J
JDaniel
Guest
If a leaf attached to the branch of a tree is still attached to the tree, it remains in potency-to-fall-to-the-ground. Thus it certainly can be construed as “just in ‘potency’”. If the leaf falls off of the tree, the (local) motion is the action of falling to the ground, but, that can’t define motion as it begs the question: it contains (the) motion. So, you’d be saying motion is motion. However, at the end of the fall, the “act” is the leaf-on-the-ground.Potency-in-act: potency in the process of becoming actual, i.e. motion. In English “potency to act” is less clear, it can be construed as just “potency.”
Another example would be my right hand is about to sweep across the front of my body from my left side to my right. (You can already see this.) While it is suspended, without the motion, on my left, it is “just in potency”. When I effect the sweep, and the hand in on the right, it is now in act. One could replace the words, potency and act, with the words, on-the-left and on-the-right, at least in this simple demonstration.
The Aristotelian definition of motion is, that motion is not only the action that occurs between potency and act, it includes them both. It is the complete action. Why, because at any point within the sweep, my hand is still, in some sense, in potency towards act. Even at the very last slice of time touching the immediate outer “skin”, so to speak, of the final position that is act, the hand still possesses potency. One could say that potency and act may be regarded as each constituting a status or a ‘condition’ or ‘mode’; a being may be in actual status or in potential status…" (On the Power of God, Aquinas, q. 3, a. 8, reply 12.)
Aquinas derives one of three definitions of “motion” from Aristotle. In Aristotle’s words, “The fulfillment of what exists potentially in so far as it exists potentially, is motion.” (Physics, Bk. III, Ch. 1, 201-a, 10-12) While there may be “potency-in-act”, then, it is not the original potency. It would be a new potency, for once the potency, or lack, was filled, or fulfilled, that potency would be gone. It could no longer be potency qua potency, and there could exist no more of that potency in the fulfilled being, or thing. Once the leaf is on the ground, the potential for it fall to the ground is history. Now, someone could pick it up then drop it again, but, that would be a separate motion, another motion. Does that make sense?
But there is a “chronology”, to use your word, in the sense that what we are defining is “motion”, not “mobile being”, at this point. We are not yet trying to define the substrate, or subject, of motion, we are trying to define “pure motion”.Even if one construes it as some kind of motion or transition from potentia to acta, it falsely implies a chronological ordering of the two.
If we were trying to define the status of the subject at a point on the continuum, you would be correct. But we are not; we are trying to define the process, the (finite) continuum.In English, “in” does not carry this same trouble – if understood incorrectly, it only implies containment, which is clearly not what is intended. Understood correctly, it has a similar sense as “caught in the act” or “in flight” or something similar – an instantaneous description of an uncompleted action.
No one is “reifying” the words. But, don’t try to take them away from us either. In fact, if anything, I (Aquinas and Aristotle, too) am striving to make the words LESS abstract. If I were in pain and science were to define pain as the firing of certain neurons, and upon going to the doctor, I was told that I can’t be in pain because those neurons aren’t firing, you and I would, without much hesitation, say, “I don’t care about any neurons. If anyone knows if I am suffering pain, it is I. And if you make it impossible for me to express my pain in an articulate way by taking the word away from me through your various definitions, then I will simply have to express it by screaming.” (Rationality and Faith in God, from a lecture by R. Spaemann, 12/06/04, at the Hochschule fur Philosophie in Munich)Insofar as they are descriptive and explanatory of experienced phenomena, of course they are relevant and useful. But there is no need to reify them in order to use them.
. . . more to follow.
jd