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Al_Moritz
Guest
More specifically, the multiverse hypothesis does not fail because atheism is not very convincing: atheism (or naturalism) is not very convincing because, among others, the multiverse hypothesis fails as design explanation.Yes, the multiverse hypothesis is more philosophy than science, but as philosophy it doesn’t seem to sail. It may well be the only atheist alternative to explaining the roots of our universe since the Big Bang itself suggests more Creation than the eternal universe hypothesis assumed by scientists before the discovery of the Big Bang. If there is no Creator, and the Big Bang can only be shown to be a one-time event, the multiverse must be allowed by the atheist to be the only plausible explanation. But as you pointed out above, that is more science fiction than science, and it’s not convincing philosophy at all since atheism is not very convincing.
My article continues:
Yet if it would solve the design problem, the multiverse would nonetheless be a serious philosophical alternative to the God hypothesis. Does it succeed?
1.4. The multiverse does not solve the design problem
The multiverse concept solves the fine-tuning problem of our particular universe, but it is generally overlooked by its proponents that it does not really solve the overall design problem.
In fact, it creates another fine-tuning problem. In order to solve the fine-tuning problem of our particular kind of universe, the multiverse would have to make the occurrence of that universe by a pure chance process statistically inevitable, against all overwhelming odds. Yet this would require a truly random distribution of physical constants in extremely fine grades among the members (universes or domains) of the multiverse, in order to allow for a sufficient variety of physical constants between them (trillions times trillions times trillions etc. variations), so that ours would be guaranteed to arise by chance out of a huge possible parameter space of physical constants. This could only be achieved by careful design of the underlying many-universe generator. Thus, instead of solving the design problem, the multiverse theory just pushes it back one step.
As Stephen Barr concludes in his book Modern Physics and Ancient Faith (p.154):
“having laws that lead to the existence of domains of a sufficiently rich variety to make life inevitable would itself qualify as an anthropic coincidence. There seems to be no escape. Every way of explaining anthropic coincidences scientifically involves assuming the universe has some sort of very special characteristics that can be thought of as constituting in themselves another set of anthropic coincidences.”
(Here the term ‘universe’ includes also the multiverse as an overarching ensemble.)
Robin Collins makes a similar point and explains the very special requirements for a multiverse that would explain the random appearance of our particular universe:
Universe or Multiverse? A Theistic Perspective
(Heading “Multiverse Generator Needs Design”.)
George Ellis agrees. In his lecture linked to above he states:
“All the same anthropic issues arise as for a single universe: Why this multiverse, and not another one?”
The well-known cosmologist Paul Davies, who cannot exactly be called ‘religious’, appears to agree as well, in his essay Taking Science on Faith:
“The multiverse theory is increasingly popular, but it doesn’t so much explain the laws of physics as dodge the whole issue. There has to be a physical mechanism to make all those universes and bestow bylaws on them. This process will require its own laws, or meta-laws. Where do they come from? The problem has simply been shifted up a level from the laws of the universe to the meta-laws of the multiverse.”
I do not know, however, in which way to make much sense of his own alternative postulated in order to avoid involvement of God,
“In other words, the laws should have an explanation from within the universe and not involve appealing to an external agency. The specifics of that explanation are a matter for future research.”
This may move too close to the idea of an ‘intrinsic necessity’ of the laws of nature, something that cannot be considered valid, as I pointed out. By the way, in his essay A Brief History of the Multiverse Davies raises similar concerns of scientific observability of the multiverse as George Ellis does, with some additional critical thoughts on the multiverse issue.
The multiverse design problem is also not adequately addressed by the hypothesis of Cosmological Natural Selection, see chapter 3 below.