact confronting him with some definite and orderly scheme of abstract relations, the kind of scheme which he can borrow only from mathematics.” A Mathematician’s Apology by G.H. Hardy, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p.g. 128-129.

I’m a poet, not a scientist. Can we really define ‘physical reality’? What we see isn’t really what we see because we can’t define it? It doesn’t make any sense to me that it is only definable by mathematics.

Also, the Hardy-Weinberg principle became known as the “law” of evolution. Couldn’t that be considered by the scientific community as a dogma or doctrine? How can a law be established by mathematics alone? I’m a tad confused. I need to know before I can move any further onto my own theory of caused cause.

Thank you,

Mary

 

[neophyte]

This is a great discussion. I’m neither a philosopher nor a theoretical physicist, but I did sleep in a Holiday Inn Express once (well, alright, I’m a Mechanical Engineer, I used to read Scientific American a lot and I paid attention in RCIA - same thing).

From the Thomist viewpoint, I’ve gathered that the “sufficient” causes for, let’s say, radioactive decay include things like the universe in which we live (constants have the values we observe) and the presence of an appropriate atom. While these causes are “sufficient” for radioactive decay, they are not “efficient” in that the atom does not necessarily decay as soon as these causes are in place. The “efficient” cause is whatever makes the atom decay at one time rather than at some other time. Did I get that? As I recall, what I’ve termed “sufficient” would more properly be called something like “that which necessarily must precede the effect but that will not make it happen without some other agent”.

Alec has ably pointed out that quantum-scale events are subject to uncertainty in position and rate of change, and I don’t see how anyone can argue against that. The math and experiments are extraordinarily clever, and both are overwhelming in their agreement that there are fundamental limitations on the accuracy with which we can measure simultaneously the position and momentum of subatomic particles or events.

What isn’t clear to me is how one concludes that these events, because they show a random probability distribution and have no observable cause, are therefore uncaused. This seems to assume either that random probability distributions are uncaused, or that all causes are observable, or both. As far as I can tell neither of these assumptions has been proven, but that may well be just my own limitation - there’s a reason I wasn’t a math major. Alec?

A series of coin tosses shows a random probability distribution, but this is because none of the governing variables are controlled. The result of each individual toss is in fact caused by the height of the coin, its geometry and material, angular and linear velocities, coefficients of friction and restitution, air currents, etc. So random distributions don’t necessarily mean lack of causation - I’ll bet prime rib against a hot dog that I can design a machine that will flip heads every time (not that I have the time or the budget).

Alec, one point you keep repeating is that your argument (assuming it’s true) does nothing more than demonstrate that St. Thomas’s First Cause argument is not a very good one; it does not in any way speak to the existence or non-existence of God. Unless my grasp of philosophy is as poor as my grasp of physics, you are of course correct on that point.

That being said, Thomists, I’ve been wondering whether these kinds of arguments are the most fertile ground. We wouldn’t use them to try to demonstrate the existence of any other person, and there is no requirement that we do so (otherwise no one would believe in anyone that they never saw or cannot reproduce). Why in the world would we do so when trying to demonstrate the existence of God? People are shown to exist, not through philosophy or physics, but by using the standards of historical evidence.

Thanks to all for a great thread.

 

[buffalo]

Hermione:

Dear Alec,

Thanks again for responding.

You mentioned the Weak Anthropic Principle as an answer to why the universe is this way and not another way. I looked it up and it states that:

“The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirements that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so.”

I don’t know if my understanding of this argument is correct, but it seems to say that the reason the universe is this way and not another is that since carbon-based life exists the universe must be structured in such a way that would allow it to exist. Perhaps I completely misunderstood something, because I don’t see how it explains anything. Isn’t it like saying that the reason why a ball is covered with blue paint and not a paint of different color is that the ball is blue? It tells us that the ball must be covered with blue paint otherwise it wouldn’t be blue, just like the values of all physical and cosmological quantities must have the values that would allow carbon-based life to exist otherwise life wouldn’t exist. All the Weak Anthropic Principle seems to say is that since life exists the physical properties of the universe are such that it can exist. But how can we take the leap that those properties must be that way? Who says that carbon-based life must evolve? Wouldn’t it be like saying that the ball must be blue? It seems to me that the Weak Anthropic Principle only moves the question of “why is the universe the way it is” to “why should carbon-based life exist,” which is essentially the same question phrased differently. Have I misunderstood the Weak Anthropic Principle?

About consciousness, I definitely agree with you that we should not abandon the science of consciousness. It is probable that through science we will learn to understand more about it. However, from my perspective, a scientific treatment of consciousness would require us to redefine science itself because from how I see it neither determinism nor randomness can lead to conscious choices. How can it be possible for anything goverened purely by cause and effect or randomness to choose, much less conscoiusly choose? I read a little about Penrose’s ideas, and from what I know he proposes that consciousness arises from the effects of quantum gravity in microtubules. I don’t understand how he can do this since there is no theory of quantum gravity. (And if there isn’t, isn’t invoking something we don’t understand very similar to invoking something beyond the physical?) Can you tell me more about it?

Continued…

The Weak Anthropic Principle is the atheists rebuttal. However,
this doesn’t hold up as we look deeper and deeper into design. For everywhere we find design, we find a greater design to support it. Then we have to ask why?

 

[hecd2]

john doran:

linde doesn’t demonstrate that there is no need for a cause for the initial singularity - he just pushes it into the indefinite past.

On the contrary, a detailed reading of Linde and Linde 's paper leads to the conclusion that they are positing a universe with stationary spatial statistics which has no need for an *initial *singularity since such a universe is infinitely self-sustaining.

the hawking hartle model goes a different route and refies imaginary time in order to avoid the initial singularity and the explanatory burden it imposes. which, again, isn’t a demonstration but more or less simply a rejection of one of aquinas’ initial premises by mere fiat.

On the contrary, the Hawking-Hartle model is a perfectly reasonable model of the physical universe that refutes Aquinas’s axiom by logical necessity.

the violation of bell’s inequality simply shows that you can have a real or a local world, but not both - it doesn’t demonstrate that the world is not “real” (i.e. irreducibly and ontologically random). that is, the violation of bell’s inequality is entirely consistent with a world populated by classical particles with definite physical poperties like position and momentum - it’s just that such a world would include the possibility of information-transmission at superluminal (i.e. instantaneous) velocities.

In order to postulate a consistent universe with definite physical properties, one needs more and bizarrely more properties than information transmission at superluminal velocities. One also needs arbitrary forces applied at indefinitely large range. This is why most physicists regard Bohmian mechanics as wanting. Admittedly Durr, Bauer, Goldstein and Zanghi are doing great work in a Bohmian framework and the Bohmian prspective is bound to provide insight. But the sacrifice one needs to make in order to save determinism is too great.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[johnnycatholic]

What has quantum mechanics empirically proven? All I see here is talk of theory after theory. Doesn’t this just show a likelyhood that something is correct rather than an empirical certainty? Aren’t these mathematical models just theoretical? Please give a list of facts about the empirical world which have been empirically proven by quantum mechanics.
Please consider that lack of evidence is not evidence, in reference to the seemingly unidentifyable causes for certain quantunm events (Ad Ignorantium).

 

[stanley123]

hecd2:

. For example, spontaneous, ‘uncaused’ generation of particle/anti-particles pairs from the vacuum are a fundamental part of modern physics and are the basis for the Hawking radiation of black holes

I thought that the Hawking theory of radiation was replaced by the p-brane theory of Andrew Strominger and Cumrun Vafa in 1996, and that the model of black holes as made up of p-branes predicts the same radiation that the virtual particle pair model predicts and causality is restored?

 

[johnnycatholic]

What has quantum mechanics empirically proven? All I see here is talk of theory after theory. Doesn’t this just show a likelyhood that something is correct rather than an empirical certainty? Aren’t these mathematical models just theoretical? Please give a list of facts about the empirical world which have been empirically proven by quantum mechanics.
Please consider that lack of evidence is not evidence, in reference to the seemingly unidentifyable causes for certain quantunm events (Ad Ignorantium).

 

[stanley123]

johnnycatholic:

Please give a list of facts about the empirical world which have been empirically proven by quantum mechanics.
.

Landau levels and the quantum hall effect are two examples of phenomena which are described nicely by quantum mechanics.

http://www.pha.jhu.edu/~qiuym/qhe/qhe.html

“The Hall effect was discovered by Edwin Hall in 1879 when he was a graduate student in the Johns Hopkins University under the advisory of Professor Henry A. Rowland, after whose name this department is named now. But at that time, even the electron was not experimentally discovered. Clear understanding had to wait until quantum mechanics came into apperance.

In 1930, Landau showed that for quantum electrons, unlike classical electrons, the electron’s orbital motion gave a contribution to the magnetic susceptibility. He also remarked that the kinetic energy quantization gave rise to a contribution to the magnetic susceptibility which was periodic in inverse magnetic field. We can see later that Landau levels along with localization can explain the integer quantum Hall effect satisfactorily.

The first inversion layer Hall conductivity measurements in strong magnetic fields were done by S.Kawaji and his colleagues in 1975. Using a somewhat different experimental arrangement which measured the Hall voltage rather than the Hall current, Klaus von Klitzing and Th. Englert had found flat Hall plateaus in 1978. However, the precise quantization of the Hall conductance in units of was not recognized until February of 1980. Five years later, in 1985, Klaus von Klitzing was awarded Nobel Prize in Physics for the discovery of quantum Hall effect.”