What does, " the nature of a thing " mean?

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The first thing we understand by the phrase “nature of a thing” is that everything has a nature. That is, everything can be defined as possessing such and such attributes. One of the first things we notice about Nature itself is that it has a nature. That is, nature consists of laws everywhere we look. There is nowhere in nature that chaos prevails. Even what might appear to be chaos is simply a mysterious ordering of elements (as when you open the door to a child’s room and find everything “chaotic” … apparently without order but actually in the exact order the child left it). So it is with the nature of the universe. It might seem to be haphazardly structured with all kinds of variable stars, planets, solar systems, and galaxies; but still left exactly in the order that God intended.
 
A big part of understanding the nature of things in science is to break them down into their components. These components are further broken down to reveal their particular constituent parts.

The properties of water are understood in terms of the behaviour of molecules, which in turn, are seen to be comprised of hydrogen and oxygen atoms held together by electrochemical forces.
These can be further “dissected” into subatomic particles and forces.

At each level the essence of the thing is decomposed, experimentally or mentally, causing it to no longer exist, to no longer manifest its nature.
The parts, no longer acting together as in the original whole, each have their own nature.
I recall the word “synergy” which seemed to be used a lot more forty years ago. The whole is more than the parts.
Would I be correct in saying that this whole would be the essence of the thing, giving it, its particular nature.
 
I recall the word “synergy” which seemed to be used a lot more forty years ago. The whole is more than the parts.
Would I be correct in saying that this whole would be the essence of the thing, giving it, its particular nature.
Interesting thought. The self-conscious “I” that exists inside us throughout life is what gives us our particular nature. That “I” consists of many parts assembled over scores of years. Yet all those parts are governed by one constant, the “I” that records, thinks about, worries about, etc. all the events that occur all the days of our lives.This fact, more than any other, gives us the sense of having a soul.
 
Doesn’t the potentiality/actuality scheme say God is zero potentiality and pure act?
No, even in Aristotle God is pure act with no potentiality, the source of all movement. In Thomas God is also pure act with no potentiality, but also the sourse of all existence and all that happens in the created universe.
The substance/form and potency/actuality dualities only seem to confuse things. For instance, they would have hindered rather than aided the discovery that most of an atom is space and most of the mass of matter comes not from the mass of the constituent elementary particles, but the speed at which they jiggle around:
I don’t see how. To A./T.A. a substance was whatever could be clearly understood to exist on its own, I’m not sure the the interior physicalities of an atom can be regarded as substances that can stand alone. Perhaps they can under highly specific conditions have a fleeting independent existence. But are we really all that certain about that?
“In quantum chromodynamics, the modern theory of the nuclear force, most of the mass of the proton and the neutron is explained by special relativity. The mass of the proton is about 80–100 times greater than the sum of the rest masses of the quarks that make it up, while the gluons have zero rest mass. The extra energy of the quarks and gluons in a region within a proton, as compared to the rest energy of the quarks alone in the QCD vacuum, accounts for almost 99% of the mass.” - en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proton#Quarks_and_the_mass_of_the_proton
So? Besides how certain is all this?
I am saying that the whole scheme seems contrived and isn’t any use to modern science.
Potential energy is a general concept. It says that wherever work is done to compress a spring (one of many examples), the spring contains the potential energy to decompress.
Correct. So, what is the problem? I’m sure Aristotle would agree. But he would point out that the spring is a man made artifact and its nature ( its matter/form composition ) is contrived by the agent(s) which designed and constructed the spring. And the agents designed it so its form possessed the potentiality you described.

The principle begins with the nature of natural things, not artificial things. But it can certainly be applied to artificial things. Certainly, science can be and is done without reflecting on these things.
Perhaps some Catholic theologians still use it but otherwise the entire framework has been replaced, it’s far too fuzzy and arcane to be of any use. You’ll find echos, but they are fragmentary. It can’t be falsified, and as such we can use Hume’s Fork to say it is purely a relationship of ideas.
Not really interested in Hume, he, Descartes, Bishop Berkley, etc. are basically philosophical idealists and I don’t regard them as sound in any way. For a detailed critique of Hume’s thought see Edward Feser here, edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/06/hume-science-and-religion.html. Divine Revelation can’t be falsified either :).

It is not just Catholic theologians who still use the philosophy of A/T.A.

Linus2nd
 
Interesting thought. The self-conscious “I” that exists inside us throughout life is what gives us our particular nature. That “I” consists of many parts assembled over scores of years. Yet all those parts are governed by one constant, the “I” that records, thinks about, worries about, etc. all the events that occur all the days of our lives.This fact, more than any other, gives us the sense of having a soul.
Thank you for your observations.

They have led me to consider how we are a work in progress.
That we are souls seems so self-evident, as is the fact that we are changed by our actions.

This being the case, it makes sense that He established His holy Church that we may grow in love and be transformed, following the Way that is Christ Himself.

Not wanting to make a hopefully long and prosperous story, short:
at the end, when all the choices have been made and the “i’m sorry’s” said,
the dried out kernel that is the totality of who we have become,
will be the seed from which we will be resurrected at the end of time.
 
A big part of understanding the nature of things in science is to break them down into their components. These components are further broken down to reveal their particular constituent parts.

The properties of water are understood in terms of the behaviour of molecules, which in turn, are seen to be comprised of hydrogen and oxygen atoms held together by electrochemical forces.
These can be further “dissected” into subatomic particles and forces.

At each level the essence of the thing is decomposed, experimentally or mentally, causing it to no longer exist, to no longer manifest its nature.
The parts, no longer acting together as in the original whole, each have their own nature.
I recall the word “synergy” which seemed to be used a lot more forty years ago. The whole is more than the parts.
Would I be correct in saying that this whole would be the essence of the thing, giving it, its particular nature.
You may call the whole by the name of its nature or essence. Thus dog, cat, coal, water, etc. But the nature or essence is what gives rise to all the constituent parts you mention and also to the particular powers, activities, etc of that dog, cat, lump of coal, that glas of water, etc. You can’t see the nature or essence, you see its signatures, its foot prints.

When you say, " I see a dog., " what you actually mean is that you see all the visable and measureable manifestations of a particular essence or nature we call a dog. The nature or essence is the root cause of all that is seen and touched and quantified and measured, etc. The human soul, for example, cannot be seen. Yet it is the root cause of all that man is and does, once united to the body. All essences or natures, animate and inanimate, are similar in that regard.

The nature or essence is caused by the conjoining of a particular form to a particular matter. This Aritotle and Aquinas call Second Substance. It cannot be seen. It is the thing without what I have called called " footprints " or its signatures. What you see is what Aristotle and Aquinas have called First Substance, because it is the thing as you first see it, with all its " footprints., " These " footprints " Aristotle and Aquinas called accidents because they exist in the Second Substance, the Nature or Essence.

Thus, the substance ( Second Substance, minus the accidents ) of the bread and wine are changed into the whole Christ ( First Substance, Christ with all his accidents ).

Linus2nd
 
There’s no real agreement on whether we even have a human nature.

“Give me a child until he is seven, and I will give you the man”.

Aristotle says we have a divided soul, and the rational part should rule the others, Descartes says we are machines, Locke sees us as blank slates, etc.
 
Heisenberg believed that the only way to make sense of Quantum Physics was to interpret Quantum States as Aristotelian potencies. Through the employment of the Aristotelian (rather than Naturalist) Metaphysics; the example of virtual particles become less mysterious as we can identify an efficient-formal cause, rather than having to violate noncontradiction.
Seems to me you’ve switched from claiming that potential/actuality is intuitively how all of us think, to saying that one physicist once used it as part of one description of one interpretation of one construct. I think my work here is done.
You seem to assume because naturalism rejected the Aristotelian Metaphysics, that it actually refuted the Aristotelian Metaphysics. That is simply not true and is historical revisionism. Questions as to the nature of causation, substance, intelligibility, etc quickly become questions of Metaphysics because every other discipline must assume these principles to get itself off the ground and therefore can not provide an argument/explanation of them.
Metaphysical naturalism and Aristotelian metaphysics are are just two of many schools of metaphysics and whether they kiss and make up isn’t necessarily of much interest to the rest of us.

It would seem just a bit hyperbolic to demand that no one can think without the aid of a metaphysician. Next you’ll be arguing that no one can exist before employing a metaphysician to prove they can. No one, anywhere, has ever urgently needed the services of the metaphysician on call. As with jingle writers and telephone sanitizers they may be fun at parties but are not especially indispensable. 😃
 
Yes, it is useful. It seems to me that science is in the business of telling us what the real essences of things are. Chemistry has told us that water is composed of two hydrogen atoms and an oxygen atom, it boils at 100C, freezes at 0C, expands its volume when frozen, conducts electricity, etc. Sure, this doesn’t exhaust water’s nature but it does tell us a lot about water’s nature. Yes, you cannot start by saying “well water has an essence” and then discover anything meaningful from that statement alone, but if there were no essence of water then water would not behave in any regular way. We’d have no principle in which we could ground the aforementioned characteristics of water.
I think this example brings out my issue with saying things have natures, because there’s a huge amount which can be said about water. You listed a few of what in modern terminology are called properties, which are clinical. But they don’t tell anything like the whole story.

The properties are beside the point if we’re in a desert, when the essential nature of water would be that it quenches our thirst. Or if our house is on fire, when it quenches the flames. Or even if we want to write a poem about a babbling brook. So now you need a standards committee to decide what, out of all the things which different people want to be included, is important enough to be part of the nature of water. And they have to meet once a year to update the standard, but no one buys it because we already know what’s important to us, whatever anyone else says.
Nagel’s “What is it like to be a bat” situation follows this line of thinking as well. Are we ever going to know what it is like to be a bat? Probably not. But is there an objective state about “what it means to be a bat?” Unless you agree with Descartes that animals are merely sophisticated automata, then yes. We have qualia given our nature as sensitive animals so I don’t see a reason to deny that bats have some sort of qualia as well qua sensitive animals.
I’d have two issues with this. The minor is qualia, which I doubt exist (this is from thinking about what they might be on a previous thread, not from any formal claim). The major is that Nagel brings into question the assumption that there is a True Reality™. On the basis that aliens would be truly alien, what if they see in the X-ray band or the radio band instead of the narrow frequency range visible to us? They wouldn’t see what we call things, and we wouldn’t see what they call things. Which implies that things are not part of True Reality™. And if things aren’t then neither are natures and essences and so on.

Whether or not things are objectively real, what does seem clear is that everything is what it is because of everything else - Lauryn Hill - Everything Is Everything (artists are excellent at metaphysics for everyman imho :))
 
A big part of understanding the nature of things in science is to break them down into their components. These components are further broken down to reveal their particular constituent parts.

The properties of water are understood in terms of the behaviour of molecules, which in turn, are seen to be comprised of hydrogen and oxygen atoms held together by electrochemical forces.
These can be further “dissected” into subatomic particles and forces.

At each level the essence of the thing is decomposed, experimentally or mentally, causing it to no longer exist, to no longer manifest its nature.
The parts, no longer acting together as in the original whole, each have their own nature.
I recall the word “synergy” which seemed to be used a lot more forty years ago. The whole is more than the parts.
Would I be correct in saying that this whole would be the essence of the thing, giving it, its particular nature.
This very much depends on the nature whether it is reducible or irreducible. In former case the nature can be explained in term of what a thing is constitute of and in later case the nature does depends on constitutes but is not definable in term of constitute namely the phrase you use, the whole is more than the constitutes.
 
Well yes, the average person doesn’t think all of that out, but Aristotle’s discourse is really just a philosophical formulation of common sense. The language is a little stuffy and difficult to understand, but that flows from the fact that he is discussing metaphysics which is by its nature very abstract. But I think most people agree that change is real and that things change without the thing itself being destroyed, that some properties of things are not essential, etc. That concedes a lot of what Aristotle is arguing even if it isn’t outlined or defended logically.
I think you tripped up here, as common sense varies. What was common sense to Aristotle in a world where there was very little technology would be very different from common sense today, even though our education is influenced by some of his ideas. Personally, I think the framework is too artificial and far too speculative. Imagine if a version of string theory took hold for 2400 years. Some people would then argue it is common sense.
*I believe there is a Scholastic maxim that goes something like “whatever is in the intellect was first in the senses” so it would appear that Feynman’s joke is directed at a strawman at least as far as the Aristotelian is concerned. We are getting metaphysical information whenever we receive sense data on an object. The Scholastic would argue that metaphysical abstraction is the highest level of generality possible starting with the sensed object:
Sensed Object → Physical Abstraction/Modern Science (being as changeable being) → Mathematical Abstraction (being as quantifiable being) → Metaphysical Abstraction (being as being)
I would think that most scientists believe that the things they observe behave in regular patterns either due to natures or laws, or they’d have some other metaphysical explanation that makes sense of their findings. And that position would have been informed by sensual experience. They may not be doing metaphysics “first” in a temporal sense but they are doing metaphysics “first” in an ontological sense.*
I like how you inserted metaphysics in there. The scholastics were empiricists, they based arguments on a posteriori reasoning. But this desire amongst you guys to claim that even an ant is doing metaphysics when it senses food, even a dog is doing metaphysical abstractions when it intercepts a frizby, seems to indicate a deep insecurity, as if you secretly suspect that metaphysics is an oxygen thief. 😃

But we’re going over old ground. It cannot be underestimated how revolutionary was Newton’s battle cry of “I frame no hypotheses”. The realization that knowing how something works does not require us to know what it means changed the world. 350 years later there are millions of scientists and none of them need to know the meaning of being or whether they are seeing only light or the steak to eat their dinner.
 
You may call the whole by the name of its nature or essence. Thus dog, cat, coal, water, etc. But the nature or essence is what gives rise to all the constituent parts you mention and also to the particular powers, activities, etc of that dog, cat, lump of coal, that glas of water, etc. You can’t see the nature or essence, you see its signatures, its foot prints.

When you say, " I see a dog., " what you actually mean is that you see all the visable and measureable manifestations of a particular essence or nature we call a dog. The nature or essence is the root cause of all that is seen and touched and quantified and measured, etc. The human soul, for example, cannot be seen. Yet it is the root cause of all that man is and does, once united to the body. All essences or natures, animate and inanimate, are similar in that regard.

The nature or essence is caused by the conjoining of a particular form to a particular matter. This Aritotle and Aquinas call Second Substance. It cannot be seen. It is the thing without what I have called called " footprints " or its signatures. What you see is what Aristotle and Aquinas have called First Substance, because it is the thing as you first see it, with all its " footprints., " These " footprints " Aristotle and Aquinas called accidents because they exist in the Second Substance, the Nature or Essence.

Thus, the substance ( Second Substance, minus the accidents ) of the bread and wine are changed into the whole Christ ( First Substance, Christ with all his accidents ).

Linus2nd
He is asking whether a dog which is constitute of set of atoms can be explained in term of set of atoms. Namely dog’s nature is atoms nature? What is your answer?
 
No, even in Aristotle God is pure act with no potentiality, the source of all movement. In Thomas God is also pure act with no potentiality, but also the sourse of all existence and all that happens in the created universe.
Isn’t that what I said though?
*I don’t see how. To A./T.A. a substance was whatever could be clearly understood to exist on its own, I’m not sure the the interior physicalities of an atom can be regarded as substances that can stand alone. Perhaps they can under highly specific conditions have a fleeting independent existence. But are we really all that certain about that? *
That’s what I’m arguing. If the Aristotelian framework breaks down then it hinders investigation. If you are a scientist wedded to Aristotelian doctrine you would be looking for substance, you would be sent down the wrong track.
So? Besides how certain is all this?
QCD is an essential part of the Standard Model. The idea that virtually all of you is space (inside and between atoms), and virtually all of your mass is nothing more than the jiggling of particles implies that our common sense view of ourselves is a little off base. We could even go the whole hog and imagine that perhaps we are just bits of jiggling space which create fields which we perceive as solid. Aristotle doesn’t have the imagination.
Correct. So, what is the problem? I’m sure Aristotle would agree. But he would point out that the spring is a man made artifact and its nature ( its matter/form composition ) is contrived by the agent(s) which designed and constructed the spring. And the agents designed it so its form possessed the potentiality you described.
If you read the linked article, most examples of potential energy are not man made, I just used a spring as an example. Potential energy is very different from “potentiality”, Work always has to be done to store the energy, the enrgy doesn’t just magically exist, it has to come from an explained source. Also it isn’t just a quality, it’s always quantifiable, measured in joules (Btus in old money).
Not really interested in Hume, he, Descartes, Bishop Berkley, etc. are basically philosophical idealists and I don’t regard them as sound in any way. For a detailed critique of Hume’s thought see Edward Feser here, edwardfeser.blogspot.com/2009/06/hume-science-and-religion.html. Divine Revelation can’t be falsified either :).
Oh well it must be wrong if Lord Fesser deems it so. :rolleyes:
 
Well yes, the average person doesn’t think all of that out, but Aristotle’s discourse is really just a philosophical formulation of common sense. The language is a little stuffy and difficult to understand, but that flows from the fact that he is discussing metaphysics which is by its nature very abstract. But I think most people agree that change is real and that things change without the thing itself being destroyed, that some properties of things are not essential, etc. That concedes a lot of what Aristotle is arguing even if it isn’t outlined or defended logically.

I believe there is a Scholastic maxim that goes something like “whatever is in the intellect was first in the senses” so it would appear that Feynman’s joke is directed at a strawman at least as far as the Aristotelian is concerned. We are getting metaphysical information whenever we receive sense data on an object. The Scholastic would argue that metaphysical abstraction is the highest level of generality possible starting with the sensed object:

**
Sensed Object → Physical Abstraction/Modern Science (being as changeable being) → Mathematical Abstraction (being as quantifiable being) → Metaphysical Abstraction (being as being)
**
I would think that most scientists believe that the things they observe behave in regular patterns either due to natures or laws, or they’d have some other metaphysical explanation that makes sense of their findings. And that position would have been informed by sensual experience. They may not be doing metaphysics “first” in a temporal sense but they are doing metaphysics “first” in an ontological sense.
I have a little problem with your diagram. Science assumes the trueness of objective reality namely it assumes that there exist some inexplicable properties which give rise to a specific behavior hence the job is done after physical abstraction. In another word, being is a being and has certain behavior which is physically explicable in term of some inexplicable properties hence physical abstraction is metaphysical abstraction. Mathematics is only a compress language for explaining physical/metaphysical concepts. It also allows us to quantify things as well.
 
He is asking whether a dog which is constitute of set of atoms can be explained in term of set of atoms. Namely dog’s nature is atoms nature? What is your answer?
But these atoms ( different types by the way ) are organized teologically, they work together in all the dogs systems ( circulartory, etc ) for the good of the dog, not for their own good. Therefore there is something ( Aristotle and Aquinas ) which coordinates the the activity of atoms, molecules, cellsr and this they called a form which was conjoined to the matter of the dog. It is this composit which acts. The atoms are not autonomous agents. The living composit of matter and form is a nature or essence. It is the source of all the activities, powers, etc of the dog.

Now read my post again and see how it all fits together.

Linus2nd
 
But these atoms ( different types by the way ) are organized teologically, they work together in all the dogs systems ( circulartory, etc ) for the good of the dog, not for their own good. Therefore there is something ( Aristotle and Aquinas ) which coordinates the the activity of atoms, molecules, cellsr and this they called a form which was conjoined to the matter of the dog. It is this composit which acts. The atoms are not autonomous agents. The living composit of matter and form is a nature or essence. It is the source of all the activities, powers, etc of the dog.

Now read my post again and see how it all fits together.

Linus2nd
Then you mean that laws of nature that define the properties of atoms well are not sufficient to explain the properties of a being like a dog? This means that we have to assign an irreducible quality so called form to the whole dog to make the whole dog different than a set of atoms since if form was reducible then we could explain the whole dog in term of a set of atoms. This irreducible quality is however gone upon death hence it has to be reducible to nothing. How an irreducible quality could become reducible?
 
Isn’t that what I said though?
Yes you did. I apologize. The word " zero " threw me off.
That’s what I’m arguing. If the Aristotelian framework breaks down then it hinders investigation. If you are a scientist wedded to Aristotelian doctrine you would be looking for substance, you would be sent down the wrong track.
I see what you are driving at. I guess it is a matter of interpretation. There is still activity going on which means there is constant movement from potentiality to actuality. I don’t think scientists need to be thinking about that. Philosophers have a different object than scientists. Philosophers are not looking for physical explanations. Philosophers are looking for the ultimate causes the underlying reality not the physical expressions of that reality.
QCD is an essential part of the Standard Model. The idea that virtually all of you is space (inside and between atoms), and virtually all of your mass is nothing more than the jiggling of particles implies that our common sense view of ourselves is a little off base. We could even go the whole hog and imagine that perhaps we are just bits of jiggling space which create fields which we perceive as solid. Aristotle doesn’t have the imagination.
I used this explanation to Aloysium:
" You may call the whole by the name of its nature or essence. Thus dog, cat, coal, water, etc. But the nature or essence is what gives rise to all the constituent parts you mention and also to the particular powers, activities, etc of that dog, cat, lump of coal, that glas of water, etc. You can’t see the nature or essence, you see its signatures, its foot prints.

When you say, " I see a dog., " what you actually mean is that you see all the visable and measureable manifestations of a particular essence or nature we call a dog. The nature or essence is the root cause of all that is seen and touched and quantified and measured, etc. The human soul, for example, cannot be seen. Yet it is the root cause of all that man is and does, once united to the body. All essences or natures, animate and inanimate, are similar in that regard.

The nature or essence is caused by the conjoining of a particular form to a particular matter. This Aritotle and Aquinas call Second Substance. It cannot be seen. It is the thing absent what I have called called " footprints " or its signatures. What you see is what Aristotle and Aquinas have called First Substance, because it is the thing as you first see it, with all its " footprints., " These " footprints " Aristotle and Aquinas called accidents because they exist in the Second Substance, the Nature or Essence.

Thus, the substance ( Second Substance, minus the accidents ) of the bread and wine are changed into the whole Christ ( First Substance, Christ with all his accidents ). "

And this is how I answered Bahman:

" But these atoms ( different types by the way ) are organized teologically, they work together in all the dog’s systems ( circulartory, etc ) for the good of the dog, not for their own good. Therefore there is something ( Aristotle and Aquinas ) which coordinates the the activity of atoms, molecules, cells, and this they called a form which was conjoined to the matter of the dog. It is this composit which acts. The atoms are not autonomous agents. The living composit of matter and form is a nature or essence. It is the source of all the activities, powers, etc of the dog. "
If you read the linked article, most examples of potential energy are not man made, I just used a spring as an example. Potential energy is very different from “potentiality”, Work always has to be done to store the energy, the enrgy doesn’t just magically exist, it has to come from an explained source. Also it isn’t just a quality, it’s always quantifiable, measured in joules (Btus in old money).
The potentiality Aristotle speaks of is primarily the potential of a specific substance to change or move. The range of a substance’s potentiality is limited by its form. Some forms may indeed have the potential to release energy because their forms have made them susceptible to storing energy supplied by some agent, ultimately God, who is the creator of all forms in the first place. The article you linked is very complex from a scientific point of view. It would certainly be next to impossible to trace the relationship between all the substances and agents involved. But ultimately they can be traced to God’s creative power.

The examples I gave to Aloysium and Bahman are easier to see. The dog, cat, etc get their energy from the food and liquids they take in. But it is their substantial forms which allow them to do this, their nature or essence is to be able to make these conversions.
Oh well it must be wrong if Lord Fesser deems it so. :rolleyes:
I know he isn’t your cup of tea but he is very good, excellent in fact. Did you know that St. Jerome had a dreadful temper? Sometimes we have to shut our eyes to people’s personality foibles. Feser has his. You and I have ours. The saints had theirs. Did you know that St. Teresa, the little flower, was very spoiled as a child and was thought to be unbalanced due to her tantrums?

Linus2nd
 
Perhaps some Catholic theologians still use it but otherwise the entire framework has been replaced, it’s far too fuzzy and arcane to be of any use. You’ll find echos, but they are fragmentary. It can’t be falsified, and as such we can use Hume’s Fork to say it is purely a relationship of ideas.
Actually; no. The biggest schools to be employing either Act & Potency and concepts analogous to Act & Potency are currently dominating the debates on Ontology in Analytical Philosophy. Scholasticism isn’t all that popular amongst Catholic Theologians at the moment; which is a pity.

Also; Hume’s fork is self-defeating, as the fork itself is not either a matter of fact or a matter of value. Therefore according to its own assertion Hume’s fork is nothing, and therefore can be disregarded.

Falsificationism is also a doctrine of Philosophy of Science, and not fundamental Ontology and Metaphysics. It can be falsified as well- demonstrate that the premises that lead to the requirement of the distinction between Act/potency are wrong. Or, that the critiques of static monism and dynamic monism launched by Aristotle, and again at modern materialism, are incorrect. You seem to think that Metaphysics is an inductive discipline, whereas it is a deductive discipline. The principles of which all special sciences presuppose, as it isn’t proper to their object of study.
 
Inocente and Bahman, Aloysium.

Here is an interesting comment by Thomas Aquinas on Nature ( just one among dozens of course ). It is from his Commantary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book 12. Thomas typically gives a brief synopsis of Aristotle’s argument. At the end he gives a " Comment. " His synopsis is numbered according to the way the paragraphs are numbered in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. His Commentaries are numbered consecutively, beginning with Book 1.

" 2634. And just as the order of the family is imposed by the law and precept of the head of the family, who is the principle of each of the things which are ordered in the household, with a view to carrying out the activities which pertain to the order of the household, in a similar fashion the nature of physical things is the principle by which each of them carries out the activity proper to it in the order of the universe. For just as any member of the household is disposed to act through the precept of the head of the family, in a similar fashion any natural being is disposed by its own nature. Now the nature of each thing is a kind of inclination implanted in it by the first mover, who directs it to its proper end; and from this it is clear that natural beings act for the sake of an end even though they do not know that end, because they acquire their inclination to their end from the first intelligence. " ( underlining mine )

dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Metaphysics12.htm#12

This may give you a better idea how Aristotle and Thomas regarded nature. It was real and it was the source of all the activity of a substance. Not only that but the whole universe and everything in it is ordered to the common good of all. Note that each substance aquires its inclination ( intentionality in modern terminology ) form the first intelligence, God, who creates their form with that intentionality encoded ( so to speak ).

" 2632. And all things (1104).

Here he shows the ways in which the parts of the universe contribute to its order. He says that all things in the universe are ordered together in some way, but not all are ordered alike, for example, sea animals, birds, and plants. Yet even though they are not ordered in the same way, they are still not disposed in such a way that one of them has no connection with another; but there is some affinity and relationship of one with another. For plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men. That all things are related. to each other is evident from the fact that all are connected together to one end.
  1. That all are not ordered in the same way is made clear by an example; for in an ordered household or family different ranks of members are found. For example, under the head of the family there is a first rank, namely, that of the sons, and a second rank, which is that of the slaves, and a third rank, which is that of the domestic animals, as dogs and the like. For ranks of this kind have a different relation to the order of the household, which is imposed by the head of the family, who governs the household. For it is not proper for the sons to act in a haphazard and disorderly way, but all or most of the things that they do are ordered. This is not the case with the slaves or domestic animals, however, because they share to a very small degree in the order which exists for the common good. But in their case we find many things which are contingent and haphazard; and this is because they have little connection with the ruler of the household, who aims at the common good of the household. " ( same link )
So all the substances in the universe that have ever been, which now are, or which will be have their individual good which is different and unique to each. Yet they all work together for the common good, by the implanted intentionality of their maker, the First Cause, God. Whether or not we can detect every " jot and tittle " of this intentiality, it is obvious that it is there.

Linus2nd
 
I think this example brings out my issue with saying things have natures, because there’s a huge amount which can be said about water. You listed a few of what in modern terminology are called properties, which are clinical. But they don’t tell anything like the whole story.

The properties are beside the point if we’re in a desert, when the essential nature of water would be that it quenches our thirst. Or if our house is on fire, when it quenches the flames. Or even if we want to write a poem about a babbling brook. So now you need a standards committee to decide what, out of all the things which different people want to be included, is important enough to be part of the nature of water. And they have to meet once a year to update the standard, but no one buys it because we already know what’s important to us, whatever anyone else says.
I don’t know why your concerns are an issue for essences/natures though. It is in the nature of water to quench human thirst and extinguish fires. Those statements are true of water after all. And we do seem to have a standards committee, at least for some of the properties I enumerated earlier. Only instead of calling it a “standards committee” we usually call it “academia.” 😃
The major is that Nagel brings into question the assumption that there is a True Reality™. On the basis that aliens would be truly alien, what if they see in the X-ray band or the radio band instead of the narrow frequency range visible to us? They wouldn’t see what we call things, and we wouldn’t see what they call things. Which implies that things are not part of True Reality™. And if things aren’t then neither are natures and essences and so on.
Again, I am not sure how the alien example would cast doubt on the validity of the notion of objective reality. That the hypothetical alien is able to see different wavelengths than humans does not show that there exist different things for aliens than for humans. If I were to go blind tomorrow, I don’t think reality would change at all although my experiences of it would surely be different. If there’s no objective reality then from whence do our experiences arise? And again, why would there be any reason to expect them to be predictable if they are not based in anything objective?
 
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