T
The_Exodus
Guest
I will state my views first:
When discussing this, it is important to really flesh out what is meant by “free will.” Do we mean that we are free to desire whatever we desire? I would think not, for no person is free to desire, say, happiness. Do we mean rather free choice? That is, in the Thomistic sense, do we have a free potentiality for making a certain action? In other words, do we have the potential of standing, or taking a walk, or eating, etc.? We should here say that yes, we really do have this potential, although we may never in fact stand, walk, etc. it is nevertheless true that we have the power of doing so or the potential.
Now, the Catholic doctrine really terminates in this mystery: all humans possess the power to accept the grace of God unto salvation. Yet not all possess the act of actually accepting it. Thomists will say that there are two graces given to man: one which is infallibly efficacious, and one which is infallibly sufficient. The former gives the act. The latter gives the power to act. Yet, they will say, since nothing can move from potency to act unless moved by the divine will, no agent which is not given efficacious grace ever attains salvation. Rather, such a one is merely potentially recepient, but, due to God’s will, is allowed to remain as it is and thereby merit damnation. It would seem, at first sight, that this makes God the cause of sin. It would seem that, since he does not give efficacious grace to all, he thereby causes those who do not receive it to sin, and that he also doesn’t really give them the power to accept efficacious grace. The Thomists, I think rightly, say two things here. a) The fact that God does not grant grace, is not therefore the cause of sin, even if grace if given does indeed prevent sin; the lack of grace is not then the cause of sin. Rather, the creature sins, it is true because it lacks grace, yet nevertheless this lack is not a cause. The creature sinning is the cause. b) In order for there to exist a power to act, it is not necessary for the power to actually be in act. For example, I possess the power of sight while I am sleeping or the power of speech while I am silent. It is not necessary, then, for me to be in act in order to possess actual power. This, the Thomists would say, is true also for a creature given sufficient grace. It is really true that it possesses the power for making a salutory act of repentence; nevertheless, it never in fact does exercise that power. The objectors to Thomism at this point would say that it is not in the creatures ability, in itself, to be in either potency to act toward salvation, or in the very act itself. In other words, the creature, in its very nature, cannot pass from one to the other on its own, but must be so moved by God. The Thomists would agree here, because, if we say that man has can pass from potential to act without God, we are effectively attributing to man a sort of divine causality. That is, we would be saying that he has, as part of his nature, actuality, since he can act in and of himself without being moved. In other words, we would be saying that man is or can be an uncaused cause, or pure act, or, to put it simply, God. This the Thomists find inadmissable. In all honesty I tend to side with them.
This is a very great mystery, and yet, St. Thomas himself taught that such things neither impugn the justice and goodness of God, nor deprive man of free choice. After all, those who never pass from potency to act are really and truly set against goodness. They really do, and freely, love the darkness and hate the light. It is true that, were God to turn them, they would freely come to him, yet his not turning is not the cause of their loving darkness. Rather, they really, of themselves, hate God and Christ. Does this make God the cause of their hatred? No. St. Thomas uses the metphor that though the power of motion in a limping man causes him to limp, it is not the moving power which causes limping, but rather the curvature of the leg itself. “The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.”
The real question is, why does God show grace to one man and not another? Yet the answer to this is found in his will alone, which is unsearchable. Yet we must always maintain that his distribution of grace is due to the order of the goodness of the universe as a whole. St. Thomas explains this in many examples, such as, when he gives the example of a builder, who, wanting to build a particular house, places certain stones at the bottom, and others at the top, as is fitting to the perfection of the house. So it is in the case of the universe. In order to display his almighty goodness, mercy, and justice most perfectly, God wills to display his effects in a manner fittingly reflective of his nature. To understand why he has ordered the universe in such a way - to see its utter and unfathomable harmony - we would have to contemplate the universe as God himself does. Such contemplation is had by those who see God as he is in the beatific vision. To us, we must refer all things to his hidden will, and have trust that God our father, in his infinite wisdom, orders all things sweetly, and that, in eternity, if we are so graced, we shall see the perfect reason for everything.
Father Garrigou-Lagrange:
ewtn.com/vlibrary/search2.asp
“Reality” chapter 11
The entire work on Grace
The entire work on Providence
When discussing this, it is important to really flesh out what is meant by “free will.” Do we mean that we are free to desire whatever we desire? I would think not, for no person is free to desire, say, happiness. Do we mean rather free choice? That is, in the Thomistic sense, do we have a free potentiality for making a certain action? In other words, do we have the potential of standing, or taking a walk, or eating, etc.? We should here say that yes, we really do have this potential, although we may never in fact stand, walk, etc. it is nevertheless true that we have the power of doing so or the potential.
Now, the Catholic doctrine really terminates in this mystery: all humans possess the power to accept the grace of God unto salvation. Yet not all possess the act of actually accepting it. Thomists will say that there are two graces given to man: one which is infallibly efficacious, and one which is infallibly sufficient. The former gives the act. The latter gives the power to act. Yet, they will say, since nothing can move from potency to act unless moved by the divine will, no agent which is not given efficacious grace ever attains salvation. Rather, such a one is merely potentially recepient, but, due to God’s will, is allowed to remain as it is and thereby merit damnation. It would seem, at first sight, that this makes God the cause of sin. It would seem that, since he does not give efficacious grace to all, he thereby causes those who do not receive it to sin, and that he also doesn’t really give them the power to accept efficacious grace. The Thomists, I think rightly, say two things here. a) The fact that God does not grant grace, is not therefore the cause of sin, even if grace if given does indeed prevent sin; the lack of grace is not then the cause of sin. Rather, the creature sins, it is true because it lacks grace, yet nevertheless this lack is not a cause. The creature sinning is the cause. b) In order for there to exist a power to act, it is not necessary for the power to actually be in act. For example, I possess the power of sight while I am sleeping or the power of speech while I am silent. It is not necessary, then, for me to be in act in order to possess actual power. This, the Thomists would say, is true also for a creature given sufficient grace. It is really true that it possesses the power for making a salutory act of repentence; nevertheless, it never in fact does exercise that power. The objectors to Thomism at this point would say that it is not in the creatures ability, in itself, to be in either potency to act toward salvation, or in the very act itself. In other words, the creature, in its very nature, cannot pass from one to the other on its own, but must be so moved by God. The Thomists would agree here, because, if we say that man has can pass from potential to act without God, we are effectively attributing to man a sort of divine causality. That is, we would be saying that he has, as part of his nature, actuality, since he can act in and of himself without being moved. In other words, we would be saying that man is or can be an uncaused cause, or pure act, or, to put it simply, God. This the Thomists find inadmissable. In all honesty I tend to side with them.
This is a very great mystery, and yet, St. Thomas himself taught that such things neither impugn the justice and goodness of God, nor deprive man of free choice. After all, those who never pass from potency to act are really and truly set against goodness. They really do, and freely, love the darkness and hate the light. It is true that, were God to turn them, they would freely come to him, yet his not turning is not the cause of their loving darkness. Rather, they really, of themselves, hate God and Christ. Does this make God the cause of their hatred? No. St. Thomas uses the metphor that though the power of motion in a limping man causes him to limp, it is not the moving power which causes limping, but rather the curvature of the leg itself. “The effect of the deficient secondary cause is reduced to the first non-deficient cause as regards what it has of being and perfection, but not as regards what it has of defect; just as whatever there is of motion in the act of limping is caused by the motive power, whereas what there is of obliqueness in it does not come from the motive power, but from the curvature of the leg. And, likewise, whatever there is of being and action in a bad action, is reduced to God as the cause; whereas whatever defect is in it is not caused by God, but by the deficient secondary cause.”
The real question is, why does God show grace to one man and not another? Yet the answer to this is found in his will alone, which is unsearchable. Yet we must always maintain that his distribution of grace is due to the order of the goodness of the universe as a whole. St. Thomas explains this in many examples, such as, when he gives the example of a builder, who, wanting to build a particular house, places certain stones at the bottom, and others at the top, as is fitting to the perfection of the house. So it is in the case of the universe. In order to display his almighty goodness, mercy, and justice most perfectly, God wills to display his effects in a manner fittingly reflective of his nature. To understand why he has ordered the universe in such a way - to see its utter and unfathomable harmony - we would have to contemplate the universe as God himself does. Such contemplation is had by those who see God as he is in the beatific vision. To us, we must refer all things to his hidden will, and have trust that God our father, in his infinite wisdom, orders all things sweetly, and that, in eternity, if we are so graced, we shall see the perfect reason for everything.
Father Garrigou-Lagrange:
ewtn.com/vlibrary/search2.asp
“Reality” chapter 11
The entire work on Grace
The entire work on Providence