What is wrong with this argument against the existence of God?

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On this page an argument is presented that the concept of God is incoherent (or at least inconsistant with our world) based on the existence of evil. I looked the page over and most of it seems powerful. The problem I see with it is that there might not be a possible world which meets all of God’s standards, thus refuting either assumption 5 or assumption 6. But even then the argument could be modified to ask why God doesn’t make a world that is more consistent with his standards, especially since he has motivation to do so. What is the flaw with this argument?
 
God gave us free will. We sinned, so we lost a lot as a result. That’s why there is evil in the world (i.e lack of good).

Does the person want to argue against free will? If there was no free will, then how could we choose to love God? Then what would be the purpose of our existence?
 
I believe the problematic assumption is number 6, because while currently the universe does not look the way - as far as we can tell - the way God wishes it to, God, being in eternity, sees the universe as a whole, and it pleases Him in the end (or else He would not have made it).

We cannot see the universe the way God sees it. We do not know how He sees the universe; we know how we see it. And we know, dimly, God’s vision, and our own, and that they do not match. But we do not see the past, present, and future altogether at the same time. If what we know about God is true, He does.

Therefore, although the universe is imperfect in the span of now, for God, it is perfect in the span of eternity.

At worst we can say this argument is inconclusive, because we cannot say what the world looks like to God.
 
On this page an argument is presented that the concept of God is incoherent (or at least inconsistant with our world) based on the existence of evil. I looked the page over and most of it seems powerful. The problem I see with it is that there might not be a possible world which meets all of God’s standards, thus refuting either assumption 5 or assumption 6. But even then the argument could be modified to ask why God doesn’t make a world that is more consistent with his standards, especially since he has motivation to do so. What is the flaw with this argument?
I wish I wasn’t at work and had the time to disassemble this argument. Firstly, God is always glorified through the actions of His creations. The existence of free will itself glorifies God. So if individuals choose evil, this glorifies God’s love and respect for the free will that He gave us. He created a world with the possibility of evil because without it there would be no freedom, and thus good would be meaningless. I know some very pious person who is not a philosopher will argue that evil can never glorify God. And of course it can’t. But the ability of God’s creations to choose good or evil will always glorify Him. I have much more to say, but not the time to type it.
 
Also, C2 does flow from A2 and A5. However, free will may be one of God’s standards to a perfect world, and preferable to a “perfect” world of clay figurines that bark when you want them to bark.
It follows, therefore, that God does not possess free will.
God possesses perfect free will, but He also possesses perfect reason. Evil is contrary to reason. (It is also contrary to free will, but this is more subtle; sin slowly but surely deprives of the initial pleasure while enslaving you to having to do it lest you feel pain from not doing it. Sin’s tricky that way. On the other hand, while good is logical, it is often an acquired taste - like beer, or Waldorf salads.)

If you knew something was evil - would come from the wrong place, would have evil results, and would be an evil way to do things - would you do it? Is anyone truly free who would contradict right reason?

I would say the ability to do evil is not an aspect of a good God, but an aspect of insanity.

God does not lack free will; He has perfect reason.

Of course, this does beg the question: if He has perfect reason, why not give us perfect reason along with free will?

Hmmmm.
 
Free will is proven by the existence of atheists. Yet, so many of these arguments are put forth by absolute ignoramuses.
 
It follows, therefore, that God does not possess free will.
That sentence jumped out at me too. The trouble I saw with it is that God has free will but cannot do evil because it is against his nature and would cause a logical contradiction. God can still be said to have free will because he can choose what (if any) good things to do, but he cannot choose evil. Maybe a being’s free will is limited by its nature, so God has free will even though he cannot choose evil because of his nature just as we have free will but cannot choose to fly by waving our arms like wings because of our nature.
 
Of course, this does beg the question: if He has perfect reason, why not give us perfect reason along with free will?

Hmmmm.
He may have created us with perfect reason. But at the fall, our wills were weakened and intellects darkened. We can still choose to go against reason.
 
On this page an argument is presented that the concept of God is incoherent (or at least inconsistant with our world) based on the existence of evil. What is the flaw with this argument?
You can end the discussion right there. C.S. Lewis states it well that our recognition of evil in itself is acceptance that there is good. If there is good, where does it come from as evolution has no concept of good/evil (strongest survive and all that…), Therefore the concept of good must have come into us from something outside of us; something which possessed good to impart and the ability so to do. That one is God.

His discussion on another page of Good and evil is incomplete to say the least and does not counter act the above philosophy.
 
That sentence jumped out at me too. The trouble I saw with it is that God has free will but cannot do evil because it is against his nature and would cause a logical contradiction. God can still be said to have free will because he can choose what (if any) good things to do, but he cannot choose evil. Maybe a being’s free will is limited by its nature, so God has free will even though he cannot choose evil because of his nature just as we have free will but cannot choose to fly by waving our arms like wings because of our nature.
A perfect being can have free will and still only choose to do what is good. Jesus has two wills, and neither of them ever veered from the other. He could choose to do evil, but doesn’t. Also, good and evil are ethical terms for the state of nature in this universe. They do not apply to God and God’s volitions in the same way that they apply to us and our actions. We consider a hurricane to be evil, and atheists blame God for hurricanes and the damage that they do. To God, a hurricane is not evil. Etc.
 
The problem is with C3 and what one defines as “perfect.”
 
Noticed this site in my weblogs. Anyway…
C.S. Lewis states it well that our recognition of evil in itself is acceptance that there is good.
To quote from the essay: “…note that the following argument does not depend on a specific definition of “Evil”. It merely requires that God desires certain outcomes that end up not happening.”

E.g., people doing things God doesn’t like, or not everyone being saved, or whatever.
His discussion on another page of Good and evil is incomplete to say the least and does not counter act the above philosophy.
Needless to say, I disagree.
 
God has free will but cannot do evil because it is against his nature…
You’ll note that I specifically quote C.S. Lewis as saying that “Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot.” So my response is taking Lewis at his word - since God has no possiblity of going wrong, then ergo God must not be free. If this is wrong, it’s C.S. Lewis who was wrong to state that in the first place.
He may have created us with perfect reason. But at the fall, our wills were weakened and intellects darkened. We can still choose to go against reason.
If Adam and Eve chose to fall, could they have had perfect reason?
 
You’ll note that I specifically quote C.S. Lewis as saying that “Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot.” So my response is taking Lewis at his word - since God has no possiblity of going wrong, then ergo God must not be free. If this is wrong, it’s C.S. Lewis who was wrong to state that in the first place.
We don’t believe God is a creature, He was not created.
 
You’ll note that I specifically quote C.S. Lewis as saying that “Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot.” So my response is taking Lewis at his word - since God has no possiblity of going wrong, then ergo God must not be free. If this is wrong, it’s C.S. Lewis who was wrong to state that in the first place.
I see, and I apologize for taking your words out of context. In all honesty I was never a huge fan of Lewis’ apologetics work, I feel he oversimplified most issues he talked about and even on those he didn’t a lot of development has occurred since his writing. So your criticism on that point is more on Lewis’ argument than on theism generally, no?
 
You’ll note that I specifically quote C.S. Lewis as saying that “Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot.” So my response is taking Lewis at his word - since God has no possiblity of going wrong, then ergo God must not be free. If this is wrong, it’s C.S. Lewis who was wrong to state that in the first place.
Thankfully, CS Lewis is not infallible - nor a Catholic (though in many ways he is much like one). It is not impossible for a creature to be like God insomuch as they possess perfect reason and perfect free will. In fact, that is almost the definition of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

Yes; a creature, with perfect free will, and perfect reason (that is, reason “full of grace”, or fully akin to God’s).
If Adam and Eve chose to fall, could they have had perfect reason?
Sure; it’s called insanity.

Also of note, even in the Garden they were not “perfect” - that is, not acutalised, not “as high as they could go”. I think it was Da Vinci who once said “Art is never finished, only abandoned”. God, if we understand correctly, is eternal. He is not bound or constrained by time. 1400 is as present to Him as 2000 as is 33 AD or 3300 BC.

So, if Adam and Eve had perfect reason and free will, it does not mean they were necessarily even close to being analogues to God. After all, they were limited. Like being Creative Mode Steve in Minecraft (except they couldn’t fly).
 
So I’ve been thinking about the argument and the point I made on the greatest possible world in post 1, and I’ve refined that point into what I see as a refutation of the argument. As I noted, the argument assumes that there is such thing as a perfect possible world - or a possible world which meets God’s standards in every possible respect. I, however, would seriously question this - I think that there is no perfect or maximally great world, and that worlds can always in some respect be made better. In light of this, either A5 is false, if we take A5 to refer to a universe which meets God’s standards in every possible respect, or A6 is false, if we take A5 to mean a world that meets God standards in general - for even though some, or even many, aspects of our world may not meet God’s standards, I see no reason to believe that our world in general, taking into account past, present and future, doesn’t. Either way, the argument is unsound.

Now, as I noted, one could counter this and ask why isn’t the world better. But if God only wants to and can create a world that meets his standards in general, and there are infinitely many worlds that meet his standards in general (but none that meet them in every respect), his is free to choose any he wants to create, and is not morally culpable for any deficiencies in the world that arise. So even this form of the argument fails.

Thoughts?
 
We don’t believe God is a creature, He was not created.
The essay continues: “One possible response is that Lewis specifically meant the word “creature” (that is, something created) rather than the more generic term “being”.”

It’s against the rules here to post the entire lengthy essay, so if you want to critique it, I’m afraid you’ll have to read it.
 
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