What exactly is the soul?

[inocente]

Indeed, I made some important assumptions (which I regarded inevitable at the moment), but not the ones you have mentioned. If I am going to explain logic, it will be inevitable to use two different approaches simultaneously: observation and introspection, because it is my purpose (as a hypothetical materialistic monist) to show how my mind emerges from matter. For that, all my analysis needs to be based on current facts, and even if I need to study my memory, it will be necessary to consider some of my current acts of memory. So, I was not assuming that my concepts were built in at birth (that would be an assumption which I would never make). I was just considering certain concepts that I already have (without asking when nor how they were formed) and I was formulating a hypothesis on why I can’t think them simultaneously (because it is my personal experience that when I am thinking one of them I cannot think the other. I can think them successively, but not simultaneously; so, I don’t say that my mind stops when I try to think contradictory notions simultaneously). Now, it is not necessary to believe in “universals” to have the notion of them, and of course a materialistic monist is one of those guys who doesn’t believe in “universals”, because “matter” is always “this matter”.

I will try to continue tomorrow.

I don’t see how even the most materialistic monist could get through life without some kind of notion of universals. I mean she looks up at night and sees points of light and calls them all stars, thus recognizing they have some general characteristics (up in the sky, point-like, bright), which she might label as universals. She might recognize that those characteristics are not strictly speaking objectively true, since “up” is relative to her; stars are not points but just a long way off; and some are brighter than others.

And of course, science is built on recognizing what metaphysics may or may not call “objective universals” - as Newton wrote, “In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction”.

But also, we’re not conscious of most of our mind, and I think philosophers of mind have proven repeatedly, by later being proved wrong, that introspection is not a useful tool here. No amount of introspection will tell us how we recognize the face of a friend so quickly and effortlessly.

 

[inocente]

From where does the idea of the universal come if material things are all individualized from which it appears that matter is a principle of individuation? There must be a power in our soul which receives the substantial forms of things into it without the form being contracted by matter and individualized as in the sensory powers. Accordingly, the intellectual power is an immaterial power which can know universals such as human nature or humanity. The idea of humanity cannot be imagined, it is known only by the intellect. The agent intellect abstracts the form of some thing (from the phantasm) from all its individuating material characteristics and thus we get the idea of the universal or the essence or nature of some thing. The substantial form of some thing such as a horse is what places some thing into a class or species of things or determines the nature of some thing. It is the intellect’s “job” to go straight to the substantial form in the phantasm and separate it from all the individuating material characteristics.

Recognizing broad classes of object would seem basic to many animals. Many avoid eating insects or berries of certain colors, which signal poison to them. An antelope needs to recognize and be wary of lions (any lion, all lions), while not being so concerned about bison. They must therefore have some means of categorizing, based on common characteristics, universals.

I think the A/T terminology obfuscates and leads down blind alleys here, which is why it was dropped - thinking about it, I’ve never heard it used in any radio or tv program, or in any book except for scholastic.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

The 9 categories of accidents are accidental forms.

This is the very “qualification” of “form” that I am referring to I think.
“Form” without an adjective primarily means what would also be called substantial form doesn’t it? In which case “accidental forms” (the 9 categories) are an analgocial use of the word. Or alternatively, accidental forms are further modifications of the substantial form?

“Material” is misleading. Material refers to matter.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that “material” can be used in a number of analogical senses (Aquinas says that somewhere). “Material”, being an adjective, suggests it is rarely used to refer to the unalloyed, non-existent hylomorphic principle described by the noun “matter”. (ie we don’t talk about material matter but we do talk about a material phantasm (which certainly isn’t matter), a material soul etc).

Language is flexible by reason of analogy and new uses.
I don’t think Aquinas or Aristotle ever coined the expression “material soul” which is why we are debating a range of “valid” possible meanings.

It would be more correct to say material forms as the accidents further qualify or determine the material substance. Forms determine, matter is undetermined.

Well yes, but “matter” can be used to signify other legit meanings as well - eg “individual” (as in “principle of individuation”) and relative “potency”

If we use the term “material form”, this does not mean that the form is matter

Strangely the expression “spiritual soul” does suggest immaterial and material souls are being distinguished!!

… it means that the form is united to matter and it cannot exist except being united to matter.

To feel the need to precision some forms by calling them “material forms” suggests there are some forms not united to matter (Platonic universals?) Which contradicts Aristotelian hylomorphic definitions and terms…which may explain why Aristotle, I believe, never used the phrase “material form”?

Did Aquinas ever use this phrase (I don’t think so) but it would make more sense with him as he does hold that some forms do subsist without matter (ie angels, souls).

The human soul is not called a material form because it can exist without being united to matter; it is an immaterial spiritual form.

Well, yes I understand this definition but as “material form” was never a phrase used by either Aristotle or by Aquinas and seems to be a sort of “recently” coined phrase … who is to say it tells us the “official” meaning of the adjective “material”. There are other possible understandings (eg a “material phantasm” is certainly not material (there is no little tree in my head when I see a tree) yet it is material in so far as it signifies a particular thing (as opposed to an immaterial universal)).

… matter is in the category of substance, it is not an accidental form nor the substantial form.

Have you got references for the way you put this? I would have said matter is a co-principle of substance, as is form - which means neither princple alone can be properly designated “substance”. I think that is Aristotle.
However you may be thining Thomistic here?

Upon further reflection upon the idea “material universals”, as I said in a previous post, in the A/T system, it is a contradiction in terms.

Well, if we allow “material soul” or “material form” (which is not really Aristotle) then we surely have to be lenient in our analogical understanding of “material” in “material universals”.

TBContinued…

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Continued from above…

What is material is individual and singular and the singular is opposed to the idea of the universal; singular does not equal universal as one does not equal many. The universal is immaterial because if it was material it would be singular and individual. Accordingly, the universal is attributed to the intellect, an immaterial power of the soul. This distinction is very important in the A/T system.

Understood.
But this is in the order of knowing.

Yet in the order of being we can recognise the presence of a universal “animating” a single material example can we not?

Obviously there are some universals that cannot be found in individual material beings (eg angelic nature).

Degrees of abstraction come into play as well (eg “number” seems to be a universal half way between immaterial “angelic nature” and material “horse nature”).

" the hypothesis that the material can produce the universal. This is BH hypothesis."
I am not sure I was quite saying that. This is your interpretation of my observation that a PC can recognise ellipses in a variety of sensible examples as well as any human so as to pass a Turing Test on the matter. An ellipse appears to be a very primitive type of “universal” to me (am I wrong?). Is such practical manipulation of this “universal” an example of “intellection”. If it isn’t then intellection (abstraction?) must be more than just the ability to deal in universals.

Consequently, the idea “material universals” was invented. The idea that the material produces the immaterial universal is totally at odds with the A/T system.

It probably is (as is “material form” if one is strict) though “totally” is what we are trying to discern. Is manipulation of numbers (ie maths) intellect-ion or very sophisticated aestimativa-tion?

Then, it appeared that Ynotzap gave another meaning to the term “material universals” such as common properties found in matter or among matter.

Agreed.

These I identified as accidental forms of material substances and so again, the term “material universals” is not proper in the A/T system.

OK, but not quite sure of your reasoning here. Do you mean a universal has to be a substantial form rather than an accidental form?
If so then he is talking “accidental material universals” then!

Not everybody holds to the Aristotle/Thomistic philosophical tradition, so one can throw out ideas, concepts, and terms however they want and devise their own philosophical/metaphysical system and concept of reality.

I think that is not fair and a tad elitest as it were. Can you demonstrate that either Aquinas or Aristotle coined the phrase “material form”? If not then why do you allow this coined phrase that strictly speaking also contradict Aristotle?

So that if one does use “material universals” they need to define it.

Fair enough, I think that is what we are doing.

The idea “material universal” I do not think conforms with reality. … This is why sensory knowledge is only about particulars.

Well that is debateable - you really mean the Aristotelian/Thomistic definition of the phrase doesn’t conform don’t you? Lets leave the constraints of traditional phrases by using everyday functional descriptions then as I attempted above and prev…

*Now number is partially abstracted from material being - and as it is not exactly exemplified in any particular thing it seems we may be dealing in some sort of universal?
Yet number is also partly material still because it seems to be intimately related to quantity.
So maybe number may be considered a sort of universal and its manipulation a form of intellection" by that material faculty Aquinas seems to call the vis cognitiva
in man and the vis aestimativa in animals. *

The sensory powers of the soul make use of a corporeal organ of the body. …
From where does the idea of the universal come if material things are all individualized from which it appears that matter is a principle of individuation?

Excellent summary of Aquinas.

I am simply observing what PC technology can actually do now with what appear to be primitive “universals” If we accept that generic shapes are universals and PCs can recognise and deal with sensible examples of them providing sophisticated statistics … then that is surely a problem for the system you just described?

It doesn’t matter if PC’s “understand” these shapes like humans are alleged to do. If a PC can do as well as a human when it comes to practical results in respect of recognising, manipulating and making conclusions wrt these primitive universals in the sensible world … then why can we not call that “understanding”?

If it is not “intellection” … then Aquinas’s system needs to be tightened/tweaked/precisioned better than it presently is I think.

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Actually, the term “material form” or now what you are saying “material soul” is not used much, if I recall right, in Aquinas. The reason is I think because if a person doesn’t know any better he/she might think that the soul is material. The soul is not material, it is the substantial form of some living thing such as a plant or animal. The matter being the sensible material the plant or animal body is made out of. The soul is not the “material” principle of activity in vegetative and sentient life. The soul is a formal principle and the principle of all the activity of vegetative and sentient life in living things. Matter is a material principle and it is not a principle of action at all. Matter without form does not even exist.

I’m not exactly sure what you mean here but I’ll take a stab at it. All material substances have accidents. For example, if we take the 3D dimension property you listed before, this is the accident of quantity or extension. It is the first accident of a material substance. Quantity extends the substance (the composite of the substantial form and matter) into three dimensional space and into parts, for example the body of an animal and thus we can observe sensible matter. Without quantity or the extension of the substance, the substance would be invisible.

You also mentioned shape. Shape is an accident in the category of quality. It’s obvious that things have different shapes. For example, the shape of an elephant is different than the shape of a horse and among horses we find all different manner of shapes. Each individual horse has a shape different than any other horse.

Color is also an accident. Human beings are of different colors and an individual human may be white but if he/she lays out in the sun, the skin color may turn brown.

All the accidents are forms. They modify or make further determinations of the substance in one way or another.

I think it is pretty obvious what Ynotzap means, though his expressions are fairly incomprehensible even analogically in Aristotelian or Thomistic systems.

We (not just scientists) do “abstract” a kind of universal from proeprties common to many different material substances that are not found in immaterial substances.

Most of these are sub categories of what Aristotle would call the accidental form “quantity” (eg extension, mass, shape …)

What form of intellection is the understanding and manipulation of these types of “universals” … that is the question?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I don’t see how even the most materialistic monist could get through life without some kind of notion of universals. I mean she looks up at night and sees points of light and calls them all stars, thus recognizing they have some general characteristics (up in the sky, point-like, bright), which she might label as universals. She might recognize that those characteristics are not strictly speaking objectively true, since “up” is relative to her; stars are not points but just a long way off; and some are brighter than others.

And of course, science is built on recognizing what metaphysics may or may not call “objective universals” - as Newton wrote, “In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction”.

But also, we’re not conscious of most of our mind, and I think philosophers of mind have proven repeatedly, by later being proved wrong, that introspection is not a useful tool here. No amount of introspection will tell us how we recognize the face of a friend so quickly and effortlessly.

I will comment on universals at night (I hope).

Without any introspection the statement “mind emerges from matter” would mean nothing. We don’t perceive “mind”. A scientist doesn’t study “mind”. We just observe behaviors. But then, your statement should be something like this instead: “All human behaviors can be explained based on matter’s properties”.

 

[ynotzap]

Rica: According to St.Thomas, the soul is the principle of activity in a living things. He separates these living things into vegetative, sentient, and rational beings. He also distinguishes the vegetative and sentient beings as having “material souls” souls made of matter. (did I understand this wrong, and if I did, how?) He also states that human souls are spiritual (non-matter) but existing. He has determined the difference by the power of the human soul in its powers to know, understand, and choosing (volition) the power of the will. We also know that the spiritual soul is directly infused by God. If the material soul has anything of spirit, then it too is directly infused by God. Are you saying that there is something of a spiritual nature in the animal soul? If you are what is it? If you are not, then what are you saying regards the nature of the animal soul. Is there no demarcation between an animal soul, or a vegetative soul and a rational soul? Is there a demarcation between matter and spirit?

We know that matter does not move itself but is moved by another- and we know God is the source of all motion, in animate, and non-animate things. We also know in secondary causes motion is transmitted by cause and effect, are these secondary causes not found in our material world, a world of matter, eg. electricity, chemical reactions, mechanical reactions, etc? All sorts of physical motion. Is this not the field of Physics? Is empirical knowledge not dealing with objective reality? I know that it just doesn’t go far enough, it doesn’t transcend. The only conclusion I can draw, is that the animal soul, or vegetative soul indirectly receives its motion through secondary causes found in our material universe, where as the human soul receives it’s power of motion directly from God

Incidently, you didn’t answer my references to my justification for the use of the concept “material universals” something common to all particulars (individual material things), I also used the principle of contradiction in the context of my explanation. " than there is nothing that’s common in the particular,(individual material things)

 

[Richca]

Recognizing broad classes of object would seem basic to many animals. Many avoid eating insects or berries of certain colors, which signal poison to them. An antelope needs to recognize and be wary of lions (any lion, all lions), while not being so concerned about bison. They must therefore have some means of categorizing, based on common characteristics, universals.

Human beings are evidently distinct from all the other animals on planet earth and they have dominion over them. Humans in theory, though I wouldn’t recommend it as it would be an intolerable sin I think, could wipe out all the animals on the earth. There is no animal on earth who could likewise wipe out the human race.

Consequently, there is some power or powers in humans not found in all other animals. These powers are fittingly called intelligence and will. Therefore, the other animals do not have intelligence and will. Human beings, of course, also have a body and physical characteristics that is distinguishable from the other animals. It is by the spiritual and immaterial power of intelligence that humans have knowledge of universal concepts.

According to A/T then, the highest powers found in the souls of animals are sensory powers both exterior and interior. This is common sensible and based on observation. The sensory powers in the souls of both man and beast operate through some corporeal and particular organ of the body. Matter individuates and makes things particular. Evidently, the five external senses receive the impressions of material individual things. Among other things, the internal senses such as the common sense makes sort of like a whole of various sensible impressions. For example, if we see a dog barking, the sight sees the dog and the ears hear the sound. Sight does not know what sound is nor do the ears know what sight is. The common sense discerns both and thus knows this particular dog is barking. The sensibles are about individual particular things and thus the brute animals do not know or comprehend universals. An immaterial power which operates independently of matter is needed for this as the universal is an immaterial concept.

The animals also have an estimative interior sensitive power by which they perceive intentions by natural instinct. Birds build nests by natural instinct. An antelope flees from the lion not because he reasons over it but by natural instinct or a sensible impression received from the lion. For example, a lion probably instills a strong emotion of fear in the antelope which instinctively moves the antelope to flee; especially if the antelope sees the lion charging after it to kill it. Bison are not carnivores so I don’t think they would instill an emotion of fear if any into the antelope to the degree a lion does since antelope are prey to lions.

Some animals may not eat berries of certain colors because of natural instinct just as birds build nests or beavers build dams. I think it may be possible that some particular animal such as a bear may even learn this by experience. This, however, does not prove that bears or some animals comprehend universals.

Human beings are certainly different than all the other animals and they certainly are more intelligent. This is a brute fact. They obviously possess some powers of soul not found in all other animals.

 

[ynotzap]

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that “material” can be used in a number of analogical senses (Aquinas says that somewhere). “Material”, being an adjective, suggests it is rarely used to refer to the unalloyed, non-existent hylomorphic principle described by the noun “matter”. (ie we don’t talk about material matter but we do talk about a material phantasm (which certainly isn’t matter), a material soul etc).

As I understand the phantasm, it resides in the brain, not in the spiritual soul. It is a sensible image produced by the operations of the senses, much like a TV representation by the work of electronics through optics, electrical frequencies and electronic circuits. It is from this material image (matter) presented to the brain through the senses that produces the image. Matter in motion can not produce a spiritual image, this is done by the spiritual soul’s power to "abstract " the intelligible species. But even in the spiritual power of the soul to abstract, because the soul and body are united, the spiritual abstraction can only be thought in terms of the physical, words, try to explain to yourself and not use words, which also are also taken from physical words, we call them “meanings” and what is meaning, if not the spiritual representation of the physical word. The soul and body co-exist together, and in this life they can not be separated, except by physical death, or corruption.
Blue Horizon:

Strangely the expression “spiritual soul” does suggest immaterial and material souls are being distinguished!!

Agreed
Blue Horizon:

Did Aquinas ever use this phrase (I don’t think so) but it would make more sense with him as he does hold that some forms do subsist without matter (ie angels, souls).

I was taught, or I assumed Aquinas taught, because my teacher treated it that way, and I haven’t heard anything to the contrary. And I agree with the rest of your statement.
Blue Horizon:

Well, yes I understand this definition but as “material form” was never a phrase used by either Aristotle or by Aquinas and seems to be a sort of “recently” coined phrase … who is to say it tells us the “official” meaning of the adjective “material”. There are other possible understandings (eg a “material phantasm” is certainly not material (there is no little tree in my head when I see a tree) yet it is material in so far as it signifies a particular thing (as opposed to an immaterial universal)).

I can’t give any imput to the use of material form, I have to take your word for it, as my knowledge of Aquinas’s works are limited. I do have to disagree with you on the understanding of the phantasm. It is a physical representation of a physical objective reality, as any TV picture is a representation of an object. The TV image of a tree, is not the physical tree, but a representation produced by electricity, frequency of light and sound,electronic circuits and components, including optics, math principles, etc. This is my argument with Rica, and again this truths are found in Physics.
Blue Horizon:

Well, if we allow “material soul” or “material form” (which is not really Aristotle) then we surely have to be lenient in our analogical understanding of “material” in “material universals”.

TBContinued…

I can agree, as long as we qualify our statments.

 

[ynotzap]

I want to make a correction. I believe the correct way to say some forms subsist, should be said " spiritual beings subsist"

 

[Richca]

Rica: According to St.Thomas, the soul is the principle of activity in a living things. He separates these living things into vegetative, sentient, and rational beings. He also distinguishes the vegetative and sentient beings as having “material souls” souls made of matter. (did I understand this wrong, and if I did, how?)

Yes, you’ve understood this incorrectly. The souls of livings things are the substantial forms of living things. In Aristotle’s doctrine of hylemorphism which Aquinas accepts, every material substance is a composite of matter and form. Plants, animals, elements, etc. are material substances. The substantial forms of living things are called souls. Non-living things such as the elements which are material substances are also composed of matter and form. The substantial forms of non-living things are not called souls. Matter does not equal form. Matter and form are two distinct realities that material substances are conposed of. All forms are immaterial whether substantial forms or accidental forms. Otherwise, there would be no sense in making a distinction between form and matter.

He also states that human souls are spiritual (non-matter) but existing. He has determined the difference by the power of the human soul in its powers to know, understand, and choosing (volition) the power of the will. We also know that the spiritual soul is directly infused by God. If the material soul has anything of spirit, then it too is directly infused by God. Are you saying that there is something of a spiritual nature in the animal soul? If you are what is it? If you are not, then what are you saying regards the nature of the animal soul. Is there no demarcation between an animal soul, or a vegetative soul and a rational soul? Is there a demarcation between matter and spirit?

 

[Richca]

Rica:
Incidently, you didn’t answer my references to my justification for the use of the concept “material universals” something common to all particulars (individual material things), I also used the principle of contradiction in the context of my explanation. " than there is nothing that’s common in the particular,(individual material things)

I think I understand what you are trying to convey by the use of “material universals,” as in that one post of yours you presented a list of some common properties found among material substances. Though I cannot say I’m 100% sure of exactly what you may mean by it. As I have pointed out previously, in the language of scholastic philosophy and in the Aristotlelian/Thomistic tradition, the phrase “material universals” is a contradiction in terms. Universal concepts are immaterial. Two, the properties you listed are actually forms. And three, they are accidental forms of not just matter but of substances. In my view, the phrase is confusing and can only bring about confusion if not downright philosophical errors. I’m not going to use it myself. I’ll try my best to understand you if you ask any further questions ( I don’t mind the questions). I think you should be able to ascertain from the questions I answered in my previous post to you the importance of the proper use of concepts and terms in trying to understand St Thomas and Aristotlelianism and avoid as much confusion as possible.

 

[Richca]

Well, yes I understand this definition but as “material form” was never a phrase used by either Aristotle or by Aquinas and seems to be a sort of “recently” coined phrase … who is to say it tells us the “official” meaning of the adjective “material”. There are other possible understandings (eg a “material phantasm” is certainly not material (there is no little tree in my head when I see a tree) yet it is material in so far as it signifies a particular thing (as opposed to an immaterial universal)).

 

[JuanFlorencio]

I don’t see how even the most materialistic monist could get through life without some kind of notion of universals. I mean she looks up at night and sees points of light and calls them all stars, thus recognizing they have some general characteristics (up in the sky, point-like, bright), which she might label as universals. She might recognize that those characteristics are not strictly speaking objectively true, since “up” is relative to her; stars are not points but just a long way off; and some are brighter than others.

And of course, science is built on recognizing what metaphysics may or may not call “objective universals” - as Newton wrote, “In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and afterwards rendered general by induction”.

Materialistic monists are not free of inconsistencies, just like any one else. As I said before, to be a monist implies the belief that thought is material. What we call ideas, therefore, are material for him; and what is called “universal ideas” should be no less material. These should be a particular set of physical interactions in the brain. So, what would it mean for such particular set of interactions to be “universal”? It is an absurdity.

I have no doubt that to be a materialistic monist is not an impediment to be able to recognize objects, or characteristics of objects, and this ability is therefore something that he has to explain in terms of physical interactions.

 

[GEddie]

I’d imagine that to a materialist, there would be no “universal ideas,” just ideas held in common in all heads.

ICXC NIKA

 

[inocente]

Human beings are evidently distinct from all the other animals on planet earth and they have dominion over them. Humans in theory, though I wouldn’t recommend it as it would be an intolerable sin I think, could wipe out all the animals on the earth. There is no animal on earth who could likewise wipe out the human race.

Consequently, there is some power or powers in humans not found in all other animals. These powers are fittingly called intelligence and will. Therefore, the other animals do not have intelligence and will. Human beings, of course, also have a body and physical characteristics that is distinguishable from the other animals. It is by the spiritual and immaterial power of intelligence that humans have knowledge of universal concepts.

According to A/T then, the highest powers found in the souls of animals are sensory powers both exterior and interior. This is common sensible and based on observation. The sensory powers in the souls of both man and beast operate through some corporeal and particular organ of the body. Matter individuates and makes things particular. Evidently, the five external senses receive the impressions of material individual things. Among other things, the internal senses such as the common sense makes sort of like a whole of various sensible impressions. For example, if we see a dog barking, the sight sees the dog and the ears hear the sound. Sight does not know what sound is nor do the ears know what sight is. The common sense discerns both and thus knows this particular dog is barking. The sensibles are about individual particular things and thus the brute animals do not know or comprehend universals. An immaterial power which operates independently of matter is needed for this as the universal is an immaterial concept.

The animals also have an estimative interior sensitive power by which they perceive intentions by natural instinct. Birds build nests by natural instinct. An antelope flees from the lion not because he reasons over it but by natural instinct or a sensible impression received from the lion. For example, a lion probably instills a strong emotion of fear in the antelope which instinctively moves the antelope to flee; especially if the antelope sees the lion charging after it to kill it. Bison are not carnivores so I don’t think they would instill an emotion of fear if any into the antelope to the degree a lion does since antelope are prey to lions.

Some animals may not eat berries of certain colors because of natural instinct just as birds build nests or beavers build dams. I think it may be possible that some particular animal such as a bear may even learn this by experience. This, however, does not prove that bears or some animals comprehend universals.

Human beings are certainly different than all the other animals and they certainly are more intelligent. This is a brute fact. They obviously possess some powers of soul not found in all other animals.

I disagree there is no animal which can wipe out the human race, the Black Death got fairly close.

Aristotle and Thomas created their categories a posteriori, they knew that their hypotheses were based on their experience and could later be proved wrong, and that has often turned out to be the case (no big deal, most hypotheses turn out to be wrong).

But fans of A / T often speak of them as if they are a priori, de facto, infallible, and I wonder if you do so. For instance, you propose that humans have intelligence and will while other animals don’t, you make it a yes/no either/or proposition. Yet even in humans intelligence varies along a continuum, and even dogs decide to get up and play, so you appear to be denying the a posteriori nature of your proposition, and imposing it a priori even against evidence.

Similarly, you claim that intelligence is a spiritual and immaterial power, different in kind from everything else in the entire universe, but again there’s no evidence for that rather extraordinary claim. You then talk of “sensory powers” and say things like “sight does not know what sound is” as if sight is a homunculus, again with no evidence. Then you conclude that behavior regarding “universals” (abilities to categorize) don’t use immaterial powers in other animals but do in humans.

Leaving aside that having to have two different explanations could be seen as denying the whole concept of universals (think about it ), it leaves little elephants around in the room, such as: if there’s a material explanation for how something works in other mammals, then since we too are mammals, it probably works the same way in us.

(btw your last sentence says humans are more intelligent than other animals, whereas earlier you said other animals don’t have intelligence and will.)

 

[inocente]

I will comment on universals at night (I hope).

Without any introspection the statement “mind emerges from matter” would mean nothing. We don’t perceive “mind”. A scientist doesn’t study “mind”. We just observe behaviors. But then, your statement should be something like this instead: “All human behaviors can be explained based on matter’s properties”.

Not sure if we have the same meaning for introspection. To me it means “examining one’s own conscious thoughts and feelings”. Trying to explain our mind by introspection has been the downfall of many philosophers of mind, since most of our mind is unconscious and not available to introspection.

The idea that we cannot study mind appears to presume there’s a difference between a mind and a philosophical zombie, which I think would be putting the horse before the cart.

Materialistic monists are not free of inconsistencies, just like any one else. As I said before, to be a monist implies the belief that thought is material. What we call ideas, therefore, are material for him; and what is called “universal ideas” should be no less material. These should be a particular set of physical interactions in the brain. So, what would it mean for such particular set of interactions to be “universal”? It is an absurdity.

I have no doubt that to be a materialistic monist is not an impediment to be able to recognize objects, or characteristics of objects, and this ability is therefore something that he has to explain in terms of physical interactions.

I don’t know about materialistic monists (although I will wear every label given so generously by other posters ) but nope, thoughts are fleeting, activities, processes, not little piles of molecules.

You were previously not separating logic from knowledge of logic, and here you’re not separating universals from the concept of universals. As I understand it, even meta-physicians don’t agree on whether “universals” really exist, but an antelope recognizes a lion (all lions, any lion) as a potential threat and therefore must have some notion akin to universals. All we’re actually talking about with universals is noticing some common characteristic, which would seem basic to the survival of many animals. The trafico police have an Automatic Number Plate Recognition box in their cars which looks for vehicle registration plates (by universals) and recognizes the registration (singularity). I’m told that animals and ANPR boxes do these things without immaterial spiritual substances. I think you’re making it out to be much more mystical than reality.

 

[inocente]

Linus - tried to send you a PM but the system says you switched them off. You suddenly stopped posting two weeks ago, hope you’re OK and just on vacation or something.

 

[Richca]

I can’t give any imput to the use of material form, I have to take your word for it, as my knowledge of Aquinas’s works are limited. I do have to disagree with you on the understanding of the phantasm. It is a physical representation of a physical objective reality, as any TV picture is a representation of an object. The TV image of a tree, is not the physical tree, but a representation produced by electricity, frequency of light and sound,electronic circuits and components, including optics, math principles, etc. This is my argument with Rica, and again this truths are found in Physics.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Not sure if we have the same meaning for introspection. To me it means “examining one’s own conscious thoughts and feelings”. Trying to explain our mind by introspection has been the downfall of many philosophers of mind, since most of our mind is unconscious and not available to introspection.

It wouldn’t be strange if we understand “introspection” differently. I think there is no common agreement on its definition. Besides, there are different levels or degrees of introspection. To say “I think” or “I have such or such feeling” is already the result of an introspective act. I know philosophers who have resorted on introspection to develop interesting descriptions of their minds, but I don’t know anyone who has tried to “explain” our mind using this method. Could you give me the names of some of those philosophers and the works in which they tried to do it?

The idea that we cannot study mind appears to presume there’s a difference between a mind and a philosophical zombie, which I think would be putting the horse before the cart.

I know nothing about “philosophical zombies”, Inocente. If you could clarify your objection I would appreciate it.

I don’t know about materialistic monists (although I will wear every label given so generously by other posters ) but nope, thoughts are fleeting, activities, processes, not little piles of molecules.

Well, you have said that you are a monist, and also that “mind emerges from matter”. So, technically you are a materialistic monist. I don’t want to mean anything else besides it.

You were previously not separating logic from knowledge of logic, and here you’re not separating universals from the concept of universals. As I understand it, even meta-physicians don’t agree on whether “universals” really exist, but an antelope recognizes a lion (all lions, any lion) as a potential threat and therefore must have some notion akin to universals. All we’re actually talking about with universals is noticing some common characteristic, which would seem basic to the survival of many animals. The trafico police have an Automatic Number Plate Recognition box in their cars which looks for vehicle registration plates (by universals) and recognizes the registration (singularity). I’m told that animals and ANPR boxes do these things without immaterial spiritual substances. I think you’re making it out to be much more mystical than reality.

The discussion about universals is an old one. On the other hand, as I said before, “I have no doubt that to be a materialistic monist is not an impediment to be able to recognize objects, or characteristics of objects”. I agree with you that an antelope is able to recognize a lion (and a lion an antelope too!). Those are the phenomena that need to be explained (acts of recognition). “Universals” are a plausible model, but not one that is consistent with your materialistic position. Perhaps you would like to present your “non-mystical concept of universals” and clarify why you think that it is evident. That might help me understand what you are trying to convey.

I also have said that “it is not necessary to believe in “universals” to have the notion of them”, but perhaps you didn’t pay attention and somehow you got the strange impression that I didn’t distinguish between “universals” and the “concept of universals”. That was a funny observation.

Also, it appears as if you were equating the functionality of an ANPR box and the ability of an animal to recognize things. No doubt that animals are as material as ANPR boxes, but do you pretend that what they can do is the same? In the role I am playing now as a materialistic monist, I wouldn’t have any basis to defend that.