So you admit that there are right and wrong definitions of a triangle, depending on the context? Kudos.
That’s not actually what I said. My position is more like this: Suppose I could talk to a geometer of the 18th-century who had never heard of other geometries. This geometer will have a Euclidean preconception of what a “triangle” is. When discussing another geometry with them, I would propose the definition of “triangle” that is used in that geometry. Their reaction may very well be that they dislike the definition, and that they would refrain from using it in practice because it is so unconventional. However, nothing should stop that geometer from accommodating my definition for the sake of the discussion and translating it into their own terms if they like. Their opinion about the “correctness” of the definition (whatever that means) is entirely irrelevant so long as the discrepancies between various usages of the word are understood by both parties.
Because the definition can be translated into something with which the geometer is familiar, my imposing that particular definition on our conversation would have no effect on the validity of our arguments. If the geometer finds a contradiction in my arguments in terms of his version of the definitions, it will correspond to a contradiction in my version. So again, the choice of definitions is irrelevant so long as their differences are appreciated by both parties.
That’s the Catholic position as to why it’s wrong to use a unconventional definition for what has been traditionally this type of thing:
I have been advised recently that I should be highly skeptical that the opinions of individual Catholics are representative of the Church’s official stance, so I’m going to have to see a citation to the part of the Catechism that defends definitions on the basis of convention.
Suffice it to say that we are agreed: no one gets to simply declare that he wants to change a definition.
That isn’t what I said; see my response to Stew above. I noticed that you evaded my question about how definitions would ever change in your framework. Any change, no matter how gradual, involves a deviation from a commonly accepted definition. Since you regard the commonly accepted ones as correct, deviations are never permissible (as they would be incorrect due to being deviant), so the definitions would never change. So again, if we take the idea that definitions are correct or incorrect seriously, they would be immutable.
Perhaps if you could cite a definition of “agnostic” of old (and your source, of course), and then cite the modern day definition (and your source) we could chat further.
Wikipedia has a nice section within the article on “agnosticism” that addresses the various types of agnosticism. It is called, appropriately enough, “Types of Agnosticism”, and each type has sources for its usage. I’ll copy and paste the section below:
Agnostic atheism: The view of those who do not believe in the existence of any deity, but do not claim to know if a deity does or does not exist.
Agnostic theism: The view of those who do not claim to know of the existence of any deity, but still believe in such an existence.
Apathetic or pragmatic agnosticism: The view that there is no proof of either the existence or nonexistence of any deity, but since any deity that may exist appears unconcerned for the universe or the welfare of its inhabitants, the question is largely academic.
Strong agnosticism (also called “hard”, “closed”, “strict”, or “permanent agnosticism”): The view that the question of the existence or nonexistence of a deity or deities, and the nature of ultimate reality is unknowable by reason of our natural inability to verify any experience with anything but another subjective experience. A strong agnostic would say, “I cannot know whether a deity exists or not, and neither can you.”
Weak agnosticism (also called “soft”, “open”, “empirical”, or “temporal agnosticism”): The view that the existence or nonexistence of any deities is currently unknown but is not necessarily unknowable; therefore, one will withhold judgment until evidence, if any, becomes available. A weak agnostic would say, “I don’t know whether any deities exist or not, but maybe one day, if there is evidence, we can find something out.”
Note that my usage of the term corresponds to “strong agnosticism” which is consistent with the variants of agnostic theism and agnostic atheism.
You’re simply moving the source of evil, but not giving an explanation as to why we’re psychologically faulty.
If we consider our evolution from more primitive life, there is no reason nature would favor “psychological perfection” as you conceive of it.
For example, natural selection would never produce perfectly happy creatures that are easily pleased. For one thing, if we were easily pleased, we wouldn’t feel so compelled to compete for mates (we’d be happy with or without them), so sexual selection would be defunct and our reproduction rate would fall below our predation rate. We would become extinct.
So the question itself is poorly framed. We are psychologically perfect from the perspective of natural selection, which is what accounts for our origins from primitive life. Being psychologically faulty by *our own *measures doesn’t undermine this understanding in the slightest.
However, if you are adamantine that one must be ONLY DISPASSIONATE about evaluating life’s situations, then…
Perhaps you could provide an example of when passion would be necessary for grasping the truth? I’m not just talking about a situation in which it helps, but a situation in which it would be impossible to understand something without passion.
