Violins of nothing

[Aloysium]

. . . “It has been argued in this thread (by some) that things cannot come from nothing but must, therefore, be made out of the Being of God.”

Some people believe that.

:twocents:

However, it have been revealed that God is infinitely powerful and that He brings everything that would not otherwise be, into existence.

Genesis, utilizing the world-view of its time, describes how God created all there is, in a hierarchical temporal sequence, where new “substance” was created utilizing “substance” that had been previously created (from the earth He brought forth all living things).

The Triune Godhead is one.
There is no Being separate from the Totality from which to make anything else.
The Word became flesh and His sacrifice was made at the foundation of the world, as revealed in Jesus Christ.
So God does enter into His Creation in order to bring it into the same loving communion that exists within the Trinity.

In the pantheistic vision, love is an illusion.
Reality does reveal otherwise.
God is Love.

 

[Peter_Plato]

We surely would say numbers are “made out of” the being of matter, would we?

Should have been "We surely would NOT say numbers are “made out of” the being of matter…etc.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

The problem with Hawking’s “something else” (quantum vacuum?) to ground space-time is that he is merely off-loading the explanatory principle onto some unspecified ground from which things “spontaneously sprout” so as to waylay the need to explain what this mysterious existential ground could possibly be.

Here you are just badmouthing cosmologists. They do try to come up with descriptions of the spontaneously-sprouting-ground. In fact, they do so in a much more careful manner than theists. Rather than simply saying “see how things are, that’s how the multiverse made it” they attempt to define what sorts of properties our universe could have given their multiverse model, and compare those to what we observe. You are right in pointing out that we can very easily come up with an infinite regress or brute facts in this scenario, but the key point is that we don’t know if at some point along the way we will run into an “existential medium” which exists a se. You cited “science” as evidence for the non-a-se-ness of our space time, but if we’re going to appeal to science, we have to be very realistic about what science actually tells us.

tl;dr: How do you know the multiverse doesn’t exist a se, or the multi-multiverse?

Even if he is correct that this “something else” exists he still hasn’t shown how it explains what does exist. AT metaphysics makes the claim that at some point a sufficiently explanatory ground MUST exist - the regress cannot go on indefinitely or nothing is ultimately explained.

But why should we expect things to have explanations “all the way down,” as it were. This is the reason people came up with the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the first place, they really wanted things to have reasons all the way to the end. Unfortunately, short of asserting it as a principle, there is really no way to justify it.

By "existential medium” I mean a kind of “mode” of existence according to which individual entities subsist on their own terms. Physical entities exist within space-time-matter-energy as the mode according to which they exist. They exist as material beings within space-time as their medium.

To try to “ground” material entities in God as their “ground of being” is much like attempting to ground ideas/dreams/qualia in the material world as if these things exist as physical entities. They simply don’t.

It’s really not very hard to describe ideas/dreams/qualia in terms of physical phenomenon by ascribing them all to physical brain activity. When people make this objection, it often sounds to me like they are saying “well, Microsoft Word doesn’t exist in a material sense!” when they have no concept of how information is stored on a hard drive. If you object on the grounds that neuroscience can’t describe brain activity as well as computer scientists can describe hard drive activity, you’d essentially be making a God-of-the-gaps sort of argument.

Another example: we would not say that numbers exist “materially” even though material entities in some sense “correspond” to or exhibit mathematical existents. We surely would say numbers are “made out of” the being of matter, would we?

But if you think about mathematics as a very useful idea, then my response to idea/dreams/qualia renders this not very different.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Here you are just badmouthing cosmologists. They do try to come up with descriptions of the spontaneously-sprouting-ground. In fact, they do so in a much more careful manner than theists. Rather than simply saying “see how things are, that’s how the multiverse made it” they attempt to define what sorts of properties our universe could have given their multiverse model, and compare those to what we observe. You are right in pointing out that we can very easily come up with an infinite regress or brute facts in this scenario, but the key point is that we don’t know if at some point along the way we will run into an “existential medium” which exists a se. You cited “science” as evidence for the non-a-se-ness of our space time, but if we’re going to appeal to science, we have to be very realistic about what science actually tells us.

tl;dr: How do you know the multiverse doesn’t exist a se, or the multi-multiverse?

Yah, sure. And how do you know my argyle socks don’t exist a se (given a proposed inherent capacity to fluctuate in and out of the visual field available to human beings)?

But why should we expect things to have explanations “all the way down,” as it were. This is the reason people came up with the Principle of Sufficient Reason in the first place, they really wanted things to have reasons all the way to the end. Unfortunately, short of asserting it as a principle, there is really no way to justify it.

That isn’t quite the problem. You see if the PSR is not adhered to, then very strange (irrational, really) ideas start to manifest themselves. If the PSR can be suspended whenever we choose, then it can be suspended arbitrarily - implying that one does not need a sufficient reason to invoke the principle of sufficient reason. Or, alternatively, implying that you don’t require a sufficient reason to either accept or deny the principle.

You see, Mr. Kappa, if there is “no way to justify” the principle then one needs no justification
to diss, miss or dismiss it. Insanity, here we come!

At what point are you willing to abandon the PSR? When the requirement for “reason” leads you to implications you find intolerable? That seems to demonstrate the very kind of arbitrariness you claim serious scientists would find objectionable.

I don’t think people “came up with” the principle of sufficient reason. More like: in order for anything at all to make sense the PSR must be true. Otherwise irrationality is as compelling as rationality since if proper reasons to account for anything need not exist as foundational to reality then they need not exist at all.

I suppose we could allow the rat of irrationality to gnaw away at the roots of reason, but then don’t complain when the entire tree gets eviscerated.

It’s really not very hard to describe ideas/dreams/qualia in terms of physical phenomenon by ascribing them all to physical brain activity. When people make this objection, it often sounds to me like they are saying “well, Microsoft Word doesn’t exist in a material sense!” when they have no concept of how information is stored on a hard drive.

This just seems an odd claim to make. No one claimed “Microsoft Word [does not] exist in a material sense,” but the claim could be that the existence of Microsoft Word cannot be sufficiently explained with reference to matter. The matter is “informed” by something beyond itself that explains the particular “form” that the magnetic particles on the hard drive take. The problem is that those same particles do not and cannot fully explain Microsoft Word, because without the complete accounting (one that transcends the particles on a hard drive) for what Microsoft Word is, the mere arrangement of particles on a hard drive does not sufficiently explain either Word nor their arrangement.

If you object on the grounds that neuroscience can’t describe brain activity as well as computer scientists can describe hard drive activity, you’d essentially be making a God-of-the-gaps sort of argument.
But if you think about mathematics as a very useful idea, then my response to idea/dreams/qualia renders this not very different.

I find it interesting that you invoke a “God of the gaps” objection when you are willing to throw out the PSR whenever a knowledge “gap” rears its ugly head. If you are willing to allow that the PSR cannot be justified why are you at all insistent that a “God of the gaps” personal theist must be objected to? Aren’t you essentially taking a “… of the gaps” position when you DENY that the PSR CAN be justified? It appears you are willing to allow gaps in the potential of reason to be explanatory, but are claiming the personal theist has no right to fill that gap with God, but you somehow (and arbitrarily) are allowed to fill the gap with “no sufficient reason is required.”

It would seem proper to ask what sufficient reason we would have for allowing YOU to dismiss the PSR but not, on similar grounds, to allow the personal theist to invoke God. What reason would be sufficient to warrant agreeing to your stance rather than taking the side of the personal theist?

 

[JapaneseKappa]

That isn’t quite the problem. You see if the PSR is not adhered to, then very strange (irrational, really) ideas start to manifest themselves. If the PSR can be suspended whenever we choose, then it can be suspended arbitrarily - implying that one does not need a sufficient reason to invoke the principle of sufficient reason. Or, alternatively, implying that you don’t require a sufficient reason to either accept or deny the principle.

It would seem proper to ask what sufficient reason we would have for allowing YOU to dismiss the PSR but not, on similar grounds, to allow the personal theist to invoke God. What reason would be sufficient to warrant agreeing to your stance rather than taking the side of the personal theist?

But I’m not suspending it arbitrarily, and I’m honestly surprised you can’t come up with the clear distinction between the case of “reason for the universe” and “reasons within the universe” on your own. There pretty obvious reasons why we might want to suspend our demand for reasons why.

All our experiences of “reasons why” come from the latter camp: all the “reasons why” we’ve ever observed fall squarely into “reasons within the universe.” Inside the universe we have an arrow of time. We have laws of physics. These are the factors which lead people to a PSR in the first place. They are reasons why we would expect reasons why; reasons why it is reasonable to expect reasons why inside the universe. (Obviously, though, we can’t adhere to it so closely that we reject the possibility of things like actually random events in quantum systems as a violation.)

Unfortunately, we really have very little knowledge that would allow us to talk about whatever framework the universe itself is embedded in. No arrow of time? No laws of physics? Why should we extend our inductive basis for the PSR this far? We have lost the reasons for expecting reasons why. Obviously cosmologists are trying to describe the framework but I believe that most are somewhat pessimistic, admitting that their theories are not likely to ever come into contact with hard scientific evidence (or at least, not in a conclusive way.)

 

[Peter_Plato]

But I’m not suspending it arbitrarily, and I’m honestly surprised you can’t come up with the clear distinction between the case of “reason for the universe” and “reasons within the universe” on your own. There pretty obvious reasons why we might want to suspend our demand for reasons why.

“I’m not suspending it arbitrarily…” but “…we might want to suspend our demand for reasons why…” on “pretty obvious reasons.”

What precisely are those “pretty obvious reasons?”

You seem to refer to two.

1. Reasons “why” are reasons from within the universe.

That doesn’t amount to a warranted reason for suspending our “demand for reasons” with reference to things outside the universe, merely that the universe itself is an internally coherent whole. Why should that be? Well all that integral coherency just “popped” into existence, I suppose, for no reason. You can’t say, however, that the internal coherency of the universe gives NO REASON for expecting reasonableness or explanations to proceed beyond the universe.

On balance it gives us more reason to expect reasons beyond the universe than not expect them, so your argument fails to support a contention that we have warrant for suspending our expectation for reasons existing beyond the bounds of the universe. You have given no warrant for that.

All our experiences of “reasons why” come from the latter camp: all the “reasons why” we’ve ever observed fall squarely into “reasons within the universe.” Inside the universe we have an arrow of time. We have laws of physics. These are the factors which lead people to a PSR in the first place. They are reasons why we would expect reasons why; reasons why it is reasonable to expect reasons why inside the universe. (Obviously, though, we can’t adhere to it so closely that we reject the possibility of things like actually random events in quantum systems as a violation.)

1. Your second point is that we can’t (or very likely can’t) come to know what is beyond the universe, so we have no sufficient warrant for thinking reasons do exist outside of what we can know. This point is simply a non sequitur. What we don’t or can’t know does not serve to prove anything about what we don’t or can’t know.

Ignorance doesn’t provide warrant for anything regarding knowledge. In effect, ignorance doesn’t even tell you what you do know because you have to have at least an inkling of what you don’t know in order to know you are ignorant. Socrates made this point a long time ago - at least he knew that he didn’t know which put him a level above the truly ignorant.

Unfortunately, we really have very little knowledge that would allow us to talk about whatever framework the universe itself is embedded in. No arrow of time? No laws of physics? Why should we extend our inductive basis for the PSR this far? We have lost the reasons for expecting reasons why. Obviously cosmologists are trying to describe the framework but I believe that most are somewhat pessimistic, admitting that their theories are not likely to ever come into contact with hard scientific evidence (or at least, not in a conclusive way.)

You could only conclude THAT, if you dismiss revelation, in principle, as false. In other words, if God, as intentional Being “fills in” what we cannot access via our faculties alone by revealing what is “outside of the universe,” then we DO have warrant to thinking those eternal reasons do exist.

The fact that the God of the OT spoke to and revealed to humanity his reasons, is evidence that the “external” recognized the limits of human reasoning BEFORE human reasoning formally or logically recognized its own limitations, thus preempting the very objection you are making.

The question you need to answer is why you would dismiss the “outside in” provision of reasons FROM God TO human beings, in principle. By your own admission you cannot know what reasons God could have so you have no grounds for disputing revelation in principle.

I am sure you can provide YOUR reasons for dismissing revelation, but I am equally certain those reasons would be tainted by self-interest or human perspective bias rather than based on pure reason.

Either way, you haven’t provided reasons for dismissing the possibility of “external to the universe explanations” existing. Nor have you given the slightest warrant for thinking the PSR may not extend beyond space-time. You have defined the limits of what can be known by unaided human reason based upon empirical data. Fair enough.

That doesn’t, however, mean a strong logical or metaphysical case could not be made for extending the PSR beyond empirical or inductive limits.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

1. Reasons “why” are reasons from within the universe.
   That doesn’t amount to a warranted reason for suspending our “demand for reasons” with reference to things outside the universe, merely that the universe itself is an internally coherent whole. Why should that be? Well all that integral coherency just “popped” into existence, I suppose, for no reason. You can’t say, however, that the internal coherency of the universe gives NO REASON for expecting reasonableness or explanations to proceed beyond the universe.

The PSR is fundamentally a sort of inductive reasoning. We see lots of things having reasons. We therefore suspect that everything must have a reason. But there are categorical differences between the phenomenon we’ve observed having reasons, and the phenomenon which are extra-universal. Specifically I gave the examples of a lack of an arrow of time or laws of physics. And so we could, and many people do, assert a PSR that applies in all cases, without regard to conditions. But we must remember that the PSR is not deduced; we are taking it on principle. And so violations of the PSR can be regarded skeptically, but not rejected solely on the basis of violating the PSR. I can and do argue that the differences in and outside the universe are sufficient to cast aside the PSR when dealing with things outside the universe. Sure, we can suspect there are reasons, but we must not demand them, or we may lead ourselves astray.

1. Your second point is that we can’t (or very likely can’t) come to know what is beyond the universe, so we have no sufficient warrant for thinking reasons do exist outside of what we can know. This point is simply a non sequitur. What we don’t or can’t know does not serve to prove anything about what we don’t or can’t know.

Ignorance doesn’t provide warrant for anything regarding knowledge. In effect, ignorance doesn’t even tell you what you do know because you have to have at least an inkling of what you don’t know in order to know you are ignorant. Socrates made this point a long time ago - at least he knew that he didn’t know which put him a level above the truly ignorant.

I’m arguing for agnosticism with regards to “reasons why,” not that they don’t exist. You are the one rejecting possibilities prematurely because you’ve got a principle.

You could only conclude THAT, if you dismiss revelation, in principle, as false. In other words, if God, as intentional Being “fills in” what we cannot access via our faculties alone by revealing what is “outside of the universe,” then we DO have warrant to thinking those eternal reasons do exist.

No, we can be agnostic with regards to its truthfulness.

Either way, you haven’t provided reasons for dismissing the possibility of “external to the universe explanations” existing. Nor have you given the slightest warrant for thinking the PSR may not extend beyond space-time. You have defined the limits of what can be known by unaided human reason based upon empirical data. Fair enough.

That doesn’t, however, mean a strong logical or metaphysical case could not be made for extending the PSR beyond empirical or inductive limits.

I will also challenge you, if you think that God actually does provide an explanation of this universe, to prove it. Given your model of God, and how he behaves, explain a fundamental feature of the universe before you know what it is. For example, what would you expect the value of the gravitational constant to be if God created the universe? (Show your work )

If you fail to do so, then I can simply contend that God doesn’t actually provide a complete explanation for the universe. I will simply say that your God model doesn’t provide the reason why the gravitational constant is what it is, and you will have to simply assert “it does, I just don’t know what the reason is.”

 

[Peter_Plato]

The PSR is fundamentally a sort of inductive reasoning. We see lots of things having reasons. We therefore suspect that everything must have a reason. But there are categorical differences between the phenomenon we’ve observed having reasons, and the phenomenon which are extra-universal…

This would be a point of basic disagreement between us. The idea that the PSR is “fundamentally a sort of inductive reasoning” denies the very basic difference between inductive and deductive that grounds logic itself. You may as well claim that logic itself (and mathematics, while you are at it) are fundamentally grounded only in induction from our experience of the world around us.

Edward Feser in his book on Aquinas illustrates and refutes this point by an example. If we were to come across a water tap with a thick red liquid on the floor below the end of it, our explanatory search would not simply end with a casual “it must have come out of the tap.” That would not serve as an explanation for why the thick red liquid did come out of the water tap, if it indeed did. Neither would we chalk it up to a novel experience and resolve to henceforth expect thick red liquids to come from water pipes. In fact, after exploring the pipe connections and confirming that the tap is indeed uncompromised in its connection to water pipes, we would look for another source for the red liquid or for a way that the liquid could have made its way into the pipe. We can do this because logic rules out impossible eventualities, not merely because we haven’t experienced them but because they are understood to be impossible. Logic, not experience, leads us to search for a sufficiently explanatory cause.

The basic response of intelligence is that a fundamental feature of reality is the unfailing fact that all changes come about as a result of sufficiently explanatory reasons or causes. It is only a confused conflation of imagination with intelligence that leads some to believe that what is imaginable is, ipso facto, conceivable or possible.

You need to read the serious refutations of Hume that have been written in the past several centuries to dispel your misconception.

 

[Peter_Plato]

I will also challenge you, if you think that God actually does provide an explanation of this universe, to prove it. Given your model of God, and how he behaves, explain a fundamental feature of the universe before you know what it is. For example, what would you expect the value of the gravitational constant to be if God created the universe? (Show your work )

This just seems confused. It presumes that an admission that God created the universe means that the one lead to conclude such a thing thereby has full access to all of God’s reasons for having done so. Why would that be presumed?

It seems to me that the same leeway given to atheist scientists who cannot fully explain the whys and wherefores of cosmology should also apply to theist metaphysicians. “We are working on it,” suffices for scientists, why not metaphysicians?

In fact, my position was that God leaves up to us the exploration of the natural world (for the most part) and only reveals that which is crucial but not discoverable by natural means. I am perfectly willing to allow that scientific research/speculation is compatible with God’s will for human beings. This need not be an either/or endeavor where either God reveals all OR leaves everything up to human endeavor. I highly doubt that premise which seems to be behind your request.

If you fail to do so, then I can simply contend that God doesn’t actually provide a complete explanation for the universe. I will simply say that your God model doesn’t provide the reason why the gravitational constant is what it is, and you will have to simply assert “it does, I just don’t know what the reason is.”

This just seems a patently weak objection and an attempt to reduce a position to a mere caricature in order to dismiss it.

The point wasn’t that if God provides a complete explanation of the universe that explanation must therefore be available to human beings by confession. The point is that in order to be explanatorily sufficient, who or whatever brought the universe into existence and sustains its existence must have the wherewithal to do so. Given the mathematical integrity and consistency of the universe, its coming into being at a discrete point in space-time, and its fittedness to human intelligence, the classical theist conception of God fits as the best explanation - far better than a resort to “basic brute fact” that materialists use to sidestep the issue of explanation altogether.

All cosmologists (on both sides of the theism debate) are led to “I just don’t know what the reason is…,” so I am not sure why inordinately making such a demand on one side should nullify or make that side untenable.

A similar stance could be taken, for example, with regard to gravity as with regard to God. We know gravity (at least what we call gravity) exists and has discernible impact on objects in the world. Yet, we cannot fully explain how or why gravity does have the influence it does. We would not dismiss the idea of gravity merely because we can’t fully explain it and must admit "I just don’t know what the reason [for gravity] is.” It would just seem silly to dismiss the idea of gravity on such tenuous grounds.

Likewise, we could be led to believe that God has discernible impact on physical reality (created it for an end or purpose - teleology, endows events with explanatory antecedents, imbues qualities such as beauty and goodness onto existing entities, etc.,) without having or even claiming to have a complete accounting for why God would act as he does, just as we do not have a complete accounting for why gravity acts as it does. Good for the goose and all that.

 

[JapaneseKappa]

This would be a point of basic disagreement between us. The idea that the PSR is “fundamentally a sort of inductive reasoning” denies the very basic difference between inductive and deductive that grounds logic itself. You may as well claim that logic itself (and mathematics, while you are at it) are fundamentally grounded only in induction from our experience of the world around us.

Consider Euclidean and Non-Euclidean geometries. They cannot both be actual “true” descriptions of the world since they are mutually exclusive. However, they are both true in the sense that they correctly deduce things from their initial principles. That doesn’t mean that their initial principles are manifest in the world, and so their conclusions may not be useful when trying to describe real, about-the-world problems. We prefer Euclidean geometry because, inductively, we have found that it gives useful answers (and is somewhat simpler.) That doesn’t mean that we should reject the possibility that some categories of real, about-the-world problems might require us to use non-euclidean geometry to get the right answer (for example, the mutliverse may run on non-Euclidean geometry, while our universe runs on Euclidean geometry.)

In the same way, I agree that you can assume the PSR and derive lots of conclusions that are “true” in the same sense as euclidean and non-euclidean geometries. Indeed, PSR-derived conclusions may even be useful when discussing real, about-the-world problems. But we have to remember that the PSR is an initial principle not a deduced conclusion.

Edward Feser in his book on Aquinas illustrates and refutes this point by an example. If we were to come across a water tap with a thick red liquid on the floor below the end of it, our explanatory search would not simply end with a casual “it must have come out of the tap.”

This just seems confused. It presumes that an admission that God created the universe means that the one lead to conclude such a thing thereby has full access to all of God’s reasons for having done so. Why would that be presumed?

If we were to come across a God, with a universe beside him, our explanatory search would not simply end with a casual “This God must have created this universe.”

Rather than simply not having “full access to all God’s reasons” I think you have no access to any of God’s reasons. And therefore I will assert: God had no reason at all for his creation of the universe, or his selection of it’s various features. Now I think you must see the problem. Even if we assume God did create the universe, we do not automatically get a complete suite of “reasons why.” In fact, it is even possible that God exists, God created the universe, but the universe still lacks “reasons why.”

This is why I think your bringing up “revelation” is just bluster. You feel like agreeing with me would be like jumping out of a comfortable lifeboat of revealed “reasons why” into some ocean of uncertainty. But in reality, you haven’t got a lifeboat. Your revealed “reasons why” have only provided you with the most basic “this red goo must have come from the tap” kinds of explanations.

It seems to me that the same leeway given to atheist scientists who cannot fully explain the whys and wherefores of cosmology should also apply to theist metaphysicians. “We are working on it,” suffices for scientists, why not metaphysicians?

Inductive reasoning. Science has had success at finding reasons why. Name a single cosmological success story from the theologist camp. In the past 2000 years, have theologians come to any consensus on a cosmological prediction which turned out to be true?

I think I can anticipate you response: “The universe has a beginning!”

But I will answer that I don’t believe theologians actually had a consensus on this point, and it has yet to be shown that the universe actually had a beginning (claims to the contrary citing the Big Bang rely on a misunderstanding of what the Big Bang is.

 

[Peter_Plato]

Name a single cosmological success story from the theologist camp. In the past 2000 years, have theologians come to any consensus on a cosmological prediction which turned out to be true?

I think I can anticipate you response: “The universe has a beginning!”

But I will answer that I don’t believe theologians actually had a consensus on this point, and it has yet to be shown that the universe actually had a beginning (claims to the contrary citing the Big Bang rely on a misunderstanding of what the Big Bang is.

This is a strange point you are attempting to make here. Theology is the “science of God.” To ask what consensus on cosmological matters theologians have come to in the past 2000 years is akin to asking concerning what enduring contributions herpetologists have made to our understanding of cosmology.

Of course, you may not appreciate what theologians have said about God over the past 2000+ years, but you, likewise, may not be too interested nor appreciative of the things herpetologists have had to say about anacondas or pit vipers either.

For that matter, “consensus” is a rather illusive quality since, as you admit, even a cut and dry systematic study of geometry has led to a breakdown of “consensus” relative to Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometry since “both cannot be true.”

 

[JapaneseKappa]

This is a strange point you are attempting to make here. Theology is the “science of God.” To ask what consensus on cosmological matters theologians have come to in the past 2000 years is akin to asking concerning what enduring contributions herpetologists have made to our understanding of cosmology.

Except no one is claiming that snakes created the universe. If there has ever been a theological consensus on anything, “God(s) created the universe” is probably it.

For that matter, “consensus” is a rather illusive quality since, as you admit, even a cut and dry systematic study of geometry has led to a breakdown of “consensus” relative to Euclidian and non-Euclidian geometry since “both cannot be true.”

They can both be internally consistent.

I suppose I could amend “consensus” to something more like:
A theological idea or movement that
-was taken seriously (was addressed by many/famous theologians or institutions)
-has had proponents up through modern times

 

[StrawberryJam]

Except no one is claiming that snakes created the universe. If there has ever been a theological consensus on anything, “God(s) created the universe” is probably it.
They can both be internally consistent.

I suppose I could amend “consensus” to something more like:
A theological idea or movement that
-was taken seriously (was addressed by many/famous theologians or institutions)
-has had proponents up through modern times

They have no idea what the rigorous standards are for peer review, let alone the scientific method.
Stop trying to teach to them what they ought to have known.

 

[Peter_Plato]

They have no idea what the rigorous standards are for peer review, let alone the scientific method.
Stop trying to teach to them what they ought to have known.

Who are “they?”

Perhaps the “rigorous standards” have flaws.

phys.org/news/2014-12-peer-breakthrough-manuscripts.html
washingtonpost.com/local/crime/fbi-overstated-forensic-hair-matches-in-nearly-all-criminal-trials-for-decades/2015/04/18/39c8d8c6-e515-11e4-b510-962fcfabc310_story.html
nature.com/news/publishers-withdraw-more-than-120-gibberish-papers-1.14763

An appropriate ad by Dr. Boli in response to the “gibberish” papers.
(Please Note: This uploaded content is no longer available.)

And for those who wish to practice denial in the face of facts… an aid to the rescue:

(Please Note: This uploaded content is no longer available.)

 

[Peter_Plato]

Except no one is claiming that snakes created the universe. If there has ever been a theological consensus on anything, “God(s) created the universe” is probably it.
They can both be internally consistent.

And where did you get the idea that theologians arrived at that consensus via inductive reasoning from empirical evidence?

You do understand the difference between theology as a “science” (defined as a “systematic body of knowledge”) and metaphysics or natural philosophy?

A theologian qua theologian begins with the assumptions that God exists and that God created the universe - ergo consensus - but do not, generally - as theologians - feel the need to prove that God created the universe. Theologians leave that thorny little issue to metaphysicians or take it as a revealed fact, just as paleontologists do NOT, generally, feel the need to prove the existence of dinosaurs because some dinosaur deniers exist - merely to study them.

A theologian, hung up on the question of whether God does indeed exist, would be severely hampered in their ability to make any meaningful statement about God. At some point the “engagement proposal” is either

1. accepted and progress made or
2. rejected and some other pursuit engaged.

Metaphysicians and natural philosophers do NOT, as far as I know, contend that the existence and creative hand of God can be proven FROM or BY direct empirical evidence. They either propose metaphysical principles which then provide grounds for deductive proofs for God or they derive the existence of God from undeniable (to rational agents) first principles. Most would, quite rightly, insist that the existence of birds, for example, does not logically or necessarily imply a bird designer or creator, though all would insist the existence of birds does imply the existence of a sufficient explanation for why birds do, in fact, exist. A subtle, though often confused, difference.

 

[thinkandmull]

So there is a sense in which God imparts his goodness to us in creation, and in a sense He does not. Nothing comes out of His finger or the shining power around it into the thing created out of nothing. He could may as well have been point His “finger” in a different direction so to speak, to paint a picture of it

 

[thinkandmull]

Well if God creates from nothing, that takes some of the steam out of the 4th Way of Aquinas. Maybe the argument works to show there is a God, but not a Creator

 

[Richca]

Well if God creates from nothing, that takes some of the steam out of the 4th Way of Aquinas. Maybe the argument works to show there is a God, but not a Creator

Well, this doesn’t make sense. In the fourth way, Aquinas says “Therefore, there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection.” Now, if God is the cause of the being of things, then it follows that He is the creator or maker of them. The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus. God is Being itself and He is the cause of being of anything that is not God.

 

[thinkandmull]

“The maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus.” How would you prove that, since we don’t come out of God, but instead He flexes His spiritual muscles and things pop out of nothing. Why not just there as finite, in the sunshine of the infinite?

Again, as the Ways led back to the Third Way