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What word these Arabian philosophers used that we normally find translated as existence, I don’t know, it may have been something like esse.
One problem is that that Arabic philosophers wrote in Arabic, and I have no idea what the word for “being” is in Arabic
. In all seriousness, though, the translation that Aquinas had of Avicenna used the term
esse, although for Avicenna
esse had a meaning closer to our “essence.”
In the Merriam Webster dictionary I’m looking at under the word “exist,” they define this word mainly as to have being or real being This, I think, is similar to “ens” which involves an essence that has the act of being or esse. This is the being of a creature but not God who doesn’t have being but is being or esse.
In common usage, “to exist” has, for most purposes, become synonymous to “to be,” although it leaves out the so-called “logical” uses of “to be.”
You mention above, that in english ‘existence’ has only a tiny sliver of the meaing “being” does. I’m wondering if your referring to esse here and not ens.
That’s right.
I’m also wondering if in today’s usage of the verb “exist” if we said “to exist” and thought of it as an act for it is a verb, and then said the act of existing, if this would be equivalent or somewhat equivalent to esse, the act of being?
What I was getting at is that “to be” can used for a whole slew of things: from “I am tired,” to “a hobbit is not an elf,” to “the square of the hypotenuse is equal to the sum of the square of the legs,” to “I am Who Am.” “To exist” can practically only be used for the very last one (and, in that sentence, only the “Who Am,” not the “I am”).
If to exist or existence means the fact of being, then this obviously is not the act of being.
Right, at least in technical, philosophical language. Most Western philosophers, from Henry of Ghent right up to Kant, have used the term to mean “fact of being.” A few (Cajetan and his followers) equated
existentia with Thomas’
actus essendi, but I think they are quite mistaken in this.
Can to exist mean the act of existing though? …]
It could, if we define it that way. I am just saying that, in fact, philosophers have used “existence” to mean the “fact of being.” And it is still used that way in contemporary philosophy. It is, if you like, a very mathematical view of being: either something “is” (exists) or it “is not” (does not exist), and there is nothing more to say, no room for degrees of being.
Also,
esse in Thomas does not only mean the act of being (
actus essendi) but also any of its manifestations: there is what he calls
esse substantiale and
esse accidentale, which are actually participations in the act of being.
Esse is very much an analogical term in Thomas. Not so
existentia in Cajetan or Scotus.
Thomas hardly uses the term
existentia or the verb
exsisto. If you do a word search, I think you come up with five or six counts. On the other had,
esse is everywhere.
For it appears to me that everthing emerges from esse and not the other way around. It is the first act for if anything acts it must first be.
“First act” is also an analogical term, and you have to see what Thomas is referring to in context. “First act” basically means any act from which another, more contingent act is communicated. For example, substance, together with its “proper” accidents and habits, is frequently referred to as “first act,” and the concrete actions of that substance are “second act.” So, the
actus essendi is the “most first” act (if I can use that expression).
This brings up another question, though being is the most universal concept we have, it applies to everything that is, it appears to me that St Thomas may be reducing ens (being) to esse (is). For esse is the root of ens just like be is the root of being.
Well, it depends. In the logical order, St. Thomas would probably say that the notion of
ens is prior to the notion of
esse, since
ens is the very first notion that the intellect has access to. However, you are right, in the order of reality, we call something
ens inasmuch as it “is” (=has
esse).
When St Thomas talks about God’s being, I believe he generally except in a few instances just uses esse. The being of creatures is ens.
Yes, although when he says
ens he means it as a substantified participle: something that is,
id quod est. So creatures are
ens and they have
esse. The point, for Thomas, is that
esse is a metaphysical principle, a perfection.
Being (ens) is composite and involves a subject with the act of being. …] St Thomas says that God’s essence and esse are identical, or rather, God’s essence is esse. I think Avicenna thought that God doesn’t even have an essence but I don’t think St Thomas went quite this far. Although St Thomas does say God is IPSUM ESSE SUBSISTENS.
Thomas says that God has an essence (or rather, is His Essence), and that the Essence is His
Esse. In fact, the phrase that Thomas prefers is that God is
Esse per essentiam (whereas creatures possess
esse per participationem).
I guess I’m hung up on thinking that being and existing are like the same (this could be due to how in the present day we use the terms or think about them) …]
As I said, in common parlance, equating “being” and “existence” is probably mostly OK. But in philosophy, “existence” takes on a particular meaning which is, in my opinion, very foreign to St. Thomas’ actual thought.
