From here, it seems that one must reify “necessary” and “contingent” in order to claim that one form of the cosmological argument has strength.
In and for our intellects, we do reify “necessary” and “contingent”. But, we really do have a choice between the use of the abstraction, or the use of the reality of the necessary or contingent statuses. If I place a mouse in a bell jar and remove all of the air from the jar, the mouse will die (not to mention explode). Thus the mouse’s existence is contingent upon its receiving sufficient air. Likewise, if I can go back in time and do that to the mouse’s parents, the mouse will never have existed. So, the poor little thing is also contingent upon its parents, or, at least their gametes.
Now, when we think of contingency and necessity with regard to mobile being, in general, then, we have no choice but to consider it abstractly, i.e., in a reified state.
As I alluded to in another post, it seems to me that the concepts of a “necessary thing” and a “contingent thing” enjoy the same ontological status as the numbers zero and one. (In fact, Dedekind’s axioms – dunno why Peano always gets the credit – for natural numbers seem to map nicely: zero being the necessary element of the semigroup, all other numbers being contingent on that number via the successor function).
And you tipped your hand – you seem to not be a mathematical realist. Why be a realist when it comes to necessity and contingency?
Hmm. I see your point. Allow me, therefore, to postulate that I am not a mathematical realist for precisely the reason that there is a difference between mathematical reality and necessity/contingency reality. But, that being said, perhaps there would not be such a difference if we cooperated in the understanding that one = unity, or unified, rather than a set, or sequence, of just numbers.
You see, if we are talking about a singular mobile being - which is really all that there is in nature, apart from rare anomalies - then what we are predicating of mobile being is of the same overall
genus, but, by a different category. For example, if we predicate that a particular mobile being is contingent, due to some real dependency or other, we are predicating that in the same way that we predicate a particular mobile being as one, that is, a unity.
But, we cannot say - unless we’ve lost our minds - that that particular mobile being is two, or three, or twenty, or a million. We can only say the latter conceptually, by abstracting a unity and applying a plurality to it. Otherwise, we would have to present the actual plurality.
This reminds me of the story of the rabbit farmer who is paid a visit by a TV reporter. After a nice, but, lengthy conversation about rabbit husbandry, the reporter glances out into the field and asks the farmer if he has any idea how many rabbits he owns. The farmer says, “Yes, I have 22,612 rabbits.” Whereupon, the reporter asks, “Goodness, how do you accomplish counting them?” To which the farmer replies, “Well, that’s easy, I count the ears then divide by two.”
Anyway… in one sense, quantity (number) can be predicated of matter, or mobile being, but, in the other sense quantity is only inferentially predicated. You see the difference?
Now, as regards contingency and necessity, we predicate these precisely in the same way we predicate unity, or one-ness, to mobile beings.
jd