uncaused cause

[hecd2]

Alterum:

Alec,

I’d like to make one more point: You seem to be arguing here (and in a separate post elsewhere to which I also responded) from the position that there are no signs to point to God’s existence (hence, in that other post, you supposed you were a rational alien instead of a human). However, we believe there are an overabundance of signs, inherent in human nature, to point to God’s existence. JimG’s post points to some of these; I’d like to add, along with free will, the idea of a moral conscience.

I will get to your other post in due course - I am a little outnumbered here .

I am not arguing at all here that there are no signs to point to God’s existence. This is a very specific thread about the merits of one of Aquinas’s five arguments for God’s existence. (In the other thread I supposed I was a rational alien because I wanted to posit a point of view untramelled by cultural bias).

With regard to moral conscience, there is a very interesting developing science called evolutionary psychology, based on observation and underpinned by a branch of mathematics called game theory, which is beginning to explain with significant insight, phenomena such as co-operation and virtue.

Finally, adherence to Catholicism is still undeniably, and foremost, an act of faith; or even better, an act of love.

I couldn’t agree more.

“For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened.”

Gee thanks. Truth is actually rather important to me,. I would describe a passge like that as an argumentum ad baculum. I utterly reject that kind of moral blackmail. I know that you didn’t mean it that way, but that’s what it, fundamentally, is.

Alec
homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

 

[hecd2]

buffalo:

Quantum physics is probabilistic. To actually determine if a predicted event has happened their must be an observer in an outside frame. The idea of an observer is a problem for atheist scientists because it defeats materialism. They have wrestled with this for 75 years. Since quantum physics appears to be a theory that is sticking this becomes a real issue and forces them to come to grips with it.

Dear buffalo,

This is the quantum measurement problem.

Tell me a few of things:
a) what is the definition of an observer?
b) if an observer is needed, why?
c) how does this create a problem for atheism?

Oh - and by the way, have you ever heard of decoherence and Hartle et al’s decoherent histories and do you understand how that resolves the quantum measurement problem?

Alec

 

[hecd2]

Sherlock:

Alec,

You wrote: “My jibes about giving (not at all directed specifically at you} were and are a simple tactic to shame those who have not given (clearly NOT you) to do so through whatever route they are comfortable with - everyone who cares about their cause is shameless in doing this as I am.”

Well, that may be so, but perhaps you should change tactics. What you originally wrote was, “I find it very interesting that only one ‘loving’ Catholic on this message board has contributed to the good cause of helping the homeless victims of Hurricane Ivan in Grenada”. That sarcasm and the use of sneer quotes around “loving” are hardly inducements to contribute to your cause, nor is it even a reasonable inference to draw: many people might be aiding hurricane victims but not through you.

SNIP

Best wishes for your success in these humanitarian efforts.

I apologise to you and anyone else on this list for sneering . Let us conclude by agreeing that we both encourage people to contribute to the rebuildiing of hoemes in Grenada through whatever route they choose, and whether or not the bricklaying, roofing and plumbing are supplemented by spritual help.

Alec
homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

 

[hecd2]

Sherlock:

Alec,

I don’t have a problem with, “Adult humanity rejoices in its ignorance”, especially as you explain it. Nor do I take issue with, “And yes, the admission that really, deep down, we don’t know, is an honourable and admirable philosophical position, and forms the raw material for all scientists, believers or not”. I don’t think we are in conflict here, and indeed I think you have expressed this quite nicely.

No, I was reacting to your last sentence, “The child in us wants certainty and latches on to all sorts of comforting fairy tales.” I took this to be dismissive of religious belief, as I’m sure you can understand. If you did not mean it to be so, then I stand corrected and apologize for my response. I will say, in my defense, that I have had a number of conversations with atheists over the years (I used to be one), and this is a common attitude among them. And it is elitist and self-aggrandizing, or at least was in the case of the people I knew (and know). So I may have had a knee-jerk response. I sincerely apologize if it wasn’t warranted.

Dear Sherlock,

Handsomely put.

This statement “The child in us wants certainty and latches on to all sorts of comforting fairy tales.” is not meant to be dismissive but explanatory. I think that human’s universal tendency to religious belief is a fascinating phenomenon and that we can learn a lot about ourselves by understanding why that is. It was something of a psychological or anthropological statement if you like about religion generally, and definitely not intended to cast ridicule.

But finally, and I hope this does not get us at loggerheads again, there is a respectable atheistic view that I cannot gloss over, arrived at with as much thought and care as yours, that while respecting the importance of religious beliefs to others, nevertheless concludes that they are misguided and untrue (just as you conclude that atheism is misguided and untrue). I should be sorry if you claim that all those who genuinely believe that your beliefs are not true are elitist and self-aggrandising.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[JPrejean]

hecd2:

The first step in Aquinas’s argument is : ‘In the world that we sense, we find that efficient causes come in series. We do not, and cannot, find that something is its own efficient cause’. Well, that is invalidated by our current sensible observations of the quantum world, so the logic of his argument fails.

Do you even know what an efficient cause is? It’s a technical metaphysical term. Proving that something was its own physical cause would not prove that the thing is its own efficient cause.

We’re back to the same false inference again. You have yet again made the unwarranted inference that lack of physical causation implies lack of metaphysical causation. If you want to have a logical refutation of St. Thomas’s proof, then you must provide a logical basis for this inference. What is so difficult to understand here? Show me a compelling logical argument for why lack of physical causation implies lack of metaphysical causation. Otherwise, your claim that St. Thomas’s argument fails is simply unwarranted.

 

[hecd2]

JPrejean:

I’m not entirely sure how you mean “flawed,” since it wasn’t ever designed to do what you would have it do. St. Thomas starts from certain premises about what reason is and what it does (hence, all of my previous ranting about meaning and philosophy and whatnot attempting to highlight those premises). His proof is designed to convince people who share those premises (viz., the First Cause is logically necessary if you accept his premises). Your naturalist presuppositions are incompatible with those premises. Therefore, while his proof might happen to be convincing to you, there is no reason to expect that it will be, nor would it entail a flaw in the argument if it did not. It is not, nor was it ever, intended to persuade such people.

Dear J,

With all respect to you, what you say here is nonsense. Aquinas’s argument is meant to be proof from sensible observations (ie observations that we make through our senses) for the existence of God. If the argument is only valid for those people who already accept the existence of God, then it is a worthless question begging exercise.

You have repeatedly claimed that Aquinas starts from premises that I do not share and do not understand and that therefore the arguments I present have no ability to invalidate Aquinas’s logic. (I actually think you mean initial philosophical axioms rather than specific premises in this paricular argument, but you choose your own words). Well then, can you state precisely what those premises are, demonstrate the extent to which I do not share them, show why that is important in the case of this particular argument of Aquinas’s and how therefore his argument survives with its full force.

As a reminder, here is the complete argument of Aquinas in the second of his Five Ways (the Uncaused Cause - the Prime Mover argument is similar but based on physical dynamics, similarly flawed and is the First Way) in his own translated words:

‘In the world that we sense, we find that efficient causes come in series. We do not, and cannot, find that something is its own efficient cause — for, if something were its own efficient cause, it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. But the series of efficient causes cannot possibly go back to infinity. In all such series of causes, a first thing causes one or more intermediaries, and the intermediaries cause the last thing; when a cause is taken out of this series, so is its effect. Therefore, if there were no first efficient cause, there would be no last or intermediary efficient causes. If the series of efficient causes went back to infinity, however, there would be no first efficient cause and, hence, no last or intermediary causes. But there obviously are such causes. We must therefore posit a first efficient cause, which everyone understands to be God’.

It is this argument, that quite clearly starts from the observations of our senses and seeks to create a logical argument that concludes that God exists, that is invalidated by more recent observations of our senses. (It is also logically flawed in that it rejects ab initio the idea that the causes can go back infinitely far)You are yet to state clearly what other aspects of Aquinas’s axiomatic system lying outside the premises and conclusions of this argument must be brought to bear and why that invalidates my challenge and saves his argument.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

JPrejean:

Do you even know what an efficient cause is? It’s a technical metaphysical term. Proving that something was its own physical cause would not prove that the thing is its own efficient cause.

Dear J,

Don’t be insulting. Of course I know what an efficient cause is and I know how it differs from the other causes defined by Aristotle. Do you?

We’re back to the same false inference again. You have yet again made the unwarranted inference that lack of physical causation implies lack of metaphysical causation.

You seem to fail to understand the very elementary point that Aquinas is arguing from what we observe - his basic premise is that in all the observations of our senses things have efficient causes. That might have been true in his day and was true up to about 1920, but it is no longer true. His first premise is false (or at least has the potential of being false).

To claim, regardless of the fact that the basic observational premise is now known to be at best questionable, that his argument survives metaphysically even if it fails physically is to replace logic with magic.

Anyone can make an claim that all things must have metaphysical causes whether or not they have physical causes, because such a claim is not subject to test or the rigours of observational correction. It is logically flawed because it begs the question with a premise that assumes the conclusion, and it is definitely not in the spirit of Aquinas’s argument. It is tantamount to introducing the step ‘then a miracle happens’ which is OK if you believe it but is not what Aquinas was seeking to do.

If you disagree with this, I ask you to reflect on Aquinas’s First Argument, which is based on physical dynamics (the First Mover argument): it is clear that he is seeking a watertight logic that requires no miraculous leaps.

The burden of proof is with Aquinas; he has embraced it - if you think you can save his argument by appeal to metaphysical causes, you need to begin by showing, logically, that metaphysical causes are necessary even if physical causes are not. Good luck.

Alec
homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

 

[Hermione]

Dear Alec,

Thank you for responding to my post.

Let me summarize what we’ve arrived at so far to make sure that I have got it right.

---

The Universe either:

1. Existed forever, in which case God is unnecessary. This idea is supported by the existence of theories that are consistent with our observations and propose an infinite universe.
2. Did not exist forever, but had a definite beginning in time when:

A) It was caused by a first cause that could be God. This idea is supported by observations pointing to the existence of a causal chain, and also by theories without randomness that have the universe begin at a definite moment in time.
B) It began randomly as a quantum fluctuation of the vacuum (I hope I have got this right). This idea is supported by observed randomness on the quantum level, and specifically by the random generation of particle-antiparticle pairs which is a consequence of the uncertainty principle.

As far as I understand the “first cause” argument, it goes like this:

1. Things in the universe exist contingently in that they don’t have to exist this way but could be very different.
2. Since things don’t have to exist this way but do, there must be a reason for it. (This is the point that you think randomness invalidates, because if things are random then there’s no “reason” for them being the way they are, right?)
3. Since the whole universe is composed of things that exist contingently, it too must exist contingently.
4. Since the universe exists contingently, there is a reason (or a cause) for its existence.

Then the argument for a first and necessary cause is made because otherwise you have an infinite regress of causes, which would be a paradox because for the chain to exist something had to start it.

Tell me if I have got any of this wrong.​

I guess the point I’d make is that as long as the universe doesn’t have to exist the way it does it raises the question of WHY it exists the way it does, and why it exists at all.

For me, a Godless universe would be a universe that NECESSARILY exists forever in a certain way. I think that as long as there is room for “why” there is room for God. And there is room for “why” as long as it doesn’t have to be the way it is.

It seems that there is plenty of room for “why” even in theories that suggest an infinite universe. I remember reading about how there could be many curved universes, but that our universe seems to be a very special case sitting on the cusp between positive and negative curvature. It seems that a perfectly flat universe is very improbable. To me this raises a “why.” (It also seems to me like you can easily invent many theories that have infinite universes and are consistent with our observations. All one would need is a larger mathematical framework that contains the mathematics of our current theories inside them. I don’t know very much about mathematics, but it seems like there could be an infinite number of these hypotheses? And furthermore, none of these hypotheses can ever be tested because we cannot observe anything that may or may not exist outside our universe.)

The point you make is that because there is so much observed randomness, the “why” isn’t an appropriate question to ask, correct?

Continued…

 

[Hermione]

I was thinking about randomness and had a very strange idea about how randomness is actually a case FOR God rather than against. I wonder what you’ll think!

What got me thinking this way is what you said about not confusing quantum uncertainty with a universe that is chaotic and arbitrary. It seems to me that even though there is innate uncertainty in the quantum world (for instance a particle actually doesn’t have a definite position and a definite momentum at the same time), large quantities of these particles still behave in a very reasonable and predictable manner. To me this is a very big WHY. Why should particles that don’t even have definite properties behave in a way that is anything but whimsical and arbitrary? Why should there be so much order and structure in a universe that at its fundamental level seems to be random?

Another thing I was thinking about is this: suppose that a personal God actually created the universe. What would this creation seem like from inside the universe? To us it would seem completely random because God would have created the universe not for a natural reason or any other necessary thing, but simply because He wanted to. In a big way it was random because God’s will is not subject to physical law.

And this brings me to the important point of free will. Do you believe that human beings have free will? When I thought about this I came to the conclusion that either there exists something more than physical determinism and randomness, or free will must be an illusion. I came to this conclusion because if there is only the material world then our consciousness and free will must arise from the material world, and specifically from the brain. Every single part of the brain obeys the laws of physics which are either deterministic or random, do you agree? And if consciousness is a property of the brain then it must be either deterministic or random too. Having free will would be like saying that our awareness can override the laws of physics and either violate cause and effect relationships, or take over randomness to make parts of the brain behave in certain ways.

As I see it, if there is nothing more than the material world, then our choices are like the choices of computer programs, which “choose” (in quotes because it’s not a conscious decision) whatever the mechanics of the interaction between software and hardware bring them to.

It seems that if there’s nothing more than the material world, then the choices we make are about as “free” as the choice of a rock to fall under the influence of gravity.

And a final point, consciousness and free will seem to be very important in quantum mechanics as well. From what I know it is our conscious awareness of the measurement that finally collapses the wave-function. I don’t understand why this should be at all, because if the brain is a quantum system, why shouldn’t it just enter a state of superposition as well? And in fact when we try to study the wave function of the universe where there is no one to collapse it (unless God is observing it ) we do have all the possibilities existing at once and hence the many-worlds theory. It seems to me that quantum mechanics assigns a very special role to consciousness, but if consciousness is just a part of the material world, doesn’t it seem contradictory that it should have a special role?

I wonder what you think!

Thanks again for reading,
Hermione

 

[Alterum]

Hermione:

And a final point, consciousness and free will seem to be very important in quantum mechanics as well. From what I know it is our conscious awareness of the measurement that finally collapses the wave-function. I don’t understand why this should be at all, because if the brain is a quantum system, why shouldn’t it just enter a state of superposition as well? And in fact when we try to study the wave function of the universe where there is no one to collapse it (unless God is observing it ) we do have all the possibilities existing at once and hence the many-worlds theory. It seems to me that quantum mechanics assigns a very special role to consciousness, but if consciousness is just a part of the material world, doesn’t it seem contradictory that it should have a special role?

I wonder what you think!

Thanks again for reading,
Hermione

This raises the question: What is observation and why does it work? Is it the passing of light through the eye and “interpretation” in the brain through the firing of neurons? Is it a measurement registering on a highly sensitive device, or a computer completing a calculation? It would seem as though the very unexplainable nature of conscious observation is given a special status in QM; it is the conscious observation that collapses the wave function. The caveat, of course, is that “conscious observation” is undefinable from this perspective; why should the measurements of devices or the firing of neurons, which on the quantum level are wave-functions, have any effect on other particles; let alone, why should it collapse the wave-functions? Why can’t Schrodinger’s Box Lid “observe” his cat and collapse its wave functions? The very nature of consciousness, as best as I can understand it, is what forces wave functions to collapse; but it relies, again, on the concept of consciousness which science has never been able to understand.

Unfortunately, I like I said, I don’t know very much about QM and thus may have misused terminology or may misunderstand some concepts. But I’m sure Alec will correct me if this is the case (thanks in advance!)

 

[hecd2]

Matt16_18:

hecd2:

The randomness of quantum mechanics is not simply a limitation of measurement. Of that we can be sure

How can we be sure of this? The only definition of randomness that you can give is a definition based on your own theological assumptions.

Dear Matt,

You’ll excuse me if I refer you to things that I have already posted. I simply haven’t got the energy to regurgitate it all again. Let me give you some hints. Look up Werner Heisenberg, John Bell, Alan Aspect, Stuart Freedman, John Clauser, Nils Bohr, John Wheeler, Marlan Scully, Kai Druhl, Andrei Linde, David Bohm. Read a popular science book or two on quantum physics. The randomness that we measure is confirmed by the precision of the measurements. It is an underlying feature, not an artefact of the measurement techniques. If you can explain the violation of Bell’s inequality by anything other than fundamental randomness and non-locality, a Nobel prize awaits you.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[Alterum]

Dear Alec,

In regard to the invalidation of Aquinas’ First Cause argument, I really don’t know. If the argument depends upon the fact that every single event in the universe requires a cause, then it would have to be invalidated on the grounds that we just don’t know whether every single event in the universe requires a cause (for it seems that some don’t). So, if this is the form the argument takes, there’s no way to say, in light of QM, that the argument is valid.

I’m not going to pretend that I’m intimately aware of the mechanics of the argument, but it seems like the statement “In the world that we sense, we find that efficient causes come in series. We do not, and cannot, find that something is its own efficient cause” is still correct. It would not seem that quantum fluctuations can be reasonably regarded as efficient causes. Nor can particle-antiparticle generation and subsequent annihilation on the quantum level be regarded as an efficient cause of anything. It seems like it’s a result of a feature of the universe if the quantum picture is correct (a product of uncertainty). Moreover, we do not and cannot prove that something is its own efficient cause; that is, to my understanding, a cause that is productive by itself, of itself. It seems important that even though there is randomness in QM, I guess one of the paradoxes is that this randomness isn’t COMPLETELY arbitrary. It’s still reliant on an observer to collapse a wave function and “cause” the cause(?)

Again, I profess no strong knowledge of either Aquinas’ arguments or any form of logic, and I’m sure my points above can be debated - as we do still seem to be debating whether or not the First Cause argument is valid.

What can be said is that the questions the First Cause argument raise, particularly the “why?” and “how?” are still as valid and relevant as ever; and I think they always will be. However, if Aquinas ever sought to prove definitively that God exists, he’s failed; there is no definitive proof outside of supernatural revelation. Or death, I suppose.

With regard to the moral conscience, while evolutionary psychology can undoubtedly explain certain aspects of morality it cannot explain the whole of it. The larger point of moral conscience is the concept of absolute morality. Our consciences are our best guides to understanding the absolute morality inherent to nature because of our benevolent and loving God. While opinions differ, they differ because our understanding is incomplete. If there is no absolute morality, then nothing is ever “right” or “wrong” in the absolute sense.

Alec, I’m very sorry that little quote seemed like “moral blackmail.” Looking at it, I can certainly see how it can be! I honestly employed it simply to express what I was saying: the nature of God (and His divinity) is inherent in the world. I’m very sorry for the negative connotation of the quote; I certainly didn’t mean to imply that you either had a “senseless mind” or that it was “darkened.” Quite the contrary, I should think!

Thanks for taking the time to respond to everything

 

[Matt16_18]

hecd2:

Dear Matt,

The randomness that we measure is confirmed by the precision of the measurements. It is an underlying feature, not an artefact of the measurement techniques.

Give me the mathematical definition of randomness. You can’t do it. You suppose that “randomness” exists because of the theological assumptions that you assume to be true. Your argument is tautological.

 

[hecd2]

Matt16_18:

Give me the mathematical definition of randomness. You can’t do it. You suppose that “randomness” exists because of the theological assumptions that you assume to be true. Your argument is tautological.

Dear Matt,

Sigh!

So you want to get mathematically jiggy? Fine by me. Here is (one) mathematical definition of randomness - a very famous equation:

Delta x. Delta p >= h/4.pi
where Delta x is uncertainty in in position , Delta p is uncertainty in momentum and h is Planck’s constant.

Here’s another:

i.hbar.[partial] d(Psi)/dt= - hbar^2/2m . [partial] d^2(Psi)/dx^2 +V(x).Psi(x,t) = H.Psi(x,t)

where i is the square root of of -1, Psi is the time independent wave function, hbar is Planck’s constant/2*pi, V is the potential, and H is the Hamiltonian.

Do you want solutions to this?

If my argument is tautological so are the arguments of all those dumb scientists like Bohr, Pauli, Dirac, Bell and Hartle. Ooh - and Heisenberg and Schroedinger.

Next up, if you insist, is the maths that leads to the Bell inequality - and the maths that explains its violation. Still with me? Want to consider Bell and Aspect, mathematically?

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[hecd2]

Alterum:

Dear Alec,
Alec, I’m very sorry that little quote seemed like “moral blackmail.” Looking at it, I can certainly see how it can be! I honestly employed it simply to express what I was saying: the nature of God (and His divinity) is inherent in the world. I’m very sorry for the negative connotation of the quote; I certainly didn’t mean to imply that you either had a “senseless mind” or that it was “darkened.” Quite the contrary, I should think!

Thanks for taking the time to respond to everything

Dear Alterum,

Just to say that I have to postpone responses to outstanding posts on this list such as yours, Mary’s (Isabus’s), Phil(thy’s), and Hermione’s because I do need to sleep . Will get back to these soon.

However, I wanted to thank you sooner rather than later for taking the time to clarify what you intended by your quotation. Thanks and best wishes.

Alec

 

[Matt16_18]

hecd2

A well defined probability distribution is not a mathematical definition of randomness.

 

[hecd2]

hecd2

A well defined probability distribution is not a mathematical definition of randomness.

Isn’t it? Gosh - thanks for that. I never imagined such a thing! well what is a mathematical definition of randomness then? And while you are at it, I am really keen to know what a ‘well defined probability distribution.’ is, not just what it’s not.

I’ve really puzzled over how the Green’s function applied to the scalar Helmholtz equation and Gauss’s theorem applied to the vector field, given Kirchoff’s boundary conditions and Huyghen’s principle can yield a solution for Fresnel-Kirchoff diffraction that matches observation and is also compatible with local solutions of the Schroedinger wave equation Perhaps you can help me that too?

Thanks!

Alec
A fundamental equation of the universe:
Delta x. Delta p >= h/4.pi
where Delta x is uncertainty in in position , Delta p is uncertainty in momentum and h is Planck’s constant

 

[Matt16_18]

hecd2

This article might clear things up for you:

A RANDOM MATHEMATICAL STRUCTURE

… Some order is necessarily there! Otherwise no order, no structure, will emerge. That is, we imagine that the axioms add some order, so we do not assume that the Random Mathematical Structure is perfectly random, the randomness rather lies in the ``random axioms’’ - meaning some relatively simple laws chosen randomly among laws of some degree of complication. … . A mathematical theory does not “mean” anything in itself, to interpret it means to relate it to concepts that emerge from one’s own, human experience.

Niels Bohr Institutet fAFG
KØBENHAVNS UNIVERSITET

 

[oriel36]

hecd2:

Dear J,

Don’t be insulting. Of course I know what an efficient cause is and I know how it differs from the other causes defined by Aristotle. Do you?

You seem to fail to understand the very elementary point that Aquinas is arguing from what we observe - his basic premise is that in all the observations of our senses things have efficient causes. That might have been true in his day and was true up to about 1920, but it is no longer true. His first premise is false (or at least has the potential of being false).

To claim, regardless of the fact that the basic observational premise is now known to be at best questionable, that his argument survives metaphysically even if it fails physically is to replace logic with magic.

Anyone can make an claim that all things must have metaphysical causes whether or not they have physical causes, because such a claim is not subject to test or the rigours of observational correction. It is logically flawed because it begs the question with a premise that assumes the conclusion, and it is definitely not in the spirit of Aquinas’s argument. It is tantamount to introducing the step ‘then a miracle happens’ which is OK if you believe it but is not what Aquinas was seeking to do.

If you disagree with this, I ask you to reflect on Aquinas’s First Argument, which is based on physical dynamics (the First Mover argument): it is clear that he is seeking a watertight logic that requires no miraculous leaps.

The burden of proof is with Aquinas; he has embraced it - if you think you can save his argument by appeal to metaphysical causes, you need to begin by showing, logically, that metaphysical causes are necessary even if physical causes are not. Good luck.

Alec
homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

Dear Sir

The famous Scholium IV of Newton’s Principia where he sets out the absolute/relative definitions and distinctions of time,place,space and motion owe much in style and presentation to Aquinas however there is nothing metaphysical in Newton’s descriptions.

ccel.org/a/aquinas/summa/FP/FP007.html#FPQ7OUTP1%between%

Unfortunately physicists from the empirical tradition in the late 19th and early 20th century imagined that Newton’s descriptions of time,space and motion were metaphysical and boy ! did they make a mess of things by restructuring Newton’s definitions and distinctions to suit the spurious concepts of the early 20th century and the linguistic fireworks that emerged as a consequence of those spurious theories.

 

[JPrejean]

hecd2:

With all respect to you, what you say here is nonsense. Aquinas’s argument is meant to be proof from sensible observations (ie observations that we make through our senses) for the existence of God. If the argument is only valid for those people who already accept the existence of God, then it is a worthless question begging exercise.

It’s not based on people already accepting the existence of God (except maybe implicitly). But it is derived from principles that St. Thomas calls “self-evident,” so long as “the essence of the predicate and subject is known to all.” It is meant to be proof from sensible observations for people who accept those premises, i.e., realist philosophers:
newadvent.org/summa/100201.htm
Moreover, you’ve committed the routine fallacy that the proper role of Christian philosophy is to convince a skeptic, which is more than likely untrue (Plantinga discussed that faulty preconception here leaderu.com/truth/1truth10.html). To call it “question begging” assumes that it’s intended to convince you, even though St. Thomas’s own words argue to the contrary.

hecd2:

You have repeatedly claimed that Aquinas starts from premises that I do not share and do not understand and that therefore the arguments I present have no ability to invalidate Aquinas’s logic. (I actually think you mean initial philosophical axioms rather than specific premises in this paricular argument, but you choose your own words). Well then, can you state precisely what those premises are, demonstrate the extent to which I do not share them, show why that is important in the case of this particular argument of Aquinas’s and how therefore his argument survives with its full force.

I used the term “premises” because they form part of an argument, but I agree that those premises state initial philosopical axioms or presupposition. And yes, I can demonstrate that causation is a philosophical axiom of St. Thomas’s rather than a derived premise. He states as much plainly when describing the process of reasoning here:

Demonstration can be made in two ways: One is through the cause, and is called “a priori,” and this is to argue from what is prior absolutely. The other is through the effect, and is called a demonstration “a posteriori”; this is to argue from what is prior relatively only to us. When an effect is better known to us than its cause, from the effect we proceed to the knowledge of the cause. And from every effect the existence of its proper cause can be demonstrated, so long as its effects are better known to us; because since every effect depends upon its cause, if the effect exists, the cause must pre-exist. Hence the existence of God, in so far as it is not self-evident to us, can be demonstrated from those of His effects which are known to us.

newadvent.org/summa/100202.htm
Thus, he clearly states that every form of a posteriori reasoning must assume the principle of cause and effect, viz., his argument depends on recognition of causation a priori. Now you have repeatedly misrepresented causation as a principle that is derived from observation in St. Thomas’s argument, and that is simply false. You have constructed the argument of this form:
(1) St. Thomas’s argument is based on a principle of metaphysical causation derived from observation that all things have a physical cause.
(2) But we have now observed things that exist with no physical cause, making the premise that all things have a physical cause false.
(3) Therefore, St. Thomas’s argument is derived from a false premise.
But your premise (1) is false, as I have shown, so your conclusion (3) is unwarranted.