What does, " the nature of a thing " mean?

[balto]

I think you tripped up here, as common sense varies. What was common sense to Aristotle in a world where there was very little technology would be very different from common sense today, even though our education is influenced by some of his ideas. Personally, I think the framework is too artificial and far too speculative. Imagine if a version of string theory took hold for 2400 years. Some people would then argue it is common sense.

Well I don’t know what to say further to try to convince you of it, but I think the issue is that it is tempting to look at the act/potency theory as a type of scientific hypothesis and start looking for concrete things that get turned on and off, which isn’t what he is arguing for. I kept imagining things like this until I understood that he’s not postulating more entities to add to our ontology but to explain what it means to be an entity in the first place.

I like how you inserted metaphysics in there. The scholastics were empiricists, they based arguments on a posteriori reasoning. But this desire amongst you guys to claim that even an ant is doing metaphysics when it senses food, even a dog is doing metaphysical abstractions when it intercepts a frizby, seems to indicate a deep insecurity, as if you secretly suspect that metaphysics is an oxygen thief.

I think the Scholastics used a combination of a posteriori and a priori arguments. Just because you sense an object doesn’t mean you are doing metaphysics or even doing any science at all, so there’s no need for an animal to do metaphysics before doing anything. But once a rational agent starts thinking this is the way the world works, or this is what this thing is and what it does, then yes, you’ve committed yourself to some metaphysical position on what it means to be whether you realize it or not.

 

[balto]

I have a little problem with your diagram. Science assumes the trueness of objective reality namely it assumes that there exist some inexplicable properties which give rise to a specific behavior hence the job is done after physical abstraction. In another word, being is a being and has certain behavior which is physically explicable in term of some inexplicable properties hence physical abstraction is metaphysical abstraction. Mathematics is only a compress language for explaining physical/metaphysical concepts. It also allows us to quantify things as well.

Well physical abstraction is still tied to matter in some way whereas metaphysical abstraction is not. Physical abstraction would ask what it means to be a cat, or what does it mean to be an atom, etc. Mathematical abstraction in general would ask what it means to be a material object, i.e. it has a shape, it has length, it has mass, etc, although I suppose you have a point that mathematics can be used in a variety of ways. Metaphysical abstraction would ask what it means to be a thing at all. My only intention was that you can abstract to higher levels of generality from a sense experience.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Then you mean that laws of nature that define the properties of atoms well are not sufficient to explain the properties of a being like a dog? This means that we have to assign an irreducible quality so called form to the whole dog to make the whole dog different than a set of atoms since if form was reducible then we could explain the whole dog in term of a set of atoms. This irreducible quality is however gone upon death hence it has to be reducible to nothing. How an irreducible quality could become reducible?

Pretty close. Actually the Nature is the result of the conjoined composit of matter and form. The form is actually where all the properties come from. And upon death the form of a living being disappears along with the Nature. What is left is the individual natures of all the atoms, etc which formerly constituted the Nature of the dog, whatever these are. In other words the body decomposes into its constituent elements.

Linus2nd

 

[Bahman]

Well physical abstraction is still tied to matter in some way whereas metaphysical abstraction is not. Physical abstraction would ask what it means to be a cat, or what does it mean to be an atom, etc. Mathematical abstraction in general would ask what it means to be a material object, i.e. it has a shape, it has length, it has mass, etc, although I suppose you have a point that mathematics can be used in a variety of ways. Metaphysical abstraction would ask what it means to be a thing at all. My only intention was that you can abstract to higher levels of generality from a sense experience.

No. Physical abstraction is dealing with what a thing in general is by finding a set of inexplicable irreducible properties that can explain the behavior of a thing. This means that behavior is reducible/explicable in term of properties and this is the edge of knowledge since you cannot possibly reduce properties to sub-properties otherwise properties are not irreducible. Mathematics is only a language that explain the behavior in term of properties in a compact form which means you have to find a proper math which is usable in the context.

This I already discuss it in another thread but it worth mentioning in here to: There are no metaphysical concept if we accept that the reality is what we observe since what we observe, objective reality, if it is really reality is explicable only in term of physical concepts. There is no room left for further abstraction hence metaphysical concepts are physical concepts.

 

[Bahman]

Pretty close. Actually the Nature is the result of the conjoined composit of matter and form. The form is actually where all the properties come from. And upon death the form of a living being disappears along with the Nature. What is left is the individual natures of all the atoms, etc which formerly constituted the Nature of the dog, whatever these are. In other words the body decomposes into its constituent elements.

Linus2nd

But we are dealing with a paradox here which states an irreducible quality so called form is reducible to nothing upon death!

 

[inocente]

I see what you are driving at. I guess it is a matter of interpretation. There is still activity going on which means there is constant movement from potentiality to actuality. I don’t think scientists need to be thinking about that. Philosophers have a different object than scientists. Philosophers are not looking for physical explanations. Philosophers are looking for the ultimate causes the underlying reality not the physical expressions of that reality.

That depends on the individual philosopher though. Physicalists don’t allow any causes other than physical. Russell denies there is any ultimate cause, the universe just is. And so on.

When you say, " I see a dog., " what you actually mean is that you see all the visable and measureable manifestations of a particular essence or nature we call a dog. The nature or essence is the root cause of all that is seen and touched and quantified and measured, etc. The human soul, for example, cannot be seen. Yet it is the root cause of all that man is and does, once united to the body. All essences or natures, animate and inanimate, are similar in that regard.

But you know that the root cause of an iPhone is not essence of iPhone. If humans evolved and are still evolving, then the soul is not the cause there either.

But these atoms ( different types by the way ) are organized teologically, they work together in all the dog’s systems ( circulartory, etc ) for the good of the dog, not for their own good. Therefore there is something ( Aristotle and Aquinas ) which coordinates the the activity of atoms, molecules, cells, and this they called a form which was conjoined to the matter of the dog. It is this composit which acts. The atoms are not autonomous agents. The living composit of matter and form is a nature or essence. It is the source of all the activities, powers, etc of the dog.

The Aristotelian idea that matter is enchanted, that atoms work “for the good of the dog, not for their own good” is alien to modern science, and probably also to the average person these days.

The potentiality Aristotle speaks of is primarily the potential of a specific substance to change or move. The range of a substance’s potentiality is limited by its form. Some forms may indeed have the potential to release energy because their forms have made them susceptible to storing energy supplied by some agent, ultimately God, who is the creator of all forms in the first place. The article you linked is very complex from a scientific point of view. It would certainly be next to impossible to trace the relationship between all the substances and agents involved. But ultimately they can be traced to God’s creative power.

But it remains that his potentiality notion is magical, whereas potential energy is well defined and measurable. It’s really very simple. The energy stored up in petrol is said to be chemical potential energy. It’s around 46 megajoule per kilogram, while the potential energy in fats we eat is around 39. In both these cases the energy was stored by life processes. Potential energy always has a source, a process which did work by which the energy got stored.

I know he isn’t your cup of tea but he is very good, excellent in fact. Did you know that St. Jerome had a dreadful temper? Sometimes we have to shut our eyes to people’s personality foibles. Feser has his. You and I have ours. The saints had theirs. Did you know that St. Teresa, the little flower, was very spoiled as a child and was thought to be unbalanced due to her tantrums?

I don’t find him convincing, he only seems interested in polemic for his cause.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

But we are dealing with a paradox here which states an irreducible quality so called form is reducible to nothing upon death!

The form, since it is a principle which brings existence to the nature or essence cannot be regarded as a quality. As long as it is joined to a particular matter to cause the nature or essence ( i.e. this dog ) to exist, it must be regarded as something real. However, upon death it does cease to exist and is replaced by the multiple forms of the dog’s ultimate, physical components. The forms of animals and plants are spiritual, living forms which have a potential to non-existence because they are tied absolutely to their matter. That is the way God made them, the way they were " encoded. " As long as they are united to their particular matter they exist. But when they are not united to their matter they cease to exist. They were not created by their creator to exist independently.

However, the human soul, which is the form of a man, does not cease to exist upon death because the soul is an intellectual substance, a spirit, which has no potential to non-existence. Because God intended intellectual susbstances, the human soul and angels, to exist forever. This is philosophically explained by the fact that the human soul has operations, thinking, willing, remembering, self awareness etc., which do not depend on their particular matter essentially but only in an accidental way. In other words the human body provides a platform for man to express himself and to function as a man. But the fact that thinking, willing, remembering, self awareness are non-material operations means that the human soul is not tied to the matter of the body and, for that reason, it can exist on its own after death. But because the soul’s proper mode of operation is as a form united to a body, this means the body can and will be reunited with its proper soul at some future time.

Thank you for a very good question.

LInus2nd

 

[inocente]

Actually; no. The biggest schools to be employing either Act & Potency and concepts analogous to Act & Potency are currently dominating the debates on Ontology in Analytical Philosophy.

Presumably not in the discredited physical sense but in the general sense of contrast, as where Aristotle talks of metaphors compared with actualities here (section 11) - perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Aristot.+Rh.+1411b&fromdoc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0060

Also; Hume’s fork is self-defeating, as the fork itself is not either a matter of fact or a matter of value. Therefore according to its own assertion Hume’s fork is nothing, and therefore can be disregarded.

By Hume’s lights the Fork must be one or the other, and an analytic philosopher argues it’s a matter of fact here - home.wlu.edu/~goldbergn/scholarship/In%20Progress/Hume%27s%20Fork.pdf

Falsificationism is also a doctrine of Philosophy of Science, and not fundamental Ontology and Metaphysics. It can be falsified as well- demonstrate that the premises that lead to the requirement of the distinction between Act/potency are wrong. Or, that the critiques of static monism and dynamic monism launched by Aristotle, and again at modern materialism, are incorrect. You seem to think that Metaphysics is an inductive discipline, whereas it is a deductive discipline. The principles of which all special sciences presuppose, as it isn’t proper to their object of study.

No, to me metaphysics is deductive a la mathematics. Hume distinguishes between (a) relationships of ideas, such as in metaphysics or math, which can be proven but can’t tell us facts about the world, and (b) matters of fact, which can tell us about the world but can’t be proven since they are only based on experience. This is why Russell thinks the universe needs no cause - the causation of universes is outside our experience.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

That depends on the individual philosopher though. Physicalists don’t allow any causes other than physical. Russell denies there is any ultimate cause, the universe just is. And so on.

I can’t help what " physicalists " think or what Russell thinks. It would take volumes to refute them individually. Feser has done this and he references others who have done the same.

But you know that the root cause of an iPhone is not essence of iPhone. If humans evolved and are still evolving, then the soul is not the cause there either.

You know we cannot discuss evolution. But whatever the case ( and I do not think it can be maintained philosophically ), it is clear that the soul is the form, the source of all of man’s activities. All of man’s activities cease upon death. That should establish the soul as the source of all of man’s activities. And please do not bring up evolution again.

The Aristotelian idea that matter is enchanted, that atoms work “for the good of the dog, not for their own good” is alien to modern science, and probably also to the average person these days.

" Enchanted " to some perhaps. I don’t think modern science would deny what I said, since it would be to deny the obvious. And the average person is not qualified to judge since they typically would not have given much, if any, thought to the matter.

But it remains that his potentiality notion is magical, whereas potential energy is well defined and measurable. It’s really very simple. The energy stored up in petrol is said to be chemical potential energy. It’s around 46 megajoule per kilogram, while the potential energy in fats we eat is around 39. In both these cases the energy was stored by life processes. Potential energy always has a source, a process which did work by which the energy got stored.

I have given you a good answer. If you do not want to accept it, I can’t help that.

I don’t find him convincing, he only seems interested in polemic for his cause.

That is no argument. He has ruffled your feathers that’s all, that does not mean he is wrong. Besides all his arguments can be distilled from Thomas Aquinas himself. Feser simply saves you the work. And he is widely accepted as an authority in his field. Even his oponents regard him as someone that needs to be dealt with seriously. So he obviously has something to say worth listening to. It is odd that you don’t seem to be critical of his antagonists who are equally, if not more polemical /. It really would be interesting to learn your actual reasons .

I think, when we get right down to it, you simply don’t want to acknowledg that Aristotle or Aquinas offer any solutions to the fundamental questions which have always confronted man. You have substituted science as an alternative, the only solution to you. That is your prerogative of course. But it does make one wonder how Faith is justified in your particular world view?

Linus2nd

 

[Bahman]

The form, since it is a principle which brings existence to the nature or essence cannot be regarded as a quality. As long as it is joined to a particular matter to cause the nature or essence ( i.e. this dog ) to exist, it must be regarded as something real. However, upon death it does cease to exist and is replaced by the multiple forms of the dog’s ultimate, physical components. The forms of animals and plants are spiritual, living forms which have a potential to non-existence because they are tied absolutely to their matter. That is the way God made them, the way they were " encoded. " As long as they are united to their particular matter they exist. But when they are not united to their matter they cease to exist. They were not created by their creator to exist independently.

However, the human soul, which is the form of a man, does not cease to exist upon death because the soul is an intellectual substance, a spirit, which has no potential to non-existence. Because God intended intellectual susbstances, the human soul and angels, to exist forever. This is philosophically explained by the fact that the human soul has operations, thinking, willing, remembering, self awareness etc., which do not depend on their particular matter essentially but only in an accidental way. In other words the human body provides a platform for man to express himself and to function as a man. But the fact that thinking, willing, remembering, self awareness are non-material operations means that the human soul is not tied to the matter of the body and, for that reason, it can exist on its own after death. But because the soul’s proper mode of operation is as a form united to a body, this means the body can and will be reunited with its proper soul at some future time.

Thank you for a very good question.

LInus2nd

Thank you very much for your answer. I am however not fully satisfied with it.

To me any living being most importantly animals for what I understand share common feathers/properties like human such as emotion and love, consciousness, etc which define their form. This properties however are as irreducible as logical thinking which human own which to me is not 100% correct since to me animal also decide based on circumstances so they should have a level of abstraction that we are not aware of them. So to me if animals disappear upon death then the same rule applies to human as well. To be honest I don’t understand what is the advantage of logical thinking compared to feeling which the former grant a life and the later does not.

Putting this problem aside, I think that you believe on hylomorphic dualism which state that form and matter can only manifest themselves to a substance if they coexist together and they are not separate substances hence form disappears upon death. This is however as I mentioned is paradoxical since a irreducible property cannot vanish upon death.

 

[inocente]

Inocente and Bahman, Aloysium.

Thanks. I tried to quote from your post but CAF kept blocking me. Don’t know why.

But anyway, three difficulties I have with it:

1. The principle that an ultimate mover is necessary is based on the observation that things stop moving unless they are kept in motion (a cart doesn’t move unless the horse pulls it). But we now know that the principle is wrong - put the cart in orbit and it will keep moving on its own. No head of the household is then necessary.
2. The “plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men” kind of philsophy, that everything exists for our sake, is what led to global warming!
3. The attempt to explain order and disorder by analogy to the hierarchy of head of the household → sons → slave → domestic animals, sounds like an argument for the divine right of kings. It that context, things possessing natures is an attempt to reconcile that the prime movers keeps them moving but even so they don’t always act in harmony.

 

[inocente]

I don’t know why your concerns are an issue for essences/natures though. It is in the nature of water to quench human thirst and extinguish fires. Those statements are true of water after all. And we do seem to have a standards committee, at least for some of the properties I enumerated earlier. Only instead of calling it a “standards committee” we usually call it “academia.”

There’s no committee, that’s like thinking there’s a World Head of Academia who controls all academics everywhere. Besides, why should a cab driver in Mexico pay attention to an academic from Korea on the nature of water? There’s no means of agreeing what is and isn’t the nature of water, therefore it’s only a matter of faith whether there are natures at all.

Again, I am not sure how the alien example would cast doubt on the validity of the notion of objective reality. That the hypothetical alien is able to see different wavelengths than humans does not show that there exist different things for aliens than for humans. If I were to go blind tomorrow, I don’t think reality would change at all although my experiences of it would surely be different. If there’s no objective reality then from whence do our experiences arise? And again, why would there be any reason to expect them to be predictable if they are not based in anything objective?

We’re talking at cross purposes. You realize that lots of things, including walls, are transparent or semi-transparent to radio wavelengths? If aliens don’t agree with your definition of what is a thing then you have no basis for claiming that your definition is objective.

 

[inocente]

Well I don’t know what to say further to try to convince you of it, but I think the issue is that it is tempting to look at the act/potency theory as a type of scientific hypothesis and start looking for concrete things that get turned on and off, which isn’t what he is arguing for. I kept imagining things like this until I understood that he’s not postulating more entities to add to our ontology but to explain what it means to be an entity in the first place.

You appear to be suggesting that Aristotle is arm waving. “What it means to be an entity” implies that entities have to get his permission before they can exist, which is a bit circular, and that the world must divide neatly into whatever he says are entities. It doesn’t. If you changed it to “explain what it means to perceive an entity” then I’d agree.

I think the Scholastics used a combination of a posteriori and a priori arguments. Just because you sense an object doesn’t mean you are doing metaphysics or even doing any science at all, so there’s no need for an animal to do metaphysics before doing anything. But once a rational agent starts thinking this is the way the world works, or this is what this thing is and what it does, then yes, you’ve committed yourself to some metaphysical position on what it means to be whether you realize it or not.

The dog intercepting a frizby is able to understand that it is separate (what this thing is) and is moving in a trajectory (what it does) so you’re still saying dogs do metaphysics. They don’t. Are you using a current definition of metaphysics?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thanks. I tried to quote from your post but CAF kept blocking me. Don’t know why.

But anyway, three difficulties I have with it:

1. The principle that an ultimate mover is necessary is based on the observation that things stop moving unless they are kept in motion (a cart doesn’t move unless the horse pulls it). But we now know that the principle is wrong - put the cart in orbit and it will keep moving on its own. No head of the household is then necessary.
2. The “plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men” kind of philsophy, that everything exists for our sake, is what led to global warming!
3. The attempt to explain order and disorder by analogy to the hierarchy of head of the household → sons → slave → domestic animals, sounds like an argument for the divine right of kings. It that context, things possessing natures is an attempt to reconcile that the prime movers keeps them moving but even so they don’t always act in harmony.

You really should have put a after each paragraph because it is clear that you aren’t in earnest. You are in rare form today.

Pax, hope you have a better day tomorrow.

Linus2nd

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Thank you very much for your answer. I am however not fully satisfied with it.

To me any living being most importantly animals for what I understand share common feathers/properties like human such as emotion and love, consciousness, etc which define their form. This properties however are as irreducible as logical thinking which human own which to me is not 100% correct since to me animal also decide based on circumstances so they should have a level of abstraction that we are not aware of them. So to me if animals disappear upon death then the same rule applies to human as well. To be honest I don’t understand what is the advantage of logical thinking compared to feeling which the former grant a life and the later does not.

Putting this problem aside, I think that you believe on hylomorphic dualism which state that form and matter can only manifest themselves to a substance if they coexist together and they are not separate substances hence form disappears upon death. This is however as I mentioned is paradoxical since a irreducible property cannot vanish upon death.

Well, I have explained my position to the best of my ability. I would like to be able to convince you that you are wrong, but it appears that I am unable to. So I will have to leave you to your own devices.

Linus2nd

 

[Charlemagne_III]

Besides, why should a cab driver in Mexico pay attention to an academic from Korea on the nature of water? There’s no means of agreeing what is and isn’t the nature of water, therefore it’s only a matter of faith whether there are natures at all.

It is in the nature of a cab driver from Mexico to do with water what the academic from Korea does with it … drink.

If it is “only a matter of faith whether there are natures at all,” the nature of man is that he has faith in natures.

 

[balto]

There’s no committee, that’s like thinking there’s a World Head of Academia who controls all academics everywhere. Besides, why should a cab driver in Mexico pay attention to an academic from Korea on the nature of water? There’s no means of agreeing what is and isn’t the nature of water, therefore it’s only a matter of faith whether there are natures at all.

Well it’s interesting because scientists don’t seem to have a problem agreeing that water boils at 100C under standard atmospheric conditions or that it freezes at 0C or that it is composed of 2 parts hydrogen and 1 part oxygen. Or that is quenches thirst and extinguishes fires. Maybe I missed the controversy that is calling everything we know about water into doubt.

We’re talking at cross purposes. You realize that lots of things, including walls, are transparent or semi-transparent to radio wavelengths? If aliens don’t agree with your definition of what is a thing then you have no basis for claiming that your definition is objective.

Yes, I realize that but you still haven’t demonstrated how you can make the jump from the premise that people disagree on what reality is to the conclusion that there is no such thing as reality at all. Biologists study living things and as of yet they still cannot agree on what a living thing is. Heck, a couple of months ago we had that guy write an article in Scientific American I believe claiming that there is no such thing as life at all. Since biologists cannot agree on what they are studying, I suppose it is valid for us to completely reject everything and anything any biologist has ever said because they have no basis for claiming that their theories on life are objective. There seems to be quite a bit of disagreement in physics as well so let’s toss that out the window too while we’re at it. I somehow doubt that is the position to which you are really committed.

 

[balto]

You appear to be suggesting that Aristotle is arm waving. “What it means to be an entity” implies that entities have to get his permission before they can exist, which is a bit circular, and that the world must divide neatly into whatever he says are entities. It doesn’t. If you changed it to “explain what it means to perceive an entity” then I’d agree.

I don’t remember claiming that something needs Aristotle’s permission to exist. How does adding “perception” to the definition substantially change the meaning of what I said? We’re still perceiving the entity.

The dog intercepting a frizby is able to understand that it is separate (what this thing is) and is moving in a trajectory (what it does) so you’re still saying dogs do metaphysics. They don’t. Are you using a current definition of metaphysics?

The dog is able to understand a frizby qua frizby. Why would metaphysics be needed here? The example you keep using is that we don’t need metaphysics to do science and I’ve argued otherwise because the modern scientific method is based on what a person believes it means to be a thing and how it behaves. Dogs don’t do either metaphysics or science so the example is not relevant. Are you trying to argue that a dog chasing a frisbee and a scientist studying quantum mechanics is essentially the same with only a difference in degree?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I would like to address an extraordinary statement made by Inocente in her post # 130. But first I will give the statement of mine which was the occasion of her comment. my statement # 118 was :

" Here is an interesting comment by Thomas Aquinas on Nature ( just one among dozens of course ). It is from his Commantary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, Book 12. Thomas typically gives a brief synopsis of Aristotle’s argument. At the end he gives a " Comment. " His synopsis is numbered according to the way the paragraphs are numbered in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. His Commentaries are numbered consecutively, beginning with Book 1.

" 2634. And just as the order of the family is imposed by the law and precept of the head of the family, who is the principle of each of the things which are ordered in the household, with a view to carrying out the activities which pertain to the order of the household, in a similar fashion the nature of physical things is the principle by which each of them carries out the activity proper to it in the order of the universe. For just as any member of the household is disposed to act through the precept of the head of the family, in a similar fashion any natural being is disposed by its own nature. Now the nature of each thing is a kind of inclination implanted in it by the first mover, who directs it to its proper end; and from this it is clear that natural beings act for the sake of an end even though they do not know that end, because they acquire their inclination to their end from the first intelligence. " ( underlining mine )

This was her response in post # 130 was:

" 1. The principle that an ultimate mover is necessary is based on the observation that things stop moving unless they are kept in motion (a cart doesn’t move unless the horse pulls it). But we now know that the principle is wrong - put the cart in orbit and it will keep moving on its own. No head of the household is then necessary. "

First of all my post was not about a first mover per se, but it was meant to illustrate what Aristotle meant and I mean by the inherent and real nature of all substances. But she took occasion to attempt to dismantle Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ Unmoved Mover by appealing to Newton’s Laws of Motion. The odd thing is that Aristotle’s argument for his Unmoved and Eternal Mover is based on the eternal motion of the heavenly bodies which, he claims rightly, can only be accounted for by an eternally existing Unmoved Mover. This is clearly stated in Aquinas’ Commentary on Book XII, Chapeter 7 of Aristotle’s Metaphysics.here:

" Then he concludes that the motion of the celestial bodies must be eternal on the ground that generation is eternal. Therefore, granted that there is no other motion by which things that pass from potentiality to actuality have always been the same except that which proceeds according to the cycle of generation, he concludes from what has been shown in the philosophy of nature (especially in Book II of Generation ) that, if something remains the same throughout the cycle of generation, something must also remain numerically the same, which will act in the same way so as to cause the eternal motion of things. For none of the things which are generated and destroyed can be the cause of the eternality which is found in generation and destruction, because no one of them always exists, nor even all of them, since they do not exist at the same time, as has been shown in Book VIII of the Physics. It follows, then, that there must be some eternal, agent which always acts in a uniform way so as to cause the eternal motion of things. This is the first heaven, which is moved and causes all things to be changed by its daily motion."

So by Aristotle’s reasoning, Newton’s eternally moving body, being not essentially different from Aristotle’s eternally moving celestial body, requires an eternally existing Unmoved Mover to account for its eternal motion.

And I have further elaborated on the so called uncaused motion of Newton’s body in my thread " The First Way Explained, now on page 2 or 3 of this forum. The answer to Newton is that no material body starts moving nor continues moving without a cause. As Dr. John A. Weisheipl demonstrates in Nature and Motion in the MIddle Ages, the agent which set the body in motion imparted an impetus to the body which modified its nature such that, by nature, the body would continue moving, seemingly without a cause. And the Agent who created the Nature of the body in such a fachion that it could be so modified, was its creator, the Unmoved Mover, or God.

So it turns out that Newton’s body had two movers, the agent that imparted the impetus and the one who created its nature so that it could be so modified. Of course God could have done both.

I would like to further point out that in Aristotle and Aquinas a moved object does have to be moved by something, but that something does not have to accompany the moved object. In fact the cause of the motion might not be close in either time or proximity as in the example just given or in the example of a thrown ball, etc.

Linus2nd

 

[inocente]

You really should have put a after each paragraph because it is clear that you aren’t in earnest. You are in rare form today.

Pax, hope you have a better day tomorrow.

Taking cheap shots is not valid reasoning. Your absence of argument can only mean that you have none. I graciously accept your total surrender.

Pax, hope you have a better day tomorrow.