uncaused cause

[George2]

I don’t believe you are giving Aristotle due credit here.

Didn’t Aquinas borrow the “unmoved mover/first cause” argument from Aristotle whom he always respectfully called the “great doctor” or some other term like that?

Don’t get me wrong, I like our boy from Aquino and used to pray in front of his reliquary (hip bone).

It was comforting to look at him through the class enclosure in the chapel altar. Just me and Thomas Aquinas away from a noisy high school hallway.

The Holy Blessed Eucharist smiling at us through His great tabernacle in the corner and a pondering ordinary man and perhaps the greatest thinker in western civilization .

Me Jesus and Aquinas in the same room. What protestant could believe that?

 

[Bob_Rowland]

Sounds suspiciously like a problem to keep theologians off the streets and out of trouble.

 

[hecd2]

theMutant:

I could only agree with this conclusion if their hypotheses were based on the same understanding of the relavent terms that are necessary to be discussing Thomas’s argument. By your own admission, they were not so based.

My point is this. If, in the lexicon of modern science, the phrase “temporally infinite” is not an oxymoron, then it is obvious that scientists mean something completely different by time (temporal), infinity, or possibly both than Thomas did. They have not simply gained a greater understanding, they are actually talking about something completely different. Likewise with cause.

You admitted as much in post #26 where you stated
If it is true that you cannot judge theoretical physics by applying lay terms then it is also true that theoretical physics cannot disprove Thomas’s argument by applying its own terms to his argument because his argument was not based on the definitions used by modern theoretical physics, but on those which form the basis of the lay understanding and which were the basis of my debate with you.

You will really do need to understand this. If theoretical scientists, when they talk about “cause,” mean something other than what Thomas did when he made is argument about the necessity of the uncaused cause (and you clearly stated that this is the case), then no matter how logical and provable their arguments are in the scientific world, they simply are not discussing the same thing that Thomas was and, therefore, their conclusions do not apply to his argument. This inability to use definitions across fields works both ways. In looking back, it appears that this misunderstanding formed the basis of the beginning of this very thread.
Just as Brown10985 appears not to have understood that Thomas’s argument is not based on the same definitions that he seems to have been applying against that argument, those of us arguing to defend Thomas’s argument have done so not realizing that we were using the same words but still not talking the same language and, therefore, not actually discussing the same thing.

I don’t think that it is viable to jump to the conclusion that because science uses precisely defined terminology that its findings therefore have no bearing on metaphysical concepts. If there are physical phenomena that are formally unpredictable and uncaused (as there are) and if there are self consistent conceptions of temporally infinite cosmologies (as there are), then the formal logical argument for a First Cause is fatally undermined. I must repeat that this is not a proof of God’s non-existence - it is merely a refutation of the proof FOR God from the First Cause. The proof from the First Cause requires temporal causality independent of the Universe - not only is the concept of time inextricably linked to the existence of the universe in GR, but there are logically and empirically self consistent cosmologies that do away entirely with the concept of a first anything as they describe a temporally infinite (and in the case of Linde, a stochastically stationary and eternal universe).

To claim that the argument from First Cause must survive because the attempted refutation from cosmology, GR and QM refers to different concepts than those that Aquinas addressed, one would have to define Aquinas’s terms, define the terms of science and show precisely how Aquinas’s argument survives in the face of apparent logical refutation. Are you up for that? It would be very interesting.

Alec
homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

 

[hecd2]

Hermione:

I guess this is mostly adressed to Alec:

I don’t understand why the mainstream interpretation of quantum mechanics invalidates the argument from contingency.

From what I’ve read Bell proposed a theorem about measurement that relies on the assumptions that 1) nothing moves faster than light and 2) that the world is “real” in that particles have a real position and a real momentum et cetera. He said that if these conditions are true then measurements will not influence each other to more than a certain degree. But when they conducted tests they found Bell’s theorem was violated, so one or more of the assumptions had to be abandoned.

Because of Einstein’s theories about the speed of light many physicists chose to abandon assumption 2) and say that particles don’t have a real position and a real momentum, that there is similar inherent uncertainty about energy and time and this is how we can have spontaneous generation of large amounts of energy (and thus matter) on short intervals of time.

But I’ve read that there are other physicists such as Bohm who have rejected assumption 1) instead of assumption 2). And this is how you get “hidden variable” interpretations of quantum mechanics. From what I know, in hidden variable interpretations you still have causation and not randomness.

Every single experiment up to very recent ones such as Stenner, Gauthier and Nelfeld, *The speed of information on a ‘fast-light’ optical medium, *Nature 425, 695 - 698 (2003) support the fact that information cannot be transmitted faster than the speed of light. Bohmian mechanics is very interesting in that he sought a formulation of quantum mechanics that would eliminate the need for an observer AND that would avoid the need for exotic hidden variables, and did so by resurrecting a 1920s idea of Louis deBroglie.

The deBroglie-Bohm formulation works like this: particles have deterministic positions and momenta (in other words fundamental particles are just like classical particles. They are not in many places at once and do not depend on `observers’ to collapse a probability function; they do not depend on difficult to imagine ideas like multiple universes: they are in fact like little marbles; if we measure a particle in a particular position, it’s because it is actually there and not anywhere else). Associated with any system of particles is a wave function that obeys Schroedinger’s equation, that encodes information about the particle system and that governs the fundamental variables of the particles, like position and momentum. (Bohm’s formulation does not attempt to resolve the wave-particle duality of matter by plumping for one or the other – rather, for Bohm, it’s particles AND waves). The basic mathematical formulation is simple and satisfying: the evolution of a system of particles is defined by Schroedinger’s equation applied to the Hamiltonian describing the masses and potential energies of the particle system, and a guiding equation for the positions of the particles that incorporates the quantum mechanical wave function of the particles (this is the quantum potential, or as it’s sometimes called the pilot wave). This formalism has been developed particularly by Durr, Goldstein, Berndl and Zanghi and is getting more and more attention from those who find the Copenhagen interpretation unsatisfactory. (The basic formulation of Bohmian mechanics is quite simple and I can reproduce it for anyone who has a little mathematical knowledge and is interested).

To be continued

 

[hecd2]

Continued

The Bohmian formulation suffers, of course, from the fact that it
results in a much more complicated solution than does the simple
linear Schroedinger equation. The quantum potential as represented by the guiding equation is not simple and is highly non-linear, and it describes what seems to be an almost arbitrary additional force term (in addition to all the classical forces acting on the particles). The Bohmian trajectory of a particle can be extremely non-Newtonian. Furthermore Bohm’s quantum potential is fundamentally non-local in character (ie things a long way apart influence one another faster than the speed of light). However, since quantum phenomena are undeniably non-local (as Aspect demonstrated), any formal theory that seeks to describe them must necessarily contain non-local attributes.

There are still other interpretations of quantum mechanics such as the many worlds interpretation which says that all possible outcomes actually happen in different universes.

This is, I assume the Feynman idea of sums over histories.

And this is why I don’t understand why the randomness of the standard interpretation can be used to refute a philosophical argument. All that we know is that the equations of the standard model work very well because they have been confirmed countless times by experiment. But we also know that the same results can be arrived at using other interpretations. These interpretations give us strikingly different conceptions of the world. How can we be certain in choosing one over the other?

We’ve either got something like the Copenhagen interpretation or Feynman’s or something like Bohm’s: in any case, it is fundamentally impossible to predict quantum events such as tunnelling, radioactive decay, quantum uncertainty in fundamental scalar fields etcetera. This fundamental unprectability is in a different class from the unpredictibaility that underlies certain chaotic classical systems. The unpredictibality is utterly fundamental and not subject to measurement accuracy These phenomena undermine the classical notion of causality (on which Aquinas rested his case) at the quantum level. Macroscopic (statistical) causality remains a perfectly respectable principle, while the foundations of causality are undermined.

How can we be sure that any of these interpretations is an accurate description of the real world? Isn’t it true that quantum mechanics itself is incomplete because it doesn’t contain gravity? Right now physicists are working to unite gravity with quantum mechanics, and what that theory will tell us about the world could very well be strikingly different from the quantum picture.

That is right - QM does not currently include gravity and no-one knows how to do it. My guess is that we will need empirical clues from observations of the Higgs field to close that loop.

To be continued

 

[hecd2]

Continued

I guess my main point is that I don’t understand how one of the many interpretations of an incomplete theory that will very probably be soon replaced by a theory with very different philosophical implications can be used to refute a philosophical argument that relies (as I think all philosophy does) on the assumption that human reasoning isn’t inherently flawed.

I think that our current understanding of QM is sufficient to demonstrate that classical causality does not apply at a quantum level - that is the current state of human reasoning.

I hope you’ll take the time to respond to this, especially if I hold wrong beliefs about what quantum mechanics actually is.

Thanks!

Your understanding of quantum mechanics makes me suspect you are a physicist or a scientist of some kind?

Alec

homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

 

[hecd2]

theMutant:

Of course they could be compared and contrasted; but ONLY AFTER ESTABLISHING DEFINITIONS OF TERMS THAT WILL BE THE SAME IN BOTH AREAS. Everything else you say is corrrect and have already confirmed that point previously. You say that we sould only come to the conclusion that they can not be compared after a good faith attempt. I think that both Alec and I made such and attempt and I made that conclusion as a result of that attempt.

IF we could establish relavent terms with consistent definitions in BOTH areas of study, then we could and should make such a comparisson and, I firmly believe, that not only will Thomas’s conclusions be found to be true, that much, if not all, of what Alec has brought forth will also. Without a common understanding of language, a valid comparrison of Thomas’s arguments and the theories of modern theoretical physics is simply not possible.

Dear David,

I would be quite interested in attempting a ‘good faith’ atempt to define terms and come to a common understanding. How about it? It might take some time, effort ansd and preparedness on both our parts to abandon stated positions.

Alec

 

[hecd2]

JPrejean:

Maybe I’m just confused because I don’t particularly see where this is relevant to St. Thomas’s argument if you are not advocating nihilism. St. Thomas’s argument deals with metaphysical causation, and you seem to be arguing that because there is no need for physical causation, there is also no need for metaphysical causation. However, even St. Thomas’s own theory requires that at least one event, the creation ex nihilo, lacks a physical cause (since there are no physical conditions even existent to produce it). But it does not lack an efficient (metaphysical) cause, viz., God. My point is that skepticism about metaphysical causation strikes me as inherently nihilistic. I have no notion whatsoever as to how one might simultaneously claim to be engaging in rational philosophy while rejecting metaphysical causation entirely, Hume’s and Popper’s valiant efforts toward that objective notwithstanding. ISTM that you are asserting that the absence of a need for a physical cause implies the absence of a need for a metaphysical cause, and the latter strikes me as nihilism.

Indeed, as even Hume would note, it is not empirical observation that rationally proves causation to us in the first place (hence, the problem of induction). Rather, it is the sense of our own experiences being caused that leads us to the notion of causation, which we in turn apply to the world around us. We instinctively take metaphysical causation for granted by presuming that we can usefully reason about anything at all, and that’s why I think that the contrary position is ultimately nihilistic and useless. Here’s an article that echoes that general proposition:
radicalacademy.com/studentrefphil6j.htm

I’m definitely not advocating any sort of pure a priorism in the manner of Descartes, and neither was St. Thomas. On the contrary, we both assume the integral role of experience, and more particularly, understanding experiences coherently in order to arrive at truthful positions. This is why I think you got me all wrong in the previous post about “delicate metaphysical sensibilities.” I’m not starting out thinking about how things ought to be, and then attempting to impose that construct on my experience. Rather, I am simply understanding how it is that my reason interacts with my experience and explaining why such an interaction is useful or meaningful. If you assume that it is not useful or meaningful, then ISTM that you must be rejecting philosophy as an endeavor outright.

I have a very simple (and probably, to you, deeply unsatisfying) answer which is that if we accept that there is no need for physical causation then it follows that there is no need for metaphysical causation for if we can logically posit that all that we are arises from physical exigencies and I see no reason, no reason at all to think otherwise, then a conclusion that there is no need for a physical First Cause then there is no need for a metaphysical First Cause. I recognise that this is very far from your starting position, but mine is that there is no phenomenon that cannot be explained by reference to the physical world, which, we know, can exist causeless. I, at least, claim Occam’s razor. Why posit a supernatural domain when that hypothesis is not required?

But, please understand that I respect, indeed honour the philosophy and theology of your experience. This thread is essentially about necessity, not about sufficiency, which is a limitation of the the thread that almost all have failed to recognise.

Alec

 

[hecd2]

john doran:

… the rest

a guy named bell is thought to have demonstrated the impossibility of hiden variables with his formulation of what is known as bell’s inequality, experimental support for which is popularly understood (just what these experiments showed is, in fact, disputed) to have culminated in the experiments of a french scientist named aspect.

Dear John,

Ah no - Alain Aspect demonstrated the violation of John Bell’s inequality - a violation that Bell was perfectly aware would occur if the full implications of QM were to be empirically demonstrated as they have been.

however, what bell showed is in fact only that the quantum world must be either local or real, but not both. in other words, either you accept the copenhagen interpretation and reject the idea that there are such things as particles that exist independently of being observed, with definite properties like position and momentum, or you give up the idea that there can be superluminal (faster-than-light) interactions.

No again: superluminal interaction is fundamental to Bohmian mechanics and non-locality is also fundamental to a Copenhagen interpretation of a quantum experiment. The issue is not non-locality wich exists in every sensible interpretation of QM) but the need for an ‘observer’ and the deterministic trajecyory of the particle.

and, as i observed in my first post, above, at that point it simply comes down to the strength of your respective convictions: which one of the two alternatives do you believe less strongly? for me, it’s locality - i am much, much less certain that information cannot be communicated faster than the speed of light than i am that the world, all the way down, has specific, objective existence.

These are not alternatives - this is, in logical terms, a false dichotomy.

i could go on, but i can’t be bothered and i think alec probably knows most of this anyway.

here’s some readings, if anyone’s interested:

general:

1. fact-index.com/h/hi/hidden_variable_theory.html
2. freespace.virgin.net/ch.thompson1/Papers/The%20Record/TheRecord.htm

papers:

1. intercom.net/~tarababe/dissertation.pdf
2. math.rutgers.edu/~oldstein/papers/crlet.pdf
3. xxx.lanl.gov/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/9810/9810080.pdf

• jd

Fine stuff - but how does ths support the notion of a First Cause?

Alec

 

[hecd2]

Sherlock:

As a Catholic, I give to Catholic charities that recognize man as more than just an interesting combination of molecules.

Good for you - thank you for this charitable and loving encouragement to all who care. In the absence of evidence to the contrary I repeat that only one person on this board has contributed to the cause of rebuilding homes for the poor people of Grenada. I don’t give a tinker’s cuss for whether contributions to that cause are made through Catholic charities or other charities such as mine as long as they are made, and those who need help care less than I do. So we all can assume that you have contributed to this cause through one of the catholic charities you referenced? Have you? Or is all this that you wrote about Catholic charities, simple bluster?

Have you read much Chesterton? There’s a great quote from him, the gist of which (sorry, don’t have the exact quote in front of me) is that “‘agnostic’ is only the Greek word for the Latin word ‘ignorant’”.

Of course it is. I am indeed ignorant and proud of it. Ignorance is the raw material of science and the true Enlightenment. The great trouble with religious dogma is that it pretends to and fails to provide absolute knowledge. Adult humanity rejoices in its ignorance. The fact is that we just don’t know about many many things including whether or not there is a God (that branch of ignorance that we call agnosticism). The child in us wants certainty and latches on to all sorts of comforting fairy tales.

Alec
homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

 

[hecd2]

clmowry:

hecd2:

*Uh, no.

The uncertainty principle disallows the concept of a field with zero value and*

zero rate of change. Not only is the non-zero value of the scalar fields in ‘empty space’ from which spontaneous quantum generation of partcle/antiparticle pairs arise good theoretical physics - it also predicts empirically measurable phenomena. The detection of the Casimir effect to an error better than 5% demonstrates the fact of these quantum effects of spontanaeous ‘uncaused’ phenomena.

Many models of the universe have the total matter-energy equal to zero. In the early universe quarks and anti-quarks annihilate to form photons (the phptons of the CMB that we can still observe). The current extant ordinary matter results from an excess of quarks over anti-quarks of one part in a billion. A billion quark/antiquark pairs annihilate for every one quark that survives. Potential energy due to gravity, expansion of the universe, and the total mass of ordinary matter sum in many models to zero. The universe might well be a zero sum game.

Alec
evolutionpages.com
Hehe…and creation is supposed to be unbelievable.

Yes - and what particular aspect of what I said do you have a problem with?

Alec

 

[hecd2]

Philthy:

Alec-

Sounds like some awesome stuff which I no longer have a hope of understanding! As you later say - it requires an understanding of the “maths”. I do, however, think I have a fairly decent mind when it comes to philosophical critical analysis. Most people can’t get beyond the basics in forming a coherent argument.
I would like to understand some of the things you stated in this post better:
From 1) Could you please explain what you mean by an “uncaused particle”. How can you truly know something is uncaused? Don’t you really mean that if there is a cause it is outside the realm of science? Even within the realm of science wouldn’t the claim of knowledge of a lack of cause require a complete understanding of the allegedly credible “multiverse” scenario you propose to exclude it as being part of the particles generation?

The ‘uncaused’ phenomena are fundamentally, deeply, unpredictable. This is not just a case for phenomena we don’t understand. The unpredictibality of tunnelling, radioactive decay, selection for which double slit to pass is genuinely random and formally uncaused.

From 2) are the “temporally infinite” universe scenarios you describe an endpoint scenario, beginning point scenario, or what?
How do we unite temporally infinite stuff with the finite within the realm of science?

By temporally infinite I mean without beginning or end. As mathematicians would say, stationary.

As for the question, what is the difficulty?

From 3) “if we are able to posit a Being that exists infinitely, the same logic would support a physical universe with the same properties.” This is a strong indication that you truly misunderstand that science may not hold all the answers. Lets look at your critical analysis:
Premise 1: We can posit an eternal being
Premise 2: Whatever logic we apply to eternal beings can
be applied to the physical universe.
Conclusion:We can posit an eternal physical universe.

Sorry my friend, but premise number 2 is invalid and therefore so is the conclusion. The eternal being posited in premise one does not, by necesity, need to be confined to laws of physical nature/physics. If a being can exist outside of nature (time and space), science will not be able to access a knowledge of this being.

Unfortunately for your logic, so is the eternal universe which is not necessarily subject to the same laws we currently observe. Premise number 2 is perfectly valid.

Hey, as an aside, is the concept of the amount of energy in our universe being a constant still valid?

No. Never has been since 1916.

Phil

Alec
homepage.ntlworld.com/macandrew/Grenada_disaster/Grenada_disaster.htm

 

[Exporter]

O.K., guys, there have been 91 posts made on this thread. Does anyone have a conclusionary statement? Or if not , why?:yup:

---

 

[hecd2]

Exporter:

O.K., guys, there have been 91 posts made on this thread. Does anyone have a conclusionary statement? Or if not , why?:yup:

---

Here’s a (biased) attempt.

Aquinas’s argument for the existence of God based on the uncaused cause is unsustainable. However the unsustainability of this argument is entirely powerless to disprove the idea of God. So, with reference purely to the uncaused cause argument, the existence of God is not necessary (unless one equates the idea of God with the idea of all that exists in the physical universe), but otherwise, God’s existence is neither proven nor disproven.

Alec
evolutionpages.com

 

[JPrejean]

Wow, I didn’t even notice that this had come back.

hecd2:

I recognise that this is very far from your starting position, but mine is that there is no phenomenon that cannot be explained by reference to the physical world, which, we know, can exist causeless. I, at least, claim Occam’s razor. Why posit a supernatural domain when that hypothesis is not required?

That is exactly my point. The statement “there is no phenomenon that cannot be explained by reference to the physical world” is logically equivalent to the statement “nothing that cannot be explained by reference to the physical world is a phenomenon worth explaining.” For the life of me, I cannot fathom how the physical world can ever answer the question of what the objective meaning of life is, which means that philosophy (the quest for meaning through the use of reason) is a worthless endeavor. And you can’t rely on Occam’s razor to support a hypothesis that doesn’t explain or trivially explains the subject of the hypothesis. IOW, it isn’t parsimonious to answer the question “What does it all mean?” with “Nothing.” Naturalism (and indeed the whole concept of the Enlightenment) is essentially nihilism in the end.

hecd2:

This thread is essentially about necessity, not about sufficiency, which is a limitation of the the thread that almost all have failed to recognise.

I believe that metaphysical causation is a necessary hypothesis for existence to have objective meaning. Is that wrong?

hecd2:

Ignorance is the raw material of science and the true Enlightenment. The great trouble with religious dogma is that it pretends to and fails to provide absolute knowledge. Adult humanity rejoices in its ignorance. The fact is that we just don’t know about many many things including whether or not there is a God (that branch of ignorance that we call agnosticism). The child in us wants certainty and latches on to all sorts of comforting fairy tales.

Ah, I see. God is all just childish wish-fulfillment because we want certainty and absolute knowledge, when we should simply be honest with the fact that “we just don’t know” because we “can’t explain the phenomenon with respect to the physical world.” Well, I guess Ayn Rand was right. Fold up the tents, people! We’re all objectivists now!

Sorry, but it’s awfully hard to take you seriously when you appear to have such little understanding of theistic philsophy. Perhaps that’s why you find it so difficult understanding why your response here is irrelevant to St. Thomas’s argument.

So, for the rational response, hecd2 hasn’t even addressed St. Thomas’s argument, because he makes a completely unwarranted inference that metaphysical causation is not necessary if physical causation is not necessary. He provides no reason for this inference other that naturalism (or nihilism, really). Therefore, if you consider naturalism a false premise (and there is certainly no reason to accept it), then you don’t have to believe it’s argument.

Congratulations, hecd2! You’ve proved that if you’re a naturalist, you are agnostic about God. For your next trick, why don’t you prove something equally impressive, like showing that water is wet?

 

[Hermione]

Alec,

Thank you for your response. I am not a scientist or a physicist, and I can’t respond to what you said about quantum mechanics because I don’t know enough.

Having read your other posts in this thread it seems to me that you think the “first cause” argument is invalid because quantum mechanics has shown us that events occur randomly and furthermore that this randomness is an innate quality of matter rather than the limitation of measurement. Is this right?

I can see how your argument could be (and possibly is) a very good one if quantum mechanics is a true description of the universe. If events in this world truly don’t need causes then you’re right: we can’t conclude that the whole of the universe needs a cause.

I guess my main objection to this is that I don’t understand how quantum mechanics can possibly be a true description of the whole universe. From my (very limited) knowledge of it, quantum mechanics studies the world on a very small scale; it also does not take everything into account (specifically gravity). Einstein’s theory of general relativity, which from my knowledge is a very good description of large-scale structures of the universe, is fundamentally incompatible with quantum mechanics precisely because of the uncertainty principle. The theory of relativity and quantum mechanics both have experimental evidence to support them, yet both cannot be true because they contradict each other. From my understanding neither of these theories can possibly be a true description of the whole universe simply because neither attempts to describe the whole universe. I’ve heard about superstring theory which is the most recent attempt on the part of scientists to unite these two theories, and (correct me if I’m wrong) superstring theory unites the two by “smoothing” over the fluctuations caused by the uncertainty principle.

The point I want to make is that it doesn’t make sense to me how any version of quantum mechanics can be a true description of the entire universe. And if it’s not, then how can it be a refutation of the “first cause” argument for God?

For me, what seems probable to be true is that there is a greater theory we’ve not yet discovered that encompasses both quantum mechanics and general relativity. The mathematical framework of this theory can be simplified in different ways for specific instances to give us quantum mechanics and relativity (just like Newton’s classical physics is a simplified version of general relativity).

If there is such a greater theory, then assuming that the philosophical implications of the equations of quantum mechanics are true makes as much sense as assuming that the philosophical implications of classical physics are true, because both are fundamentally incomplete.

Do you agree with me that for quantum mechanics to invalidate the first cause argument it has to be a true description of the universe? If you do, what makes you think that quantum mechanics is the true description of the universe and not a simplified mathematical version of a greater theory that could very well do away with the uncertainty principle?

Another point that I hope you’ll address is this: I don’t understand how the idea of inherent randomness is compatible with science in general. If things are completely random and don’t need causes, then how can we apply the scientific method to study the universe? From my understanding scientific theories are tested by making hypotheses and performing experiments to either support or disprove the theories. If events happen randomly and without causes, then what guarantee do we have that a certain set of experimental conditions will always lead to a certain outcome? It seems to me that the idea of randomness would discredit science, can you explain how this isn’t true?

Thanks again!
Hermione

 

[JimG]

There are several phenomena that, in my view, cannot be explained by reference to the physical world: Mind and Will.

Mind works by abstraction–that is, by removing every physical component of something in order to arrive at its essence. Mind is itself non-material, or it would not have the ability of abstraction.

Will empowers one to choose. If the will is material, it is determined, (quantum theory or not), and thus not free.

And mind, if it is material, is also determined, and this whole thread might have been randomly typed by a woodpecker at a keyboard.

 

[Alterum]

Alec,

My understanding of quantum mechanics is quite slim, but from what I do understand of what you wrote, I just want to make a point.

It seems to me as though we can liken (in one respect) the First Cause argument to a question that asks, say, “What came first, the chicken or the egg?”

Your response, from what I understand (and I could be wrong) is saying that, since it is fundamentally impossible to predict certain quantum events, neither HAD to come first; in fact, neither needed a cause.

Let’s bear in mind that this view needs to be extrapolated onto the entire universe, at which point you can claim that the First Cause argument is invalid because the universe really doesn’t need a first cause (?).

I do not think, if that is indeed the crux of the argument, that we can reasonably use this argument to invalidate the First Cause argument. An argument from the randomness of QM seems to say, “Look, by our best scientific observations up to this point we can determine that random things happen in the universe on a quantum level, so the whole beginning of the universe could be random,” whereas the First Cause argument taken this far might say, “Random things - and everything else - happen in the universe; but of course it was all created by some reasonably omnipotent power.” You come no nearer to addressing this proposition - and no nearer to grasping the *how? - *when you observe random things in nature as when you observe static things in nature.

While First Cause doesn’t prove that there is a God, it points fairly strongly to the idea that there has to be some omnipotent power.

I’d like to make one more point: You seem to be arguing here (and in a separate post elsewhere to which I also responded) from the position that there are no signs to point to God’s existence (hence, in that other post, you supposed you were a rational alien instead of a human). However, we believe there are an overabundance of signs, inherent in human nature, to point to God’s existence. JimG’s post points to some of these; I’d like to add, along with free will, the idea of a moral conscience.

Finally, adherence to Catholicism is still undeniably, and foremost, an act of faith; or even better, an act of love.

“For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened.”

 

[buffalo]

Alterum:

Alec,

My understanding of quantum mechanics is quite slim, but from what I do understand of what you wrote, I just want to make a point.

It seems to me as though we can liken (in one respect) the First Cause argument to a question that asks, say, “What came first, the chicken or the egg?”

Your response, from what I understand (and I could be wrong) is saying that, since it is fundamentally impossible to predict certain quantum events, neither HAD to come first; in fact, neither needed a cause.

Let’s bear in mind that this view needs to be extrapolated onto the entire universe, at which point you can claim that the First Cause argument is invalid because the universe really doesn’t need a first cause (?).

I do not think, if that is indeed the crux of the argument, that we can reasonably use this argument to invalidate the First Cause argument. An argument from the randomness of QM seems to say, “Look, by our best scientific observations up to this point we can determine that random things happen in the universe on a quantum level, so the whole beginning of the universe could be random,” whereas the First Cause argument taken this far might say, “Random things - and everything else - happen in the universe; but of course it was all created by some reasonably omnipotent power.” You come no nearer to addressing this proposition - and no nearer to grasping the *how? - *when you observe random things in nature as when you observe static things in nature.

While First Cause doesn’t prove that there is a God, it points fairly strongly to the idea that there has to be some omnipotent power.

I’d like to make one more point: You seem to be arguing here (and in a separate post elsewhere to which I also responded) from the position that there are no signs to point to God’s existence (hence, in that other post, you supposed you were a rational alien instead of a human). However, we believe there are an overabundance of signs, inherent in human nature, to point to God’s existence. JimG’s post points to some of these; I’d like to add, along with free will, the idea of a moral conscience.

Finally, adherence to Catholicism is still undeniably, and foremost, an act of faith; or even better, an act of love.

“For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and wickedness of men who by their wickedness suppress the truth. For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened.”

Quantum physics is probabilistic. To actually determine if a predicted event has happened their must be an observer in an outside frame. The idea of an observer is a problem for atheist scientists because it defeats materialism. They have wrestled with this for 75 years. Since quantum physics appears to be a theory that is sticking this becomes a real issue and forces them to come to grips with it.

 

[Sherlock]

Hecd2,

You wrote: “Good for you - thank you for this charitable and loving encouragement to all who care.”

It’s not my job to encourage donations to an unknown individual on the Internet who may or may not be doing what he claims. There are a lot of scams out there. Personally, if it means anything, I think that you are probably on the up-and-up, but let’s be clear: it’s not my job to encourage donations to your cause.

You wrote: “In the absence of evidence to the contrary I repeat that only one person on this board has contributed to the cause of rebuilding homes for the poor people of Grenada.”

No, it simply means that only one person has contributed to YOU. Don’t ask Christians to give you “evidence” of their generosity to charitable causes—it’s just unseemly. We’re not to trumpet our giving.

You wrote: “I don’t give a tinker’s cuss for whether contributions to that cause are made through Catholic charities or other charities such as mine as long as they are made, and those who need help care less than I do.”

But giving to a Catholic charity, in my mind, means that I am dealing with a real organization, with real accountability (most charities give accounts of where the money goes). Giving money to an individual over the Internet doesn’t strike me as a very smart use of my charitable funds. And, frankly, it may make a difference to those who are helped: Catholics believe that man is more than a clever animal. A charity that can give spiritual help as well as material help treats the whole person, not just their material needs.

You wrote: " So we all can assume that you have contributed to this cause through one of the catholic charities you referenced? Have you? Or is all this that you wrote about Catholic charities, simple bluster?"

This is tasteless on your part, but you may not know that so I’ll give you a pass. Here’s a hint for the future, though: Christians are instructed not to boast of their giving. But yes, I do contribute. In fact, I tithe. Some of my tithing is given to strengthening Catholicism in this country (Catholic Answers, Ave Maria University, Thomas More Law Center, Legionaries of Christ, etc.), some of it is in the form of sponsoring children and aging persons in poor countries (3 kids and one elderly blind woman), some spent aiding the Church in the former Soviet Union (Aid to the Church in Russia, Vladivostok Mission, Ukrainian Catholic Education Foundation, etc.), pro-life groups, and yes, Catholic aid to many areas in the world through groups such as Catholic Relief Services, Catholic World Mission, CNEW, as well as many individual groups of religious orders (Passionist Missionaries, Franciscan Friars, etc.). And yes, many of these groups are providing hurricane relief. Does that answer your question? Can you give me one good reason why I should send money to an unknown individual who is hostile to religion, instead of to these charities?

You wrote: “Adult humanity rejoices in its ignorance. The fact is that we just don’t know about many many things including whether or not there is a God (that branch of ignorance that we call agnosticism). The child in us wants certainty and latches on to all sorts of comforting fairy tales.”

This is merely the standard fairy tale (and an elitist, self-aggrandizing one to boot) that is latched on to by the atheist and agnostic. This caricature of the Christian as an idiot, which comfortably ignores the great Christian scientists throughout history, is not deserving of any respect.