Abp. Lefebvre’s illicit consecrations for which he was excommunicated were public, thus I am canonically bound to presume the imputability of those actions. Every single interpretation of the law and response to the abp.'s arguments that has been proferred by the Holy See has confirmed the sanctions against him. This is not one isolated case but decades worth of correspondence. Given all of this, why should the burden of proof be upon me to establish what the law obliges us to presume?
Wait a minute. You are saying that your conclusions must by law be based on the law and not on reason?
What law obliges this of you? This flies in the face of Church teaching.
St. Thomas Aquinas says:
Whether human law binds a man’s conscience
Human laws are either just or unjust. If they are just, they have the power to bind our conscience because of the eternal law from which they are derived. As Proverbs says, “Through me kings reign and lawmakers decree just laws” (Prov. 8:15).
Laws are said to be just either because of their end, when they are ordained to the common good; or because of their author, when the law does not exceed the power of the lawmaker; or because of their form, when burdens are distributed equitably among subjects for the common good. For since a man is part of the multitude, whatever he is or has belongs to the multitude as a part belongs to the whole. Thus nature inflicts harm on a part in order to save the whole. Accordingly laws which inflict burdens equitably are just, bind the conscience, and are legal laws.
Laws are unjust in two ways: First, they may be such because they oppose human good by denying the three criteria just mentioned. This can occur because of their end, when a ruler imposes burdens with an eye, not to the common good, but to his own enrichment or glory; because of their author, when someone imposes laws beyond the scope of his authority; or because of their form,
when burdens are inequitably distributed, even if they are ordered to the common good. Such decrees are not so much laws as acts of violence, because, as Augustine says, “An unjust law does not seem to be a law at all.” Such laws do not bind the conscience, except perhaps to avoid scandal or disturbance, on account of which one should yield his right. As Christ says, “If someone forces you to go a mile, go another two with him; and if he takes your tunic, give him your pallium” (Mtt. 5:40f.).
Whether someone subject to the law can act outside the letter of the law
All law is ordered to the common well-being of men and gains the force of law from precisely that fact. To the degree that it fails in accomplishing this end, it loses its binding force. Thus the Jurist says, “No reason of law or advantage of equity allows us to interpret harshly and render burdensome those healthy measures which were originally enacted for man s welfare.”
It often happens that a law aimed at the general welfare is useful in most cases and yet on occasion is very harmful.
Because a legislator cannot foresee all possible individual cases, he promulgates a law which fits the majority of cases, having the common good in mind.
If a case emerges in which the law is harmful to the common good, it should not be observed.
For example, if a law says that the gates of a certain besieged city should remain closed, such a law is beneficial to the city in most cases; yet if the enemy is pursuing some of the very citizens by whom the city is defended, refusal to open the gates and let them in would be harmful to the city. In such cases, the gates should be opened despite the letter of the law, in order to attain the common good intended by the legislator.
Note, though, that if obedience to the letter of the law involves no immediate danger calling for instant remedy, not everyone is competent to decide what is good or bad for the city, but only the leaders, who have authority to dispense with the law in such cases. If it is indeed a matter of immediate danger allowing no time to consult a superior, such necessity carries its own dispensation,
for necessity knows no law.
My above comment about the validity of acts of the Holy See was aimed at precisely this point: the burden of proof does not fall upon the Holy See to show that each and every one of its acts was, indeed, valid. Rather, the onus lies upon the one who contends it was not. Thus it is wrongheaded to presuppose that I, in adopting the decades worth of decisions issued by the Holy See as the starting point of the discussion, am obliged to prove their validity against each and every argument. It is perfectly legitimate to assume them as a point of departure.
That is an utterly absurd tautology. You presume that all orders are moral and then demand a citation of an immoral order. When it is presented, you reject it’s validity on the account of your presumption.
Chesterton described this as " First he challenged me to find a black swan, and then he ruled out all my swans because they were black."
