Whatever is moved, is moved by another

[Richca]

In the first proof for the existence of God in St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, he proposes a few propostions to which I add a third namely:

1. Whatever is moved is moved by another. (This wording is the wording in the SCG of Aquinas and is possibly the correct wording for the ST from what I read on another thread. The older English translation of the ST has “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.” The newer English translation by Fr. Thomas Gilby has “anything in process of change is being changed by something else.” For the present discussion, I don’t think we need to dwell on which translation is the correct one. However, if somebody knows something that my affect our understanding of how we are to understand the first proposition, please enlighten us.)
2. Motion is nothing else but the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.
3. I am going to propose another proposition which St Thomas does not expressly state but which I think can be inferred in the first proof, namely, whatever is moved or changed is divisible, i.e., it has a composition of parts at least two, namely, potency and act. In St Thomas’ commentary on Aristotle’s physics, book 7, he says: There cannot be a moveable object whose motion does not depend on its parts; just as if I were to show that a divisible thing cannot be the first being, because the being of whatever is divisible depends on its parts.” In this particular instance and without reading into this passage any further and which for the present purposes I don’t think really matter much, Aquinas may be talking about motion properly so called, i.e, a change in quality, quantity, or place wherein the substance or subject itself is not changed. However, Aristotle says in physics book VI, Lecture 5, chapter 4, “Everything that changes must be divisible.” This is universally true for any kind of change whatsoever in some manner or other; the mobile object is divisible. You can read Aquinas’ commentary on this. To simplify things presently, lets say that everything that is moved or changed must have a compostion of at least two parts which we are going to call potentiality and act, as its primordial composition as the first thesis of the 24 Thomistic theses states : Potency and Act so divide being that whatsoever exists either is a Pure Act, or is necessarily composed of Potency and Act, as to its primordial and intrinsic principles.

Without going through all of Aristotle’s demonstrations why whatever is moved or changed is divisible, I propose the following.
Firstly, before anything can change, we must first have a being to change which we may call a substratum or substance of change.
Secondly, if change is real, a being of some kind, this is not going to be simple Being. For Being as Being, is one and simple and being simply one it does not have any composition of parts. The only contrary to being is non-being and non-being does not exist. Simple Being then is unchangeable for there is nothing for Simple Being to change into for it just is simply Being. If motion or change is a being of some kind, this does not apply to Simple Being, for it possesses the fullness of Being and you cannot add being to it.

Consequently, whatever is moved or changed must be composite and composed of at least two parts which in Aristotle’s terms are act and potency. As said above, before anything can change, we must first have something to change, namely, a being of some kind and for present illustrative purposes we can call this part of the being act. Before a being can change, it must have the potentiality to change and so lets can call this other part potency. So, we have a composite being composed of two parts, act and potency. The potential part is that part that can be changed.

 

[Richca]

(Continued)

For Aristotle/Aquinas, potency does not raise itself to act. Aquinas says in the first proof “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. From the outset, this is quite obvious, for potency is not act. A potency is not a being in act, but a being in potency which presently is a kind of non-being but not sheer nothingness. A being in potency is something real and stands midway between absolute non-being and actual being. For example, there was a time in the not to distant past, that we did not exist, we were non-beings. However, now we do exist and are actual beings. Somehow, we passed from non-being or not having actual existence to having existence and being. This passage was not from sheer nothingness for our parents are the cause of our existence and ulitimately God in whom, before having existence in our own beings apart from God, existed in the mind of God from all eternity. From nothing, comes nothing; so a non-being cannot cause a being. However, a being can cause that which is a non-being before it is a being, to be a being and have actual existence.

Lets focus on the part of the being that is potency. Nothing can give itself what it does not have, that is, change itself. For example, suppose this part that is potency can be changed to whiteness. Presently, it is not white. Non-whiteness cannot change itself to whiteness. Nor can this potency possess white and not white at one and the same time and thus change itself. It cannot be potentially white and actually white at the same time. This would be like saying that Simple Being can change itself into non-being, possess being and non-being at one and the same time. In other words, being is non-being. This is of course, contrary to the first principle of our intellectual reasoning, namely, the principle of non-contradiction which is that being is not non-being.

Therefore, since potency cannot move or change itself, whatever is moved or changed is moved or changed by another.

Aristotle introduced the concepts of act and potency to explain how motion or change comes about in the world for it was not yet quite clear to the ancient greek philosophers whether change is an illusion such as those in Parmenides’ camp, or whether change or becoming is the only reality so that there is nothing permanent or stable in things such as those in Heraclitus’ camp. For Aristotle, to say that change is an illusion contradicts what is self-evident to our sense perception of the world, for example, a tree that loses it leaves in the fall and winter. On the other hand, to say that there is nothing stable or permanent also contradicts our sense perception, for example, a tree that loses its leaves in the fall and winter, is the same tree that has leaves in the spring and summer.

All comments are welcome,
In JMJ, Richca

 

[Linusthe2nd]

In the first proof for the existence of God in St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, he proposes a few propostions to which I add a third namely:

1. Whatever is moved is moved by another. (This wording is the wording in the SCG of Aquinas and is possibly the correct wording for the ST from what I read on another thread.

Yes, the Latin phrase, " Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur, " is translated as, " Whatever is moved is moved by another. " And it is best to stick with what is correct eventhough it has been misstranslated for hundreds of years. It is even misstranslated wherever it occurs in the Works of Aristotle as far as I can tell. But for your purposes here, it does not seem to matter. It may later.

I have been trying to come up with a way to explain its importance without writing a book!

The older English translation of the ST has “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.” The newer English translation by Fr. Thomas Gilby has “anything in process of change is being changed by something else.” For the present discussion, I don’t think we need to dwell on which translation is the correct one. However, if somebody knows something that my affect our understanding of how we are to understand the first proposition, please enlighten us.)
2. Motion is nothing else but the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.

1. I am going to propose another proposition which St Thomas does not expressly state but which I think can be inferred in the first proof, namely, whatever is moved or changed is divisible, i.e., it has a composition of parts at least two, namely, potency and act. In St Thomas’ commentary on Aristotle’s physics, book 7, he says: There cannot be a moveable object whose motion does not depend on its parts; just as if I were to show that a divisible thing cannot be the first being, because the being of whatever is divisible depends on its parts.” In this particular instance and without reading into this passage any further and which for the present purposes I don’t think really matter much, Aquinas may be talking about motion properly so called, i.e, a change in quality, quantity, or place wherein the substance or subject itself is not changed. However, Aristotle says in physics book VI, Lecture 5, chapter 4, “Everything that changes must be divisible.” This is universally true for any kind of change whatsoever in some manner or other; the mobile object is divisible. You can read Aquinas’ commentary on this. To simplify things presently, lets say that everything that is moved or changed must have a compostion of at least two parts which we are going to call potentiality and act, as its primordial composition as the first thesis of the 24 Thomistic theses states : Potency and Act so divide being that whatsoever exists either is a Pure Act, or is necessarily composed of Potency and Act, as to its primordial and intrinsic principles.

Without going through all of Aristotle’s demonstrations why whatever is moved or changed is divisible, I propose the following.

.

Firstly, before anything can change, we must first have a being to change which we may call a substratum or substance of change.

The correct term would be " subject. "

Secondly, if change is real, a being of some kind,

Change is not a being. I think what you inteded to say is that if change is real it must occur in a being ( subject ) of some kind.

this is not going to be simple Being. For Being as Being, is one and simple and being simply one it does not have any composition of parts. The only contrary to being is non-being and non-being does not exist. Simple Being then is unchangeable for there is nothing for Simple Being to change into for it just is simply Being. If motion or change is a being of some kind, this does not apply to Simple Being, for it possesses the fullness of Being and you cannot add being to it.

Consequently, whatever is moved or changed must be composite and composed of at least two parts which in Aristotle’s terms are act and potency. As said above, before anything can change, we must first have something to change, namely, a being of some kind and for present illustrative purposes we can call this part of the being act. Before a being can change, it must have the potentiality to change and so lets can call this other part potency. So, we have a composite being composed of two parts, act and potency. The potential part is that part that can be changed.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

Quote: originally from Richca
Secondly, if change is real, a being of some kind,

Change is not a being. I think what you inteded to say is that if change is real it must occur in a being ( subject ) of some kind.

Pax
Linus2nd

Any kind of change including substantial changes is going to involve the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality, i.e., a being in potency to a being in act. Any kind of an act is a being. Aristotle defined motion as the act of a being in potency in so far as it is still in potency. Motion is an action of a being in potency, it has received an action from a being in act. Action is an accidental being in the ten categories. If I go walking which involves motion, this is obviously an action I’m performing. Walking is something real and it has real existence and whatever has real existence is a real being of some kind. If change or motion is not an action or being, then it either does not exist in the world or its an illusion which is what Parmenides thought.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Any kind of change including substantial changes is going to involve the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality, i.e., a being in potency to a being in act. Any kind of an act is a being. Aristotle defined motion as the act of a being in potency in so far as it is still in potency. Motion is an action of a being in potency, it has received an action from a being in act. Action is an accidental being in the ten categories. If I go walking which involves motion, this is obviously an action I’m performing. Walking is something real and it has real existence and whatever has real existence is a real being of some kind. If change or motion is not an action or being, then it either does not exist in the world or its an illusion which is what Parmenides thought.

From Thomas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book 4, Lesson 1.
dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Metaphysics4.htm#1

1. But it must be noted that the above-mentioned modes of being can be reduced to four.

(1) For one of them, which is the most imperfect, i.e., negation and privation, exists only in the mind. We say that these exist in the mind because the mind busies itself with them as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. In what respect negation and privation differ will be treated below (564).

1. (2) There is another mode of being inasmuch as generation and corruption are called beings, and this mode by reason of its imperfection comes close to the one given above. For generation and corruption have some admixture of privation and negation, because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality, as is stated in the Physics, Book III.
2. (3) The third mode of being admits of no admixture of non-being, yet it is still an imperfect kind of being, because it does not exist of itself but in something else, for example, qualities and quantities and the properties of substances.
3. (4) The fourth mode of being is the one which is most perfect, namely, what has being in reality without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid being inasmuch as it exists of itself. This is the mode of being which substances have. Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three.

Note that being, purely and simply, is that which exists of itself, is a substance. it is something that has or is a nature in reality - man, angel, God, horse, iron, air, water, etc.

Further being is defined even in the dictionaries as that which is. It is always a noun or refers to a noun. " Walking " is a participle, a verb form of the verb walk.

Walking is a change, but it is not a being. The most you can say is that it tells what a being is doing.

So while change is something real in the world it is a being only in an anological and relative sense. It is confusing unless you explain that the term is being used anologically or relatively and not univocally. That is that it is being used in a less perfect way, to use Aristotle’s explanation.’

Another thing. Aristotle says that being is what the intellect know first. He says for example that it is what babies know first. That can hardly be said of change. And I remember, as a lad, I always identified substances first. The substance may have been doing something but I seldom gave thought to that fact.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[StrawberryJam]

I’m very moved by all the must be statements.
Convincing to a point.
If one simply accepts points that are presented without evidence.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I’m very moved by all the must be statements.
Convincing to a point.
If one simply accepts points that are presented without evidence.

Since God has given us an intellect there must be certain truths of intellectual searching which serve as foundations for a further search of truth. The " evidence " is in the logic of the arguments not in " weights and measures " which are scientific tools. The tools of philosophy are the intellectual tools of reason God has given us.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[Richca]

Walking is a change, but it is not a being. The most you can say is that it tells what a being is doing.

Pax
Linus2nd

Walking is absolutely a being as well as any kind of an action of a being. Walking is not substantial being but accidental being. It is an act of a person but it doesn’t change that person’s substance which is why it is called accidental being. As I said earlier, action is one of the ten categories of being which is divided into substance and accident. Another division of being is potency and act. Being is something which exists or has existence. The act of walking is something which exists, it is real and therefore a being. It is the action of a substance and it is called second act; the substance is called first act.

To help clarify this for you, here is a quote from St Thomas from the ST, Q.79, art.2, where he discusses whether the act of sin is from God. He says “The act of sin is both a being and an act.” We could substitute walking here for sin or any kind of act from us such as praying, thinking, willing, loving, working, etc.

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Walking is absolutely a being as well as any kind of an action of a being. Walking is not substantial being but accidental being. It is an act of a person but it doesn’t change that person’s substance which is why it is called accidental being. As I said earlier, action is one of the ten categories of being which is divided into substance and accident. Another division of being is potency and act. Being is something which exists or has existence. The act of walking is something which exists, it is real and therefore a being. It is the action of a substance and it is called second act; the substance is called first act.

To help clarify this for you, here is a quote from St Thomas from the ST, Q.79, art.2, where he discusses whether the act of sin is from God. He says “The act of sin is both a being and an act.” We could substitute walking here for sin or any kind of act from us such as praying, thinking, willing, loving, working, etc.

I know they said it but I disagree for the reasons I stated. I think we should always use " being " in its primay meaning, which is a substance. They also distinguish " being of the mind " from being as a real thing ( substance ).

Pax
Linus2nd

.

 

[Bahman]

In the first proof for the existence of God in St Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica, he proposes a few propostions to which I add a third namely:

1. Whatever is moved is moved by another. (This wording is the wording in the SCG of Aquinas and is possibly the correct wording for the ST from what I read on another thread. The older English translation of the ST has “whatever is in motion is put in motion by another.” The newer English translation by Fr. Thomas Gilby has “anything in process of change is being changed by something else.” For the present discussion, I don’t think we need to dwell on which translation is the correct one. However, if somebody knows something that my affect our understanding of how we are to understand the first proposition, please enlighten us.)

You have to be clear here: What do you mean with another here “Whatever is moved is moved by another”. Whatever is moved is moved by consciousness in my opinion. Consider a system which is in an initial state S. S cannot cause another state, lets say S’, unless it is annihilated before S’ since both S and S’ cannot coexist. This means that conscious state of C from state of S must exist upon its annihilation and then C can create state of S’. In another word, what moves is moved by consciousness.

1. Motion is nothing else but the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality.

Motion is simply change in form.

1. I am going to propose another proposition which St Thomas does not expressly state but which I think can be inferred in the first proof, namely, whatever is moved or changed is divisible, i.e., it has a composition of parts at least two, namely, potency and act. In St Thomas’ commentary on Aristotle’s physics, book 7, he says: There cannot be a moveable object whose motion does not depend on its parts; just as if I were to show that a divisible thing cannot be the first being, because the being of whatever is divisible depends on its parts.” In this particular instance and without reading into this passage any further and which for the present purposes I don’t think really matter much, Aquinas may be talking about motion properly so called, i.e, a change in quality, quantity, or place wherein the substance or subject itself is not changed. However, Aristotle says in physics book VI, Lecture 5, chapter 4, “Everything that changes must be divisible.” This is universally true for any kind of change whatsoever in some manner or other; the mobile object is divisible. You can read Aquinas’ commentary on this. To simplify things presently, lets say that everything that is moved or changed must have a compostion of at least two parts which we are going to call potentiality and act, as its primordial composition as the first thesis of the 24 Thomistic theses states : Potency and Act so divide being that whatsoever exists either is a Pure Act, or is necessarily composed of Potency and Act, as to its primordial and intrinsic principles.

Potency and actuality are parts of motion and not form. Form could be discontinuous but not divisible hence divisibility of form is an illusion.

Without going through all of Aristotle’s demonstrations why whatever is moved or changed is divisible, I propose the following.
Firstly, before anything can change, we must first have a being to change which we may call a substratum or substance of change.

That is form which is subject to change and divisibility is not necessary for change.

Secondly, if change is real, a being of some kind, this is not going to be simple Being. For Being as Being, is one and simple and being simply one it does not have any composition of parts. The only contrary to being is non-being and non-being does not exist. Simple Being then is unchangeable for there is nothing for Simple Being to change into for it just is simply Being. If motion or change is a being of some kind, this does not apply to Simple Being, for it possesses the fullness of Being and you cannot add being to it.

Form is simple and doesn’t have any part but it can change hence simple being in your definition can change.

Consequently, whatever is moved or changed must be composite and composed of at least two parts which in Aristotle’s terms are act and potency. As said above, before anything can change, we must first have something to change, namely, a being of some kind and for present illustrative purposes we can call this part of the being act. Before a being can change, it must have the potentiality to change and so lets can call this other part potency. So, we have a composite being composed of two parts, act and potency. The potential part is that part that can be changed.

Again, movement is not part of form but part of the whole which contains consciousness and form. Consciousness is simply what create the movement. You don’t need to divide the form to two part to resolve the problem of movement when you have consciousness.

 

[Bahman]

(Continued)

For Aristotle/Aquinas, potency does not raise itself to act. Aquinas says in the first proof “nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. From the outset, this is quite obvious, for potency is not act. A potency is not a being in act, but a being in potency which presently is a kind of non-being but not sheer nothingness. A being in potency is something real and stands midway between absolute non-being and actual being. For example, there was a time in the not to distant past, that we did not exist, we were non-beings. However, now we do exist and are actual beings. Somehow, we passed from non-being or not having actual existence to having existence and being. This passage was not from sheer nothingness for our parents are the cause of our existence and ulitimately God in whom, before having existence in our own beings apart from God, existed in the mind of God from all eternity. From nothing, comes nothing; so a non-being cannot cause a being. However, a being can cause that which is a non-being before it is a being, to be a being and have actual existence.

First, potency by definition is the availability of changes in the form. The form stays static if form cannot be changed by consciousness. It is then up to consciousness to choose between different available final forms and create a new form within the process which we call it motion.

Second, actuality is the process in which consciousness decides about final form. Final form, so called actual, is then created upon consciousness decision.

Third, I disagree with the first bold part. Please read my definition of potency.

Forth, I disagree with the second bold part. What we call self awareness is simply the awareness of our actions caused by our consciousness granted by our memories of our decisions. Nothing can be changed without consciousness and nothing can be self aware without memory.

Lets focus on the part of the being that is potency. Nothing can give itself what it does not have, that is, change itself. For example, suppose this part that is potency can be changed to whiteness. Presently, it is not white. Non-whiteness cannot change itself to whiteness. Nor can this potency possess white and not white at one and the same time and thus change itself. **It cannot be potentially white and actually white at the same time. **This would be like saying that Simple Being can change itself into non-being, possess being and non-being at one and the same time. In other words, being is non-being. This is of course, contrary to the first principle of our intellectual reasoning, namely, the principle of non-contradiction which is that being is not non-being.

I disagree with the first bold part. You can obviously change your form without any intervention. What is necessary for any change is consciousness as it was stated in the previous post.

The second bold part is a good understanding of subject matter. That is why you need consciousness.

**Therefore, since potency cannot move or change itself, whatever is moved or changed is moved or changed by another. **

Aristotle introduced the concepts of act and potency to explain how motion or change comes about in the world for it was not yet quite clear to the ancient greek philosophers whether change is an illusion such as those in Parmenides’ camp, or whether change or becoming is the only reality so that there is nothing permanent or stable in things such as those in Heraclitus’ camp. For Aristotle, to say that change is an illusion contradicts what is self-evident to our sense perception of the world, for example, a tree that loses it leaves in the fall and winter. On the other hand, to say that there is nothing stable or permanent also contradicts our sense perception, for example, a tree that loses its leaves in the fall and winter, is the same tree that has leaves in the spring and summer.

All comments are welcome,
In JMJ, Richca

The comment for the bold part: and that being is consciousness.

 

[Richca]

I know they said it but I disagree for the reasons I stated. I think we should always use " being " in its primay meaning, which is a substance. They also distinguish " being of the mind " from being as a real thing ( substance ).

Pax
Linus2nd

.

Hi Linus,
It is not possible to understand the philosophy and metaphysics of St Thomas or Aristotle or even to understand reality if we think being only means substance. We would be leaving out 9/10ths of reality. As I said before, Aristotle divides being into the ten predicaments, namely, substance and accidents. The ten categories are kinds of being. Being itself is in all the categories and transcends the categories because being itself is not a genus. As far as the ten categories go, being is primarily said of substance as you say. However, this does not mean that the accidents are not real or that they do not have existence or that they are not beings. Substance signifies that which exist of itself and which substands or underlies the accidents. Accidents only have existence in a substance and because of the substance. They are beings in a being.
If it is said, Socrates is white. White is something that has real existence in Socrates. It is an accidental being in Socrates.
If you are referring being of the mind to the intellectual power in human beings, this power is something real and is a being, for this power exists in the soul. It is by this power that we are able to think and reason. It is also by this power that we are distinguished from other animals, for human beings are called, rational animals. Aquinas, however, distinguishes the powers of the soul from its essence. The powers of the soul are accidents of the soul. They are called proper or inseperable accidents. A human being cannot be conceived or even exist without, for example, the intellectual power, as well as the other powers of the soul as long as a person exist at least in the body.

 

[Richca]

You have to be clear here: What do you mean with another here “Whatever is moved is moved by another”. Whatever is moved is moved by consciousness in my opinion. Consider a system which is in an initial state S. S cannot cause another state, lets say S’, unless it is annihilated before S’ since both S and S’ cannot coexist. This means that conscious state of C from state of S must exist upon its annihilation and then C can create state of S’. In another word, what moves is moved by consciousness.

Another here means another being, for example, a hand that moves a stick. If you mean by consciousness a mind or intellect, then since God is the first mover what moves is moved by a living intellectual power since God is life, intellect and will. However, not every intermediate mover is a consciousness. For example, I would not call the sun conscious of heating up a pool of water and changing the water from cold to warm or hot.

Motion is simply change in form

 

[lmelahn]

From Thomas’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book 4, Lesson 1.
dhspriory.org/thomas/english/Metaphysics4.htm#1

1. But it must be noted that the above-mentioned modes of being can be reduced to four.

(1) For one of them, which is the most imperfect, i.e., negation and privation, exists only in the mind. We say that these exist in the mind because the mind busies itself with them as kinds of being while it affirms or denies something about them. In what respect negation and privation differ will be treated below (564).

1. (2) There is another mode of being inasmuch as generation and corruption are called beings, and this mode by reason of its imperfection comes close to the one given above. For generation and corruption have some admixture of privation and negation, because motion is an imperfect kind of actuality, as is stated in the Physics, Book III.
2. (3) The third mode of being admits of no admixture of non-being, yet it is still an imperfect kind of being, because it does not exist of itself but in something else, for example, qualities and quantities and the properties of substances.
3. (4) The fourth mode of being is the one which is most perfect, namely, what has being in reality without any admixture of privation, and has firm and solid being inasmuch as it exists of itself. This is the mode of being which substances have. Now all the others are reduced to this as the primary and principal mode of being; for qualities and quantities are said to be inasmuch as they exist in substances; and motions and generations are said to be inasmuch as they are processes tending toward substance or toward some of the foregoing; and negations and privations are said to be inasmuch as they remove some part of the preceding three.

Note that being, purely and simply, is that which exists of itself, is a substance. it is something that has or is a nature in reality - man, angel, God, horse, iron, air, water, etc.

Further being is defined even in the dictionaries as that which is. It is always a noun or refers to a noun. " Walking " is a participle, a verb form of the verb walk.

Walking is a change, but it is not a being. The most you can say is that it tells what a being is doing.

So while change is something real in the world it is a being only in an anological and relative sense. It is confusing unless you explain that the term is being used anologically or relatively and not univocally. That is that it is being used in a less perfect way, to use Aristotle’s explanation.’

Another thing. Aristotle says that being is what the intellect know first. He says for example that it is what babies know first. That can hardly be said of change. And I remember, as a lad, I always identified substances first. The substance may have been doing something but I seldom gave thought to that fact.

Pax
Linus2nd

English translations tend to obscure certain subtlties of Latin and Greek, especially the distinction between esse (Gk. to einai) and ens (Gk. to on). Both of these come out to “being” in English, but their meanings are subtly different. Esse refers to the “action” of being (which takes on various levels in Aquinas), whereas ens refers to “something that is” (which applies best to substances, but also can be applied, to a greater or lesser degree, to the various kinds of accidents).

Grammatically esse (to einai) is an infinitive, whereas ens is a substantified participle.

Frankly, I find the translation from the English Dominican Province rather frustrating, because it often fails to make this distinction. (It also tends to translate esse as “existence,” which is a concept very much foreign to Aquinas’ thought.)

 

[Linusthe2nd]

English translations tend to obscure certain subtlties of Latin and Greek, especially the distinction between esse (Gk. to einai) and ens (Gk. to on). Both of these come out to “being” in English, but their meanings are subtly different. Esse refers to the “action” of being (which takes on various levels in Aquinas), whereas ens refers to “something that is” (which applies best to substances, but also can be applied, to a greater or lesser degree, to the various kinds of accidents).

Grammatically esse (to einai) is an infinitive, whereas ens is a substantified participle.

Frankly, I find the translation from the English Dominican Province rather frustrating, because it often fails to make this distinction. (It also tends to translate esse as “existence,” which is a concept very much foreign to Aquinas’ thought.)

I agree the the English Dominican translation of the S.T. is pretty loose, I would rather have a more literal translation. To me a " being " will always be a substance, a real thing. I may be wrong but I think that when Thomas is talking about accidents he seldom if ever refers to them as " beings. " The only instance I recall is when he follows Aristotle in revfering to thoughts, ideas, etc. as " beings of the mind. " I’m not hung up about it, I just think Aristotle over did it here, I think he should have handled it differently. Because if the first thing the intellect knows is Being, then it is pretty hard to see how that would cover " walking, " or changing of any kind. That makes no sense to me. No one will ever convince me that " walkin, " " twirling, " " carrying, " " throwing, " etc. are beings. I don’t even think you can say they are beings by analogy. How can a verb or a participle be compared to a substance? I don’ t see how it can be done.

Pax
Linus2nd.

 

[oldcelt]

I agree the the English Dominican translation of the S.T. is pretty loose, I would rather have a more literal translation. To me a " being " will always be a substance, a real thing. I may be wrong but I think that when Thomas is talking about accidents he seldom if ever refers to them as " beings. " The only instance I recall is when he follows Aristotle in revfering to thoughts, ideas, etc. as " beings of the mind. " I’m not hung up about it, I just think Aristotle over did it here, I think he should have handled it differently. Because if the first thing the intellect knows is Being, then it is pretty hard to see how that would cover " walking, " or changing of any kind. That makes no sense to me. No one will ever convince me that " walkin, " " twirling, " " carrying, " " throwing, " etc. are beings. I don’t even think you can say they are beings by analogy. How can a verb or a participle be compared to a substance? I don’ t see how it can be done.

Pax
Linus2nd.

A “being,” whatever you define that to be, is not needed. Just a force…simple motion…something as simple as the rupturing of a stationary single cell.

 

[lmelahn]

I agree the the English Dominican translation of the S.T. is pretty loose, I would rather have a more literal translation. To me a " being " will always be a substance, a real thing. I may be wrong but I think that when Thomas is talking about accidents he seldom if ever refers to them as " beings. " The only instance I recall is when he follows Aristotle in revfering to thoughts, ideas, etc. as " beings of the mind. " I’m not hung up about it, I just think Aristotle over did it here, I think he should have handled it differently. Because if the first thing the intellect knows is Being, then it is pretty hard to see how that would cover " walking, " or changing of any kind. That makes no sense to me. No one will ever convince me that " walkin, " " twirling, " " carrying, " " throwing, " etc. are beings. I don’t even think you can say they are beings by analogy. How can a verb or a participle be compared to a substance? I don’ t see how it can be done.

Pax
Linus2nd.

I think it would be better to say that being (ens) is most properly attributed to substances, but I think it is clear that Aquinas considers that ens can be attributed also to the accidents. Clearly, they have a less perfect being (esse) than substance does, but they “are” all the same.

Aquinas knew and fundamentally accepted Aristotle’s assertion that " ‘being’ (ens) has many different meanings, but all of them are in reference to one," which is substance. (See Metaphysics IV, 2, and also Aquinas’ commentary, which you referred to in your previous post.)

As you point out, Metaphysics* IV, 2, mixes in various manners of attributing being (ens) that are not really ens properly so-called, such as privations and negations. However, that is because Aristotle is simply making a short summary of his analysis in this passage. The in-depth analysis of being ens is found in Metaphyiscs V, where he divides ens into four fundamental modes of attribution:

• being (ens) as per accidens
• being as per se in three modes:
• being according to the “modes of predicating” (that is, the ten categories).
• being as true and false
• being as act and potency

This is a place where a lot of students of Aristotle often make a mistake (but Aquinas did not): being as per accidens does not mean the being proper to the predicamental accidents (the nine categories that are not “substance”). What Aristotle is referring to here is predication that is not bound by necessity. For example, if I say, “the elephant is trumpeting,” I am describing a contingent event, something that “happens to occur” (Latin accidit). (It is technically not perfectly per accidens, but it is sufficient as an illustration.)

As Aquinas says,

He [Aristotle] says, then, that while things are said to be both essentially per se

] and accidentally per accidens , it should be noted that this division of being is not the same as that whereby being is divided into substance and accident. This is clear from the fact that he later divides essential being into the ten predicaments , nine of which belong to the class of accident (In V Metaph., lc. 9, Marietti 885).

Per se attribution only occurs when whatever is predicated follows necessarily, or at least for the most part: for example, when I say, “elephants are capable of trumpeting” (which would be an example of the first kind of ens per se).

Aristotle argues that you can only make a science (episteme) using per se predication: no zoologist is interested in the fact that this particular elephant is trumpeting, except insofar as it helps him to establish that elephants in general trumpet.

The important thing to note is that the first type of ens per se)—which turns out to be the most important one, at least for metaphysics—includes all ten of the categories. To be sure, the accidents, so to speak, contain less being (esse) than substances do, but they possess it all the same. (Aquinas specifies that it is better to say that accidents “are in” a substance, than that they simply “are”—in his technical vocabulary, substances are beings “simpliciter,” or without qualification; whereas accidents are beings “secundum quid,” or with qualifications.)

However, unless being (ens) can be attributed to the accidents, it is very difficult to understand Aquinas’ doctrines regarding the transcendentals, the universal “properties” of being (ens).

Consider the good, which is “convertible” with being (ens); the funny thing is, “good” is predicated without qualification (simpliciter) of the accidents, and only with qualifications (secundum quid) of substance! (That is what Aquinas is getting at in I, q. 5, a.1, ad 1.)*

 

[Linusthe2nd]

Hi Linus,
It is not possible to understand the philosophy and metaphysics of St Thomas or Aristotle or even to understand reality if we think being only means substance. We would be leaving out 9/10ths of reality. As I said before, Aristotle divides being into the ten predicaments, namely, substance and accidents. The ten categories are kinds of being. Being itself is in all the categories and transcends the categories because being itself is not a genus. As far as the ten categories go, being is primarily said of substance as you say. However, this does not mean that the accidents are not real or that they do not have existence or that they are not beings. Substance signifies that which exist of itself and which substands or underlies the accidents. Accidents only have existence in a substance and because of the substance. They are beings in a being.
If it is said, Socrates is white. White is something that has real existence in Socrates. It is an accidental being in Socrates.
If you are referring being of the mind to the intellectual power in human beings, this power is something real and is a being, for this power exists in the soul. It is by this power that we are able to think and reason. It is also by this power that we are distinguished from other animals, for human beings are called, rational animals. Aquinas, however, distinguishes the powers of the soul from its essence. The powers of the soul are accidents of the soul. They are called proper or inseperable accidents. A human being cannot be conceived or even exist without, for example, the intellectual power, as well as the other powers of the soul as long as a person exist at least in the body.

I know you are repeating what Aristotle taught and what Thomas also held. But I disagree, that’s all. I have no problem with the categories of substance and accidents, except for the categories of local motion and relations. So when I am talking about accidents I am not thinking of beings, I am thinking of accidents.

I will add that there are others who have questioned Aristotle’s categories. I never looked into them since I have already decided to handle A’s categories my own way. I avoid the issue by identifying the kind of accident I am speaking of.

Pax
Linus2nd

 

[lmelahn]

I know you are repeating what Aristotle taught and what Thomas also held. But I disagree, that’s all. I have no problem with the categories of substance and accidents, except for the categories of local motion and relations. So when I am talking about accidents I am not thinking of beings, I am thinking of accidents.

I will add that there are others who have questioned Aristotle’s categories. I never looked into them since I have already decided to handle A’s categories my own way. I avoid the issue by identifying the kind of accident I am speaking of.

Pax
Linus2nd

I am just trying to understand you here.

If accidents are not beings, what permits us to say, for example, “the rose is red”?

Aquinas would answer (and I agree with him ) that both the rose and the redness “are.” They differ, however, in their manner of being (modus entis): the rose subsists and the redness inheres the rose.

Isn’t that enough of a distinction to say what you want?

 

[Linusthe2nd]

I think it would be better to say that being (ens) is most properly attributed to substances, but I think it is clear that Aquinas considers that ens can be attributed also to the accidents. Clearly, they have a less perfect being (esse) than substance does, but they “are” all the same.

Aquinas knew and fundamentally accepted Aristotle’s assertion that " ‘being’ (ens) has many different meanings, but all of them are in reference to one," which is substance. (See Metaphysics IV, 2, and also Aquinas’ commentary, which you referred to in your previous post.)

As you point out, Metaphysics** IV, 2, mixes in various manners of attributing being (ens) that are not really ens properly so-called, such as privations and negations. However, that is because Aristotle is simply making a short summary of his analysis in this passage. The in-depth analysis of being ens is found in Metaphyiscs V, where he divides ens into four fundamental modes of attribution:

• being (ens) as per accidens
• being as per se in three modes:
• being according to the “modes of predicating” (that is, the ten categories).
• being as true and false
• being as act and potency

This is a place where a lot of students of Aristotle often make a mistake (but Aquinas did not): being as per accidens does not mean the being proper to the predicamental accidents (the nine categories that are not “substance”). What Aristotle is referring to here is predication that is not bound by necessity. For example, if I say, “the elephant is trumpeting,” I am describing a contingent event, something that “happens to occur” (Latin accidit). (It is technically not perfectly per accidens, but it is sufficient as an illustration.)

As Aquinas says,

Per se attribution only occurs when whatever is predicated follows necessarily, or at least for the most part: for example, when I say, “elephants are capable of trumpeting” (which would be an example of the first kind of ens per se).

Aristotle argues that you can only make a science (episteme) using per se predication: no zoologist is interested in the fact that this particular elephant is trumpeting, except insofar as it helps him to establish that elephants in general trumpet.

The important thing to note is that the first type of ens per se)—which turns out to be the most important one, at least for metaphysics—includes all ten of the categories. To be sure, the accidents, so to speak, contain less being (esse) than substances do, but they possess it all the same. (Aquinas specifies that it is better to say that accidents “are in” a substance, than that they simply “are”—in his technical vocabulary, substances are beings “simpliciter,” or without qualification; whereas accidents are beings “secundum quid,” or with qualifications.)

However, unless being (ens) can be attributed to the accidents, it is very difficult to understand Aquinas’ doctrines regarding the transcendentals, the universal “properties” of being (ens).

Consider the good, which is “convertible” with being (ens); the funny thing is, “good” is predicated without qualification (simpliciter) of the accidents, and only with qualifications (secundum quid) of substance! (That is what Aquinas is getting at in I, q. 5, a.1, ad 1.)

I’ll have to reread Meta., part V again. May be a little over my pay grade .

I have no problem with the transcendentals because we know that in God all attributes are one with his nature/substance/being.

Pax
Linus2nd