What exactly is the soul?

[ynotzap]

I’m not sure exactly what you mean or trying to convey by the phrase “material universals”, but I believe this phrase would be foreign to the scholastics and I don’t believe I’ve come across it in Aquinas’ works. In Aquinas’ doctrine, a 'material universal" would in a sense be a contradiction. For matter is the principle of individuation and whatever is composed out of matter is some particular material thing such as a particular atom, rock, plant, or horse.

A universal concept comes not from the matter of some thing but from its form. It is the form which places some thing into a class of things, for example lions, and through which a thing has some specific nature. The form determines the matter. The form is also a principle of knowledge. Matter in and of itself, prime matter, is unintelligible. The intellect abstracts the form of some thing from all the material individuating characteristics and thus we can understand the essence and substance of a thing. This abstraction gives us the idea of the essences and natures of things such as humanity, horseness, etc. This is the universal which is the object of scientific knowledge. The essence of a material substance considered as a universal includes matter, however, not individual matter such as these bones and this flesh, but common matter as Aquinas calls it. For man cannot be conceived without flesh and bones but the universal “humanity” does not include individual flesh and bones such as the flesh and bones of Socrates, but flesh and bones in general. The universal concept known by the intellect is immaterial even though it may include common matter because you can’t imagine it, if you tried to imagine it you would be imagining some particular thing such as a particular man, it is something known only by the intellect. The universal cannot be imagined.

If a person didn’t have any knowledge of Metaphysics, and was a scientist, and if you asked him what is universally common to all matter, what do you think he would answer. Would it perhaps be 3D dimension, weight, size, shape, density, color, occupies space, temperature, movement, things common to all physical matter. His observation is in the realm of the physical, do you think he would be in the same place that empirical scientists are today? And is empiricism totally wrong? I just find they would be very limited by not transcending to the spiritual level, not that they were totally, or even wrong in their discoveries in the place they find themselves. Some think that atoms are the physical, material elements that is the common material element to all matter. Do you think they are totally wrong. To deal with the nature of a thing, isn’t that part of Metaphysics, abstract, the intelligible species. Universals on the material level, are material, Universals on the intelligible level are Metaphysical. This is what you are using. Could you design a computer with this knowledge alone? I am using the common meaning of universals, not the Metaphysical.

You say that a universal does not come from the matter of a thing…are you not thinking about the intelligent species as regards matter? I am speaking of the sensible species.Are you saying that there is nothing physical that is common to all physical things?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

I’m not sure exactly what you mean or trying to convey by the phrase “material universals”, but I believe this phrase would be foreign to the scholastics and I don’t believe I’ve come across it in Aquinas’ works. In Aquinas’ doctrine, a 'material universal" would in a sense be a contradiction. For matter is the principle of individuation and whatever is composed out of matter is some particular material thing such as a particular atom, rock, plant, or horse.

A universal concept comes not from the matter of some thing but from its form. It is the form which places some thing into a class of things, for example lions, and through which a thing has some specific nature. The form determines the matter. The form is also a principle of knowledge. Matter in and of itself, prime matter, is unintelligible. The intellect abstracts the form of some thing from all the material individuating characteristics and thus we can understand the essence and substance of a thing. This abstraction gives us the idea of the essences and natures of things such as humanity, horseness, etc. This is the universal which is the object of scientific knowledge. The essence of a material substance considered as a universal includes matter, however, not individual matter such as these bones and this flesh, but common matter as Aquinas calls it. For man cannot be conceived without flesh and bones but the universal “humanity” does not include individual flesh and bones such as the flesh and bones of Socrates, but flesh and bones in general. The universal concept known by the intellect is immaterial even though it may include common matter because you can’t imagine it, if you tried to imagine it you would be imagining some particular thing such as a particular man, it is something known only by the intellect. The universal cannot be imagined.

Yes this is my understanding of Scholastic universals too, hence my interest in ynotzap’s reference to “material universals.”

However I have not studied Scholastic universal’s and intellection closely so there may be some room to breathe.

For example, we all know that “soul” is inferred not seen (hence immaterial). Yet many wise commentators do refer to the soul’s of animals as “material souls” so they are obviously using the word “material” in some other analogical sense.

Likewise Aquinas talks of a material phantasm. Linus2nd cannot accept this phrase (for similar reasons why I used to find it difficult to accept phrases like “material soul” and "spiritual soul (of course they are spiritual, its an uncessary circumlocution)!

So the word “material” is used in a variety of subtley different ways.
I wonder if the same is true of “material universals” and there is a sense in which some universals can be more material than others.

I recall somewhere Aquinas acceptably distinguished various levels of abstraction based on degrees of “immateriality.”

For example the discipline of “number” (ie maths).
Now number is partially abstracted from material being - and as it is not exactly exemplified in any particular thing (not to be confused with its “one-ness” which is not a "number’ but a transcendental (“unity”)) it seems we may be dealing in some sort of universal?

And number is also partly material still because it seems to be intimately related to quantity.

So maybe number may be considered a “material universal” and its manipulation a form of “material intellection” by that material faculty Aquinas seems to call the vis cognitiva
in man and the vis aestimativa in animals.

 

[inocente]

If a person didn’t have any knowledge of Metaphysics, and was a scientist, and if you asked him what is universally common to all matter, what do you think he would answer. Would it perhaps be 3D dimension, weight, size, shape, density, color, occupies space, temperature, movement, things common to all physical matter. His observation is in the realm of the physical, do you think he would be in the same place that empirical scientists are today? And is empiricism totally wrong? I just find they would be very limited by not transcending to the spiritual level, not that they were totally, or even wrong in their discoveries in the place they find themselves.

An issue is that what you call Metaphysics with a capital M is only one of many schools of metaphysics, which all explain the world in their own ways. The scientist might believe in none or any one of them, or create new metaphysics, for instance as some have done in trying to interpret what quantum physics results tell us (or don’t) about the nature of being.

 

[ynotzap]

Yes this is my understanding of Scholastic universals too, hence my interest in ynotzap’s reference to “material universals.”

However I have not studied Scholastic universal’s and intellection closely so there may be some room to breathe.

For example, we all know that “soul” is inferred not seen (hence immaterial). Yet many wise commentators do refer to the soul’s of animals as “material souls” so they are obviously using the word “material” in some other analogical sense.

Likewise Aquinas talks of a material phantasm. Linus2nd cannot accept this phrase (for similar reasons why I used to find it difficult to accept phrases like “material soul” and "spiritual soul (of course they are spiritual, its an uncessary circumlocution)!

So the word “material” is used in a variety of subtley different ways.
I wonder if the same is true of “material universals” and there is a sense in which some universals can be more material than others.

I recall somewhere Aquinas acceptably distinguished various levels of abstraction based on degrees of “immateriality.”

For example the discipline of “number” (ie maths).
Now number is partially abstracted from material being - and as it is not exactly exemplified in any particular thing (not to be confused with its “one-ness” which is not a "number’ but a transcendental (“unity”)) it seems we may be dealing in some sort of universal?

And number is also partly material still because it seems to be intimately related to quantity.

So maybe number may be considered a “material universal” and its manipulation a form of “material intellection” by that material faculty Aquinas seems to call the vis cognitiva
in man and the vis aestimativa in animals.

Can the collective particulars of objective things, matter, which in common to all matter be called “material universals” (sensible species) and not intellectual species? I heard it stated that dogs dream in their sleep, because sometimes they bark, groan etc maybe because they too experience the material phantasm, the representation of a physical image.

 

[Richca]

If a person didn’t have any knowledge of Metaphysics, and was a scientist, and if you asked him what is universally common to all matter, what do you think he would answer. Would it perhaps be 3D dimension, weight, size, shape, density, color, occupies space, temperature, movement, things common to all physical matter.

These for the most part except for movement are forms, and more specifically, accidental forms. They fall under the nine categories or genera of accidents. Matter along with the substantial form is found only in the category of substance. Forms are not matter. Form and matter are two distinct realities of things of which material substances are composed. Accordingly, being that the properties you list above are forms, then the phrase “material universals” does not make sense. I think it would be better to say “formal universals” since these properties fall under the nine genera of accidents.

 

[JuanFlorencio]

… back to the subject.

You’ve said a few things which triggered my reification-fallacy alarm, and off it went again when you asked how does a monist explain the origin of logic. Presumably you mean monism in the context of philosophy of mind, as opposed to the subset of substance dualism which believes in ISS.

I’m still at a loss as to why different positions on the philosophy of mind would affect the origin of an abstraction such as logic. Perhaps if you explain what in your opinion is the origin of logic, I might get a handle on what you’re asking and silence that pesky reification-fallacy alarm.

I will try to say something meaningful about the origin of logic later. First I would like to explain why, in my opinion, it becomes problematic for a materialistic monist. To do that I will play the role of a person who believes that a matter which becomes organized is enough to explain everything which ordinarily happens in our world. A modality of what is known as the principle of causality is implicit in this belief: Similar initial conditions would always give rise to similar results (statistically or deterministically). So, whenever I observe a determined phenomenon, it makes sense to me to look for an antecedent set of other phenomena which should be causally linked to it, and such set of phenomena must belong to the same realm.

In my methodically assumed position as a monist, I would say -just as you say- that my mind emerges from matter. It would mean that every one of my thoughts is nothing else but the interaction of material particles in movement through an incredibly complex body (the brain) organized in a very specific way. To me, different thoughts would be different systems of movements and interactions in my brain. As a base for this belief I would offer the numerous cases of brain damage which are associated to cognitive abnormalities. Also, I would mention experiences of brain stimulation (physical and chemical) which have been proven to affect our cognitive abilities and, finally, I would refer to the monitoring of brain activity that has been performed by many researchers.

Due to the normative character of logical principles, I would try to build a model to clarify it. I realize that in spite of this normative character the functioning of my mind is not necessarily subject to logical principles every time I think. For example, I find it not impossible for me to fall into contradictions. Let’s suppose that I decide to use the expression “material universal” -which is being discussed by Richca, BH and Ynotzap: If I understand that every material object is characterized by its singularity, and that a “universal” is defined precisely as the opposite of it, I would admit that it is not a valid expression, unless I change the meaning of the words. I will be able to write it, and to say it; but I will not be able to think it. To explain why, I would consider those images of the brain which can be obtained when a patient thinks on something. I would think on the image of a patient’s brain which is obtained when the patient is thinking the notion of materiality, and afterwards on the image of the same patient’s brain when he is thinking on the notion of universality. I would expect to see important differences between the images; showing that one set of brain interactions is incompatible with the other; such that when I am thinking on one of those notions, I will be unable to be thinking on the other. I will pretend that whenever I fall into contradictions it is because I am not thinking really on the meaning of the words I use; or that thinking on the meaning of a word is most of the times an incomplete activity; and that sometimes it will be possible for me to think simultaneously on incompatible notions because I don’t think on them thoroughly: I think just parts which are different but not incompatible. But if I consider those “parts” of the notions which are incompatible, I will be unable to think them simultaneously. The principle of non-contradiction would be just a physical impossibility.

I will continue later, but… Do you see some problem so far?

 

[Blue_Horizon]

Can the collective particulars of objective things, matter, which in common to all matter be called “material universals” (sensible species) and not intellectual species? I heard it stated that dogs dream in their sleep, because sometimes they bark, groan etc maybe because they too experience the material phantasm, the representation of a physical image.

Yes I see no reason why animals cannot dream of reality by means of imagination and its phantasms which in the end match what comes in via the sensible species when awake.

However while such phantasms are material Aquinas holds they are also particular representations as well.

The question is really about how he defines particular versus universal wrt what the phantasm is capable of I suppose.

If the vis aestimativa of animals works on phantasms as an (name removed by moderator)ut … then what is the output if we cannot call it an “intellectual species”.

Is it an “aestimative species” and can it involve “number” or other primitive “material universals???.”

 

[Blue_Horizon]

These for the most part except for movement are forms, and more specifically, accidental forms. They fall under the nine categories or genera of accidents. Matter along with the substantial form is found only in the category of substance. Forms are not matter. Form and matter are two distinct realities of things of which material substances are composed. Accordingly, being that the properties you list above are forms, then the phrase “material universals” does not make sense. I think it would be better to say “formal universals” since these properties fall under the nine genera of accidents.

 

[inocente]

I will try to say something meaningful about the origin of logic later. First I would like to explain why, in my opinion, it becomes problematic for a materialistic monist. To do that I will play the role of a person who believes that a matter which becomes organized is enough to explain everything which ordinarily happens in our world. A modality of what is known as the principle of causality is implicit in this belief: Similar initial conditions would always give rise to similar results (statistically or deterministically). So, whenever I observe a determined phenomenon, it makes sense to me to look for an antecedent set of other phenomena which should be causally linked to it, and such set of phenomena must belong to the same realm.

In my methodically assumed position as a monist, I would say -just as you say- that my mind emerges from matter. It would mean that every one of my thoughts is nothing else but the interaction of material particles in movement through an incredibly complex body (the brain) organized in a very specific way. To me, different thoughts would be different systems of movements and interactions in my brain. As a base for this belief I would offer the numerous cases of brain damage which are associated to cognitive abnormalities. Also, I would mention experiences of brain stimulation (physical and chemical) which have been proven to affect our cognitive abilities and, finally, I would refer to the monitoring of brain activity that has been performed by many researchers.

Due to the normative character of logical principles, I would try to build a model to clarify it. I realize that in spite of this normative character the functioning of my mind is not necessarily subject to logical principles every time I think. For example, I find it not impossible for me to fall into contradictions. Let’s suppose that I decide to use the expression “material universal” -which is being discussed by Richca, BH and Ynotzap: If I understand that every material object is characterized by its singularity, and that a “universal” is defined precisely as the opposite of it, I would admit that it is not a valid expression, unless I change the meaning of the words. I will be able to write it, and to say it; but I will not be able to think it. To explain why, I would consider those images of the brain which can be obtained when a patient thinks on something. I would think on the image of a patient’s brain which is obtained when the patient is thinking the notion of materiality, and afterwards on the image of the same patient’s brain when he is thinking on the notion of universality. I would expect to see important differences between the images; showing that one set of brain interactions is incompatible with the other; such that when I am thinking on one of those notions, I will be unable to be thinking on the other. I will pretend that whenever I fall into contradictions it is because I am not thinking really on the meaning of the words I use; or that thinking on the meaning of a word is most of the times an incomplete activity; and that sometimes it will be possible for me to think simultaneously on incompatible notions because I don’t think on them thoroughly: I think just parts which are different but not incompatible. But if I consider those “parts” of the notions which are incompatible, I will be unable to think them simultaneously. The principle of non-contradiction would be just a physical impossibility.

I will continue later, but… Do you see some problem so far?

Yes, you’re making a number of what may well be unwarranted assumptions.

I would imagine that the concepts “material” and “universals” are learned rather than built-in at birth. For instance, sell two identical shirts on eBay, one in its original packaging, the other worn by George Clooney and then dry cleaned four times. The second will still get the higher price, even though it is used. I think it’s called an “attachment object”, and the trait shows that in some circumstances we don’t really believe in “universals”, and we tend to believe there is some immaterial aspect to the second shirt, as if it somehow retains a meaningful “memory” of its famous wearer.

The concept of logical contradiction may also be learned. In science fiction, a good way to cause a rogue robot or computer to explode is to feed it a “logic bomb” - a logical contradiction or paradox. In the real world, a computer never explodes in such circumstances. It might go into an infinite loop though, and stop responding until rebooted.

But we don’t do either. We might have some cognitive discord, but we continue functioning, no problem. Indeed, slapping together contradictory thoughts is part of creativity. Slap singular and universal together and out might pop the concept of equality, or of identical components (atoms).

We don’t yet know a large number of things about how our minds work. A mother can recognize her baby’s cries in a split-second. We not only recognize a friend’s face in a split-second, we can detect his mood too. The amount of processing needed is immense, yet we do such things with ease. By comparison, we’re very slow and error prone at simple logic or arithmetic, we can only do it with conscious effort.

 

[inocente]

Can the collective particulars of objective things, matter, which in common to all matter be called “material universals” (sensible species) and not intellectual species? I heard it stated that dogs dream in their sleep, because sometimes they bark, groan etc maybe because they too experience the material phantasm, the representation of a physical image.

There’s evidence that all mammals (at least) dream.

psychologytoday.com/blog/animal-emotions/201212/do-animals-dream-science-shows-course-they-do-rats-too

 

[ynotzap]

Richca;13141595:

Can we call all the items in the 9 categories “forms” in an unqualified manner?

Regardless, Ynotzap’s list of common properties above are “material” insofar as spiritual substances do not possess them.

So if we can call the (obviously spiritual) souls of plants and animals “material souls”…why not the above accidents “material accidents”.

Really the only Aristotelian accidents that qualify would be quantity and a few types of quality I suppose. (Interestingly Aquinas agrees that “quantity” in material substances does serve as a sort of quasi subject for the remaining accidents - something Descartes and friends took so seriously that they completely replaced Aristotelian “matter” (perhaps substance as well) with “quantity”).

Of course there is no such thing as a “phantasm” that represents pure “extension” because it is unthinkable. (Just as an angel or a soul cannot be adequately represented by a phantasm).

As Aquinas states the concept of extension (or an angel) is always represented by a variety of phantasms of particular material examples none of which is individually adequate to the concept we associate with the example…

What about the transcendentals as a response to ynotzap’s question (ie unity, otherness, beauty, truth, being). These would apply to spiritual substances as well so there is nothing specifically “material” about them I suppose.

I think there should be a distinction made between Metaphysics, beyond the physical, after physics, dealing with the ultimate cause and principles of the existence of things, being as such and Physics, dealing with the physical, a science involved with the properties, changes, and the actions of matter and energy. What I have reference to in using the terms “material universals” puts it into physics, more than metaphysics, although one involves more the physical aspect of reality, and the other the intellectual ( the spiritual aspects of reality, as thought, the product of knowing and reasoning is spiritual in nature. Energy in physics is considered continuous , including electricity, heat, optics, mechanics, etc, now also dealing with atoms, quantum physics, also physical properties.
When speaking of cameras, computers, and knowing, a clear distinction should be made
All that the camera or computer can do is covered by physics. But when the mind of men is involved especially in design or a discovery is made, the scientific method is used which is based on observation study, and experimentation to determine the nature or principles of what is being studied. this includes the science of math, the systematized knowledge of nature and the physical world.

When Aquinas speaks of a material soul, the principle of( material) activity found in vegetative and animal life he is restricting it to material, or matter. It would appear very logical to seek the answer in physical things, and physical principles, rather than metaphysical principles, although the metaphysical principles are the basis for the physical principles found in matter. So this keeps the problems of the material soul in the second degree of abstraction which is quantative. And this is why math is so effective in the discovery and design of things such as the computer

 

[Richca]

Can we call all the items in the 9 categories “forms” in an unqualified manner?

 

[ynotzap]

Rica: you suggested perhaps using the word “formal universals”, and perhaps it would be better. But would this mean anything to a physicist, or an empirical scientist? Is not the list of particulars in physical things keeping it in the realm of physics. I already explained the meaning of “physics”.

How would you explain what St.Thomas meant by the words “material soul”, and how would physical laws contradict metaphysical laws? Isn’t one based on quantative laws, and the other on “qualitative laws”- literally a “mechanical ball joint is a “material universal” But I do not mean that do I. Why couldn’t electricity be something common to physical things, and because it is common, be called a “material universal’ You say this causes confusion, to whom, perhaps to one who is using the meta-physical interpretation, are the empirical scientists using this interpretation, or the physics professor. That is why I stated that there is a distinct division of Physics, and Metaphysics. One deals with the physical, the other the metaphysical. I also stated that the metaphysical underlies the physical. If I made an erroneous statement ( and I could have), than there is nothing common to material things, and there is no common relationship. There is nothing to the existence of particular, or physical things that have anything in common. Or perhaps I should have said” that matter is a universal material” in the physical world. And I also believe there are appropriate terms used to explain things on different levels of meaning and we have to distinguish one from another.

 

[ynotzap]

Incidentally: I understand that the material soul is the (material ) principal of activity in vegetative and sentient life.( the immanent source) How do you explain this without turning to the particulars in matter? Physics?

 

[ynotzap]

I did explain what I called “material universals”, something common to physical things, is this a contradiction in application or meaning in the way I use the concepts?Can common mean universal? Shared by all? Doesn’t all mean universal, please explain. I know how you explained “universal” and I accept the metaphysical interpretation. But you don’t seem to accept my definition which is a common one found in a common dictionary. which I believe is justified since we are dealing with particular, individualistic things.

 

[ynotzap]

I did qualify my statement.

 

[Aloysium]

Incidentally: I understand that the material soul is the (material ) principal of activity in vegetative and sentient life.( the immanent source) How do you explain this without turning to the particulars in matter? Physics?

I don’t understand what the bolded part means.
Modern science as it is understood in the fields of physics, chemistry even biology has nothing to do with any sort of soul.
Good luck with this.

 

[Richca]

Incidentally: I understand that the material soul is the (material ) principal of activity in vegetative and sentient life.( the immanent source)

Actually, the term “material form” or now what you are saying “material soul” is not used much, if I recall right, in Aquinas. The reason is I think because if a person doesn’t know any better he/she might think that the soul is material. The soul is not material, it is the substantial form of some living thing such as a plant or animal. The matter being the sensible material the plant or animal body is made out of. The soul is not the “material” principle of activity in vegetative and sentient life. The soul is a formal principle and the principle of all the activity of vegetative and sentient life in living things. Matter is a material principle and it is not a principle of action at all. Matter without form does not even exist.

How do you explain this without turning to the particulars in matter? Physics?

 

[JuanFlorencio]

Yes, you’re making a number of what may well be unwarranted assumptions.

I would imagine that the concepts “material” and “universals” are learned rather than built-in at birth. For instance, sell two identical shirts on eBay, one in its original packaging, the other worn by George Clooney and then dry cleaned four times. The second will still get the higher price, even though it is used. I think it’s called an “attachment object”, and the trait shows that in some circumstances we don’t really believe in “universals”, and we tend to believe there is some immaterial aspect to the second shirt, as if it somehow retains a meaningful “memory” of its famous wearer.

The concept of logical contradiction may also be learned. In science fiction, a good way to cause a rogue robot or computer to explode is to feed it a “logic bomb” - a logical contradiction or paradox. In the real world, a computer never explodes in such circumstances. It might go into an infinite loop though, and stop responding until rebooted.

But we don’t do either. We might have some cognitive discord, but we continue functioning, no problem. Indeed, slapping together contradictory thoughts is part of creativity. Slap singular and universal together and out might pop the concept of equality, or of identical components (atoms).

We don’t yet know a large number of things about how our minds work. A mother can recognize her baby’s cries in a split-second. We not only recognize a friend’s face in a split-second, we can detect his mood too. The amount of processing needed is immense, yet we do such things with ease. By comparison, we’re very slow and error prone at simple logic or arithmetic, we can only do it with conscious effort.

Indeed, I made some important assumptions (which I regarded inevitable at the moment), but not the ones you have mentioned. If I am going to explain logic, it will be inevitable to use two different approaches simultaneously: observation and introspection, because it is my purpose (as a hypothetical materialistic monist) to show how my mind emerges from matter. For that, all my analysis needs to be based on current facts, and even if I need to study my memory, it will be necessary to consider some of my current acts of memory. So, I was not assuming that my concepts were built in at birth (that would be an assumption which I would never make). I was just considering certain concepts that I already have (without asking when nor how they were formed) and I was formulating a hypothesis on why I can’t think them simultaneously (because it is my personal experience that when I am thinking one of them I cannot think the other. I can think them successively, but not simultaneously; so, I don’t say that my mind stops when I try to think contradictory notions simultaneously). Now, it is not necessary to believe in “universals” to have the notion of them, and of course a materialistic monist is one of those guys who doesn’t believe in “universals”, because “matter” is always “this matter”.

I will try to continue tomorrow.

 

[Richca]

I don’t understand what the bolded part means.
Modern science as it is understood in the fields of physics, chemistry even biology has nothing to do with any sort of soul.
Good luck with this.

Surely, you understand that human beings have a soul , yes?

Interesting though. Modern biology which studies living things does not even know that the soul, the principle of life in living things, exists. And there are probably some biologists, the ones who are not catholic or christian, who are unaware that they have a soul that is the life of the their own body. We, indeed, have an immaterial immortal soul. How often do we ponder this? It is a good meditation. We don’t see it! It’s like we live as if it don’t exist! Our poor souls!

This illustrates a good point, however, namely, the limited knowledge the natural sciences provide us and the importance of philosophy and metaphysics. The natural sciences provide us with an incomplete picture of reality. They are mostly concerned with the sensible, the tangible, bodies, matter, and what can be quantified by mathematics. There is nothing wrong with this, its the field of study of these sciences. The natural sciences appear to me to be like scratching at the surface of reality.

Reality, however, has many intangible, qualitative, immaterial aspects to it besides the tangible and sensible. Thus, the importance of philosophy and especially first philosophy or metaphysics. Philosophy and metaphysics provide us with a comprehensive picture of reality. Metaphysics studies the universal principles of being and reality and ultimately the universal principle and cause of all reality, namely, God.