What do you consider proof of God, if anything?

[tonyrey]

It’s one of the perks of fallibilism and pragmatism to not need to be committed to any particular metaphysical or foundational claim.

Pragmatism makes at least two metaphysical presuppositions:

1. Something exists.
2. Knowledge exists.

 

[Leela]

It’s not a “category error.” It’s simply another way of saying, “. . . actually actual.” C’mon.

Then numbers are actually actual.

I guess the Alien monster is both a concept and real, then. or, perhaps it is really real as the effect of the cause which is the concept. I am so confused.

Ideas can be effects and causes.

The monsters from the movie alien are products of human imagination. They are real. They just aren’t physical things. Same thing with mathematics and scientific models. E=mc^2 for exmaple is a real invention of Einstein though it has no physicality.

Can you touch a number? Of course, you can write a number. Once written, does it come to life some how?

I guess things that you can’t touch and things that don’t come to life aren’t real in your book. But I think you are taking an usual position.

 

[Leela]

Pragmatism makes at least two metaphysical presuppositions:

1. Something exists.
2. Knowledge exists.

It is no PREsupposition to say that we exist since we have to exist BEFORE we can suppose anything. Metaphysical assumptions would concern the nature of existence.

As for knowledge, pragmatists are sceptical about the possibility of finding a foundation for our claims to know something. That isn’t to say that we don’t know anything, we just don’t think there is any way to justify our knowldege claims in a way that would satisfy every possible audience.

 

[JDaniel]

The point I was trying to make is that the “contingency” you describe is whether or not various properties can be ascribed to the “thing,” not whether or not the “thing” exists or not.

And, that’s my point. It has become too easy, for human beings, to simply predicate, which we regularly do of abstract being. But, reality is different. Reality consists of things that have come to be in a real sense; particularly beings that have mobility, in the widest sense. At first look, we apprehend real things precisely because of their motility - while they are in motion. Motion is inextricably involved in the essences of mobile material being, even if it is temporarily at rest. An abstraction consists in immobilizing a subject - in the mind, then, distilling the essentials (first principles) of that subject into universals that can be predicated of other things, whether of the same class, species, or not. (I’m trying to avoid getting into the various debates of existentialism, which I don’t think will prove to be all that beneficial to our discussion.)

Properties, I think you will agree, are not the only things that can be predicated of material mobile being (and beings). States (of being) can also be predicated of being, perhaps to a higher importance than properties. States of being, or, more precisely, modes, or conditions, of being, can be called properties as well, but, perhaps they lose something when deposited into the bucket called “properties”. Properties are normally thought of as accidental, such as the red color of an apple. But, a mode of being is more properly being as primary (or secondary) matter or matter+form, or act.

Indeed, even modern physics theorizes that the most basic material in the mouse has “existed” for as long as the universe has

Like the dirt used to make Adam.

– so what does it mean to call it “contingent,” really?

Simply, how and why did it come to be (the ordering of its parts), and, what is it (as an aggregate) contingent upon for continuance as being (as an aggregate), not as its parts. Hydrogen, oxygen, carbon, calcium, iron, etc. - its parts - lying in a pile of rubbish have no particular value. They can be easily thrown out into the garbage as more can be obtained tomorrow. But, once they are together as a functional aggregate (however insufficient that definition is, but, physics likes it), in the form of a living person, while yes you can throw him, or her, out, there will be severe consequences to you if found out. At the hands of the State, you might become a non-functional aggregate!

We are more than merely functional aggregates - despite that the particles of which we consist are all from the same soup. Robots are functional aggregates, too. Yet all of the robots in the world do not add up to the value of a single human being.

The particular arrangement of material that provokes us to call it a “mouse?”

I think so; unless it is nothing more than a functional aggregate.

Perhaps – but can one really apply that notion of contingency outside its original context of natural processes, as one must do for the cosmological argument?

I don’t know why not. All beings (except God) are contingent on coming to be, whether or not that coming-to-be is an aggregation of existing natural materials (the imposition of “form” on primary, or secondary, matter) or a coming-to-be from nothing (the imposition of form and matter where nothing existed before). You see, we deduce that all mobile material beings had beginnings, so, logically and physically it is impossible for that to have always been the case. If it is illogical and physically impossible for that to always have been the case then there must be some-thing (truly existing being, thing, exigency) that has necessary (no beginning and no end) existence AND that has-always-been-the-case.

continued . . .

 

[JDaniel]

Truly I don’t see the difference between saying all of these things are contingent, based on the rock’s history through time – and saying all of these things are necessary, based on taking into consideration the universe without applying time to it.

I’m not saying that. See my preceding paragraph.

Surely you must have figured by now that I consider this a pseudoproblem, just like the question of uncaused causes, etc. I merely put monism forth as a metaphysics equally consistent as the one put forth by scholastics. It’s one of the perks of fallibilism and pragmatism to not need to be committed to any particular metaphysical or foundational claim.

Not really: monism IS pantheism. But, we know - from science, in fact - that nature is not permanent. Nature has no eternality, despite that it has a sizable lifespan. Nature had a beginning and nature will have an end (I hope not too soon, though). The problem I have with fallibilism and pragmatism is that there is NOTHING that we can really rely on outside of our finite, fragile, limited minds. (Hence, philosophies such as Hume’s.) General relativity required Special relativity when it was found to be problematic. What gravity is is still undergoing amendments. K. Miller, et al, did not really kill IC, although he thinks he did. Realize that I am not positively stating that IC might not ultimately be destroyed by the findings of science, it just has not been destroyed as of this moment.

I guess I am saying – on what grounds can you claim there are two beings at all? Only via mental action. The same applies to necessity and contingency. It might be that ascribing one-ness, two-ness, three-ness, etc., or necessity, contingency, etc., says more about you (and me) than it does about the cosmos.

On the grounds that my mind captures and apprehends the existences of exigencies (beings) that-are-not-(merely)concepts. We recognize that the first things we ever noticed, once we became old enough to perceive motion, was the substrate, so to speak, of those motions. Once we perceived the substrate of those motions, we began to recognize similarities and differences in the substrates of our perceptions. (We began to “recognize” mom and dad, for instance.) Our parents placed mobiles above us so that our times in our cribs would be occupied by other substrates-in-motion and we wouldn’t cry. And, soon, if we perceived substrates that we didn’t recognize, we would become frightened.

I seriously doubt that several-months-old babies are able to operate from illusions, or create elaborate illusions. Rather, it is material mobile being that has impressed itself upon the mind of a non-thinking child and left impressions, really, pictures; pictures in explicit detail. Along with sounds, smells, tastes, and tactiles. Even at that age, the baby’s mind can take pictures and store them. So, which came first: the exterior material mobile beings, or, illusions created by juxtaposition of pictures?

That’s my basic problem with the cosmological argument – at least in any formulation I can conceive of that doesn’t permit a pantheist interpretation, which is not the aim of the cosmological argument.

And rightly so. A pantheistic interpretation contradicts our science. (Part of the reason I am such a staunch realist.) We know nature had a beginning and will have an end. It cannot have been self-moved, IOW, it cannot have brought itself into being. Since that is the case, how, then, do we explain our being here? We are left with two explanations, either we were created, or we are suffering an immense and incredible illusion.

jd

 

[JRKH]

Ah, I see… that would mesh well with the idea of leaving the physical behind, which is a major belief regarding heaven. No need to look it up, a quote’s source rarely actually means much imho. Thank you for the replies, I think I understand your position in this regard now.

I know you said I didn’t need to look it up, but you got me thinking about it and so I did anyway.

This is from the "Dialoge of St Catherine of Sienna" It was dictated by her, while in a state of ecstasy, to her secretaries, and completed in the year of Our Lord 1370. Here is an exerpt

Of the glory of the Blessed.
"Similarly, the just soul, for whom life finishes in the affection of charity and the bonds of love, cannot increase in virtue, time having come to naught, but she can always love with that affection with which she comes to Me, and that measure that is measured to her. She always desires Me, and loves Me, and her desire is not in vain ….
In love, the Blessed rejoice in My eternal vision, participating in that good that I have in Myself, everyone according to his measure, that is that, with that measure of love, with which they have come to Me, is it measured to them. Because they have lived in love of Me and of the neighbor, united together with the general love, and the particular, which, moreover, both proceed from the same love. And they rejoice and exult, participating in each other’s good with the affection of love, besides the universal good that they enjoy altogether. And they rejoice and exult with the angels with whom they are placed, according to their diverse and various virtues in the world, being all bound in the bonds of love. **And they have a special participation with those whom they closely loved with particular affection in the world, with which affection they grew in grace, increasing virtue, and the one was the occasion to the other **of manifesting the glory and praise of My name, in themselves and in their neighbor; and, in the life everlasting, they have not lost their love, but have it still, participating closely, with more abundance, the one with the other, their love being added to the universal good, and I would not that you should think that they have this particular good, of which I have told you, for themselves alone, for it is not so, but it is shared by all the proved citizens, My beloved sons, and all the angels – for, when the soul arrives at eternal life, all participate in the good of that soul, and the soul in their good. … they have an exultation, a mirthfulness, a jubilee, a joyousness in themselves, which is refreshed by the knowledge that they have found in that soul. They see that, by My mercy, she is raised from the earth with the plenitude of grace, and therefore they exult in Me in the good of that soul, which good she has received through My goodness.

(Bolding mine)

Just thought you might find it ineresting.

Peace
James

 

[tonyrey]

It is no PREsupposition to say that we exist since we have to exist BEFORE we can suppose anything. Metaphysical assumptions would concern the nature of existence.

Yes, but we presuppose that we are presupposing. In other words presupposing presupposes “we”! We wouldn’t presuppose presupposing without “we”, would we?

As for knowledge, pragmatists are sceptical about the possibility of finding a foundation for our claims to know something. That isn’t to say that we don’t know anything, we just don’t think there is any way to justify our knowledge claims in a way that would satisfy every possible audience.

Nevertheless you presuppose that knowledge exists and even though claims do not satisfy in a way that would satisfy every possible audience you presuppose that some claims are superior to others.

 

[Leela]

Yes, but we presuppose that we are presupposing. In other words presupposing presupposes “we”! We wouldn’t presuppose presupposing without “we”, would we?

Pragmatists point out that we don’t even need to do that. One of the critiques that pragmatism makes on the philosphical tradition is in this (usually unrecognized) presupposition of an experiencing subject interacting with objects. This presuposition, often referred to as Catesianism, is what Dewey called the “brood and nest of dualisms” that is responsible for most of the western philosphical problems like the mind/body problem, appearance/reality, free will/fatalism, fact/value, subjective/objective, etc.

Nevertheless you presuppose that knowledge exists and even though claims do not satisfy in a way that would satisfy every possible audience you presuppose that some claims are superior to others.

Nothing needs to be presupposed. We experience some claims are superior to others. We don’t presuppose it. There is no need to cling to the belief that some things are better than others as a dogma. We can remain open to evidence that all beliefs are equal, but if they are, then the belief that all beliefs are equal is no better than the belief that some beliefs are better than others.

Best,
Leela

 

[JRKH]

I hope this isn’t considered off topic, but I wanted to ask:

Is there anything that is scientifically accepted that cannot be proven?

In order for something to be scientifically accepted it must be quantifiable (measurable) correct?

So is there something that is accepted by Science as existing but is not measurable?

Peace
James

 

[Leela]

I hope this isn’t considered off topic, but I wanted to ask:

Is there anything that is scientifically accepted that cannot be proven?

In order for something to be scientifically accepted it must be quantifiable (measurable) correct?

So is there something that is accepted by Science as existing but is not measurable?

Peace
James

The issue for science isn’t proof but verification, falsifiability, and solving problems. No matter how may times you drop a stone and it falls to the ground, you haven’t proved that it always will do so. Yet every time the stone does what you expect, you are providing more evidence in support of your theory that the stone will fall when dropped. The theory is a scientifically valid hypothesis since it is falsifiable. For a hypothesis to be falsifiable we have to be able to articulate exactly the sort of evidence that would disprove it. Every time we create experimental conditions where it is possible to disprove a theory we have the possibility of more evidence in support of the theory but never proof of the theory. Science is always open to the possibility of better theories. The pencil is mightier than the pen!

 

[DavidHume]

And rightly so. A pantheistic interpretation contradicts our science. (Part of the reason I am such a staunch realist.) We know nature had a beginning and will have an end. It cannot have been self-moved, IOW, it cannot have brought itself into being.

I don’t think a pantheistic interpretation contradicts our science; neither Albert Einstein thought nor Steven Hawking thinks that it does. I believe Hawking has remarked that asking what is prior to the Big Bang is like asking what is north of the North Pole.

 

[DavidHume]

Properties, I think you will agree, are not the only things that can be predicated of material mobile being (and beings). States (of being) can also be predicated of being, perhaps to a higher importance than properties. States of being, or, more precisely, modes, or conditions, of being, can be called properties as well, but, perhaps they lose something when deposited into the bucket called “properties”. Properties are normally thought of as accidental, such as the red color of an apple. But, a mode of being is more properly being as primary (or secondary) matter or matter+form, or act.

That’s more metaphysics, but I appreciate your clear statement of it. I personally don’t consider properties to be “accidental” vs. modes, which I guess you would call “essential” or something similar.

I’m not sure there’s value in making (in the question of ontology), the necessary/contingent, accidental/essential, or indeed, this entire class of distinctions which all seem to be of the same character to me.

It still seems to boil down to the assumption of this basic distinction, under a variety of names: people who accept the cosmological argument consider it self-evident – people who do not accept the cosmological argument do not consider it self-evident.

But, once they are together as a functional aggregate (however insufficient that definition is, but, physics likes it), in the form of a living person, while yes you can throw him, or her, out, there will be severe consequences to you if found out. At the hands of the State, you might become a non-functional aggregate!

Sure, but that says things about human behavior, not about the nature of the aggregate. For example, a law against murder does not entail that humans have a soul.

We are more than merely functional aggregates - despite that the particles of which we consist are all from the same soup. Robots are functional aggregates, too. Yet all of the robots in the world do not add up to the value of a single human being.

I’m not going to disagree with you, but I will say that this is because of human custom, not because of any essential difference between robots and human beings.

 

[DavidHume]

The problem I have with fallibilism and pragmatism is that there is NOTHING that we can really rely on outside of our finite, fragile, limited minds.

Under a medieval standard of knowledge, we can’t even rely on that, I don’t think. I think it’s more fruitful to examine what one means by knowledge, rather than search for the metaphysical foundations most conducive to one’s habits and orientation.

On the grounds that my mind captures and apprehends the existences of exigencies (beings) that-are-not-(merely)concepts.
…
I seriously doubt that several-months-old babies are able to operate from illusions, or create elaborate illusions. Rather, it is material mobile being that has impressed itself upon the mind of a non-thinking child and left impressions, really, pictures; pictures in explicit detail. Along with sounds, smells, tastes, and tactiles. Even at that age, the baby’s mind can take pictures and store them. So, which came first: the exterior material mobile beings, or, illusions created by juxtaposition of pictures?

My question wasn’t directed at your perceptions of the world – my question was on what grounds do you assign necessity, contingency, number, membership in a class, etc. to any of the objects you perceive to be in the world?

My answer is: on pragmatic grounds. Which is certainly fine for day-to-day participation in the universe, but I am doubtful that it justifies using those same principles to make ontological claims about things not in the universe.

 

[JRKH]

The issue for science isn’t proof but verification, falsifiability, and solving problems. No matter how may times you drop a stone and it falls to the ground, you haven’t proved that it always will do so. Yet every time the stone does what you expect, you are providing more evidence in support of your theory that the stone will fall when dropped. The theory is a scientifically valid hypothesis since it is falsifiable. For a hypothesis to be falsifiable we have to be able to articulate exactly the sort of evidence that would disprove it. Every time we create experimental conditions where it is possible to disprove a theory we have the possibility of more evidence in support of the theory but never proof of the theory. Science is always open to the possibility of better theories. The pencil is mightier than the pen!

Forgive my ignorance - but is there an answer to my simple questions here??
From what I gather here, you are saying that science cannot not prove anything.


Pece
James

 

[DavidHume]

Forgive my ignorance - but is there an answer to my simple questions here??
From what I gather here, you are saying that science cannot not prove anything.

That is the answer, and most working scientists will likely agree.

 

[JRKH]

That is the answer, and most working scientists will likely agree.

So I guess we have 21 pages of hot air here. If science cannot even “Prove” that Oxygen exists, or that the earth spins on its Axis or that Chickens lay eggs, then there can certainly be no “proof” in any quantitative sense that God does or does not exist.

If science cannot “prove” anything, what chance has the philosopher? All a scientist or philosopher can do is persuade someone to this or that hypothesis.

Guess it’s time to close the thread since Proof is what is asked for.

Peace
James

 

[liquidpele]

So I guess we have 21 pages of hot air here. If science cannot even “Prove” that Oxygen exists, or that the earth spins on its Axis or that Chickens lay eggs, then there can certainly be no “proof” in any quantitative sense that God does or does not exist.

If science cannot “prove” anything, what chance has the philosopher? All a scientist or philosopher can do is persuade someone to this or that hypothesis.

Guess it’s time to close the thread since Proof is what is asked for.

Peace
James

Don’t get too technical with the question… my inquiry was to find out how people decided to believe in God, as in what was proof enough for them. The point of this thread is not to decide that there is or can be proof of God, or anything else. This was meant to be much more subjective a question than I suppose the question indicated.

 

[Leela]

Forgive my ignorance - but is there an answer to my simple questions here??
From what I gather here, you are saying that science cannot not prove anything.

That is pretty much what I was saying. Sorry I wasn’t more direct. My only quibble is that your statement “science cannot prove anything” implies that science always fails at trying to prove things, while “proving things” or discovering the one true account of “the Way Things Really Are” isn’t the goal of scientific inquiry from the perspective of the philosopher of science if not the typical scientist.

Consider the following from Einstein:
“Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavour to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears it ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of the mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison.”

Even if you sought to write the one true account of “The Way Things Really Are,” there is no conceivable way of comparing your account with reality itself. All we can do is verify specifics where our data is consistent with our theories and falsify generalities when the data do not fit the theories. There is no way to prove generalities, and we don’t need to think of progress in science as getting closer to the truth. We are making progress because we can solve problems we couldn’t solve before and do things we couldn’t do before.

Best,
Leela

 

[tonyrey]

Nothing needs to be presupposed.

It is impossible to commence an investigation without having a question in your mind. That question cannot exist in a void. For example, “How have human beings come to exist on this planet?” That question presupposes (a) human beings exist now and (b) they have not always existed. Not only that. You presuppose the methods you use will help you to answer the question…

 

[JRKH]

That is pretty much what I was saying. Sorry I wasn’t more direct. My only quibble is that your statement “science cannot prove anything” implies that science always fails at trying to prove things, while “proving things” or discovering the one true account of “the Way Things Really Are” isn’t the goal of scientific inquiry from the perspective of the philosopher of science if not the typical scientist.

Consider the following from Einstein:
“Physical concepts are free creations of the human mind, and are not, however it may seem, uniquely determined by the external world. In our endeavour to understand reality we are somewhat like a man trying to understand the mechanism of a closed watch. He sees the face and the moving hands, even hears it ticking, but he has no way of opening the case. If he is ingenious he may form some picture of the mechanism which could be responsible for all the things he observes, but he may never be quite sure his picture is the only one which could explain his observations. He will never be able to compare his picture with the real mechanism and he cannot even imagine the possibility of the meaning of such a comparison.”

Even if you sought to write the one true account of “The Way Things Really Are,” there is no conceivable way of comparing your account with reality itself. All we can do is verify specifics where our data is consistent with our theories and falsify generalities when the data do not fit the theories. There is no way to prove generalities, and we don’t need to think of progress in science as getting closer to the truth. We are making progress because we can solve problems we couldn’t solve before and do things we couldn’t do before.

Best,
Leela

Well - my response was to the lengthy answer I had recieved from Mr Hume.
Yours seems to be another somewhat Lengthy reply that essentially says the same thing. Science doesn’t prove, it verifies. So we are back to the problem of there being no answer to the OP’s question. Other than our own subjective faith system where-in we accept something as sufficient verification of God’s existance.

So we Don’t Prove anything - We just have Faith that the Earth Rotates, that Breathing will keep us alive, that food is good for us, that if we drop a ball it will fall to the ground etc. So rather than talking about Proof in anything whether science or religion, we are talking about faith.

Peace
James